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Abstract 
The twenty-first century has witnessed a significant increase in terrorist activities across the 
world, especially after the attacks on New York and Washington on September 11 2001. The 
phenomenon, of international terrorism, represented a huge challenge to states and civil 
societies. The governments’ reactions were swift and strong, primarily in the enactment of 
anti-terrorism laws and the strengthening of the cooperation in security issues. However, 
despite a general consensus as regards the necessity to legislate in the face of the growing 
threat of terrorism, the provisions, of the new laws, were criticised heavily by the media; 
human rights; and civil liberties organisations; and the public in general. The main grievance 
was tension between the aim of ensuring security and concerns about reducing civil liberties. 
In view of their exceptional role in society, the independent media, became one of the 
indirect victims of the new legislation, with severe restrictions imposed on journalists. This 
thesis examined the various legislative approaches. The conclusion is that, without properly 
addressing security concerns, the new laws affected media organisations unduly.    
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Chapter One 
Introduction 
 
1.1 Background: 
In modern, open and democratic societies, and, in a period of relative peace and economic 
stability, governments do not feel the need to restrict the civil liberties of their citizens by 
imposing drastic laws or interfering too much in the people’s normal lives. Therefore, in 
such circumstances, the size, of the challenge, is more or less controllable and manageable. 
However, in the case of conflicting circumstances (war; economic crisis; terrorism and so 
on), things are dealt with in a completely different way. In fact, it is during a period of crisis 
that the worth of a government is confirmed or disproved.   
There is no doubt that the phenomenon of terrorism represents a huge challenge to 
authorities, and that the value, of executive powers, will be measured eventually according 
to the responses to that challenge and the efficiencies of the measures taken. Those, who 
choose terrorism to achieve political gains and draw public attention to their demands, have 
realised, for a long time, that their actions  would be fruitless without the presence of the 
media to report their deeds. Accordingly, they understood quickly how essential the media 
was, and included it, in their strategies, in order to amplify and convey their message to 
world audiences.   
For their part, the media, for various reasons, find themselves in a very difficult situation. 
On the one hand, they consider themselves committed to informing the public about what is 
happening around them, good or bad.  On the other hand, they are under the simultaneous 
threat and scrutiny by terrorist organisations and authorities. Terrorists can threaten their 
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lives, whilst law enforcers can stop them; search them; confiscate their documents or 
cameras; arrest them; harass them; and restrict their freedom of movement.   
The key date, which changed significantly the lives, of most citizens in the world, was  
September 11 2001 when terrorists attacked the symbols of the supremacy of the only 
superpower left after the fall of the Soviet Union, namely, the United States of America 
(USA). These exceptional events prompted international condemnation and calls for 
appropriate measures to prevent similar tragedies in the future. Amongst the first measures, 
which were taken, was the enactment of anti-terrorism laws in many countries. The United 
Kingdom (UK), which had particular past experience with terrorism, was amongst the first 
countries to issue an anti-terrorism legislation. 
This study considers the historical background of terrorism; the potential incentives to 
making it the main challenge of modernity; the innumerable definitions of the concept 
Terrorism; and the new laws made to face the threat of terrorism in the USA, the UK and 
the European Union (EU).  This study examines also the potential effects which the new 
British laws had on human rights generally, and on the media freedom in particular, 
especially its capacity to investigate and report, to the public, on matters related to terrorism. 
Several cases are identified and the concerns of human rights and media organisations 
reported. There follows a conclusion which specifies the study’s contribution to knowledge, 
and its limitations and recommendations.  Finally, this research explores the lessons, of the 
UK experience, in terms of the effects, of anti-terrorism laws and their enforcement, may 
have  on other democracies faced with similar threats and sustained campaigns of violence. 
 
 
1.2 Research Questions:  
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The study tried to answer the following questions: 
 What are anti-terrorism laws? 
 What are the emergent challenges from the enactment of the anti-terrorism laws 
particularly in the United Kingdom?           
 What are the effects of antiterrorism laws on the media? 
 What are the effects of anti-terrorism laws on journalists in particular? 
 
1.3 Statement of Purpose: 
This study aimed to examine the laws, introduced after September 11 2001, in order to shed 
light on their impact on the media and the civil liberties which were abridged in different 
areas of life in the UK. As a major step to understanding and analyzing the discourse around 
terrorism today as well as discussing the definition and typology of terrorism in different 
parts of the world, it tackled the different historical eras of the Cold War; Post-Cold War; 
and the aftermath of September 11 2001. The study highlighted, also, the obstacles, 
encountered by the mass media, and  the challenges to some fundamental rights, e.g. freedom 
of expression; privacy; data protection; freedom from surveillance; the right to a fair, public 
trial; and the right not to be subjected to torture and inhuman treatment. The study advocated 
that there ought to be a much wider discussion of the questions regarding the scale of terrorist 
threats and the existing evidence about them. 
 
1.4 Methodology: 
This was mainly a library-based research project. The main sources were collected from the 
libraries of the Universities of Stirling; Glasgow Caledonian; Glasgow and the National 
Library of Scotland. In addition, the researcher scrutinised sources from the Australian 
National University and the McGill University. As regards the part concerned with the 
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critical analysis of the topic, the researcher relied on official documents; statements; books; 
and journals, as well as on reports from the United Nations (UN); the European Commission 
on Human Rights (ECHR); a British institution, named Liberty, dedicated to Human Rights; 
international NGOs such as Reporters Without Borders; the International Federation of 
Journalists (IFJ); Amnesty International; and Human Rights Watch. It is essential, also, to 
mention the importance, for this research, of internet sources; on-line research; UN and 
Western law websites. The documents, relative to the UK terrorism laws, were drawn from 
the official governmental websites. The work was based, also, on the data obtained from 
attendance at several conferences on the issue of terrorism and civil liberties.  The critical 
analysis, of the issues raised in the thesis, was carried out by relying on books; journal 
articles; and official documents as well as reports of international organisations and research 
centres. 
 
1.5 Contribution to knowledge:  
 This thesis’ distinctive character consists of presenting an in-depth analysis of the effect of 
Anti-terrorism Laws on media. However, the other contributions to knowledge were: 
 The researcher is an Arab from Libya - an area believed to be in political crisis and 
a haven for terrorism. This is the first study, of this issue, by a researcher with this 
background. This was very important since the debate on how terrorism might be 
counteracted whilst simultaneously maintaining human rights and a free media, was 
extremely vital for that area.    
 This study contributes to knowledge by highlighting the importance of anti-terrorism 
laws and the maintenance of human rights in general and freedom of the media in 
particular.  
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 The study is amongst very few which have linked the anti-terrorism laws to the 
freedom of media; this is unlike many other studies which discussed generally the 
laws in relation to human rights. 
 Along with other efforts, the study draws the legislators’ attention to the concerns of 
the media personnel.  
 The study observed that the disturbed regions represented always an origin for 
terrorism. 
1.6 General Structure of the Thesis: 
The thesis comprises of the following six chapters. 
The first chapter is the introduction. 
The second chapter deals with the historical background of terrorism and the emergence of 
antiterrorism laws. It links the changes, in the nature of terrorism, to different historical eras, 
by discussing the historical background of terrorism and distinguishes between domestic and 
international terrorism. The chapter highlights, also, the main changes which have taken 
place in the nature of terrorism, such as the involvement of states in the acts of terrorism.  
The third chapter examines the different definitions and types of media; and how the media 
has developed since the dawn of history. It highlights, also, the role played by international 
media organisations. It discusses the relationship between the media and antiterrorism with 
particular emphasis on the laws which aim to counteract terrorism. The chapter tries to cover 
the debated relationship between the media and antiterrorism laws and how, generally, the 
antiterrorism laws, enforced after 9/11, affected the media.  
 
The fourth chapter focuses on the terrorism laws in the UK; the EU; and the USA and their 
effects on journalists.  The researcher reviewed the UK’s numerous pieces of anti-terrorism 
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legislation with a particular focus on the provisions which presented a challenge to civil 
liberties and freedom of reporting. The USA Patriot Act and National Security Act were 
examined, also, from that standpoint,  and particular instances of negative consequences 
were highlighted. In addition, several European case studies from Europe are presented. The 
purpose of addressing these issues was to assess, to what extent, the legislation had  effected 
freedom of information.  The countries were not selected at random but for specific reasons, 
such as the fact that their legislation raised concerns amongst Human Rights and Civil 
liberties organizations; ethnic minority groups; religious entities; and representatives of 
worldwide media. The other incentive, for addressing legislation in the USA; the UK; and 
certain EU states, was that these countries amended their legislation very quickly in the light 
of September 11, and took the lead in dealing with terrorism.  
 
The fifth chapter discusses the relationship between anti-terrorism laws and the media, 
comparing British law with that of European and American law. The chapter covers, also, 
the reactions, of governments and international organisations, to these issues.  Furthermore, 
it discusses the co-operation between the UK; members of the European Union; and the 
United States of America in counteracting terror. This chapter discusses particular cases of 
media personnel who claimed to have been affected by anti-terrorism laws. Finally it reviews 
British anti-terrorism laws in light of the concerns raised by human right activists.  
 
The sixth chapter features the conclusions; provides an overview of the thesis; its 
contribution; limitations; and recommendations. 
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Chapter Two 
Historical Background and Definitions of Terrorism  
 
2.1 Introduction  
This chapter focuses on the historical background of terrorism and traces the emergence of 
anti-terrorism laws. Accordingly, it discusses both the historical background and the various 
definitions of terrorism. Additionally, it considers the main incentives for defining terrorism; 
and distinguishes between international terrorism and domestic terrorism. 
 
2.2 Historical Background 
The historical background, of this study, is divided into three pre-determined phases. The 
first deals with the aftermath of the Second World War and is the study’s starting point. This 
particular phase was characterised by what is known in history as the ‘Cold War’ era. It 
ended with the collapse of the Soviet Union and, in 1989, the fall of the Berlin Wall.  The 
second phase, known as the post-cold War phase, is relatively significant and witnessed the 
supremacy of the United States of America, with the acknowledged hegemonic 
consequences for the rest of the world,1 as highlighted by Ashcar.2  The third phase started 
with the tragic events, of September 11 2001, which provoked worldwide reactions.  These 
included tough legislation which, as a response to terrorism and whether or not intentionally, 
limited severely the work of the media. 
                                                          
1 See Hess and M. Kalb (eds), ‘The media and the war on the terrorism’. Brookings Institution, Washington, 
2003, p.1. 
2 G. Achcar, ‘Seven theses on the current period, the war, and the anti-war movement’, in Solidarity Working 
Paper: Iraq and Beyond, October 2004. Retrieved on 2March 2011, http://www.solidarity-
us.org/pdfs/IraqAndBeyond.pdf. Ashcar (2004) argued that: The era of US hyper power was inaugurated by 
the first Bush administration's war against Iraq in January-February 1991, the year of the USSR's final collapse. 
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Depending on the kind of media organisations involved and their relationship with the 
executive powers, the effects, of the new legislation, were felt differently.  However, with 
the passing of time, real and genuine concerns appeared when, due to the antiterrorism laws 
passed in most countries, several media organisations found themselves restricted in 
conducting their work.  This put journalists; reporters; photographers; and all media 
professionals at risk of either arrest or legal pursuit.3 The following section discusses, in 
more detail, the three phases mentioned previously.  
 
2.2.1 Post Second World War Phase (1945 -1989) 
After World War II, the world became effectively divided in two blocs, with western liberal 
democracies led by the United States of America (USA) on one side, and the socialist East, 
under the leadership of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), on the other. During 
that period, which lasted nearly half a century, the communications world was subject, also, 
to the two dominant materialistic ideologies, namely, capitalism; and communism. 
Accordingly, the media, an essential instrument for the promotion of ideologies, was either 
part of the socialist camp (or communist, for many thinkers, the two terms are often 
interchangeable) or acting as its counterpart, and representing the “free world” in the West.  
In socialist countries, dissident voices or overt criticisms were unheard because of the 
totalitarian nature of the ruling regimes. In the so-called ‘free world’ and, despite the 
prevailing ideology of liberal democracy, it was possible, nevertheless, to have an alternative 
media.4  
                                                          
3 D. Kellner, The Media In and After 9/11, International Journal of Communication, 2007, 1: 123-142. 
4 S. Livingstone, ‘On the Continuing Problem of Media Effects' in J. Curran and M. Gurevitch (eds), Mass 
Media and Society, London: Arnold, 1996, pp. 305-24. 
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The two conflicting ideologies created a paradigm: the Cold War period. Yet, despite 
reflecting the general feeling and understanding of most people around the world, such a 
perspective,  was not shared by political scientists such as Huntington; Kuhn; and James. 
For Huntington, who relied heavily on the theories of James and Kuhn, ideas, like the Cold 
War, were only an evocation of “simplified pictures of reality called concepts, theories, 
models, and paradigms”.5  It was through these intellectual constructs that it was possible to 
prevent confusion and chaos. 
 
For Kuhn, the development of science was not evolutionary but consisted of a series of 
“peaceful interludes punctuated by intellectually violent revolutions,”6 and, in those 
revolutions, “one conceptual world view is replaced by another.”7 The paradigm shift 
resulted from intellectual encounters and debates and scientists defending the paradigm in 
crisis, whilst their counterparts highlighted the unavoidable emergence of a new paradigm. 
Therefore, a paradigm revolution occurred following battles regarding scientific theories. By 
effacing the precedent paradigm completely, the new paradigm relegated it to history.  
Kuonqui considered that the creation, of a new theory, did not mean necessarily that the 
                                                          
5 See S. P. Huntington, ‘If Not Civilizations, What? Samuel Huntington Responds to His Critics’, Foreign 
Affairs. November/December 1993. available online at: 
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/49414/samuel-p-huntington/if-not-civilizations-what-samuel-
huntington-responds-to-his-crit  
  
6 Kuhn stated that “The transition from a paradigm in crisis to a new one from which a new tradition of normal 
science can emerge is far from a cumulative process, one achieved by an articulation or extension of the old 
paradigm. Rather it is a reconstruction of the field from new fundamentals, a reconstruction that changes some 
of the field's most elementary theoretical generalizations as well as many of its paradigm methods and 
applications. During the transition period there will be a large but never complete overlap between the problems 
that can be solved by the old and by the new paradigm. But there will also be a decisive difference in the modes 
of solution. When the transition is complete, the profession will have changed its view of the field, its methods, 
and its goals. SeeT.S. Kuhn.  The Structure of Scientific Revolutions 84-5 
 
7 N.Wade, ‘Thomas S. Kuhn: Revolutionary Theorist of Science’, Science, 1977, 197, 143-145 
http://europepmc.org/abstract/MED/17834074/reload=0;jsessionid=0vWYjcN7xJpJYm3EoosG.2.  
 
10                                   Chapter Two: Historical Background and Definitions of Terrorism 
 
 
intention, behind it, was a genuine quest for truth, but “rather a contestation between 
scientists and power struggles over whose views shall champion over the others. Paradigms 
constitute entire worldviews such that every empirical reality and theoretical construct is re-
read and re-interpreted in the new paradigm.”8 
  
 The paradigm’s ‘universality’ which, once adopted, remained at the forefront, was 
introduced; led; and ‘imposed’ on the public by the media9 and, consequently, with the 
passage of time, obtained a sort of legitimacy.  
 
To sum up the ‘Cold War’ era, it could be said that, in the aftermath of World War II, the 
victors, under the USA’s leadership on the one hand, and Russia on the other, united their 
efforts.  At that time, the threat, which they had to confront and defeat, was represented by 
the challenges of Nazism and Fascism. However, later on, the predominance, of opposed 
ideological conceptions (deep economic divergence in particular) on the future of modern 
societies, induced the new superpowers (i.e. the USA and the Soviet Union) to divide the 
world10 into two distinct groupings; the capitalist, on the one hand and the communist on the 
other. In reality, direct confrontation, between the two superpowers, never occurred. It was 
at the level of the satellite countries, of these two poles, that the real ‘battlefield’ for the two 
ideologies11 took place.  
 
                                                          
8 See C. Kuonqui, Is Human Development a New Paradigm for Development? Capabilities Approach, 
Neoliberalism and Paradigm Shifts, (Paper presented at the August 2006 international conference “Freedom 
and Justice” of the Human Development and Capability Association HDCA), (p.9), 2006, Groningen, 
Netherlands, available online at, http://www.capabilityapproach.com/pubs//6_3_Kuonqui.pdf. 
 
9 The prominent role of the media, as a vehicle for introducing new concepts, was to be underlined here. 
10 According to the circumstances, the division, of the world, was achieved either in a coercive or a seductive 
manner. 
11 What is meant is that the two superpowers never clashed directly but through ‘proxies’. For example,  Italy 
after 1945, Berlin 1960s’, Korea 1950s’, Cuban Missile Crisis 1963, Vietnam 1960’s and 1970’s, Prague crisis 
1956, Angola, Poland 1980s’, Afghanistan 1979, and all movements of independence from colonialism. 
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The Soviet Union’s fall, as a superpower, put an end to the Cold War era. The obsolete 
paradigm was supplanted by the new paradigm of the ‘war on terror’; this, with all its various 
interpretations and derivatives, became the modus vivendi of the new era.12  In the context 
of the 9/11 events, it was clear that the USA, the only remaining undoubted superpower, 
would react vigorously and launch the “war on terror”. The paradigm was ready to be used 
and the opinions, of cautious political analysts, were ignored. Policymakers, instead of 
dealing with the challenge as an appalling crime, which needed proper investigation and 
legal process to apprehend those responsible, preferred to follow another path. They rushed 
towards a major military response, a “war on terror”, which, a decade later, was seen as 
deeply counter-productive.13 
Before the adoption of this particular paradigm, political strategists suggested what might be 
called in  Kuhn’s terms a ‘pre-paradigm’14; this viewed Islam as the “Green Threat”,15 in 
opposition to the obsolete “Red Threat”16 represented by the communist bloc until 1989. It 
is essential to observe that the paradigm, in question, was devised by a certain category of 
thinkers. It did not appear naturally or suddenly by magic.17     
                                                          
12 See D. J. Kilcullen, ‘New Paradigms for 21st-Century Conflict’, Foreign Policy Agenda, eJournal, May 
2007, Volume 12, number 5, pp39-50, available online at 
http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/state/kilcullen_21c_conflict_may07.pdf  
See also D. S. Cohen, The War on Terrorism 2001, online article available online at: 
www.academia.edu/1263787/The_War_on_Terrorism. With these words, President Bush established a 
paradigm for the post-Cold War struggle between the United States of America and state-sponsored 
worldwide terrorism. 
13 P. Rogers, ‘A War Gone Badly Wrong – The War on Terror Ten Years on’, ORG International Security 
Monthly Briefing – August-September 2011. 
14 Kuhn enounced, in 1962, his theory of “scientific revolutions”; this was a theory divided into six stages. The 
Pre-paradigm stage represented the initial phase or phase 0, where several schools of thought competed whilst 
there  was not a system where principles  were shared. The other phases  were Phase 1, which was  the 
Acceptation of the paradigm, Phase 2  was normal science; Phase 3 represented the appearance of anomalies; 
Phase 4  was called crisis of the paradigm; and, finally, Phase 5 was the scientific revolution.  See T.S. Kuhn, 
‘The Structure of Scientific Revolutions’, International Cyclopaedia of Unified Science, 1970, Vol. 2, No. 2, 
p.47, http://insitu.lri.fr/~mbl/Stanford/CS477/papers/Kuhn-SSR-2ndEd.pdf . 
15 The ‘Green Threat’ was considered   to be the new paradigm following the fall of the Soviet Union. 
16 The ‘Red Threat’ referred to the Communist world during the Cold war. 
17 Ibid 
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2.2.2 The Post-Cold War Phase (1989-2001) 
The post-Cold War witnessed a nation’s monopoly, of world leadership, by virtue of its 
military; political; and economic strength. Following the collapse of the Eastern bloc and the 
state of euphoria and victory felt in the West, there was, initially, a kind of misunderstanding 
and misinterpretation of the situation. Consequently, the domination of liberal democracies; 
free markets; and capitalism misled many observers, and the judgment made (i.e. the 
supposed final success of the capitalist model) might have been expressed too hastily. Yet, 
in 1989, with the demise of the Soviet Union bloc, represented by the symbolic fall of the 
Berlin Wall, the USA and its allies or “satellites”18 dominated effectively the bipolar 
ideological worlds. 
 
In circumstances such as the ones which witnessed the end of an era (i.e. the collapse of the 
USSR) it was natural and understandable for the Soviet Union’s adversaries to overreact and 
express a rather euphoric attitude. Unfortunately, the collective euphoria, of the time, 
influenced, also, several western scholars such as Lewis;19 Pipes;20 Huntington;21 
                                                          
18 M. Yılmaz, ‘Resolving Internal Conflicts in the Post-Cold War Era: Is Peacekeeping Enough?’ Journal of 
Economic and Social Research, 8(2), pp. 27-42. 
19 B. Lewis, British historian, was, in fact, the originator of the ‘clash of civilisations’ thesis. He   made the 
following statement in 1957 at John Hopkins University: ‘we shall be better able to understand this situation if 
we view the present discontents of the Middle East not as a conflict between states or nations, but as a clash of 
civilisations’  
20  R. Pipes was a scholar from Harvard,  a historian, of the Soviet system, whilst ideologically opposed to it. 
He was, also, adviser to President Reagan. In March 1981, he made this statement to Reuters: "Soviet leaders 
would have to choose between peacefully changing their Communist system in the direction, followed by the 
West, or going to war. There is no other alternative and it could go either way… Détente is dead." 
21 See S. P. Huntington, ‘The Clash of Civilisations?’ Foreign Affairs; 1993;72, 3. Huntington stated that ‘in 
future serious external threats to American could arise from China, Russia, Islam or some combination of 
hostile states.’  
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Fukuyama;22 and Kramer23, who thought that the time was ripe for a new representation and 
charting of the world. In their work, Dahms et al. quoted Vygotsky, a Russian educational 
scholar, who considered "intellectual abilities as being much more specific to the culture in 
which the child was reared." 24 Accordingly, it can be said, to a certain extent, that the 
perceptions, of the thinkers reviewed previously, viewed were dictated or influenced rather 
by the philosophical culture in which they believed profoundly as a result of their educational 
and intellectual environment.  
 
The twenty-first century cannot be severed from its predecessor, either in terms of dramatic 
events, such as the two World Wars or in terms of human achievements in science and 
technology and advancement of human well-being. The ‘discontinuity’ or shift, identified 
by a part of academia, was challenged, nevertheless, by others who argued that the line drawn 
did not represent faithfully the reality on the ground. In this study, the researcher made an 
effort to try to understand the new challenges, encountered by media organisations, which 
evolved following the path of the technology.25 
 
                                                          
22 Fukuyama, who was one of Huntington students, affirmed, in an article which was developed later into a 
book, a theory, according to which  there was  a ‘single sustainable model for national success’ and that it was 
the ‘end of mankind’s ideological evolution and ‘ the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final 
form of human government’. See F. Fukuyama, ‘The End of History’,  The National Interest ,Summer 1989.   
23 M. Kramer was a  Middle East historian who directed the Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern Studies. 
He supported the promotion of bill HR 3077; this was an initiative to provide closer Congress control over 
Middle Eastern Studies departments in the United States of America.  
24 See G. K. Clabaugh, EdD, ‘The Educational Theory of Lev Vygotsky: an analysis’, p.2, article available 
online at:  www.aiz.vic.edu.au/.../Article-The-Educational-Theory-of-Lev-Vygo 
25 L. Marlow, Post-war, Journalists Ask Themselves Hard Questions: The Vantage Points from which this War 
Was Witnessed Give Future Historians a Wealth of Material’, The Irish Times, 8 Nov 2003. 
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For instance, Mahajan,26 offering a harsh criticism of the United States of America’s drive 
to war in the twenty-first century, believed that, at this particular time in history, the US 
administration showed an explicit contempt for the United Nations. Other influential 
thinkers and political activists shared this opinion.27 A year after the September 11 2001 
tragedy, President Bush, when addressing the General Assembly of the most important world 
organisation (the United Nations), was quite unambiguous when he declared bluntly: “The 
United Nations must do what we say or it risks becoming irrelevant”.28 
 
In that very critical period in history, it was decided that the world was entering the ‘age of 
terror’ and, consequently, all measures had to be taken to annihilate the new threat. This was 
despite the negative effects deriving from the diverse measures taken in the fields of security; 
legislation; executive action; and so on. Consequently, freedom of information and speech 
became victims of drastic laws which were rushed in specific and extraordinary 
circumstances. What became to be  universally known as 'the war against terror' did affect 
the media to a certain extent throughout the world, especially when one considers the 
restrictions  which journalists; photographers; and other media professionals   were subjected 
to as a result of the enforcement of significant numbers of severe laws on national security 
issues.  
 
Emulating Western liberal democracies, most countries, in the world, , implemented laws 
intended to deal with terrorism. Whether entitled 'anti-terrorism' laws; emergency laws; 
                                                          
26 R. Mahajan, Full Spectrum Dominance, US Power in Iraq and Beyond, Seven Stories Press, New York. 
2003. P. 24 
27 (G. Ashcar,; N. Chomsky,; Prof. F. Boyle; L. Blum,; D. Miller,; T.Ali; and so on).   
28 During his presentation to the General Assembly on September 12, 2002, US President, G.W.Bush, made 
this statement , supporting the argument that war was necessary to enforce international law and, making the 
U.N. "relevant," according to the US norms was high on the justifications. 
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special laws; counterterrorism laws; or branded as 'patriotic' (e.g. the US Patriot Act) 29, or 
put forward as  amendments to existing criminal codes, all, of them, had (and still have to 
some degree) an impact on freedom of speech generally and on the media in particular. The 
dominance of international affairs and the interdependence between politics and law 
produced new forms of challenges to media organisations in all their forms, especially 
because, as Kellner observed, “the media are key instruments of political power, constituting 
a terrain upon which political battles are fought and providing instruments for political 
manipulation and domination.” 30 
 
2.2.3 Post September 11 2001 Events 
Most countries and in particular those targeted directly by terrorist actions have had to take 
relevant measures to face this form of threat. Nevertheless, there are still divergences at the 
level of the international legal community regarding what kind of behaviour can be 
considered as an act of terrorism. The existing differences prevent the adoption of an 
international convention on terrorism which includes a legally binding and comprehensive 
definition of terrorism. 
 
The UN Security Council UNSC) did consider the inclusion of violent actions perpetrated 
by either single persons or groups as terrorism, regardless of whether they were sponsored 
by states. The difficulty, for the UNSC, was to define clearly what constituted a terrorist 
                                                          
29 The USA Patriot Act stands for Uniting (and) Strengthening America (by) Providing Appropriate Tools 
Required (to) Intercept (and) Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001. In the 107th Congress, the USA PatriotAct, 
enacted in October 2001 (P.L.107-56), contained provisions related to terrorism. It gave law enforcement 
increased authority to investigate suspected terrorists, including surveillance procedures such as roving 
wiretaps; it provided for strengthened controls on money laundering and financing of terrorism; it improved 
measures for strengthening of defenses along the U.S. northern border, believed to be an important conduit for 
terrorists; and it authorized disclosure of foreign intelligence information obtained in criminal investigations 
to intelligence and national security officials. 
30  See D. Kellner, ‘Media Industries and Media/Cultural Studies: An Articulation’ in J. Holt and A. Perren, 
Media Industries: History, Theory, and Method, p.2, 2007, Wiley-Blackwell, available online at: 
http://pages.gseis.ucla.edu/faculty/kellner/essays/2009_Kellner_blackwell_Chp7.pdf . 
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action, even if the menace to international peace and security by violent action was 
acknowledged unanimously.  As a result of the lack of consensus within the UNSC regarding 
an agreed  definition of terrorism, states took the initiative in deciding what constituted 
terrorism and, despite the risks of ambiguity  which might result from subjective choices, 
developed their own definitions of the phenomenon,. Under the umbrella of the UNSC 
resolutions, there was an ‘implicit accord’ or rather an ‘imprudent decision’ to allow States, 
to criminalise political opponents and breach their citizens’ basic rights. Only a few months 
after the September 11 2001 attacks, the US-based Human Rights Watch singled out states 
such as Russia; Uzbekistan; Egypt; Israel; China; Malaysia; and Zimbabwe which, under the 
pretext of waging the “war on terror”, in fact, were waging wars against their political 
opponents.31 
 
Accordingly, without necessarily respecting universal values and principles, there are 
countries which, through their own national legislations, define and punish acts of terrorism.  
Therefore, under international law, a definition of terrorism is crucial as a means of 
preventing the States’ abuse of domestic antiterrorist laws by. However, concerning 
internationally accepted standards, it is worthwhile mentioning certainly two very important 
UNSC Resolutions which were passed in the wake of the September 11th 2001 terrorist 
                                                          
31 In the introduction of its 2002 annual report Human Rights Watch stated that:  
President Vladimir Putin of Russia embraced this rhetoric to defend his government's brutal campaign 
in Chechnya. China's foreign minister Tang Jiaxuan did the same to defend his government's response 
to political agitation in Xinjiang province. Egyptian Prime Minister Atef Abeid, brushing off criticism 
of torture and summary military trials, rejected "call[s] on us to give these terrorists their 'human 
rights'" and suggested that Western countries should "think of Egypt's own fight against terror as their 
new model." Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon repeatedly referred to Palestinian Authority 
President Yasir Arafat as "our bin Laden." Alluding to September 11, Malaysian Deputy Prime 
Minister Abdullah Ahman Badawi defended administrative detention under his country's long-abused 
Internal Security Act as "an initial preventive measure before things get beyond control." A 
spokesman for Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe justified a crackdown on independent 
journalists reporting on abuses by his government as an attack on the "supporters" of terrorism.  
See Human Rights Watch Report, World Report 2002: Events of 2001, p XX , 2002, retrieved on, available 
online at: http://www.hrw.org/legacy/wr2k2/intro.html.  
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attacks in the United States of America. The UNSC passed Resolutions 1373 and 1566 
shortly after the attacks on the USA territory. The former32 drew enormously from the 
Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism Convention; this set up a normative framework 
to tackle the worldwide financing of terrorist activities. 
 
The UNSC, recognising the gravity of the attacks against the USA and the fact that such acts 
threatened international peace and security, issued firm resolutions encouraging states to 
engage with the terrorist threat and take specific measures; procedures; and precautions 
regarding terrorism and its financing. The first UNSC Resolution 1373 underlined some key 
concepts, 33  whilst, in October 2004, the UNSC approved the second Resolution 34  (i.e. 
UNSCR 1566) . The UNSC’s intentions were to address and resolve the problem of defining 
terrorism and considered this phenomenon as: 
 
“criminal acts, including against civilians, committed with the intent to cause death 
or serious bodily injury, or taking hostages, with the purpose to provoke a state of 
terror in the general public or in a group of persons or particular persons, intimidate 
a population or compel a government or an international organisation to do or to 
abstain from doing any act” ,  which constitute offences within the scope of and as 
defined in the international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism”. 
                                                          
32 [2001] 9 SCR 1373 
33 For instance, the Resolution 1373 ought to quell terrorism and enact legislation which criminalises the 
intentional collection of funds for terrorism purposes. Moreover, the properties and assets of those who 
facilitate, assist or commit terrorist acts must be frozen. The Resolution obliges, also, states to prohibit persons 
from directly or indirectly financing those who commit terrorist acts, and to ban the use of their territory as a 
safe shelter for those who finance or plan terrorism. The Resolution requires, also, that states must guarantee 
that any person who is involved or takes part in the financing, planning, or supporting otherwise of terrorist 
acts is brought to justice, and that such terrorist acts are considered  to be serious criminal charges in domestic 
laws with suitable penalties .Finally, the Resolution established the Counter-Terrorism Committee (C.T.C.), 
which inspects and evaluates the application of the obligations under the Resolution and provides assistance to 
states.  See[2001] 9 SCR 1373 
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It is debatable whether this paragraph was intended to form a definition of terrorism; 
however, it might be the beginning of a consensus on what would be the key ingredients of 
such a definition. Yet, the above formula presents some deficiencies which cannot be 
neglected. Firstly, the timing, three years after the September 11 2001 events, might be 
considered as inadequate. At this stage, most States had adopted already a variety of 
legislation based on their own interpretations of terrorism and their own domestic interests; 
in some circumstances, these were detrimental to other states.  The second weakness, of 
Resolution 1566, is its non-binding nature since, when dealing with terrorism suspects, 
States are not obliged to adopt the proposed definition and are able still to devise 
independently their own definitions.  
 
According to Brennan, although it was inspired by earlier treaties on counter-terrorism and 
the debates at the General Assembly level, the definition  did not adopt the existing 
definitions, in related treaties, and,  consequently, might contradict them. 35 
 
Therefore, the definition of terrorism, given in Resolution 1566, is only a sort of guide for 
States wishing to make their own legislations conform to international norms relative to 
counter-terrorism measures. It was shown, through the UNGA debates, that there continued 
to exist a disagreement regarding the definition of terrorism. Consequently, it appears that, 
addressing the issue of how to face terrorism, is more of a priority than the insistence of 
finding a consensual definition of the phenomenon. Such an attitude is the UNSC’s preferred 
scenario, in view of the fact that, whilst neglecting to define terrorism, it established counter-
terrorism mechanisms. 
                                                          
35 See A.M. Brennan, ‘The Difficulties in Defining Terrorism under International Law’, a blog to Human 
Rights Watch in Irland,2011, retrieved online at: http://humanrights.ie/criminal-justice/the-difficulties-in-
defining-terrorism-under-international-law/  
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The researcher considers that, despite the pragmatic stance and approach noticed at the level 
of international organisations, the inability to define the phenomenon made it more 
complicated to implement a programme meant to confront such a threat to international 
peace and security. Moreover, allowing States to decide what violent actions constituted 
terrorism might generate legal ambiguity. In fact, divergence in interpretations, of what 
represented terrorism, did provoke discrepancies in States’ legislations. In particular, the 
Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTT), which was set up immediately after the tragic events 
of September 11 2001, acknowledged that the lack, of a binding definition of terrorism, 
handicapped its work. The Counter-Terrorism Committee found itself in a difficult situation 
since, in fact, it was unable to take action against groups which, under some States’ 
legislations,   were not considered to be terrorists.  
 
However, this is not the CTT’s only worry because non-democratic governments, in 
countries like Chechnya; China; and Egypt (before the revolution) took the opportunity to 
devise definitions of terrorism in order to allow counter-terrorism operations interfering with 
basic human rights.36 Therefore, with the selective definitions developed endangering civil 
rights and the freedom to dissent, the absence, of a consensual definition on terrorism, was 
very concerning. Several non-governmental agencies denounced and condemned such 
practices . For instance, Amnesty International stated that: 
“Often “suppression of terrorism” has been used as an excuse for laws and practices 
designed simply to stifle dissent and opposition. In many cases this has amounted to 
                                                          
36 See Human Rights Watch Report, World Report 2002: Events of 2001, p XX, 2002, available online at: 
http://www.hrw.org/legacy/wr2k2/intro.html.  
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a “war” against political opposition of whatever kind, with the use of a repressive 
catalogue of violations of human rights including the right to life, the right not to be 
tortured, the right not to be detained arbitrarily and the right to a fair trial. Those 
affected frequently include the wider population who are innocent of any activity”. 
37 
The CTT engaged in close collaboration with the UN Human Rights Committee to prevent 
the use of the UN Security Council Resolution 1373 as an instrument to justify breaches of 
the most fundamental human rights. In addition and in order to allow international control, 
the CTT required states to include, in their reports on antiterrorism dealings, the inclusion of 
data relative to compliance with human rights. However, the definition of terrorism remains 
“at the mercy” of executive powers. Additionally, the two UN resolutions pointed out that 
states  had an obligation to criminalize and prevent both direct and indirect financing of 
terrorism. 38   
What these terrorist actions are – was drafted in the second resolution-  
“Acts committed to cause death or injury, to provoke terror amongst the public or to 
compel a government to do something prohibited by international instruments 
relating to terrorism. Such acts are supposed to have no justification ideals like 
independence or injustice cannot be used as a justification for these actions of 
terror”.39  
                                                          
37 See Human Rights Dissolving At the Borders? Counter-terrorism and EU Criminal Law Amnesty 
International EU Office, 31 May 2005. AI Index: IOR 61/013/2005. 
38 See United Nations, Office on Drugs and Crime, ‘Guide for the Legislative Incorporation and 
Implementation of the universal Anti-Terrorism Instrument’s, 2006, p.16. 
39 D. Yates, Review of the terrorism suppression act 2002: Report of the Foreign Affairs, Defense and Trade 
Committee. Wellington, New Zealand, House of Representatives, 2005 
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Consequently, it is obvious that the aims do not seem to be indicative of terrorist acts; 
however, the means; violence; intimidation; and techniques of terror merit classification as 
a “terrorist act”. 
Most acts of terrorism are intended to be spectacular because the perpetrators want to 
promote their claims or send a message to as large an audience as possible.  Currently, 
analysts, as well as social and political scientists, refer to relative data in order to evaluate 
the worthiness of taking a particular threat seriously.  It is interesting to look at the findings 
of McCormack40 who, whilst relying on official data, provided by the US Department itself, 
stated that:  
“…worldwide terrorism deaths for the year 2001 as reported by the U.S. State 
Department, including the 3000 deaths on September 11, were about 3400. For the 
year 2006, the State Department classified 20,498 deaths worldwide as attributable 
to terrorist incidents, 13,000 of which were in Iraq. Traffic deaths in the U.S. recently 
have hovered at about 42,000 per year following a peak of almost 50,000 in the late 
1980s. Deaths from guns in the U.S. consist of about 16,000 suicides, 10,000 
homicides, and 6,000 accidents per year”.41  
Terrorism manifests itself through repeated violent actions which individuals; groups; or 
states employ for certain criminal or political reasons 42 . Whereas, in the case of 
assassination, the direct targets of violence are not the real or intended targets. The first 
                                                          
40 W. MacCormack, ‘Legal responses to terrorism’, Newark, NJ: LexisNexis, 2007 
41 See W. MacCormack, ‘Values Implicated in the Struggle with Terrorism: War, Crime, and Prevention’ in 
Values and Violence, Springer, 2009, Volume 4, Part III, pp.257-277. 
42 A. Schmid & A. Jongman, ‘Political Terrorism: A New Guide To Actors, Authors, Concepts, Data Bases, 
Theories, And Literature’, Transaction Publishers, 2005. 
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victims of violence are selected usually in a very arbitrary way, from a particular population 
and serve as ‘message generators’.43  
2.3 Terrorism  
Terrorism, as a phenomenon, might be understood and defined as an intentional act which 
exploits fear through the use of deliberate violence in order to achieve political change.44  
All terrorist activities tend to leave a deep impact on the first victims in addition to the targets 
of the attacks. 45  Terrorists seek to gain authority over the public generally and the 
government and other political parties; they aspire to provoke political change on either local 
or international scales.46 
 
Terrorism’s threat to democratic societies; human rights; and general social development 
was echoed in numerous conventions and official government documents, including the 
Commission of the European Communities’ September 2001 proposal for a Council 
Framework Decision on Combating Terrorism.47  By citing the UN General Assembly’s and 
the Commission on Human Rights’ resolutions, the prevailing literature and reports from 
NGOs pointed to the potential disintegrative effects of terrorism on the freedoms; rights; and 
liberties  which served, also, as the basis of the European Union’s  Charter of Fundamental 
Rights.48 
 
                                                          
43  See M. G. Marshall, ‘Global Terrorism: an Overview and Analysis’, University of Maryland, 11 
September 2002, p.3, http://www.systemicpeace.org/CSPpaper3.pdf. 
44 B. Hoffman, ‘Inside Terrorism’, Columbia University Press: New York, 1998, p.43. 
45 B. Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, 2006, p. 174, cited in Terrorism and the Media, July 23, 2008, Deliverable 
6, Work package 4, page 5, http://www.transnationalterrorism.eu/tekst/publications/WP4%20Del%206.pdf  
46 B. Hoffman, ‘Inside Terrorism.’ Revised and Expanded Edition, New York: Columbia University Press, 
2006. 
47 See the various definitions adopted by the various countries reviewed and the influence of the Framework 
Decision of the European Union as it was discussed earlier in this chapter 
48 M. Deflem, Terrorism and Counter Terrorism: Criminological Perspectives, Oxford: Elsevier, 2004. 
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Furthermore, terrorism can have a destabilizing effect on civil society and poses an eminent 
threat to democratic societies or ‘legitimately constituted governments;’ therefore, whether 
politically motivated or otherwise, differentiating the offence from other criminal acts.49 By 
replacing politics with violence; interrupting individuals’ freedom to choose governmental; 
societal; and national policies; and supplanting them with the assertion of frightening 
messages, backed by violence; terrorism has a chilling effect on the institutions which 
protect human rights constitutionally, and, thereby, disrupting society’s essential elements 
of democracy.50  
  
2.3.1 “Old” versus “New” Terrorism 
Regardless of the adopted definition, several scholars asserted that, since the mid-1990s and 
characterised by novel elements, ‘terrorism’ had taken a new shape. These writers 
formulated a ‘new’ concept, involving various actors; incentives; objectives; strategies; and 
actions, which they considered to be substantially different from the ‘old’ concept of 
terrorism, pre-1990s. 51  According to these analysts, the so-called ‘new’ terrorism had 
increased since New York’s tragic events of September 11 2001 and had become a crucial 
issue worldwide. Already, in anticipation of that particular date, terrorism experts, such as 
Laqueur; Carter; Deutch; and Zelikow were promoting the idea of a ‘new terrorism’ by 
suggesting, in their work, concepts such as ‘postmodern’52 and ‘catastrophic’53 terrorism. 
Later, Hoffman argued that the ‘new’ terrorism was unlike the ‘old’ ones because its 
                                                          
49 B. Saul, ‘Defining Terrorism to Protect Human Rights’,FRIDE (Working Papers), February 2006. 
50 M. Deflem, Terrorism and Counter Terrorism: Criminological Perspectives, Oxford: Elsevier, 2004. (p.1-
6) 
 
51 See W. Laqueur, ‘The New Terrorism: Fanaticism and the Arms of Mass Destruction’, Oxford University 
Press: London, 1999; See also Lesser, Hoffman, Arquilla, Ronfeldt, Zanini and Jenkins, ‘Countering the New 
Terrorism’, RAND: Santa Monica, 1999; or Stefan M Aubrey, The New Dimension of International 
Terrorism, Vdf Hochschulverlag: Zurich. 2004. 
52 W. Laqueur, “Postmodern Terrorism”, Foreign Affairs, 1996, 75 (5), pp. 24-36 
53 A. B. Carter,; J. Deutch and P. Zelikow, ‘Catastrophic Terrorism Tackling the New Danger’, Foreign 
Affairs, 1999, 77(6), pp. 80-94. 
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consequences were “far more lethal threat than the more familiar ‘traditional’ terrorist 
groups”.54  Laqueur went further when he equated the ‘new’ terrorism with a revolution in 
character and emphasised the ‘radical transformation’ of the phenomenon.55   Simon and 
Benjamin (2000; p.59) stated that: 
 “The old form of predominantly state sponsored terrorism is joined by a new, 
religiously motivated form of terrorism that neither relies on the support of sovereign 
states nor is constrained by the limits of violence that state sponsors have undergone 
themselves or placed on their proxies”.56   
In order to support their arguments, the proponents, of the ‘new’ terrorism, pointed to several 
terrorist acts which were perpetrated since 1993.57 Additionally, it  was claimed that, in 
contrast to the violence of the old terrorism which involved rational and discriminate acts, 
the increased number of present day deadly and indiscriminate terrorist acts, on targets,  
conveyed a message: ‘Terrorists want a lot of people watching, but not a lot of people 
dead’58 .  Despite the diminution of its recurrence, the new terrorism was more lethal.  
Consequently, Jenkins observed that: ‘many of today’s terrorists want a lot of people 
watching and a lot of people dead’.  Another argument was that, in contrast to the old 
terrorism,  the new terrorism  was religiously inspired;59  this was predominantly secular and 
political in character. According to analysts, of the new terrorism, this shift has dire 
consequences. In contrast to secular organisations, people, with religious incentives, do not 
derive any kind of legitimacy from other people; their struggle being guided divinely. 
                                                          
54 B. Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, St. Andrew’s University Press, London, 1998, pp. 200. 
55 W. Laqueur, The New Terrorism, 1999, p. 4 
56 S. Simon and D. Benjamin, ‘America and the New Terrorism’, Survival, Vol. 42(1), spring 2000, pp.  59-
75.  
57 For example the bombing of the World Trade Center in New York in 1993, and the attack with Sarin gas on 
the Tokyo subway system in 1995, and the bombing of the Murrah building in Oklahoma City in 1995.  The 
subsequent bombing of American embassies in Kenya, and Tanzania, the 11th September tragic events on the 
US territory reinforced definitely the argument for the ‘new’ terrorism. 
58 B. Jenkins, The Study of Terrorism: Definitional Problems, Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1980. 
59    S. Simon and D. Benjamin. ‘America and the New Terrorism’, Survival, Vol. 42(1), spring 2000, pp  59-
75.  
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Political aims and clear goals are lost since destruction and chaos have become ends in 
themselves.60  
 
In order to sum up the discussion regarding old versus new terrorism, it could be noted that 
two major opinions predominated.  There were academics who argued that understanding 
the actual phenomenon of terrorism  did not necessitate knowing or referring imperatively 
to the “old” or traditional terrorism which  was seen as obsolete and anachronistic. This first 
group argued for analysis of the “new” terrorism as a novel concept).61  However, other 
scholars disputed the new concept and affirmed that the new terrorism’s highlighted 
characteristics did not differ substantially from those of the old terrorism.62  
 
 
2.3.2 International Terrorism and Domestic Terrorism 
McCormack63 distinguished between international and domestic terrorism, observing that 
there was more interest and focus on the former.  Sanchez-Cuenca and de la Calle argued 
that “quantitative analysis on terrorism focuses almost exclusively on international attacks 
                                                          
60 M..J. Morgan, ‘The Origins of the New Terrorism’, Parameters, Spring, 2004, pp. 29-43. 
61 See B. Hoffman, Inside Terrorism.  Columbia University Press: New York, 1998. p. 196, p. 205; D. Benjamin 
and S. Simon, The Age of Sacred Terror: Radical Islam’s War Against America. Random House, New York, 
2003, p. 221 and p. 384; I. O. Lesser et al., Countering the New Terrorism, The Rand Corporation: Santa 
Monica: 1999, p. 2; and W. Laqueur, The New Terrorism: Fanaticism and the Arms of Mass Destruction, 
Oxford University Press: New York:, 1999, p. 7.  
62 See for example: D. Tucker, ‘What is New about the New Terrorism and How Dangerous is It?’ 
,Terrorism and Political Violence vol.14 (3), Fall 2001, pp. 1-14;  
T. Copeland., ‘Is the ‘New Terrorism’ Really New? An Analysis of the New Paradigm for Terrorism. The 
Journal of Conflict Studies, vol. 21 (2), Winter 2001, pp. 7-27; 
I. Duyvesteyn,  How New is the New Terrorism? Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, vol. 27 (5) 2004, pp. 439-
454 
D. Zimmerman, The Transformation Of Terrorism, Andreas Wenger: Zurich.  2003.  
R. Coolsaet, Al-Qaeda: The Myth, Academia Press: Gent. 2005.   
J. Burnett and D. Whyte, ‘Embedded Expertise and the New Terrorism’, Journal for Crime, Conflict and the 
Media, Vol.1 (4) 2005. pp. 1-18.  
63 W. MacComack, (2005). Legal Responses to Terrorism. Dayton, OH: LexisNexis Matthew Bender. 
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because of the absence of datasets on domestic incidents”. 64  Evidence, from different 
surveys, showed that, in reality and compared to all other forms of terrorist violence, 
international or ‘global’ terrorism  was rather modest.65 For instance, figures, given by the 
Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism dataset (MIPT) and covering 
approximately eight years (1998–2005), recorded 26,445 fatalities. However, only 6447 
resulted from international terrorism, of which more than 3000 were due to the September 
11 attacks.66  
  
Sanchez-Cuenca and de la Calle emphasized that domestic terrorism represented, by far, the 
greatest part of all terrorist violence.67  Deploring most researchers’ focus on international 
terrorism by, the cited authors considered that it “it truncates the sample of terrorist violence 
and it generates important biases”.68 For instance, the most widespread and accepted idea 
that terrorism targets mainly civilians or non-combatants originates from what it is 
highlighted usually when international attacks occur. However, by examining domestic 
terrorism in particular, it appeared that terrorism tended to target police or military forces 
more systematically.69  The two writers’ argument could be verified easily through the 
examination of how several other researchers defined or interpreted terrorism.  
 
2.4 Reasons for Defining Terrorism 
                                                          
64 B. Saul, ‘Reasons for Defining and Criminalizing 'Terrorism' in International Law’. Mexican Yearbook of 
International Law, 2006,Vol. 6, pp. 419-460, Sydney Law School Research Paper No. 08/121. 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1291567.  
65 J..D. Kiras, ‘Terrorism and Globalization’, in J. Baylis and S. Smith (eds.) ‘The Globalization of World 
Politics: An Introduction to International Relations, Oxford University Press, 2004, pp. 479-498. 
66 V. Asal; R. K. Rethemeyer, ‘The Nature of the Beast: Organizational Structures and the Lethality of 
Terrorist Attacks’, Journal of Politics, 2008, 70 (2): 437-49. 
67 I. Sánchez-Cuenca and L. de la Calle, ‘Domestic Terrorism: The Hidden Side of Political Violence’, 
Annual Review of Political Science, 2009, Volume 12.  
68 Ibid. p.32 
69Ibid or I. Sánchez-Cuenca and L. de la Calle, ‘Domestic Terrorism: The Hidden Side of Political Violence’, 
Annual Review of Political Science, 2009, Volume 12.  
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Apart from the key motive that drafting a general definition would contribute to harmonizing 
national criminal laws, other benefits might be generated from a consensual and general legal 
definition. For instance,  with regard to the fulfilling of the double criminality requirement, 
in extradition treaties,70  and respecting, as laid down in many treaties, the legal advice which 
states ‘aut dedere aut iudicare’ (i.e. "either prosecute or extradite") for terrorist offences.71 
Also with regard to the extradition issue, a definition of terrorism might help to end the 
confusion which reigns regarding political offences – offering an exemption to the 
requirement of extradition – and terrorism – for which most treaties allow no exemption 
from extradition. 
 
2.5 The Importance of Defining Terrorism 
Defining terrorism is not merely a theoretical or academic exercise but a priority.72  Far from 
being restricted to specific countries or regions of the world, terrorism, as a phenomenon, is 
currently a universal problem. The consequences, of indiscriminate terrorist attacks, provoke 
human casualties from different nationalities; bases and training camps of terrorists are 
disseminated in several countries; and, despite international law,73 assistance to terrorist 
                                                          
70 Double criminality requirement, or Dual Criminality Definition, is “a typical requirement of extradition 
treaties: that the conduct alleged constitute a crime in both the demanding and the delivering state.”, see 
L.Duhaime, Legal Dictionary, retrieved on, day month year, 
http://www.duhaime.org/LegalDictionary/D/DualCriminality.aspx     
71  See B. Saul, ‘Exclusion of Suspected Terrorists from Asylum’, Institute for International Integration 
Studies, Trinity College, Dublin, July 2004, Discussion Paper No 26. 
72 See ‘Mapping Counterterrorism: A categorization of policies and the promise of empirically-based, 
systematic comparisons’, 17 June 2008, p. 5, Deliverable 11, Work package 6, ‘Citizens and governance in a 
knowledge-based society’, http://www.transnationalterrorism.eu/tekst/publications/WP6%20Del%2011.pdf  
73 See D. Jinks, ‘State Responsibility for the Acts of Private Armed Groups’, Chicago Journal of  
International law,4(2003),P83-95.   
Jinks wrote:  
“The primary rules of international law define the content of the legal obligations-that is, primary 
rules establish particular standards of conduct (for example, do not take property without adequate 
compensation). In contrast, the secondary rules of state responsibility define the general conditions 
under which states are to be considered responsible for internationally wrongful actions or omissions. 
As the International Law Commission has noted, "It is one thing to define a rule and the content of 
28                                   Chapter Two: Historical Background and Definitions of Terrorism 
 
 
organisations might come from states74 or from groups and ethnic communities.75  Since 
there is a consensus on the fact that terrorism is an international phenomenon, the challenge 
has to be faced, also, at an international level. 
A consensual definition of terrorism is indispensable   in formulating appropriate legislation 
against terrorism.76  For instance, it will help in extraditing terrorists. Although there are 
multiform agreements between states, usually, extradition, for political reasons, is rejected, 
and terrorism is always political.77   
The prerequisite, for defining terrorism and in order to achieve it efficiently, can be observed 
through the six following aspects which Ganor identified:78  
1. Legislation and punishment – the laws and regulations enacted to provide the executive 
powers with the adequate tools for fighting terrorism.  A definition of terrorism was 
needed to legislate  in order to ban the support  for terrorism; to prosecute terrorists; and 
to confiscate their financial resources.  A distinction ought to be made between terrorism 
and ordinary crime. The need, for separate legislation for terrorism, stemmed from the 
                                                          
the obligation it imposes, and another to determine whether that obligation has been violated and what 
should be the consequences of the violation." R. Ago, Second Report on State Responsibility, [1970] 
2 YB Int L Commn 271,306, UN Doc NoA/CN.4/SER.A/1970/Add.1 (1970).      
                  
74 P. Wilkinson, ‘Can a State be 'Terrorist'?’ International Affairs, Royal Institute of International Affairs, 
Summer 1981, Vol. 57 (3), pp. 467-472. 
75  See P. Wilkinson, Terrorism Versus Democracy: the Liberal State Response. Routledge: London, 2006. 
76 See J.Rupérez, “The United Nations in the fight against terrorism”, (Paper delivered during the 132nd 
International Senior Seminar Visiting Experts’ Papers), 2005. Retrieved on  
http://www.unafei.or.jp/english/pdf/RS_No71/No71_07VE_Ruperez.pdf  
77 See Commission On Human Rights, ‘Specific Human Rights Issues: New Priorities, in Particular 
Terrorism’, Sub-Commission on the Promotion, and Protection of Human Rights, Fifty- fifth session, 
Agenda item 6 (c), p.26, retrieved on, http://www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/terrorism/docs/WP1.pdf.  
78 B. Ganor, ‘Defining Terrorism: Is One Man’s Terrorist Another Man’s Freedom Fighter?’ Police Practice 
and Research, 2002, 3(4): 287–304.  
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enormous danger which, due to its political dimension, terrorism posed to modern society 
and its values. 
2. In particular in the formulation and ratification of international conventions against 
terrorism, international cooperation was required to achieve concrete results in fighting 
terrorism,.  Whilst providing, also, for the extradition of terrorists, these had to prohibit 
terrorist acts; assistance to terrorism; the transfer of funds to terrorist organizations; state 
support for terrorist organizations; and commercial ties with states sponsoring terrorism. 
3. It was argued, also, that terrorism depended mainly on the support of States which aimed 
to achieve their goals through terrorist groups.  It was impossible to confront the threat of 
terrorism efficiently without addressing the relationship between some States and terrorist 
groups. An important step, towards a solution, was to agree on a definition of terrorism 
and hence, how to deal with States sponsoring terrorism. 
4. Offensive action – States ought to keep the initiative, whilst attempting to limit the 
capacity of terrorist organisations to operate. Accordingly, a permanent offensive had to 
be directed towards terrorism and, to ensure international support, there was a need for a 
consensually adopted definition of terrorism.  
5.  Popular support for terrorism – It was crucial to limit terrorist activity by undermining 
the ability of terrorist groups to obtain any form of support from populations.  Legislation, 
at domestic and international levels, could deter such support; this might induce 
organisations, tempted to use violence for political aims, to renounce violent methods in 
order to maintain legitimacy amongst the population. 
6. Normative Scale – a definition, distinguishing terrorism from other violent actions, would 
enhance international efforts to challenge the legitimacy of terrorist groups.  
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2.6 Defining Terrorism  
Struggling with definitions was not a novelty in terrorism research, and scholars, involved 
in terrorism studies, agreed that there was genuine difficulty in finding a definition.79  
Following a review of the existing literature, this researcher deduced that, in view of the 
geopolitical and geo-strategies of the present world, encountering resistance to an agreed 
and universal definition, was quite comprehensible.80 However, most people were aware of 
the main aspects of terrorism, and some might argue that the issue  was not how to define it, 
but rather how to deal with it. People, involved in the writing of anti-terrorism laws, could 
not allow themselves to neglect a coherent definition of the subject of the legislation.  
Gupta, a scholar deeply involved in Terrorism studies, underlined the non-existence of a 
general official definition of terrorism; however, he added that there were rather “many 
functional descriptions”81 of the phenomenon. For instance, whilst identifying terrorism as 
a special form of political violence, Wilkinson82, vested terrorism with five characteristics.83 
Terrorism remains a term that is extremely difficult to define.  There were scholars who 
asked why it was absolutely necessary to find a legal definition of the concept. For instance, 
                                                          
79 See Spencer (2010, p. 1) in A. Spencer, ‘Tabloid Terrorist’, Palgrave Macmillan: London, 2010. 
80 The protagonists of the different wars illustrate such idea, from the US perspective; armed actions against 
their troops abroad are identified with terrorism while their own actions in foreign territories are ‘legitimate’. 
   
81 See D. K. Gupta, ‘Exploring Roots of Terrorism’ in Tore Bjørgo (ed.) Root Causes of Terrorism. London: 
Routledge, 2004. 
82 P. Wilkinson. ‘Response to Terrorism from the Toolbox of Liberal Democracies: Their Applicability to Other 
Types of Regimes’, in Countering Terrorism Through International Cooperation. Proceedings of the 
International Conference on “Countering Terrorism Through Enhanced International Cooperation.” 
Courmayeur, Mont Blanc, Italy, 2001, 06-213, pp. 206-213. 
 
83 Firstly, terrorism is premeditated and aims to create a climate of extreme fear or terror. Secondly, it is directed 
at a wider audience than the immediate victims of the violence.  Thirdly, it inherently involves attacks on 
random and symbolic targets, including civilians. Fourthly, the acts of violence committed are seen by the 
society in which they occur as extra-normal, in the literal sense that they breach social norms, thus causing a 
sense of outrage; and  finally, terrorism is commonly used to influence political behaviour: forcing opponents 
to concede perpetrators’ demands, provoking over-reactions, serving as a catalyst or to publicise  
political/religious causes, inspiring followers, giving vent to deep hatred and the thirst for revenge, and helping 
undermine governments and institutions designate as enemies by the terrorists.”   
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Baxter referred to it as ‘imprecise, ambiguous, and above all it serves no operative 
purpose’,84 and regretted that a legal concept of terrorism had been inflicted upon academia. 
Higgins, another eminent international lawyer, observed that, “Terrorism is a term without 
a legal significance. It is merely a convenient way of alluding to activities, whether of States 
or of individuals, widely disapproved of and in which either the methods used are unlawful, 
or the targets protected, or both”.85  Reflecting on the above statements, Walter questioned 
the necessity of finding a legal definition of the concept, suggesting that it would be 
preferable rather to define the criminal acts within terrorism.86  
Scholars, in politics; law; history; psychology; theology; and criminology tried 
unsuccessfully to devise a definition of ‘terrorism’; however, they failed to come up with a 
single interpretation.87  There was no agreement on the limits of the ‘terrorism’ phenomenon.  
Therefore, for analysts such as Bowel and Ganor, terrorism represented all sorts of violence 
except state violence. Yet, some scholars considered that people, who defended a noble 
cause, could not be classified as terrorists and, indeed, ought to be regarded as patriots. 88 
There was no unanimity on what constituted ‘terrorism.’  
Despite its soundness, Baxter’s view, regarding the lack of a purpose for a definition, was 
not shared universally. There were authors who argued that not having a universal definition  
made the task of international lawyers more complicated when they had  to devise a legal 
definition.89 The unavailability, from political scientists, of a factual and solid definition, 
                                                          
84 R. Baxter, ‘A Sceptical Look at the Concept of Terrorism’, Akron Law Review, 1974. 
85 See R. Higgins, ‘The General International Law of Terrorism’, in R. Higgins and M. Flory, International 
Law and Terrorism, Routledge: London 1997, p. 28 
86 C. Walter, ‘Defining Terrorism in National and International Law’, 2003, p.2, available online at: 
https://www.unodc.org/tldb/bibliography/Biblio_Int_humanitarian_law_Walter_2003.pdf  
87 M. Williamson, ‘Terrorism, war and international law: the legality of the use of  force against Afghanistan 
in 2001’. Ashgate, 2009, p. 38.  
88  J. B. Bell, Trends in Terror: The Analysis of Political Violence’ World Politics, 1977, 29 (3) pp. 447-481. 
 
89 B. Golder and G. Williams, ‘What is Terrorism? Problems of Legal Definition’, M UNSW Law Journal 
2004, Vol.27(2), available online at: http://tamilnation.co/terrorism/terrorism_definition.pdf.  
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due to disagreement as to the physical reality of what constituted ‘terrorism’, led to an 
unsatisfactory legal definition in international legislation.90  Mallison and Mallison 
underlined the fact that both: “Terror” and “terrorism” are not words which refer to a well-
defined and clearly identified set of factual events. Neither do the words have any widely 
accepted meaning in legal doctrine. ‘“Terror” and “terrorism” consequently, do not refer to 
a unitary concept in either fact or law”.  
Yet, despite what was stated as regards shortcomings due to the absence of a consensual 
definition, nevertheless, most scholars, including Williamson91, insisted that it was essential 
to find a solution and to define a concept seen as a threat to international peace and security. 
It was comprehensible, also, that, in terms of priorities, a preliminary step (i.e. a definition 
of ‘terrorism’) was required in order to be able to move to the analysis of lawful responses 
to the threat.  
Whilst recognising that scholars and the international community would be unlikely to agree 
on a universally acceptable definition of the term ‘terrorism’, Murphy did not reject 
participation in the debate on the ‘definitional quagmire’92. For him, there were positive 
aspects, in this process, since it: 
“will at least provide an awareness of the difficulties which preclude consensus and 
will provide clarity on the main points of disagreement. An international legal 
definition will only be possible once those points of disagreement have been 
acknowledged, and, as far as possible, addressed.” 
                                                          
90  W. Mallison & S. Mallison, ‘The concept of Public Purpose Terror in International Law: Doctrines and 
Sanctions to Reduce the Destruction of Human and Material Values’, 1973, Howard Law Journal, 12.  
91 M. Williamson, ‘Terrorism, war and international law: the legality of the use of force against Afghanistan 
in 2001’. Ashgate, 2009, p. 38. 
92 J. Murphy, ‘State Support of International Terrorism’, Legal, Political and Economic Dimensions, 1989 
pp. 3-30. 
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2.6.1 Defining Terrorism in Different Countries 
It is undisputable that September 11 2001caused renewed focus and attention at a global 
level on the concept of terrorism.  Consequently, in June 2002, the Council of Europe 
issued a Framework Decision (FD) on Combating Terrorism; this contained a definition of 
terrorism.93 Based on the provisions of Article34 (2),94  of the European Union’s Lisbon 
                                                          
93 See The Council of the European Union, ‘Council Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on combating 
terrorism’, 2002, available online at: 
http://eurlex.europa.eu/smartapi/cgi/sga_doc?smartapi!celexapi!prod!CELEXnumdoc&lg=EN&numdoc=320
02F0475&model=guichett  
K. Boyle, ‘Terrorism, States of Emergency and Human Rights’, Antiterrorist Measures and Human Rights, 
2004, pp. 95-116. 
94 The continued basis for framework decisions is set out in transitionary provisions of the Lisbon Treaty. See 
Treaty on European Union (Nice consolidated version), Title VI: ‘Provisions on police and judicial 
cooperation in criminal matters’ Article 34, Article K.6 - EU Treaty (Maastricht 1992). available online at: 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:12002M034:EN:HTML 
2. The Council shall take measures and promote cooperation, using the appropriate form and 
procedures as set out in this title, contributing to the pursuit of the objectives of the Union. To that 
end, acting unanimously on the initiative of any Member State or of the Commission, the Council may: 
(a) adopt common positions defining the approach of the Union to a particular matter; 
(b) adopt framework decisions for the purpose of approximation of the laws and regulations of the 
Member States. Framework decisions shall be binding upon the Member States as to the result to be 
achieved but shall leave to the national authorities the choice of form and methods. They shall not 
entail direct effect; 
(c) adopt decisions for any other purpose consistent with the objectives of this title, excluding any 
approximation of the laws and regulations of the Member States. These decisions shall be binding and 
shall not entail direct effect; the Council, acting by a qualified majority, shall adopt measures necessary 
to implement those decisions at the level of the Union; 
(d) establish conventions which it shall recommend to the Member States for adoption in accordance 
with their respective constitutional requirements. Member States shall begin the procedures applicable 
within a time limit to be set by the Council. 
Unless they provide otherwise, conventions shall, once adopted by at least half of the Member States, 
enter into force for those Member States. Measures implementing conventions shall be adopted within 
the Council by a majority of two thirds of the Contracting Parties. 
3.(15) Where the Council is required to act by a qualified majority, the votes of its members shall be 
weighted as laid down in Article 205(2) of the Treaty establishing the European Community, and for 
their adoption acts of the Council shall require at least 62 votes in favor, cast by at least 10 members. 
4. For procedural questions, the Council shall act by a majority of its members.  
Article 9 of the Protocol on Transitional Provisions provides that: 
The legal effects of the acts of the institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the Union adopted on 
the basis of the Treaty on European Union prior to the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon shall 
be preserved until those acts are repealed, annulled or amended in implementation of the Treaties. The 
same shall apply to agreements concluded between Member States on the basis of the Treaty on 
European Union. 
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Treaty, these decisions were  binding on all member states, although they  left room for 
domestic differentiation regarding the exact procedures and methods.   Therefore, in order 
to evaluate the implementation of the Decision, it was necessary to  consider definitions of 
terrorism within the member states’ national legislations.   
 
The majority of countries, considered in the Transnational Terrorism, Security and the 
in place preceding the Framework  already had terrorist legislation ,Rule of Law sample
to  regard  with’s effects the Decisionestablish be interesting to would t I 95.Decision
current counter-terrorism efforts. Even more interesting, from this point of view, would be 
the analysis (set out below) of those countries  which, previous to the FD,  had experience 
in countering terrorism and, yet, during their – mostly nationally confined – struggles, had 
96.terrorist legislation-not to adopt specific antideliberately  chosen 
 
The structure, used in the EU definition of terrorism97, was known, in legal research on 
terrorism, as a combination of the subjective and the objective approaches.98 The subjective 
element referred to the first part of the definition, the perpetrator’s intention, was divided 
                                                          
See Treaty on European Union (Nice consolidated version), Title VI: ‘Provisions on police and judicial 
cooperation in criminal matters’ Article 34, Article K.6 - EU Treaty (Maastricht 1992). Available online at:, 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:12002M034:EN:HTML. 
  
 
95  As a European research project, TTSRL was a multi-faceted research project  which aimed to help Europe 
better understands terrorism. The research, itself, was conducted between 2006 and 2009. 
 
96 J. Burnett and D. Whyte, ‘Embedded Expertise and the New Terrorism’ Journal for Crime, Conflict and the 
Media, 2005, vol. 1, no. 4, pp. 1-18. 
97 E. Dumitriu, ‘The E.U.’s Definition of Terrorism: The Council Frame-work Decision on Combating 
Terrorism’, 2004, Vol. 5, No. 5, German Law Journal, pp. 585 – 602. 
 
98 In general, States legislators combine subjective and objective methods, thereby merging the intent of the 
perpetrator, with specific actions, such as ordinary general criminal offences, in order to devise a definition of 
terrorism. In addition, under Article 1 of the Framework Decision, terrorist offences consist of two objective 
elements, incrimination under national law and effective or potential consequences, “Seriously damage a 
country or an international organization.”  
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into three separate goals.99  The second part consisted of a list of the offences which, taken 
together with the intention, would be considered as terrorist offences.100   Often, this sort of 
listing  was referred to as the objective approach.  This was because the classification, of 
whether or not the offence had occurred, was quite easy to determine and was made explicitly 
clear within national law.  However, the perpetrator’s intention contained always a 
subjective element since it  had to be interpreted by people.101  It could not be proven in and 
of itself, for instance by pointing to the concrete results, since that whole element was 
completely immaterial. To sum up, the EU definition consisted mainly of a combination of 
two approaches; on the one hand, an objective one, which determined, if certain actions  
ought to be considered as terrorist, by finding whether or not there was occurrence. On the 
other hand, based on the perpetrator’s intention, a subjective approach classified certain acts 
as terrorist.102 
 
It is worthwhile mentioning that, even before the introduction of the European Framework 
Decision, the majority of the TTSRL sample countries - France; Germany; Italy; Portugal; 
Russia; Spain; Sweden; and the United Kingdom - already had terrorist legislation in place. 
Amongst these nations, the definitions, employed by France; Russia; and the United 
                                                          
99 The subjective elements consists firstly of “seriously intimidating a population,”, secondly, “unduly 
compelling a Government or international organisation to perform or abstain from performing any act,” or 
“seriously destabilizing or destroying the fundamental structures of a country or an international organisation.” 
100 The Framework Decision identifies three types of offences: terrorist offences, (Article 1), offences relating 
to a terrorist group (Article 2), and offences linked to terrorist activities (Article 3). It is also stated in Article 
4, that inciting, aiding or abetting, and attempting to commit one of the offences referred to in Articles 1 to 3 
must also be incriminated in national law. 
101 E. Dumitriu, ‘The E.U.’s Definition of Terrorism: The Council Frame-work Decision on Combating 
Terrorism’,German Law Journal, 2004, Vol. 5, No. 5, p.596. 
102 D. L. Byman, ‘Never heard of the Cinema Rex fire Abadan? It’s the second-deadliest terrorist attack in 
modern history’, Washington Post, May 6, 2007. 
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Kingdom were already quite comprehensive and detailed. However, Dimitriu observed that 
these countries’ adopted definitions, of terrorist offences, were far from being uniform. 103  
 
France; Russia; and the United Kingdom used a combination of the subjective and the 
objective approaches in order to define terrorism; this was similar to the Framework 
Decision definition  which followed theirs.104  The other five countries defined terrorism, in 
an elusive manner, since they employed the term ‘terrorism’ in the legislation, but without 
defining it explicitly.  For example, the German approach consisted of criminalizing terrorist 
groups (and, consequently, identifying every member of such organizations as a terrorist) 
without detailing either the characteristics of these groups’ activities or their followers.  On 
the other hand, without clarifying the nature of the organisations involved; their background; 
or their incentives, Spain employed almost the reverse of this principle by equating certain 
activities with terrorism only when executed by a member of an armed band or terrorist 
organisation. 
 
The rest of the TTSRL countries – the Czech Republic; Denmark; the Netherlands; and 
Poland –introduced specific terrorist legislation but only after the adoption of the Framework 
Decision.105  For instance,  to a large extent, the Czech and Danish definitions were inspired 
by the EU definition;  they retained the same structure and method without trying to add, 
amend or remove any of the conditions contained in the European document.  Conversely, 
the Dutch approach was more elaborate and wider than the Decision. Intentionally, the 
                                                          
103 Dimitriu stated that: “Indeed, as of 2001 only six out of fifteen E.U. Member States, 22 had a separate 
incrimination for terrorist acts in their criminal law; other States were punishing terrorist acts as a common 
offence (infraction de droit commun).  Moreover, the definitions of terrorist offences adopted in the six 
Member States were far from uniform.” 
104 I. Cameron, ‘Human Rights and Terrorism’, Peace and Security: current Challenges in International Law, 
2004, pp. 193-232. 
105 Details, about the countries definitions, are provided later in this study. 
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definition, adopted by Poland, y did not consider at all the second part of the EU definition. 
It was interesting to note that, despite having terrorist legislation in place prior to the 
Framework Decision, Portugal and Sweden  did alter their definition of terrorism 
substantially in order to make it conform to the EU definition.  
 
In order to fulfill the EU definition’s international criterion, other countries, with existing 
terrorist legislation prior to the Framework Decision, added only the precondition relative to 
the fact that international organisations might be targeted, also, by terrorist attacks. The 
circumventing manner, such the one used by the German; 106  Italian; 107  and Spanish 
legislators,108  was amended only in Germany by adding the second part of the EU definition; 
left out by Italy; while Spain did not make any amendment to its definition.109  
 
In general, it could be said that France; Italy; Russia; Spain; and the United Kingdom  had 
not undergone any fundamental changes  arising from the EU’s adoption of the Framework 
Decision. By contrast, the Czech Republic; Denmark; Germany; the Netherlands; Poland; 
                                                          
106 In Germany, before the amendment of Article 129a of the law, terrorism was divided into four categories: 
founding a terrorist organisation; being a member of a terrorist organization; supporting a terrorist organization; 
and campaigning for a terrorist organization. It had never been altered before the European directives, through 
the Framework Decision, were introduced and adopted in 2005. Currently, it includes sub-sections referring to 
specific acts  which qualify as terrorist when executed by a member of a terrorist organization. Therefore, 
although Germany added the objective element, the EU definition’s subjective element  was added, also, to the 
new formulation of Article 129a.  
 
107 In the Italian case, as for Germany, the law does not define terrorism explicitly but leaves that option open 
to the judiciary, which, in 1987, provided a source for a definition through its decision. The amendment, 
introduced by law n. 438 in 2001, Article 270-bis includes foreign governments or international organizations 
as targets of terrorism. In 2005, law n. 155 was enacted, defining terrorism explicitly within the Italian Penal 
Code and based on the European Framework Decision. Nevertheless, it insists only upon the notion of terrorist 
intent (subjective) and did not add the 2nd part of the FD definition, relative to the objective list of offences.  
 
108 In Spain, the amendments, adopted after the Framework Decision, widened the definition of terrorism. Thus, 
the 'conspiracy to perform a terrorist act' and the 'glorification of terrorism'  were included in the criminal 
definition of what constitutes terrorism. The EU definition is certainly more detailed than the Spanish one, 
since it establishes a list of terrorist acts inexistent within the Spanish legislation. However, although the 
Spanish definition is wider and less precise, it does meet all of the FD criteria. 
 
109 See COT Institute for safety, security and Crisis Management, Defining Terrorism, WP3, Deliverable 4, 
October 2008, pp. 114-115, Netherland, available online at: 
http://www.transnationalterrorism.eu/tekst/publications/WP3%20Del%204.pdf  
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Portugal; and Sweden used it clearly as a general blueprint for their own definitions.   In 
order to have a more precise idea about the changes made, the researcher provides  a short 
and concise overview, of the most distinctive and changing elements within the national 
contexts, before returning to the comparison with the EU definition and offering some 
conclusions. 
 
 
2.6.2 European Union 
The EU definition referred, also, to offences, specifically concerning terrorist groups, such 
as founding a terrorist organization; participating in; supporting; and campaigning for 
terrorist organisations.  Such activities were considered themselves to be participation in 
terrorism. In this respect, only Germany; Portugal; and Spain actually criminalized terrorist 
organisations and their activities, whilst other countries decided to define terrorism as the 
activities of founding; participating in; supporting; and campaigning for terrorist groups. 
 
Regarding the differences with the EU definition, some noteworthy developments could be 
distinguished.  In evaluating the amendments to terrorism definitions, already in place prior 
to the introduction of the Framework Decision, it could be observed that Germany; Italy; 
Portugal; and Sweden did amend their own definitions substantially, whilst after the 
introduction of the Framework Decision, France; Russia; Spain; and the UK made minor 
changes. As regards the application of the definition, as envisaged by the EU, it was 
surprising to notice that certain countries (i.e. Italy; Poland; Spain; Sweden; and the United 
Kingdom) had ignored intentionally and decided not to include, in their legislations, the latter 
part of the definition which related to the listing of criminal acts. The subjective element, 
which refers to terrorist intent, exists now in all countries’ definitions, although, in Germany, 
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this was not always the case.110 Lastly, all the above countries included foreign governments’ 
offices (such as Embassies; Consulates; Chambers of Commerce) and international 
organisations, working within their boundaries. as possible targets of terrorist groups. This 
widening of possible targets suggested that there was a noticeable expansion of the scope of 
the definition of terrorism.  
 
Regarding the executive powers’ implementation of the newly adopted definitions, the scope 
and broadness of the definitions, made in Denmark; the Netherlands; Russia; Sweden; and 
the United Kingdom led several NGOs to express concerns.111  The fact was that there was 
particular criticism  about the scope and wording of the definitions, in those countries, would 
prevent people participating in genuine and legitimate political protest, with the risk of 
potential arrest; detention; and trial of lawful political activists. Despite reassurances by 
politicians, numerous cases were observed112  regarding the limitations on the freedom to 
express dissent or to gather in certain places (e.g. close to Embassies or consulates) or to 
take photographs. This gave foundation to criticism and concerns made by Civil Liberties 
and Human Rights organisations. 
 
2.6.3 United Kingdom 
From 1974 to 1989, various Prevention of Terrorism (Northern Ireland) Acts were dedicated 
entirely to the Irish situation.113  Therefore, s.9 of the 1974 Act stated that ‘terrorism means 
                                                          
110 S. Mekhennet and F. Dexter, ‘British Law Against Glorifying Terrorism Has Not Silenced Calls to Kill 
for Islam’, The New York Times, August 21, 2006, 
http://travel2.nytimes.com/2006/08/21/world/europe/21london.html   
111 Organisations such as Article 19, Liberty, International Federation of Journalists (IFJ), National Union of 
Journalists (NUJ), Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, and so on… 
112 In the UK, the new measures targeted photographs particularly, see, for instance, the case of M. Vallee or 
Gillian   
113 M. Aksu,; Y. Buruma, and P.H.P.H.M.C. Kempen (2006) ‘Strafrechtelijke antiterrorismemaatregelen in 
Nederland, het Verenigd Koninkrijk, Spanje, Duitsland, Frankrijk en Italie’, WODC: Eerste inventarisatie van 
40                                   Chapter Two: Historical Background and Definitions of Terrorism 
 
 
the use of violence for political ends, and includes any use of violence for the purpose of 
putting the public or any section of the public in fear.’ A review of such definitions, requested 
by the Select Committee on Home Affairs, noted several shortcomings within this definition. 
For instance, despite the exclusion of threats of violence, it was too broad and did not require 
a serious level of violence; risk to health and safety; or electronic disruption. Conversely, it 
was restricted in terms of intention and excluded religious and non-ideologically motivated 
violence.114 
 
Additionally, another definition could be found in s.2 (2) of the Reinsurance (Acts of 
Terrorism) Act 1993 which criminalized people acting in connection with or on behalf of an 
organisation using terrorist tactics. Due to the changing circumstances, the British reviewed 
their antiterrorist legislation in 1996. In the Inquiry into Legislation against Terrorism115, 
Lord Lloyd of Berwick concluded that, in order to fight international terrorism efficiently, it 
was an absolute necessity to draft a different definition.  
2.7 Debate on definitions of terrorism  
Several writers gave the following definitions of terrorism.  These presented a variety of 
perspectives which illustrated the different views expressed.                                       
For instance, Held defined terrorism as:  
                                                          
contraterrorismebeleid: Duitsland, Frankrijk, Italië, Spanje, het Verenigd Koninkrijk en de Verenigde Staten – 
Workdocument No. 6. 
114 Lord Carlile of Berwick Q.C., ‘The Definition of Terrorism’, (Presented to Parliament by the Secretary of 
State for the Home Department, by Command of Her Majesty, Home Department, 2007,Cm7052 
115 Lord Lloyd of Berwick, ‘Legislation Against Terrorism ‘, A consultation Paper Presented to the 
Parliament by the Secretary of State for the Home Department and the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland 
by Command of Her Majesty, 1998, Cm 4178, 
http://www.archive.officialdocuments.co.uk/document/cm41/4178/4178.htm. 
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“a specific form of political violence. It usually has the purpose of creating fear or 
terror among a population. It does not necessarily target innocent people or civilians, 
but it frequently does so”.116 
 Kapitan argued that terrorism 
“is the deliberate use of violence, or the threat of such, directed upon civilians in 
order to achieve political objectives.117  
An earlier definition of terrorism was given by Wilkinson who stated that: 
 “Terrorism is the systematic use of coercive intimidation, usually to service political 
ends.”118  
Chomsky was more precise in his definition of terrorism which he considered to be  
“the calculated use of violence or the threat of violence to attain goals that are 
political, religious, or ideological in nature…through intimidation, coercion, or 
instilling fear.”119  
 As quoted by Ignatieff, Malik reckoned that: 
“Terrorism is a violent form of politics, and it is because terrorism is political that it 
is dangerous. Terrorists represent causes and grievances and claim to speak for 
millions.”120  
Hoffman’s definition of terrorism was  quite extensive since he states that: 
“Virtually any especially abhorrent act of violence perceived as directed against 
society whether it involves the activities of antigovernment dissidents or 
governments themselves, organised-crime syndicates, common criminals, rioting 
mobs, people engaged in militant protest, individual psychotics, or lone 
extortionists—is often labeled terrorism.121”  
As an international lawyer, Bassiouni’s opinion was as follows: 
“Terrorism” can be defined as a strategy of violence designed to instill terror in a 
segment of a population or society in order to achieve a power outcome, 
propagandize a cause, or inflict harm for a vengeful purpose. Both state and non-
                                                          
116 V. Held, How Terrorism Is Wrong: Morality and Political Violence. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008. 
117 T. Kapitan, ‘The Terrorism of “Terrorism’, in J P Sterba (Eds.), Terrorism and International 
Justice,  Oxford University Press, NY, 2003, pp.47-68. 
 
118 P. Wilkinson, ‘The Strategic Implications of Terrorism.’ in M.L. Sondhi, Terrorism and Political Violence, 
Sondhi: Har-Anand Publications, India, 2000. 
119 N. Chomsky, Hegemony or survival. NY: Metropolitan Books, 2003.  
120 M. Ignatieff, The Lesser Evil: Political Ethics in an Age of Terror, Toronto:  Penguin Canada, 2004. 
121 B. Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, NY, Columbian University Press, 2006. 
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state actors resort to such a strategy, whether in the context of war or peace. In the 
case of states, a state can direct terror-violence either against its own population, non-
nationals under its control, or the population of another state. Similarly, non-state 
actors may target individuals or groups within their own state or those of another 
state, as well as states’ interests.122  
Another international law expert, Ben Saul stated: 
“There are no clean lines between terrorism and other forms of political violence, 
and the debate about defining terrorism is also a debate about the classification of 
political violence in all its myriad forms: riot, revolt, rebellion, war, conflict, uprising 
revolution, subversion, intervention, guerrilla warfare, and so on.”123  
“Terrorism”, in the most widely accepted contemporary usage of the term, was 
fundamentally and inherently political. Torres argued that terrorism, 
“is also ineluctably about power: the pursuit of power, the acquisition of power, and 
the use of power to achieve political change. Terrorism is thus violence—or, equally 
important ironically, perhaps, terrorism in its original context was also closely 
associated with the ideals of virtue and democracy.”124 
In order to enable international operations against terrorists, there is a need to reach a 
definition of terrorism  which will be approved by a wide international consensus,.  The 
expected definition should be based on the same principles approved already regarding 
conventional wars (i.e. inter-state conflicts), and extrapolated to non-conventional wars (i.e. 
between a state and an organisation).125 As a source and effective mechanism, the devised 
definition of terrorism increases the capacity of the international community to fight 
terrorism by helping in the enactment of antiterrorism legislation and the drafting of specific 
punishments against perpetrators of terrorism and those who encourage it.  It will allow the 
                                                          
122 C. Bassiouni, ‘Terrorism, Law Enforcement, and the Mass Media: Perspectives, Problems, Proposals’, 
2009, 72(1), The Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology. 
123 B. Saul, ‘The Legal Response of the League of Nations to Terrorism’. Journal of International Criminal 
Justice, 2006, 78. 
124 R. Torres, En manos de los usuarios, Periodistas, nº 7, diciembre. Federación de Asociaciones de la Prensa 
de España. Madrid, (2006). pp. 46-48. 
125 B. Ganor, ‘Defining Terrorism: Is One Man’s Terrorist Another Man’s Freedom Fighter?’ Police Practice 
and Research, 2002, 3(4): 287–304. 
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design of laws and international conventions against terrorism; terrorist organisations; states 
sponsoring terrorism; and, eventually, companies dealing economically with such states.  
Moreover, by providing a definition on terrorism, it will be possible to prevent terrorist 
organisations maneuvering, within the domestic politics of certain countries, to obtain public 
legitimacy. In addition, part of the population, which, in other circumstances, would support 
such groups, will be more cautious in giving unconditional allegiance. Finally, the effective 
use, of the definition of terrorism, could induce terrorist groups or organisations to be more 
inclined towards ethical and practical considerations and, in order to reach their aims, to shift 
from indiscriminate terrorism to other options (e.g. guerrilla warfare), thus provoking a 
significant  decline in international terrorism activities.126   
The struggle, to define terrorism, appears to be more challenging than the struggle against 
terrorism itself.127 The opinion, which claims that it is unnecessary and almost impossible to 
agree on a consensual definition of terrorism, dominates currently and for a long time, has 
established itself as the ‘politically correct’ one. Laqueur attempted to show that an 
objective, internationally accepted definition of terrorism was achievable; that the 
effectiveness of the struggle against terrorism depended on such a definition; and the quicker 
nations realized that the better for modern societies. 128 
The September 11 2001 terrorist attacks on US soil, and the United States of America’s 
subsequent efforts, to establish a large coalition to fight this threat, highlighted the debate 
                                                          
126 B. Netanyahu (Ed), International Terrorism: Challenge and Response, The Jonathan Institute, Jerusalem, 
1980. 
127 B. Ganor, ‘Defining Terrorism: Is One Man’s Terrorist Another Man’s Freedom Fighter?’ Police Practice 
and Research, 2002, 3(4): 287–304. 
128W. Laqueur, The Age of Terrorism, Little, Brown and Company, Boston, Toronto, 1988. 
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about what constituted terrorism.129 Since 2001, thousands of books and articles have been 
written on the subject. Silke130 argued that one book, on terrorism, was published every six 
hours, whilst Jackson131 stated that the subject area of terrorism was the “the fastest 
expanding areas of research in the English-speaking academic world”. Others underlined 
that terrorism research was becoming a ‘stand-alone subject entering a golden age of 
research’.132  Despite the amount of literature on the topic of terrorism, this issue suffered 
consistently from a concrete lack of theory.133  
Most researchers believed that an objective and internationally accepted definition of 
terrorism could be achieved hardly or agreed upon.134 After all, some said, ‘‘one man’s 
terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter.’’135 Therefore, , according to the people who share 
the above definition of terrorism136, determining, who was a terrorist, fell into the 
interpreter’s subjectivist viewpoint; and, accordingly, such a fixed definition  would not 
allow moving forward in the international fight against terrorism.137  
                                                          
129 The debate about the definition of terrorism did occur in different arenas, being domestic parliaments, or 
International organisations such as the UN, the EU, the Council of Europe (CoE), the OECD, the African 
Union (AU).  
130 See Silke, ‘Research on Terrorism’ in Chen, H; Reid, E; Sinai, J; Silke, A; and Ganor, B (eds), Terrorism 
Informatics. Knowledge Management and Data Mining for Homeland Security, New York: Springer, 2008, 
pp. 27-50. 
131 R. Jackson, ‘The Ghost of State Terror: Knowledge, Politics and Terrorism Studies’, in Critical Studies on 
Terrorism, 2008, Vol.1(3): pp.377–392. Article available online at: 
http://humansecuritygateway.com/documents/ISA_theghostsofstateterror.pdf  
 
132 See J. Shepherd, ‘The Rise and Rise of Terrorism Studies’, The Guardian, 3/07/2007, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/education/2007/jul/03/highereducation.research. See as well as R Attwood, ‘Study 
of Terrorism Steps up to New Level’, The Times, 22/6/2007. 
http://www.timeshighereducation.co.uk/news/study-of-terrorism-steps-up-to-new-level/209437.article 
 
133 A. Spencer,Tabloid Terrorist, Palgrave Macmillan: Basingstoke, 2010. 
134 Ibid. p. 2 
135 The quote is  in fact another version of "One man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter" first written 
by Gerald Seymour in his 1975 book  Harry's Game, about a British cabinet minister killed by the Irish 
Republican Army (IRA). 
136  The relativist definition of terrorism seems rather ‘simplistic’ and weak; there are terrorist activities which 
cannot have any real support, and the dichotomy terrorist/freedom fighter rather reductive of the diversity of 
perspectives. 
137 Such a definition might have had some appeal for the people colonised, when they wanted to free themselves 
from the oppression, which is not anymore the case, in the present time . 
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The other extreme considered that it was enough to say that ‘what looks like a terrorist, 
sounds like a terrorist, and behaves like a terrorist, is a terrorist’.138  Yet, targeting people, 
on ethnic grounds, is not only ethically wrong but, also, divisive practically and 
counterproductive in an open society.   This thinking does not help the comprehension of 
an already problematic issue. In the same manner, Ganor criticized equally those who tried 
to categorize terrorism between ‘old and new terrorisms’; ‘bad and worse terrorism,’; 
‘internal and international terrorism;’ or ‘tolerable terrorism and intolerable terrorism.’ 139                                                                                                                                
For Ganor, such attempts revealed the subjectivity of the person doing the categorizing –
such an attitude undermined the efforts towards identifying who were the real terrorists. 
At the same time, there were others who argued for the necessity of having a clear and strong 
definition of terrorism, however, without recognizing explicitly that such a definition would 
be used for their own political ends140 (i.e. weakening their political opponents by labeling 
them as terrorists or supporters of terrorism). 
Ganor addressed also another aspect which seemed to hinder the efforts towards a proper 
definition of terrorism. The writer argued that several states, fostering ‘terrorist groups’, 
attempted constantly to convince the international community (for example, through the 
General Assembly of the UN) to define terrorism in such a way that particular ‘terrorist 
                                                          
138An American citizen, James Inhofe, the Republican senator of Oklahoma, acknowledged on a TV show 
(CBS, 2010) that "I know it's not politically correct to say, I believe in racial and ethnic profiling." In the US 
in particular, profiling is commonly used. For instance, following the 2010 Christmas Day incident, the Obama 
administration announced that citizens from 14 countries - all but one, Cuba, were Muslim countries - would 
be subjected automatically to extra screening before boarding flights to the US. See Martha Teichner, What 
Does a Terrorist Look Like?, CBSNews, April 11 2010, http://www.cbsnews.com/2100-3445_162-
6385040.html . 
139 See B. Ganor, ‘Defining Terrorism: Is One Man’s Terrorist Another Man’s Freedom Fighter?’ Police 
Practice and Research, 2002, 3(4): 287–304. 
140 See M. Crenshaw (Ed.), Terrorism in Context. Pennsylvania State University: Pennsylvania, 1995. 
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organisations’, which they supported, were not included in the definition – and in doing so - 
justified their help to certain groups and exempted them from any eventual responsibility.141  
The countries, specifically mentioned by Ganor, were Syria; Libya; and Iran. The author 
seemed to be less objective when he stated that these countries: 
“have lobbied for such a definition, according to which ‘freedom fighters’ would be 
given carte blanche permission to carry out any kind of attacks they wanted, because 
a just goal can be pursued by all available means”. 
Ganor presented no evidence about  his claims. Accordingly,   this researcher argues that 
Ganor  was misled by theses states’ official political statements which  were echoed in the 
mainstream media and taken out of their original context. It  was interesting to  investigate 
how other scholars considered the United Staes of America’s  hegemonic rule, which, 
certainly not by chance, supported Ganor’s claims.  For instance, Odom142, reflecting on the 
American concept of ‘War on Terrorism’ is very critical towards the path, followed by the 
American administration, since September 11 2001. He considered the American policy, 
relative to the “Global War on Terrorism”, to be ‘perverse’143 and an example of ‘sustained 
hysteria’. Accordingly, he confirmed that he shared the opinions of the critics who 
considered that terrorism was not as ‘an enemy but as a tactic’ when he said:    
“Because the United States itself has a long record of supporting terrorists and using 
terrorist tactics, the slogans of today’s war on terrorism merely make the United 
                                                          
141 See B. Ganor, ‘Countering State-Sponsored Terrorism’, ICT Papers of The International Policy Institute 
for Counter-Terrorism, The Interdisciplinary Center, Herzlia, Israel, 1997. 
 
142 See G. W Odom, ‘American Hegemony: How to Use It, How to Lose It’, Proceedings of the American 
Philosophical Society, 2007, 151 (4): 410, available online at 
http://www.middlebury.edu/media/view/214721/original/OdomPaper.pdf  
143 According to Odom, The united States of America’s  first ‘perverse’ policy  was  its stance on 
Nonproliferation Policy. The author stated that:  
“Although our nonproliferation policy was meant to maintain regional stability, it actually has accelerated 
proliferation and created instability. Given America’s recent record on nonproliferation in South Asia, 
the lesson that Iran and others must draw is that if they acquire nuclear weapons, Washington will embrace 
them, as it has India and Pakistan. Moreover, because the United States permitted Israel to proliferate 
some years back, this adds to the incentives for all Arab states to proliferate as well.” 
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States look hypocritical to the rest of the world. A prudent American president would 
end the present policy of “sustained hysteria” over potential terrorist attacks; order 
the removal of most of the new safety barriers in Washington and elsewhere, and 
treat terrorism as a serious but not a strategic problem.”144 
Odom’s perspective was more comprehensive than Ganor’s. By enlarging the picture for 
readers rather than focusing on three countries, he created a clearer idea about terrorism; this 
might mislead researchers when analysing the ‘terrorism’ phenomenon. 
There  were serious reservations as regards the soundness of arguments developed by a 
number of schools of thought on the issue of ‘terrorism; and, therefore, the divergences, 
between them, would make it difficult for the international community to face and fight 
efficiently the challenge represented by terrorist organisations.  In order to illustrate the 
existing contradiction, Ganor believed that:  
“An objective definition of terrorism is nevertheless not only possible; it is also an 
essential requisite in any serious attempt to combat terrorism”.145 
Whilst Gutpa underlined the few tiny but definite threads which were shared in what he 
called the “rapidly burgeoning literature”:  
It is nearly impossible to define “terrorism.” The link between sociopolitical and 
economic structural factors, such as poverty, lack of economic opportunity, and 
terrorism is weak and there is no single profile of a “terrorist”.146  
However, without being able to provide a consensual definition, it would be very difficult to 
coordinate, in a consistent manner, the struggle against international terrorism. 
Consequently, the scattered efforts, as those at the present time, would go really nowhere. A 
                                                          
144 It is essential to underline, here, that the reported statements were not made by an American dissident or an 
anti-Imperialist scholar, since, under President Reagan's administration, Professor William Odon, in addition 
to his academic credentials, was Director of the National Security Agency (NSA). 
 
145 See B. Ganor, ‘Defining Terrorism: Is One Man’s Terrorist Another Man’s Freedom Fighter?’ Police 
Practice and Research, 2002, 3(4): 287–304. 
146 See D.K. Gupta, ‘Exploring Roots of Terrorism’, in T Bjørgo (ed.) Root Causes of Terrorism. Routledge:  
London, 2004. 
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correct and objective definition of terrorism might be based on agreed international laws and 
principles regarding what behaviours were permitted in conventional wars between nations. 
The regulation of warfare and armed conflict, resulting from international efforts, consists 
of two main codes147 based on legal and humanitarian considerations. These laws are set out 
in the Geneva148 and Hague149 Conventions. Despite the common use of Hague and Geneva 
together, each offers a distinctive approach to the problem of regulating armed conflict. The 
established basic principles consider that, although, due to the fact that such action is a 
necessary evil, it is permissible to harm soldiers deliberately during wartime, , the deliberate 
targeting of civilians is forbidden absolutely. Consequently, these two Conventions make a 
clear distinction between soldiers attacking enemy soldiers, and war criminals who attack 
civilians deliberately. 
Academics;150 politicians;151 and journalists,152 all use a variety of definitions of terrorism; 
and examples were presented previously in this study.  Some definitions focus on terrorist 
                                                          
147 Both approaches are represented by a certain number of conventions and protocols. 
148 The Geneva approach distinguishes, in its definition, between combatants, civilians and war casualties and 
prisoners. It considers that civilians, wounded soldiers and war prisoners should be treated in a humanly 
appropriate way. See  http://www.answers.com/topic/geneva-and-hague-conventions#ixzz1rRPJ2U3T. 
149 The Hague approach focuses instead on the rights and duties of soldiers during armed conflicts, and makes 
clear restrictions on behaviour, and insists on the prohibition of particular weapons and inhumane practices.                                                                                                                                                                      
See  http://www.answers.com/topic/geneva-and-hague-conventions#ixzz1rRPJ2U3T 
 
150 See, for example, the following scholars whose statements  were quoted previously in this study; M. 
Ignatieff, (2004); N. Chomsky, (2003);  P. Wilkinson, (2000); Kapitan, (2003); Held, (2008); B. Hoffmann, 
(2006); Bassiouni, (2009);  B.Saul, (2006); R.Torres, (2006). 
151The following politicians  represents only a few examples and the circumstances of their interventions, either 
interviews, speeches, books and so on: (Joe Biden, speech, Aug. 7, 2006); (Wesley Clark, 203, p. 106) (George 
W. Bush, speech, Dec. 18, 2005); (Nelson Mandela, Larry King Live, May 16, 2000); (Rudolph Giuliani, CNN 
interview, Sep. 11, 2002); (Benjamin Netanyahu, 1989, p.15); (Pat Buchanan, 2004, p. 58) (Jacques Chirac, 
speech, Sep. 24, 1986); (Barack Obama, speech, Feb. 28, 2006);( Tony Blair, The Guardian, Friday 5 August 
2005).  
152 See L. J. Martin, ‘The Media's Role in International Terrorism’, University of Maryland, Mayland, 
http://pegasus.cc.ucf.edu/~surette/mediasrole.html 
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organisations’,153 whilst others consider the incentives and characteristics of terrorism,154 or 
the way individual terrorists behave.155  
In their work on political terrorism, Schmidt and Jongman156 mentioned more than hundred 
different definitions of terrorism these were collected from a survey which they conducted. 
Their research approach consisted of isolating recurring terms and ordering them according 
to their statistical appearance in the studied definitions.157  In the academic field, there was 
reference often to Ganor’s proposed definition of terrorism,158  This justified the researcher 
focusing on this specific writer’s work. Ganor stated that terrorism: 
"is the intentional use of, or threat to use, violence against civilians or against civilian 
targets, in order to attain political aims.159  
Three important elements  were highlighted:160 firstly, the nature of the action and the use or 
the threat of using violence.  Therefore, (following this definition), it was assumed that an 
                                                          
153 Ibid. Martin in his study stated that :  
“While the mass media do, generally, cover terrorism at a rate of at least nine incidents per day worldwide, 
the press uses the term " terrorist" sparingly, preferring such neutral terms as guerrilla, rebel, and 
paramilitary, or using no value-laden adjectives at all. This raises the question of the effectiveness of 
terrorism. The press gives terrorists publicity but often omits the propaganda message that terrorists would 
like to see accompanying reports of their exploits, thus reducing terrorism to mere crime or sabotage.” 
154 See P. Wilkinson, “Response to Terrorism from the Toolbox of Liberal Democracies: Their Applicability 
to Other Types of Regimes’, in Countering Terrorism Through International Cooperation. Proceedings of the 
International Conference on “Countering Terrorism Through Enhanced International Cooperation.” 
Courmayeur Mont Blanc, Italy, 2001, pp. 206-213. 
155 See U.S. Army TRADOC G2 Handbook No. 1 (Version 5.0), ‘A Military Guide to Terrorism in the Twenty-
First Century’, Terrorist Motivations and Behaviors, Chapter 2, 2007, available online at:  
http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/army/guidterr/ch02.pdf  
156 A. Schmidt, & A. Jongman, (Eds.), Political Terrorism, SWIDOC, Amsterdam and Transaction Books, 
1988. 
157 In terms of percentages for the use of specific terms, Schmidt and Youngman’s findings were as follows: 
[1]. ‘Violence, force’ appeared in 83.5% of the definitions [2]. ‘Political’ 65% [3]. ‘Fear, emphasis on terro’r 
51% [4]. ‘Threats’ 47% [5]. ‘Psychological effects and anticipated reactions’ 41.5% [6]. ‘Discrepancy between 
the targets and the victims’ 37.5% [7]. ‘Intentional, planned, systematic, organized, action’ 32% [8].‘Methods 
of combats, strategy, tactics’ 30.5%. See Schmidt and Jongman (1988), p.5. 
158 See ‘Approaches to Defining Terrorism’, in Special Topics in Criminal Justice  available at: 
http://www.elearnportal.com/courses/criminal-justice/special-topics-in-criminal-justice/special-topics-in-
criminal-justice-approaches-to-defining-terrorism  
159 See B. Ganor, ‘Defining Terrorism: Is One Man’s Terrorist Another Man’s Freedom Fighter?’ Police 
Practice and Research, 2002, 3(4): 287–304. 
160 Ibid.  
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activity exempt from violence or a threat of violence could not be considered to be 
terrorism.161  
Secondly, the intention, of the action was always to achieve political objectives – such as 
regime change; overthrow of rulers; or inducing changes in social or economic policies. The 
nonexistence of a political aim prevented an action being described as an act of terrorism. 
Committing violent actions against civilians, without political motives, was  considered to 
be rather as a simple criminal offence or an act of insanity, but not terrorism. However, 
ideological or religious factors might be included within political objectives. Ganor 
underlined that, in addition to the fact that the concept of ‘political aim’  was sufficiently 
broad to include a variety of factors, the concise and exhaustive aspects, of such a definition, 
represented real advantages,. Ideological; religious; or other motives behind political aims  
were judged irrelevant when it  came to the definition  of terrorism.  In this context, Duvall 
and Stohl’s following statement deserves mention:162 
“Motives are entirely irrelevant to the concept of political terrorism. Most analysts 
fail to recognize this and, hence, tend to discuss certain motives as logical or 
necessary aspects of terrorism. But they are not. At best, they are empirical 
regularities associated with terrorism. More often they simply confuse analysis”.163 
Thirdly, civilians were the main target for terrorist actions. Terrorism was included in the 
category of political violence; however, it  was distinct from the other forms of violence such 
as guerrilla warfare or civilian insurrection. Terrorist organisations exploited largely the 
vulnerability of innocent civilians; provoking anxiety; and huge coverage by a reactive 
media when attacks  were conducted against civilians. 
                                                          
161  For instance, activities which include nonviolent opposition/protests, strikes, and peaceful demonstrations.  
162 Schmidt and Jongman (1988) quoted these authots. 
163A..P. Schmidt, Political Terrorism, SWIDOC. Amsterdam and Transaction Books, 1984. 
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The three point, of the above definition, underlined that terrorism  was not an unintentional 
activity or an accident which provoked civilian casualties who, by misfortune, were in an 
area known for its violent political activities. Rather, it highlighted the fact that, purposely, 
terrorists targeted innocent people. Therefore, civilians used as human shields to cover 
military activity or installations could not be considered to be ‘collateral damage’ to, if such 
damage  was incurred in an attack aimed originally against a military target. Full 
responsibility was incumbent upon whoever used such shields.164 
 
2.8 Conclusion: 
Throughout the years, the numerous international legal attempts, in dealing with terrorism, 
avoided mostly the difficulty of drafting a general definition. This chapter presented the three 
historical phases of the evolution of the notion of ‘terrorism’: the post Second World War 
phase which was the study’s starting point; the post-cold War phase which witnessed the 
supremacy of one superpower; and the period following the September 11 2001 events.  The 
chapter discussed, also, the various definitions of terrorism, whether at the level of 
international organizations, or national legislation, or in the form of opinions of experts both 
within and outside academia. It stressed the primary need to formulate a consensual 
definition of terrorism; this was deemed crucial in enhancing the role of government in 
enacting legislation to fight terrorism.  Therefore, there was an attempt to shed light on the 
controversies between different schools of thought as regards the nature of terrorism; its 
essence; targets; and mechanisms,  and the divergence in labeling terrorism as either ‘old’ 
or ‘new’.  There was, also, an emphasis on the motivational background which could be 
                                                          
164 See B. Ganor, ‘Defining Terrorism: Is One Man’s Terrorist Another Man’s Freedom Fighter?’ Police 
Practice and Research, 2002, 3(4): 287–304. 
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found in the more overarching construct of political violence as an attempt to illustrate the 
overlap between terrorism and other types of political violence, mostly considered as such 
by its victims and a large part of observers.  In conclusion, it could be said that terrorism 
found its motivational factors in a general or specific frustration felt by certain groups within 
societies.  
The study aimed to highlight the relationship between terrorism and the laws counteracting 
it at one end of the spectrum and the media at the other. Consequently, the following chapter 
defines the media; its types;  its historical developments; and, finally, examine the debated 
relationship between the media and anti-terrorism laws. 
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Chapter Three:  
 Media, Terrorism and Anti-terrorism Laws 
 
3.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter addressed the historical context of the development of terrorism and 
delineated the circumstances from which the enactment of anti-terrorism laws originated. 
Whilst underlining the distinction between international and domestic terrorism, it considers, 
also, the various definitions of terrorism, and the academic and institutional debates about 
the criteria for defining terrorism.  
In this chapter, before addressing the relationship between the mass media and the laws 
enacted in the context of the ‘war on terror’, it is necessary to define the relevant concepts. 
The term ‘media’ refers to all methods or channels of information and entertainment, whilst 
mass media is used specifically to describe newspapers; radio; and television.165 However, 
the revolution, in telecommunications, has affected the ‘conventional’ media and induced 
most media organisations to adapt themselves to the new phenomenon by accepting new 
norms and instruments of communication and by investing and competing to provide their 
services through the Internet.  This chapter focuses on the media, by defining its role; its 
importance; its tools; and its relationship with terrorism.  
 
3.2. Definition of Media 
Media are transmission channels used to gather and deliver information. Generally, media 
are associated with mass communications. There are instances where they refer to only one 
                                                          
165 These media can be called conventional media, in contrast to the modern and alternative media provided 
by non-professionals on the Internet.   
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medium (BBC 4; CNN; the Guardian; and so on), for conveying any type of information. 
Mass communications encompass not only institutions but, also, the means used as technical 
mechanisms (e.g. press; radio; films) to diffuse information to a great number of listeners; 
viewers, and readers, despite their geographical locations and heterogeneity in terms of 
populations; cultures; and religions.166 News media refers commonly to sources such as TV; 
radio; and newspapers. In the last two decades, there appeared, also, on the Internet, other 
forms of media such as reporting services; blogs; web pages; and all types of propaganda 
broadcasts. A new event, such as a terrorist action, is susceptible always to attracting wide 
attention.167 
 
Akin observed that the term ‘media’ was used generally when referring to “the group of 
corporate entities, publishers, journalists, and others who constitute the communications 
industry and profession”. 168  Also, when it related to conflict, "the press" or the journalists 
and reporters who  wrote and reported the news referred often to “news media”  as the term 
to describe the news industry. 169 News means either facts, or interpretation of facts or even 
the views expressed by journalists since these determine later what facts to include; which 
information to report; the interpretation to give; and the required space or time. The 
management depends on a number of factors such as: the editor’s opinion; and the events 
which show management's bias.170  However the media’s role is not limited only to reporting 
the news, often, they create it by deciding which story is newsworthy and which is not.  
                                                          
166 M. Janowitz, ‘The study of Mass Communication’, in D L Sills (ed), International Encyclopaedia of the 
Social Sciences, MacMillan, New York, 1968, pp. 40-51. 
167 J. R. White, Terrorism and Homeland Security, Wadsworth, Belmont, California, 2011. 
168 J. Akin, "Mass Media", Beyond Intractability. Eds. Burgess G and Burgess H. Conflict Information 
Consortium, University of Colorado, Boulder. March 2005 http://www.beyondintractability.org/bi-
essay/mass-communication. 
169 R. Schaffert, (The Media's Influence on the Public's Perception of Terrorism and the Question of Media 
Responsibility. Media Coverage and Political Terrorists. Praeger Publishers, New York, 1992. 
170 A. Kohut, ‘Self-Censorship: Counting the Ways’, Columbia Journalism Review, May 2000. Vol. 39 (1), 
p.42. 
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The adverse side, of the mass media, lies in the fact that the news media thrive on conflict. 
Often, the media present the latest catastrophe or crimes as leading stories. It is assumed 
that, the greater the presentation of the conflict, the greater the audience since more viewers; 
listeners; and readers are likely to be impressed.  Therefore, the media exploit this fact and 
try to adjust and fabricate conflict in order to make it look more intense than it is really. 
Accordingly, conflict resolution stories are neglected in favour of the most spectacular, 
colourful, and shocking aspects of a conflict dynamic. 
  
3.3 Terrorist Use of Media  
Terrorist attacks occur on particular occasions, often targeting elites, and ensuring that the 
media can have easy access to the scenes of violence.171   Consequently, media coverage can 
grant status and even legitimacy to opposition groups; therefore, television coverage 
becomes naturally one of their planned strategies and top priorities.172  The news’ role is to 
generate profit for large media firms and, within the media world, fierce competition exists 
in order to obtain profits for their respective shareholders.   Consequently, the media rely 
extensively on government reports and a new term, called ‘parachute journalism’, has 
emerged.173   
Another drawback, of the modern media, is their dependence on advertisements; this may 
affect their neutrality.174   
                                                          
171 R. W. Schaffert, Media Coverage and Political Terrorists: A Quantitative Analysis, Greenwood, 1992. 
172 E. Sanders, ‘Results of FCC's Media Studies Are Released’, Los Angeles Times, Oct 2002. 
http://pqasb.pqarchiver.com/latimes/202977141.html?did=202977141&FMT=ABS&FMTS=FT&desc=Calif
ornia%3b+Results+of+FCC%27s+Media+Studies+Are+Released 
173 “Parachute journalism” is a pejorative term used, in media circles, to refer to a practice whereby outsider 
journalists are sent, for a short period, to cover an event abroad without having the necessary knowledge of the 
politics; traditions; and culture of the place. Consequently, the news reports are likely to be inaccurate.  
174  For example, some media do not report certain stories that might affect their advertisers’ interests. 
According to a survey made in 2000, "...about one in five (20 percent) of local and (17 percent) (of) national 
reporters say they have faced criticism or pressure from their bosses after producing or writing a piece that was 
seen as damaging to their company's financial interests". See Kohut, A (2002).  
 
Chapter Four: UK Anti–Terrorism Laws a critical overview             56 
 
 
 In the United States of America’s constitution, the existing provisions, of relating to 
freedom of expression, do not control how the news media select and present stories, 
particularly in times of war.175 Authoritarian regimes impose, also, restraints on journalists; 
these range from fines to imprisonment. However, due to the nature of modern society, 
people depend on the media to be informed and, even if accounts are limited or biased, do 
seek access to the world’s events.176  Here, it is important to mention that technological 
advances facilitate access to all forms of information, making it difficult to assess the 
soundness of the sources. 
3.3.1 Terrorists’ Incentives and Objectives for using the Media: Stating the Problem  
Fromkin pointed out that those political movements, which opted for terrorist action, chose 
such violent and extreme instruments because they lacked material resources; supporters; 
finance; or territory. These   were the pre-conditions for any legitimate political action.177 
For Crenshaw, terrorism represented an indirect strategy to achieve political aims, by 
influencing audiences through the media.178 Kydd and Walter observed that terrorists 
differed in the audiences which they intended to influence and in the messages which they 
wanted to convey to selected audiences.179  For instance, some groups used violent action, 
convinced that their opponents would comply with their demands. Others wanted to provoke 
indiscriminate repression by governments: a reaction which would serve their cause; 
destabilize the government; and give a form of legitimacy to the use of violence. By using 
terrorist violence, other groups wanted to show their strength (i.e. their capacity to 
                                                          
175 According to survey of 287 US journalists, "about a quarter of those polled have personally avoided 
pursuing newsworthy stories". See Kohut, A (2002)  
176 D. Laws, ‘Representation of Stakeholding Interests’. The Consensus Building Handbook. Thousand Oaks: 
Sage Publications. 1999. 
177 D. Fromkin, ‘The strategy of terrorism’, Foreign Affairs, 1975, 53(4), 683–698.   
178 M. Crenshaw, ‘The causes of terrorism’, Comparative Politics, 1981, 13(4), 397–399.   
179 A. Kydd, and B. Walter,‘The strategies of terrorism’. International Security, 2006, 31(1), 49–79.   
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undermine their adversaries) to their supporters and to gain the sympathy of others. For all 
these motives, media attention was essential since it represented the vehicle through which 
terrorists conveyed their messages to various audiences and, therefore, a key goal was  to 
influence the scale and tone of media coverage of their attacks.180 
It would be pertinent to consider the potential objectives which terrorists wanted to  achieve 
by approaching the media. Alexander et al. believed that terrorists might interact with the 
media for three specific aims: firstly to attract the attention of a wide audience; secondly to 
have a form of recognition; and, thirdly, to have the proper channels through which to 
legitimise their action.181 Another scholar, Gerrits, considered instead the psychological 
interaction between terrorists and the media.182  He pointed out that, from such a perspective, 
the aims could be listed as follows: demoralising the enemy; showing their destructive 
power; gaining sympathy and spreading terror; and panic in the public minds. This was 
because the media was the best instrument to use in order to achieve all these aims. For 
Bandura, terrorist organisations used the media for moral justification; to gain sympathy and 
to intimidate their opponents.183  
 
In a similar vein, Stohl argued that terrorists were interested primarily in the audience and 
not the victims.184  He emphasized that the way, in which the audience reacted, was as 
                                                          
180 B. Jenkins, ‘International terrorism: A new mode of conflict’ in David Carlton and Carlo Schaerf (eds.), 
International terrorism and world security, Croon Helm: London, 1975. See also Brigitte L. Nacos, ‘Mass-
Mediated Terrorism: The Central Role of the Media in Terrorism and Counterterrorism, Rowman & 
Littlefield, 2002 and B Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, Columbia University Press, USA, 2006. 
181 See Alexander et al, Terrorism: Theory and Practice, Westview Press: Boulder, 1979, p. 162. 
182 R.P.J.M. Gerrits, “Terrorists’ Perspectives: Memoirs,” in: D.L. Paletz, and A. Schmid, Terrorism and the 
Media, Sage: London.1992,p. 29-61; and C.D. Vinson, “Introduction,” in: D. L. Paletz and A. Schmid (1992), 
Terrorism and the Media, London: Sage, 1992, p. 1-5. 
183 A. Bandura, “Mechanisms of Moral Disengagement,” in: W. Reich, (Ed.), Origins of Terrorism; 
Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, States of Mind, Woodrow Wilson Centre Press: Washington, 1998, pp. 
161-191. 
184 Stohl (1985) quoted in S. L. Rhine; S. E. Bennett; R. S. Flickinger, After 9/11: Televisions viewers, 
Newspaper readers and Public Opinion about Terrorism’s Consequences, (Paper prepared for presentation at 
the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association), Boston Massachusetts – August 29th - 
September 1st 2002. 
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important as the act itself. Therefore, the terrorists’ key objectives were: gaining media 
attention; national and international audiences; and access to decision-makers. This 
explained, also, why terrorist groups choose judiciously specific locations to carry out their 
violent acts, so as to gain wide media coverage.  
 
Without dismissing the previous analysts’ opinions, Nacos (2007) combined their findings 
in a comprehensive framework. She highlighted ‘Four Media-Centered Goals’: the first 
consisted of gaining the attention and awareness of a variety of audiences and, thus, 
intimidating their targets. The second goal was to convey their message in order that the 
public recognised the motives for their actions. The third was to obtain the respect and 
sympathy of those in whose name they conducted their violent acts. The final objective was  
to  gain the same legitimacy; status; and treatment  as enjoyed by political actors.185 
 
3.4 Interdependence Media and Terrorism  
Terrorism attracts media and media attract terrorism. It is a symbiotic relationship, although, 
in terms of proportions, the terrorists seem to need the media more than the media need 
them.186 Current historical development showed that, during the last decade, there  could be 
found several examples of the mutually beneficial relationship between terrorist groups and 
the media.187  Analysts quote often Margaret Thatcher’s famous statement “publicity is the 
oxygen of terrorism”,188 made during her time as British Prime Minister between 1979 and 
                                                          
 
185 B. L. Nacos, op.cit B. L. Nacos, ‘Mass-Mediated Terrorism: The Central Role of the Media in Terrorism 
and Counterterrorism, Rowman & Littlefield, 2002 ,p.20 
186 A. C. Ekwueme and Rev. Fr. P. M. Obayi, ‘Boko Haram Assault on Nigeria: Towards Effective Mass 
Media Response’, New Media and Mass Communication, Vol. 5, 2012, at www.iiste.org  
187 D. Rohner and B. S. Frey. ‘Blood and ink! The common-interest-game between terrorists and the media’, 
Public Choice, 2007,133: pp. 129–145 http://bsfrey.ch/articles/C_471_07.pdf 
188 British Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher, in R. W. Apple Jr., Meese Suggests Press Code on Terrorism,. 
NewYork Times, July 18, 1985. 
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1990, .189 In some ways, Thatcher expressed explicitly what other politicians and 
government official preferred to formulate more subtly (and think privately).  For her, things 
were straightforward; and, for the media, she suggested a very simple solution, however 
unrealistic, - not paying attention to terrorist acts and, consequently, to avoid reporting them. 
She considered that such an approach would withhold oxygen and dissuade further terrorism 
actions. Thatcher’s assertion, derived from logical reasoning, might be plausible since one 
of the terrorists’ main objectives  was to convey a message of fear to people, whether 
involved in the action or not. 
 Nacos expressed a similar view in saying, 
“While publicity has been a central goal of most terrorists throughout history, the 
means of communication have advanced from word-of-mouth accounts by witnesses 
to news reporting in the print press, radio, newsreel, and eventually television, which 
has greatly enhanced terrorists’ propaganda capabilities. More recently, the World 
Wide Web has emerged as a new and the perhaps the most potent propaganda vehicle 
for terrorist groups and “lone wolves,” as well as for the advocates of political 
violence.” “Without massive news coverage the terrorist act would resemble the 
proverbial tree falling in the forest: if no one learned of an incident, it would be as if 
it had not occurred.”190  
 
Ganor‘s statement, regarding the relationship between the media and terrorism, was even 
stronger, 
“Terrorists are not necessarily interested in the deaths of three, or thirty – or even of 
three thousand - people. Rather, they allow the imagination of the target population 
to do their work for them. In fact, it is conceivable that the terrorists could attain their 
aims without carrying out a single attack; the desired panic could be produced by the 
                                                          
189 E. R. Muller; R. F. J. Spaaij, & A. G. W. Ruitenberg, Trends in terrorisme, Alphen aan de Rijn: Kluwer, 
Netherlands, 2003. See also J. D. Vieira, ‘Terrorism at the BBC: The IRA on British Television’, in A. O. 
Alali & K. K. Eke, Media coverage of terrorism, methods of diffusion. Sage: London, 1991, pp. 73-85. 
 
190 B. L. Nacos, “Accomplice or Witness? The Media’s Role in Terrorism.” Current History, April 2000, 
Vol. 99 (636), p. 174-178. 
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continuous broadcast of threats and declarations – by radio and TV interviews, videos 
and all the familiar methods of psychological warfare.”191   
 
Hoffman, another expert on terrorism, consolidated Nacos’ and Ganor’s perspectives by 
stating: 
“With the help of the media – willingly or not – terrorism easily reaches global audience. 
Between media and terrorism, there exists a very interactive (symbiotic) relationship.”192 
 
Later, the same author (Hoffman, 2006) went further later and argued that: 
“without the media’s coverage the act’s impact is arguably wasted, remaining 
narrowly confined to the immediate victim(s) of the attack, rather than reaching the 
wider ‘target audience’ at whom the terrorists’ violence is actually aimed.”193  
 
Generally however, media personnel dismissed Thatcher’s suggested course of action since 
it could be observed that mass media played a crucial role in disseminating and amplifying 
the terrorists’ messages. Reports, such as the one issued by the Sixth Framework 
Programme194, contended that, in fact, the media benefitted from terrorist acts. It was beyond 
contention that a relationship existed between the media and terrorism. However, it was 
legitimate to determine the nature of such a relationship and to find out whether, as stated 
by Thatcher, publicity was the oxygen of terrorists and if, in some ways, the media, 
benefitted from terrorist acts. It was said, sometimes, that the media and terrorists “sleep in 
the same bed, but with different dreams.”  It was undeniable that the media thrived in 
reporting violence since such news increased the audience. Therefore, they reacted promptly 
                                                          
191 See B. Ganor, Terror as a Strategy of Psychological Warfare, International Institute for Counter-
Terrorism, July15, 2002 http://212.150.54.123/articles/articledet.cfm?articleid=443.  
 
192  B. Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, Columbia University Press, New York, 2003. 
193  Ibid, page 174. 
194 See “Terrorism and the Media”, TTSRL, July 23, 2008, Deliverable 6, Work package 4, 
http://www.transnationalterrorism.eu/tekst/publications/WP4%20Del%206.pdf.  
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when terrorist actions occurred. Publicising terrorism was very fruitful for the media, 
especially in reinvigorating their competitiveness in attracting a larger audience.195 
Chenoweth stressed that:  
“Sensational media coverage also serves the terrorists in their recruiting, teaching, 
and training techniques. The press, therefore, is inadvertently complicit in fulfilling 
terrorists’ objectives”.196 
By their nature, the media had an insatiable appetite for unusual, disturbing, circumstantial, 
and highly dramatic stories. Mueller quoted what he termed as a cynical aphorism of a 
business newspaper:  
‘If it bleeds it leads’ and its less obvious corollary, if it doesn’t bleed, it certainly 
shouldn’t lead and indeed, may not fit for print at all’.197  
 
Jenkins observed that, for media outlets, it made no difference that ordinary crimes exceeded 
significantly the victims of terrorism. They did not allocate time proportionally according to 
the number of deaths in the world. They preferred to report on unusual, alarming, or dramatic 
circumstances. Therefore, it was rather very subjective.198 The famous Brazilian guerrilla, 
Carlos Marighella, wrote in his guide ‘Mini-manual of the Urban Guerrilla’ that: 
                                                          
195 SeeB.L. Nacos “Terrorism and Media in the Age of Global Communication,” In: Hamilton, D.S., (Ed.), 
Terrorism and International Relations, 2006. Center for Transatlantic Relations: Washington, DC, p. 81-102. 
Nacos  was quite explicit in the following statement: 
“While I do not suggest that the news media favor this sort of political violence, it is nevertheless true 
that terrorist strikes provide what the contemporary media crave most – drama, shock, and tragedy 
suited to be packaged as human interest news.” pp. 81-82. 
 
196 See E. Chenoweth, The Inadvertent Effects of Democracy on Terrorist Group Emergence, (Document 
published as Discussion Paper at Belfer Centre for Science and International Affairs), June 2006, 
http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/chenoweth_2006_06.pdf 
197 J.E. Mueller, Overblown: How Politicians and the Terrorism Industry Inflate National Security Threats 
and why we believe them, Free Press, New York, 2006, p. 40. 
198 B. M. Jenkins, ‘The Psychological Implications of Media-covered Terrorism’, Rand Paper Series, 1981, 
p.2, http://www.rand.org/pubs/papers/2005/P6627.pdf. 
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 “The war of nerves or psychological war is an aggressive technique, based on the 
direct or indirect use of mass means of communication and news transmitted orally in 
order to demoralize the government. In psychological warfare, the government is 
always at a disadvantage since it imposes censorship on the mass media and winds up 
in a defensive position by not allowing anything against it to filter through.” 199 
 
3.5 Terrorism as a Communicative Action  
“A wider consideration of terrorism from a communicative prism leads to see it as a 
communicative action”.200  
Zurutuza referred to Laqueur who considered terrorism to be “propaganda by deeds” since 
its violent acts constituted a kind of publicity claim to attract the attention of audiences 
towards the terrorist groups’ demands.201   
In such a situation, terrorists needed mass media and prepared carefully their violent actions  
in order to ensure wide press coverage in prime time and to reach the maximum audience 
possible. Since most of the audience did not witness their deeds, the media were expected to 
be and were used as loudspeakers. The success of an act “depends almost entirely on the 
amount of publicity it receives”.202  Zurutuza insisted on the peculiarity of terrorism as a 
communicative action because she was unconvinced by those who considered terrorist 
violence to be an end in itself. Jenkins seemed to share the same opinion in stating that the 
terrorists’ real concerns were not the number of victims of their violent deeds but how many 
people would watch later.203 For Schmid, the real aim was to terrify people and undermine 
                                                          
199  C. Marighella, ‘Mini-manual of the Urban Guerrilla’ in Jay Mallin, Terror and Urban Guerrillas. A Study 
of Tactics and Documents, University of Miami Press: Florida, 1982, p.104.  
200 C. Zurutuza, ‘Terrorism as a Communicative Action: a proposal for the study of government response’, in 
Banu Baybars Hawks & Lemi Baruh, Societies under Siege: Media, Government, Politics, and Citizens’ 
Freedoms in an Age of Terrorism, 2010, p.18, (international conference held at Kadir Has University, 
Istanbul in 2009), http://www.khas.edu.tr/uploads/pdf-doc-vb/SocietiesUnderSiege.pdf.  
201 W. Laqueur, Terrorism, Weidenfeld and Nicolson: London, 1977. 
202 Ibid.p.135. 
203 B.Jenkins, “Should Our Arsenal against Terrorism Include Assassination?” Rand Paper P-7303, January 
1987. 
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authorities. Violence was used to communicate with a certain category of people. The 
victims were not the priority, they were only instrumental. Therefore, violence was a 
message for third parties.204  Karber stated that,  
“The terrorist’s message of violence necessitates a victim, whether personal or 
institutional, but the target or intended recipient of the communication may not be 
the victim”.205  
Tuman observed that the communicative action (i.e. terrorism) expected a response in the 
sense of raising public awareness of the terrorists’ ‘legitimate’ demands and, thus, increasing 
pressure on governments).206 Violence was a meticulously planned and choreographed 
spectacle, intended to allow access to the media circuit. The media, willingly or 
involuntarily, ensured, by their presence, the entry of terrorists into the political 
communication triangle (see Figure 1.1), constituted by citizens; mass media; and public 
institutions.207  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.1: The Triangle of Political Communication (Nacos, 2007, 15) 
                                                          
204 A. P. Schmid, 'Frameworks for Conceptualising Terrorism', Terrorism and Political Violence, 2004, 
Vol.16 (2), pp.197-221, available online at: 
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205 P. Karber, 1971, ‘Urban terrorism: Baseline data and a conceptual framework’, Social Science Quarterly, 
52, p. 529. Article available online at: 
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207 B.L. Nacos, Mass-Mediated Terrorism: The Central Role of the Media in Terrorism and Counterterrorism, 
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Weimann and Winn adopted the metaphor of violence as a staged performance for people 
“whose discourse has a script and whose actions are choreographed to achieve the exposure 
and media attention”.208  
3.6 Terrorist Use of the Internet 
In modern times, the means and variety of universally available communication has attracted 
terrorist groups which saw, in the internet and other modern electronic devices, a real 
opportunity to spread their messages, using media instruments of great convenience. The 
new and emerging media facilitated the spreading of terrorist publications through websites. 
Baran highlighted the benefits of the electronic revolution by stating that: 
“New technologies have simply allowed the dissemination of terrorist messages to 
reach a broader audience with a more concise message”.209 
In the same vein, Michel Moutot, a French journalist from the Agence France Press (AFP), 
observed that terrorists did not need any more to strive in conveying their messages. Having 
replaced the ‘official’ media, the Internet was much quicker and it was more effective to use 
it.210 Therefore, in the field of terrorism, the Internet appeared to have supplanted efficiently 
the conventional media since, now,  terrorist groups  were able to edit and broadcast, on a 
global scale, any message or programme which they wanted.211 By reaching various 
audiences, either through the “old” or the “new” media, terrorists’ material could serve to 
attract more people to their cause.  Consequently, the Internet appeared to be an instrument 
                                                          
208 G. Weimann & C. Winn, The theater of terror: Mass media and international terrorism, Longman: New 
York, 1994, p. 14. 
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211 B. Klopfenstein, ‘Terrorism and the exploitation of media’, in A. P. Kavoori and T. Fraley (eds), Media, 
Terrorism, and Theory, Rowman and Littlefield, USA, 2006, pp.107-120. 
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which increased the spread of terrorist propaganda and furthered their operational objectives 
at little expense or risk. 
3.7 Governments and Media 
In developing countries where dictatorships predominate, the interference, of governments 
in the control of the media, was a well-known fact. However, it was more surprising when 
the censorship was sought to be imposed by a representative of the country which was the 
promoter of the Freedom of Speech enshrined in its constitution.212 
Price reported that: 
“In the opening days of the war in Afghanistan, Secretary of State Colin Powell 
called the Emir of Qatar seeking his cooperation in moderating the views of Al 
Jazeera, the now famous satellite service with an important demographic of Arab 
viewers.213 
 
Before the September 11 2001 events, Al Jazeera was seen as a source of hope in a region 
where the media were under the governments’ strict control. However, perceptions changed 
following the American led invasion of Afghanistan. Many officials, in the American 
                                                          
212 United States First Amendment – Annotation 6: Freedom of Expression--Speech and Press  
Adoption and the Common Law Background  
Madison's version of the speech and press clauses, introduced in the House of Representatives on June 8, 1789, 
provided: ''The people shall not be deprived or abridged of their right to speak, to write, or to publish their 
sentiments; and the freedom of the press, as one of the great bulwarks of liberty, shall be inviolable.''1. The 
special committee rewrote the language to some extent, adding other provisions from Madison's draft, to make 
it read: ''The freedom of speech and of the press, and the right of the people peaceably to assemble and consult 
for their common good, and to apply to the Government for redress of grievances, shall not be infringed.''2. In 
this form it went to the Senate, which rewrote it to read: ''That Congress shall make no law abridging the 
freedom of speech, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and consult for their 
common good, and to petition the government for a redress of grievances.''3. Subsequently, the religion clauses 
and these clauses were combined by the Senate.4. The final language was agreed upon in conference. See 
Annotation 6 - First Amendment, Freedom Of Expression--Speech And Press, FindLaw, available online at: 
http://constitution.findlaw.com/amendment1/annotation06.html#1  
 
213 M. E. Price, Media and Sovereignty: The Global Information Revolution and its Challenge to State 
Power, Massachusetts Institute of Technology: Massachusetts, 2002, p.6.  
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Administration, considered the Arab channel to be hostile to its declared campaign against 
terrorism. In private, the Arabic media was labelled as the “media of the terrorist”. 
Broadcasting Osama Bin Laden’s videos of was a matter of real concern for the American 
administration.  
 
Several methods were used to make the Arabic channel friendlier to the American 
perspective and foreign policies. However, as well as constant efforts to try to convince Al 
Jazeera to renounce from airing what they saw as propaganda, the Americans used, also, 
another technique by proposing that the channel conducted a series of interviews with its 
officials in order to counter balance the Islamic perspective. In addition, the State 
Department considered buying air time on Al Jazeera  in order to send positive 
advertisements to the huge number of Arab viewers, and to present a better image than that 
of its soldiers invading and occupying Arab lands militarily. 
 
The US Administration tried, also, to promote new competitors to Al Jazeera, through 
finance or other means, such as giving them access to satellite services. The American 
bombing of Al Jazeera offices in Kabul and Baghdad represented another means of 
intimidating the Arab media and deterring other media outlets from following similar lines. 
Indeed, Al Jazeera represents a case study in understanding the behaviour of powerful 
nations and their governments which are keen to modify the infrastructures and the market 
to control and influence the conveyance of messages. 
 
3.8 Laws and Human Rights in the United Kingdom 
In the United Kingdom, although such rights were not assured by a single codified 
constitution, the early recognition of human rights for its citizens occurred long before most 
other countries in the world. However, at the beginning of the twenty-first century, the non-
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legislative tradition was abandoned with the passing of the Human Rights Act 1998 
(HRA);214  this helped to codifying most of the rights enshrined within the ECHR.215  
 
3.8.1 The Development of Human Rights in the United Kingdom 
This part, of the thesis, gives an overview of the concept of human rights and how that 
concept developed because, mainly, the freedom of expression and free media were integral 
parts of human rights. Amongst the United Kingdom’s nations, England and Wales do not 
have a codified constitution, whilst Northern Ireland and Scotland do.216 The secular 
antagonism between Britain and France, once the two major world powers, might explain 
the divergence between the two countries in terms of political organization.  Yet, there are 
more tangible and obvious reasons to understand why the European states’ adoption of 
constitutions by was not emulated in Britain.  As a geographical entity, Britain, separated 
from the continent, is, also, intentionally distinct from its continental neighbours. However 
the revolutionary concepts of the 1789 French Revolution, which became constitutional 
principles, were not alien to the UK. The Magna Carta Libertatum goes back to 1215, whilst 
the Statute of Due Proces’, based on the principle of due process, was adopted in 1354. 
Nowadays, English courts invoke still both the Magna Carta and the concept of due process 
which, in 1689, was integrated into the English Bill of Rights.217 
 
The relatively recent adoption of the Human Rights Act 1998 was exceptional since the UK  
had not promulgated previously any written constitutional statement on human rights. 
                                                          
214 In Scotland, the Human Rights Act came into force in 1999. See  Kühne (2006) 
215 The European Convention on Human Rights was ratified by the United Kingdom in 1951. 
216 The constitution for Scotland was provided by the Scotland Act 1998, whilst Northern Ireland had a 
written Constitution from 1973 onwards; this was repealed and replaced, in large part, by the Northern 
Ireland Act 1998.  
 
217  In 2001, the case Lewis v. Attorney-General of Jamaica, [2001] 2 A.C. 50 (P.C. 2000), in which five 
Jamaican men sentenced to death appealed the constitutionality of the execution of the sentence, on the grounds 
that the method of execution, constituted a form of cruel and inhuman punishment contrary to both Magna 
Carta and the English Bill of Rights. Slynn (2005) 
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English judges estimated that it was unnecessary to positively create such rights since 
English law was founded upon the conviction that individuals were free to behave as they 
wanted as long as they did not infringe the law.218  Thus, the absence of legal restrictions or 
prohibitions were considered essentially as appropriate evidence for the existence of a right.  
English liberal pragmatism might be, also, a further reason for the absence of codified 
fundamental rights.219 
  
In the twentieth century, however, the situation changed significantly: in 1950, the European 
Convention of Human Rights was adopted and was ratified by the UK in 1951. In fact it was 
the first state to do so.220 In the same spirit, as early as 1966 the UK granted its citizens the 
right to lodge complaints directly before the European Court of Human Rights.221 However, 
despite this early ratification, the ECHR’s influence on UK's legal system was rather limited 
(though not negligible),222 when compared with the influence it had in other countries which 
ratified it.223  
 
                                                          
218 See H-H. Kühne, (2006) Strafprozessrecht - Eine systematische Darstellung des deutschen und 
europäischen Strafrechts. Heidelberg: C. F. Müller 
219 See J. Rivers (2001), Menschenrechtsschutz im Vereinigten Königreich. 
Juristenzeitung 3: 127-132 
220 Following the human tragedies, committed since WWI, and in order to protect human rights, international 
institutions and tribunals were established. Thus, the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal 
Declaration on Human Rights extended beyond national boundaries  which, hitherto, had only domestic regard 
for human rights. See Spencer (1999). 
221 See  J.R.Spencer; N. Padfield (2006) L'intégration des droits européens en droit britannique. Rev. Sc. 
Crim. 3: 537-550 
222 The ECtHR rulings led to important changes in the law of criminal procedure. For instance, in the case of 
Republic of Ireland vs. UK (1978) 2 EHRR 25, the Strasbourg court ruled that the interrogation techniques, 
used during the troubles in Northern Ireland ,were in clear violation of Art. 3., which prohibited torture and 
inhuman or degrading treatments. Promptly, the UK legislators drafted the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 
1984 which was, in fact, a revision of the English law on criminal procedure and evidence. The Section 76,  of 
this Act, specifies that confessions, obtained through inhuman or degrading treatment, were deemed 
unacceptable. See Spencer (1999). 
223 For instance, in the Netherlands, the ECHR is applicable directly. For this country, the particularity is the 
fact that international law ranks higher than domestic law, inducing courts to apply the ECHR. See Swart 
(1999). 
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International treaty obligations do not bind UK courts unless they are incorporated into 
domestic statutes. This confirms the UK’s dualist tradition in this field,224  since courts are 
expected to apply domestic law, assuming that it would not differ substantially from the 
ECHR, and, in such a situation, interpreting it to conform. Nevertheless, where domestic law 
clashed with the European Convention, the courts were supposed to continue to apply 
domestic law.225  
 
In the UK, the limited application of the ECHR - prior to the passage of the Human Rights 
Act1998226 – might be the result of the British parliamentarians’ perception of the concept 
of sovereignty by.227 The British insist on the fact that, in any liberal democracy, the laws, 
drafted by a sovereign and elected parliament, represent the will of the people. Accordingly, 
in British courts, British judges are expected to implement such laws implemented by 
without having to question them or to test their validity against what is deemed to be "higher" 
legal principles.228 Nowadays, the British argument, regarding the concept of parliamentary 
sovereignty, is contested increasingly in view of international geopolitical developments 
which affect traditional concepts of national sovereignty. At the international level, the 
promulgation of human rights  namely the founding of the European Court of Human Rights, 
                                                          
224 Nevertheless, Warbrick (2004) believed that the dualism in question  was fading when it  came to human 
rights. Spencer and Padfield (2006) examined, in-depth, the relationship between UK’s law and European 
rights.  
225 Thus, in Regina v Secretary of State for the Home Office, ex parte Brind [1991] 1 AC 696, the UK 
government did not allow the BBC’s diffusion of interviews with representatives of some North Ireland 
organisations, such as Sinn Fein. However, the journalists’ claim that the interdiction was in violation of the 
European Convention (Art. 10) was rejected by the Law Lords who argued that the law, which authorised the 
Home Secretary to ban a particular programme, had to be implemented, regardless of the articles of the 
mentioned Convention. 
226 The Human Rights Act of 1998  came into force in October 2000. 
227  This was asserted clearly in the Government’s White Paper on human rights “the courts should not have 
the power to set aside primary legislation (…) on the ground of incompatibility with the Convention. This 
conclusion arises from the importance which the Government attaches to parliamentary sovereignty.” 
Secretary of State (1997)Secretary Of State (1997), at 2.13  
228 For example, the constitutional rights of citizens. 
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and the creation of the European Union, convinced many European states involved to 
relinquish some of their powers to this relatively newly constituted body.229  
 
The adoption, of the HRA 1998, did influence the British courts as regards human rights 
matters. Through their enshrinement in statute, many of the European Convention’s 
guarantees became important in terms of the hierarchy of norms; this prevails over case-law 
in the UK. It was mentioned earlier that, when a conflict occurred between domestic law and 
the European Convention before the HRA came into force, domestic law prevailed.230 Now, 
the enactment of the HRA 1998 obliged national courts to apply the Act equally with the 
implementation of other domestic statutes. The HRA 1998, itself, had a subsequent effect on 
the way in which courts reconsidered the traditional law on human rights. Section 3(1) stated 
that where possible other laws ought to be interpreted in accordance with the Convention.231 
Consequently, in the UK, what is known as “the literal rule” of statutory interpretation  was 
abandoned. This rule meant that, if the wording was unambiguous, a clear legal text ought 
to be interpreted literally. Section 3 of the Human Rights Act 1998232 made such an 
interpretation obsolete because, now, the courts were expected to interpret the text according 
to the Convention.233 
                                                          
229 Elliott (2007) mentioned the case, examined by the House of Lords,  of Jackson (House of Lords, Regina 
(on the application of Jackson) v Attorney General, 13 October 2005, UKHL 56, 2006 1 AC 262. During that 
session Lord Steyn stated that a “pure and absolute” conception of parliamentary sovereignty was “out of 
place” in modern Britain, whilst Lord Hope confirmed his peer position by saying that “parliamentary 
sovereignty is no longer, if it ever was, absolute”. 
230 See the Case Saunders [1996] 1 CrAppR 463, when British legislation obliged Saunders to answer 
questions, and, later, used his answers in court as evidence against him. Such dealing is contrary to the "fair 
trial" principles under Art. 6(1) of the European Convention. The English Court of Appeal held that English 
courts could have recourse to the European Convention on Human Rights and decisions thereon by the 
European Court of Human Rights only in the case of ambiguity in the UK’s law. Following the appeal, made 
by Saunders, at the Strasbourg Court, this Court ruled later that Art. 6(1) of the ECHR had been breached, in 
view of the disrespect for the right to silence enshrined in the fair trial principle of Art. 6(1) (Saunders v UK 
(1997) 23 EHRR 313). 
231  S. 3(1) of the Act stated that: “So far as it is possible to do so, primary legislation and subordinate legislation 
must be read and given effect in a way which is compatible with the Convention rights.”   
232  S. 3(1) read as follows: “So far as it is possible to do so, primary legislation and subordinate legislation 
must be read and given effect in a way which is compatible with the Convention rights.” 
233 See J.R. Spencer; N. Padfield (2006) L'intégration des droits européens en droit britannique. Rev. Sc. 
Crim. 3: 537-550 
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In practice, judges were determined to find consistencies between their traditional laws and 
the European Convention. They keep trying to make the existing laws compatible with the 
ECHR, using wide and far-reaching interpretations to this end.234  In the case of complete 
impossibility of interpreting domestic law according to the ECHR, Spencer mentioned two 
distinct situations. In the case of domestic case-law, since the enactment of the HRA 1998, 
the ECHR had to prevail, whilst, in the case of incompatibility between domestic statutory 
law and the ECHR, the domestic law  had to prevail.235 
 
The solution found by the courts, in order not to contravene the norms imposed through the 
European Convention of human rights, was to declare their incompatibility; without 
affecting the validity of the norms, this was meant to draw the government’s attention to the 
problem raised and  to prompt British legislators to alter the law according to the HRA’s 
requirements. In case the government was well intentioned and decided to make the required 
changes, a special ‘fast track’ procedure existed.236  Consequently, the place, given to the 
human rights provided by the Convention, was is reinforced certainly, although it did not 
have the same authority as the constitution in other countries. 237 Another important 
procedure is that, once new legislation is adopted, the government must issue a statement 
confirming that the new Bill is in accordance with the European Convention.238 
 
                                                          
234 See Slynn (2005); The House of Lords confirmed this practice when it stated that Art. 3 of the HRA 1998 
demanded interpretation in conformity with the Convention, although in the case of incompatibility with the 
clear wording of a domestic provision (Sheldrake v Director of Public Prosecutions [2004] UKHL 43 (para. 
44). See also Elliott (2007). 
235 See J.R. Spencer (1999) English Criminal Procedure and the Human Rights Act 1998. Israel Law Review 
33: 664-677 
236 See s. 10 and schedule 2 of the HRA 1998,  and Elliott and Quinn’s study (2006) 
237 Such as in the United States, Germany or Spain, to name a few 
238 67 S. 19(1) of the Act. 
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A close examination of the competent organs, which may ensure compliance with human 
rights, should not prevent underlining the fact that, due to the parliamentary sovereignty 
mentioned earlier, in Britain, the courts’ influence on legislative decisions is extremely 
limited. There is not any particular domestic legal proscription on legislating in a way which 
is inconsistent with fundamental human rights. 239  This is despite the fact that House of 
Lords and Supreme Court rulings show an increasing respect for human rights and are 
considered seriously by the British government.240  
 
Although there is no pressure or legal compulsion on legislating in conformity with human 
rights, until now it can be said that there is good will and a real intention to legislate 
according to the international norms of human rights.241 Nonetheless, writers, such as Elliott, 
underlined the enduring risks by stating that majority rule could undermine the review of 
executive or legislative actions.242 In the UK, the absence, of a constitution, suggests 
necessarily the nonexistence of a constitutional court which, in case of a violation of his 
human rights, induces a British citizen to refer to the European Court of Human Rights243. 
 
Indeed, the absence, of an internal instrument to ensure the respect for human rights, was 
one of the main reasons for finding, in Strasbourg, a relatively high percentage of cases from 
                                                          
239 Elliott, (2007). Another writer, Spencer underlined as well that: "If there is one matter of principle on which 
British politicians of all shades of opinion seem invariably to agree, it is the importance of preserving the 
sovereignty of Parliament." See Spencer (1999). 
240 As the adoption of the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 proved,  this was a clear reaction to the House of 
Lords’ Declaration of incompatibility of indefinite detention of foreign terrorist suspects (s. 23 of the Anti-
Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001) with Arts. 5and 14 ECHR (A & Others v. Secretary of State for the 
Home Department, [2004] UKHL 56 
241 70 For instance, this will was manifested, , by the fact that, in order to prevent infringement of Art. 5 ECHR, 
the British legislator issued derogations from Art. 5 ECHR, invoking Art. 15 ECHR, (Elliott (2007), at 6 and 
7) 
242 Elliot stated that “under the UK’s present constitutional arrangements, the jurisdiction of British courts to 
review executive and legislative action for compatibility with human rights norms ultimately remains 
vulnerable to majority rule.” 
243 Under Art. 34 of the European Convention of Human Rights 
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the UK.244 Nevertheless, in certain circumstances, the Supreme Court (formerly the House 
of Lords), the highest national court, makes rulings on the compatibility of British law and 
jurisprudence with the Human Rights Act 1998.245 These cases  are considered for this study, 
especially those linked with anti-terrorism legislation. It is important to observe that there is 
no need to compare the number of cases, which the UK submitted to the ECtHR, with the 
number of other states’ cases where judgments were made by constitutional courts. This is 
because, depending on the country being considered, the requirements regarding the 
admissibility and merits are different. 
 
At the Constitutional Courts level and contrary to what happens usually on the European 
mainland, , the number of cases, dealt with by the Supreme Court is very small. In addition, 
a high degree of discretion is present when deciding whether or not it is necessary to rule on 
the submitted matter246. Its judgments are confined to elements of the law which the Court 
of Appeal considers to be essential.247 Therefore of the are not so, although they are more 
considered and elaborate compared to judgments made by other countries’ constitutional 
                                                          
244 See C. Warbrick. 2004. Emergency Powers and Human Rights: The UK Experience. In Legal Instruments 
in the Fight Against International Terrorism – a transatlantic dialogue, ed. JWIN C. Fijnaut, pp. 361-408. 
Leiden, Boston Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 
245  The rulings of the House of Lords, made since 1996, are available online at 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld/ldjudgmt.htm 
246  This  was suggested in s. 33(2) of the Criminal Appeal Act 1968,  which stated: “The appeal lies only with 
the leave of the Court of Appeal or the House of Lords; and leave shall not be granted unless it is certified by 
the Court of Appeal that a point of law of general public importance is involved in the decision and it appears 
to the Court of Appeal or the House of Lords (as the case may be) that the point is one which ought to be 
considered by that House.” The formulation “shall not be granted unless…”  suggests that the general rule is, 
in fact, not to grant the appeal, except if the matter presents an importance to the general public importance or 
the Court of Appeal or the House of Lords considered that it  was relevant to rule upon it. 
247 See s. 12(3) of the Administration of Justice Act 1969 (c. 58). 
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courts, there are not so many Supreme Court’s rulings.248 The Supreme Court’s decisions 
have a binding effect on all other British courts.249 
As regards the ECtHR, Elliott and Quinn mentioned that its place, within British courts, was 
not defined in an adequate way.250  Section 2 of the HRA 1998 stated that a British court 
was required only to take account of the cases decided by the ECtHR. The latter’s decisions 
were not binding. In reality, British courts followed the ECtHR’s jurisprudence since they 
risked having their rulings defeated by Article 81 of the ECtHR. Nevertheless, there were 
exceptions when that jurisprudence was not followed. 251 
 
3.9 Human Rights and Anti-terrorist Legislation in The United Kingdom 
In 2005, Lord Hoffman, concerned with the UK government’s response to terrorist acts, 
made a strong statement in the House of Lords:   
           “I do not underestimate the ability of fanatical groups of terrorists to kill and 
destroy, but they do not threaten the life of the nation. The real threat to the life of the 
nation, in the sense of a people living in accordance with its traditional laws and political 
values, comes not from terrorism but from laws such as these. That is the true measure of 
what terrorism may achieve. It is for Parliament to decide whether to give the terrorists 
such a victory”. 252  
3.10 Human Rights in the UK after the Second World War 
                                                          
248 For instance, the House of Lords adopted only 79 decisions in 2000, compared with the 429 decisions in 
German Bundesverfassungsgericht , and the 312 decisions of the Spanish Tribunal Constitucional. The lowest 
number  was registered in France with the Conseil Constitucionnel adopting only 43 decisions by.  
249 Until 1966, they bound, also, subsequent decisions of the House of Lords. In 1966, the Lord Chancellor 
issued a Practice Statement saying that the House of Lords were no longer bound by its previous decisions. In 
practice, the House of Lords overrules only rarely one of its earlier decisions. See Elliott and Quinn (2006). 
250 Thus, in R (Alconbury Developments Ltd) v Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport and the 
Regions, [2001] UKHL 23, the House of Lords held: “In the absence of some special circumstances it seems 
to me the court should follow any clear and constant jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights. 
If it does not do so there is at least a possibility the case will go to that court which is likely in the ordinary 
case to follow its own constant jurisprudence.” In fact, Tthis view resembled the view taken by most courts in 
continental countries. It  made the difference beween case law and written legislation less rigid since, although, 
in theory, they were allowed to do so. in practice, judges, in continental legal systems, were, also, reluctant to 
deviate from High Court decisions,. 
251 C. Elliott and F.Quinn (2006).  Criminal Law, Longman, 
252 Lord Hoffman, in House of Lords, A (FC) and others (FC) v Secretary of State for the Home Department, 
[2005] UKHL 71, at 96 and 97. 
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As the oldest democracy, the UK has one of the longest traditions of human rights.253 
However, the UK was confronted with terrorism for a longer period than any other European 
country.  Although some anti-terrorist laws existed before this period, this section sheds light 
on the UK’s terrorism laws after the Second World War.  For decades, the challenge, 
represented by the IRA in the Northern Ireland conflict, induced the adoption of special 
legislation. For instance, the Civil Authorities (Special Powers) (Northern Ireland) Act 1922 
represented the most extensive of the special measures allowing Unionist control of Northern 
Ireland.254 Prevention of Terrorism Acts, which came into force between 1974 and 1989, 
were based on the Prevention of Violence Act 1939;255 this was repealed in 1973.256 
In the 1960s and early 1970s, the escalation of violence in Northern Ireland compelled the 
British government to suspend the Northern Ireland Parliament in 1972,257 and to introduce 
Direct Rule.258  However, the Direct Rule system did not remove the existing emergency 
legislation. The UK Government’s claim, that the 1973 Northern Ireland (Emergency 
Provisions) Act (EPA)259 was a replacement for various Special Powers Acts enacted 
between 1922 and 1943,  was questioned by Donohue, who observed that the new  “statute 
                                                          
253 Which goes back as early as 1215, with The Magna Carta, which provided already the habeas corpus 
rule. 
254 See Civil Authorities (Special Powers) Act (Northern Ireland), 1922, CAIN Web Service, available online 
at: http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/hmso/spa1922.htm  
255 The Prevention of Violence Act 1939 was a response to the Irish Republican Army (IRA) campaign of 
violence from 1939 to 1940, known as the S-Plan, against the UK’s civilian; economic; and military 
infrastructures . The 1939 act expired in 1953 and was repealed in 1973 and replaced by the Prevention of 
Terrorism Act.  
256 G. Ísaksson. (2009). Human rights against anti-terrorist laws: Are human rights in the UK in jeopardy 
because of the nation’s increasing anti-terrorist laws? University of  Akureyri 
, founded by the Northern Irelandof  legislature home rulethe Parliament represented  Northern IrelandThe 257
Government of Ireland Act 1920; this body functioned from 7  June 1921 to 30  March 1972. It was abolished 
subsequently under the Northern Ireland Constitution Act 1973.   
258 Direct rule was a political system which referred to the administration of Northern Ireland directly from 
Westminster, seat of the British Parliament. According to the terms of a new Temporary Provisions Act, the 
Direct Rule was established, for the first time, on 28 March 1972,. This system was abolished finally on 8May 
2007, with the holding of elections and the creation of the Northern Ireland Assembly. 
259 The main characteristics, of the Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 1973,  was the abolition of 
the death penalty in Northern Ireland, and the establishment of the Diplock courts, where terrorism related 
offences were tried by a judge without jury. Its anti-terrorism provisions  were replaced by subsequent 
legislation. See Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 1973, Legistlation.gov.uk, available online at: 
http://www.legisltion.gov.uk/ukpga/1973/53/pdfs/ukpga_19730053_en.pdf  
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simply renamed the vast majority of the regulations”.260 She underlined that the 1973 EPA 
kept unaltered the Government’s extensive powers in terms of “detention, proscription, 
entry, search and seizure, restrictions on the use of vehicles, the blocking of roads, the 
closing of licensed premises, and the collection of information on security forces”.261  
In the Diplock Report, two essential changes were made: the abolition of the jury system 
and, irrespective of the offender’s motivation, the establishment of certain crimes as 
“scheduled offences” (i.e. terrorist crimes). 262 
The general powers, allocated to the Civil Authority in Northern Ireland, were retained by 
the UK government, through the authority given to its representative, the Secretary of State 
                                                          
260 See L. K. Donohue,  Civil Liberties, Terrorism, and Liberal Democracy: Lessons from the United 
Kingdom  
HARVARD Kennedy School archive, 2000, p.4, available online at: 
http://www.hks.harvard.edu/var/ezp_site/storage/fckeditor/file/pdfs/centers-
programs/centers/taubman/working_papers/donohue_00_civillib.pdf  
261 Ibid. p. 4 
262 See Report of the Commission to Consider Legal Procedures to deal with Terrorist Activities in Northern 
Ireland. In the Summary and Conclusion of the report it is highlighted that scheduled offences referred to 
terrorist crimes. 
(f) Recommended changes in the administration of justice, unless otherwise stated, apply only to 
cases involving terrorist crimes, defined as scheduled offences (paragraphs 6, 7, 114-119 and the 
Schedule).  
(g) Trials of scheduled offences should be by a Judge of the High Court, or a County Court Judge, 
sitting alone with no jury, with the usual rights of appeal (paragraphs 35-41).  
(h) The armed services should be given power to arrest people suspected of having been involved in, 
or having information about, offences and detain them for up to four hours in order to establish their 
identity (paragraphs 42-50).  
(i) Bail in cases involving a scheduled offence should not be granted except by the High Court and 
then only if stringent requirements are met (paragraphs 51-57).  
(j) The onus of proof as to the possession of firearms and explosives should be altered so as to 
require a person found in certain circumstances to prove on the balance of probabilities that he did 
not know and had no reason to suspect that arms or explosives were where they were found 
(paragraphs 61-72).  
(k) A confession made by the accused should be admissible as evidence in cases involving the 
scheduled offences unless it was obtained by torture or inhuman or degrading treatment; if 
admissible it would then be for the court to determine its reliability on the basis of evidence given 
from either side as to the circumstances in which the confession had been obtained (paragraphs 73-
92).  
Document available online at: http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/hmso/diplock.htm  
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for Northern Ireland to “make provisions additional to the foregoing provisions of this Act 
for promoting the preservation of the peace and the maintenance of order".263 
Originally, as its name suggests, the Emergency Provisions Act 1973 (EPA) was intended to 
be, only a temporary measure. In 1974, Merylin Rees, the Secretary of State for Northern 
Ireland stated that “The [1973 EPA] makes emergency provisions and is by its nature 
temporary, to cover the period of an emergency.  If its provisions are to be renewed, clearly 
it is necessary to demonstrate that the emergency continues in force.”264 However, it 
remained in force for twenty-six years. 
 
In 1975, the UK Government amended the 1973 Act and, three years later, enacted the 
Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 1978.265 Further successive EPAs, enacted 
                                                          
263 G.F.Ísaksson. (2009)Human rights against anti-terrorist laws. Are human rights in the UK in jeopardy 
because of the nation’s increasing anti-terrorist laws?, University of Akureyri, Faculty of Law and Social 
Sciences, Law division, Iceland.. 
264 See House of Commons debate, Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions), (intervention of the Secretary 
of State, Mr Merylin Rees), House of Commons, Deb 09 July 1974 Vol. 876 cc1273-31 available online at: 
http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1974/jul/09/northern-ireland-emergency-provisions   
265  In the introduction of the Act (23 March 1978), it  was stated that it was “An Act to consolidate, with 
certain exceptions, the Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 1973, the Northern Ireland (Young 
Persons) Act 1974 and the Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) (Amendment) Act 1975. See Northern 
Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 1978, Legislation.gov.uk, available online at: 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1978/5/pdfs/ukpga_19780005_en.pdf  
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respectively in 1987;266 1991;267 and 1996268, whilst expanding certain powers and 
suspending others, followed mainly the previous legislation.  
 The argument, regarding the preservation of the 1973-96 Emergency Provisions Acts, 
(EPAs’) changed slightly, becoming an essential instrument in the on-going fight against 
terrorism.269  
Accordingly, for the mainland, the UK adopted the Prevention of Terrorism Acts (PTA), and 
the Emergency Provisions Acts (EPA) for Northern Ireland.  It was decided to deal with 
terrorist acts mainly through the criminal justice process; occasionally modified, to a certain 
extent, in order to face the different problems resulting from the nature of terrorist groups 
and their intimidation methods of people; witnesses; or jurors.270  The new wave of terrorist 
acts, perpetrated since the beginnings of the twenty-first century has concerned British 
                                                          
266 The Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 1987 was repealed on 27August 1991. The first part of 
the Act consisted of the Amendments of the EPA 1978. The following list represented the changes made  
 1. Limitation of power to grant bail in case of scheduled offences. 
 2.  Maximum period of remand in custody in case of scheduled offences. 
 3.  Power of Secretary of State to set time limits in relation to preliminary proceedings for scheduled 
offences. 
 4.  Court for trial of scheduled offences. 
 5.  Admissions by persons charged with scheduled offences. 
 6.  Entry and search for purpose of arresting terrorists. 
 7.  Power to search for scanning receivers. 
 8.  Power of Secretary of State to direct the closure etc. of roads. 
 9.  Additional offence relating to proscribed organisations. 
 10. Extension of categories of persons about whom it is unlawful to collect information. 
 11. Offences relating to behaviour and dress in public places. 
 12. Compensation. 
 13. Expiry and eventual repeal of 1978 Act. 
267 Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 1991, [27th June 1991] was “An Act to re-enact, with 
amendments, the Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 1978, the Northern Ireland (Emergency 
Provisions) Act 1987 and Part VI of the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1989; and to 
make further provision for the preservation of the peace and the maintenance of order in Northern Ireland”. 
See Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 1978, Legislation.gov.uk, retrieved on, 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1978/5/pdfs/ukpga_19780005_en.pdf  
268 Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 1996 (repealed on the 19th February 2001) was “An Act to 
re-enact, with omissions and amendments, the Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 1991; and for 
connected purposes.” (17th June 1996) 
269 A. Mowbray, Cases and Materials on the European Convention on Human Rights, Oxford University Press; 
2Rev Ed edition (24 May 2007). 
270 Bonner (2000): The United Kingdom's Response to Terrorism: the Impact of Decisions of European 
Judicial Institutions and of the Northern Ireland 'Peace Process'. In European Democracies Against 
Terrorism. Governmental Policies and Intergovernmental Cooperation, ed. F Reinares, pp. 31-71. 
Dartmouth, Hants: Ashgate 
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legislators, and the 2005 London bombings  and the 2007 Glasgow airport incident appeared 
to have confirmed their preoccupations about the security of their country.  These particular 
acts prompted the passage of further laws to secure the safety of UK citizens.  
 
3.11 Events Post September 11 2001 
The UK enacted legislation known as the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001,271  
with the adoption of measures which were rejected previously from the Terrorism Act 
2000272. The 2001 Act provided powers to inspect premises and deny access to specified 
persons; additional powers of arrest in, and removal from, aircraft and airports; wider powers 
in respect of the regulation of aviation security and enhanced powers to detain aircrafts; 
provision for the retention of communications; traffic data; the creation of an offence of 
using noxious substances to harm or intimidate (there was, also, provision in relation to 
hoaxes involving harmless substances);  and asset freezing powers where an individual, 
entity or country posed a risk to the UK economy, the life or property of UK nationals or 
residents.273 Even for non-terrorist cases, it allowed Military Police to operate outside 
military bases.  Part 4 enabled foreigners to be detained indefinitely as terrorist suspects.274  
                                                          
271 The Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 was enacted on 14 December  2001. 
272 In 2000 the incoming Labour government and Parliament enacted the Terrorism Act 2000 (TA). Whilst 
repealing the Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA) and much of the Emergency Provisions Act (EPA), the 2000 
TA  provided, for the first time, what was meant to be a permanent anti-terrorist law in Britain. Inspired by the 
PTA it divergeds from it in several aspects. The 2000 TA  allowed the ban of terrorist organizations and the 
seizure of their finance; it created, also, new offences such as “directing terrorism” whilst giving more powers 
of arrest and detention. New elements were the possibility of arresting people, in the United Kingdom, for 
inciting terrorism abroad and widened the definition of terrorism to include “the use or threat of action, 
designed to influence the government or intimidate a section of the public, for a political, religious or 
ideological cause where this action or threat of action involves violence or damage to property or creates a 
serious risk to the health or safety of a section of the public”. See S.Breau; S. Livingstone .nd R. O’Connell 
Anti-Terrorism Law and Human Rights in the United Kingdom post September 11, Human Rights Centre, 
Queens University Belfast. Available at: http://www.britishcouncil.org/china-society-publications-911.pdf  
273 See G. F. Ísaksson  (2009). Human rights against anti-terrorist laws. Are human rights in the UK in 
jeopardy because of the nation’s increasing anti-terrorist laws? Faculty of Law & Social Sciences. Law 
division. available at: http://skemman.is/stream/get/1946/3641/10733/1/BA_Ritger%C3%B0.pdf  
274 UN Security Council , http://www.un.org/sc/members.asp. 
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Subsequently, the Criminal Justice Act 2003 was issued; this extended a terrorist suspect’s 
period of detention for questioning from 7  to 14 days.275  This step action was justified by 
claiming forensic analysis of chemical weapon materials might not be completed in 7 
days.276 
Then, the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 was enacted, the main feature of which was the 
“control order”; this was a form of house arrest.277 This spawned over 50 hours of debate in 
Parliament; however, it was passed just in time to become applied to 4 terrorist suspects.278 
The next Act, drafted after the 7 July 2005 London bombings,279 was the Terrorism Act 
2006. This created the offence of “glorifying” terrorism and increased the period, for which 
terrorist suspects could be detained without charge, to 28 days.280 Originally, the government 
sought a 90 day period, and attempted to justify this by claiming that the key evidence, on 
which charges were based, might be coded on one of thousands of hard disks, and it could 
                                                          
275 B. Dickson, The Detention of Suspected Terrorists in Northern Ireland and Great Britain, 43  Rev. L.U. 
Rich.. 927 (2008-2009). 
276 See G.F.Ísaksson; G. Friðgeir (2009) , Human rights against anti-terrorist laws. Are human rights in the 
UK in jeopardy because of the nation’s increasing anti-terrorist laws?, University of Akureyri, Faculty of 
Law and Social Sciences, Law division, Iceland.. 
277 See Counter-Terrorism Policy and Human Rights: Draft Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 (Continuance 
in force of sections 1 to 9) Order 2006. Twelfth Report of Session 2005–06, page 14. Available at:  
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/jt200506/jtselect/jtrights/122/122.pdf  
 
278 See G.F. Ísaksson; G. Friðgeir(2009), Human rights against anti-terrorist laws. Are human rights in the 
UK in jeopardy because of the nation’s increasing anti-terrorist laws?, University of Akureyri, Faculty of 
Law and Social Sciences, Law division, Iceland. 
 
279 L. Bondí, Building Peace in the 21st Century. Legitimacy and Legality: Key Issues in the Fight Against 
Terrorism, The Fund for Peace, September 11 2002, p.33,  
http://www.fundforpeace.org/publications/reports/keyissues.pdf 
280 See M.Arden, Meeting the challenge of terrorism: The experience of English and other courts, Australian 
Law Journal, 2006, 80:818. Rt Hon Lady Justice M. Arden, DBE, Member of the Court of Appeal of England 
and Wales. The speech was presented on 16 August 2006 at the John Lehane Memorial Lecture (Supreme 
Court of New South Wales). The text is available online at: 
http://www.judiciary.gov.uk/Resources/JCO/Documents/Speeches/Speech_lj_arden_Meeting_the_challenge
_of_terrorism_04122006.pdf  
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take a very long time to search them. However, it did not succeed in obtaining Parliamentary 
approval for such a change.281  
Opponents, of the 2006 TA, focused on sections 1 and 23.  Section 1 made the 
encouragement of terrorism an offence, whilst  section 23 extended the detention period for 
terrorist suspects. According to Parker,282 Act 2006 encountered harsh criticism and 
resistance from human rights organisations and civil liberties groups. The Act’s most 
contentious aspect was the attempted increase of the detention period without charge for 
suspects from 14 days to 90 days. The Blair Government argued that, given the complexities 
of modern terrorism and the evidence gathering process, the police and intelligence services 
had insisted on this requirement in order to be able to carry out their investigations 
appropriately.283  Eventually, the motion was defeated since the parliamentarians were far 
from being convinced by the executive’s arguments. Nevertheless, the increase of the period, 
from 14 to 28 days, won the MPs’ approval.  
Less than a week before the enforcement of the 2008 Counter-terrorism law, photographers 
were complaining about the police forces’ attitudes towards them. They believed that section 
76 of the new anti-terrorism law would be very restrictive and would leave professional 
photographers open to fines and arrest. The National Union of Journalists was convinced 
that the new measures would impair further media professionals; restrict the freedom of the 
press; and increase the harassment of photographers. Marc Vallee, who covered all kind of 
                                                          
281 Ibid.  
282 See Parker Implementation of the UK Terrorism Act 2006–The 
Relationship between Counterterrorism Law, Free Speech, and the Muslim Community in the United 
Kingdom versus the United States Emory International Law Review p.p. 711-758 Volume 21, Issue 2 (2007) 
 
283 See S.Hewitt (2008) The British War on Terror: Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism on the Home Front 
Since 9/11, 
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protests, affirmed that the police harassed photographers repeatedly by using the stop and 
search powers under section 44 of the Terrorism Act 2000.284 
The Counter-Terrorism Act 2008 allowed police questioning of suspects after they were 
charged, and required convicted terrorists to notify the police of their whereabouts.285 In the 
Act, he highest profile provision was a measure to allow the police to detain terrorist suspects 
for up to 42 days before being charged.286  
 
 
3.12 The Effect of Anti- terrorism laws on Freedom of Expression 
                                                          
284 According to Vallee, the extension of powers, brought by the new legislation, were likely to worsened the 
situation and, due to its vague formulation, would.  not help to prevent abuse Vallee commented: "They will 
now be able to arrest you if a photograph could potentially incite or provoke disorder. But isn't that any 
protest?" Justin Tallis, freelance journalist said that he was targeted by the police. "I moved to London six 
months ago and it's already happened to me two or three times." Val Swain, a member of Fitwatch, a collective 
which photographed police intelligence teams taking pictures of protesters, said: "I took a picture of an officer 
on my camera phone and he walked over and said, 'you are going to delete that'. We're in a public place, he's 
in a public role and he knew that. They've been gearing up for it but so far they've stopped short of arresting 
people. Now they will have the power to do it." Jeremy Dear, general secretary of the NUJ, said: "Police 
officers ... believe they have the power to delete images or to take editorial decisions about what can and can't 
be photographed. The right to take photos in a public place is a precious freedom. It is what enables the press 
to show the wider world what is going on." See J. Adetunji, ‘Photographers fear they are target of new terror 
law’,  
The Guardian, 12 February 2009. Available at: 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/media/2009/feb/12/photographers-anti-terror-laws  
See also M.Vallee, ‘Documenting dissent is under attack’, The Guardian, 12th February 2009, available online 
at: http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2009/feb/11/police-terrorism-photography-liberty-central  
285 See part 4 on the notification requirements at  
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2008/28/contents/enacted  
286 However, despite the fact a majority of the Parliament’s MPs approved the extension of  the period of 
police detention of terrorist suspects, without any criminal charges, from 28 days to 42 days, the 
government’s provision    were defeated heavily in the House of Lords. Furthermore, a clause was inserted 
into the Counter-Terrorism which read:  
 For the avoidance of doubt, nothing in this Act allows the Secretary of State to extend the maximum 
period of pre-charge detention beyond 28 days 
See http://www.publicwhip.org.uk/division.php?date=2008-10-13&number=1&house=lords . 
As for the 28 day period, this provision, passed in 2006,  was renewed annually by the UK Parliament. 
However, in July 2010, the 28 day period was renewed only for six month. Then, in January 2011, the 
legislation expired;  this meant legally that the pre-charge detention reverted back to 14 days. In 2012, The 
Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 amended the provision and reduced the pre-charge detention period 
permanently to a maximum of 14 days. It  could be observed that, compared  to other democracies, 7 days in 
Ireland; 4 days in Italy; 2 days in the USA; and 1 day in Canada; the 14 days period  continued to represents 
the longest period;. 
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Freedom of expression and the right to seek; receive; and convey information is one of the 
most fundamental human rights, enshrined in Article 19 of the United Nations Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights.287  However, such a right is not absolute and should be 
exercised subject to certain qualifications.  For instance, states have the right to limit freedom 
of expression for the sake of ‘morality; public order; and general welfare’.288 Therefore, any 
debate, about the implementation of Article 19, must be contextual and intended to find the 
right balance between, on one hand, the concerns of media professionals and, on the other, 
those of governments. 
Human rights organisations argued that, due to anti-terrorism laws, the right to the freedom 
of expression faced significant challenges.289 The most significant, of these challenges, 
appeared with the emergence of new crimes relating to speech which was seen to encourage 
terrorism, either directly or indirectly. Restrictions were expanded from existing prohibitions 
on incitement to much broader and less well defined areas such as glorifying or apologising 
for terrorism.  In addition, there were countries which adopted extensive prohibitions on 
                                                          
287 Article 19 states that “Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes 
freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through 
any media and regardless of frontiers”. The full text of the UN Universal Declaration of Human rights is 
available at:  http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/index.shtml#a19  
288 Articles 29 (2) and 29 (3), of the UN Declaration, give states the right to limit freedom of expression in 
certain contexts.  
29 (2): “ In the exercise of his rights and freedoms, everyone shall be subject only to such limitations 
as are determined by law solely for the purpose of securing due recognition and respect for the rights 
and freedoms of others and of meeting the just requirements of morality, public order and the general 
welfare in a democratic society.”  
29 (3): These rights and freedoms may in no case be exercised contrary to the purposes and principles 
of the United Nations. 
289 Since the beginning of the twenty-first century, The enactment of anti-terrorism laws, in most countries of 
the world, was underlined particularly. 
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criticism of national institutions and symbols. Internet-based speech was influenced, also, in 
various attempts to block or remove websites with controversial content.290  
In 2008, Terry Davis, the Secretary General of the Council of Europe, stated that the 
European Convention on Human Rights291 and the European Court of Human Rights’ related 
case law “remain the fundamental standards regarding the right to freedom of expression 
and information in all situations including times of crisis.”292  
 The Council of Europe standards and guidelines, on protecting freedom of expression and 
information in times of crisis, recommended that Member States ought not to use vague 
terms when imposing restrictions of freedom of expression and information in times of 
crisis.293 Incitement to violence and public disorder ought to be defined clearly adequately. 
Article 10, of the European Convention on Human Rights, provides for strong protections 
on freedom of expression under whilst allowing states to protect national security.  However, 
                                                          
290 Russian Federal Law No. 148-FZ, of 27 July 2006, amending Articles 1 and 15 of the federal law “On 
Countering Extremist Activity”. 
291 Section I Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights states: 
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions 
and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and 
regardless of frontiers. This article shall not prevent States from requiring the licensing of 
broadcasting, television or cinema enterprises.  
2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to 
such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a 
democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the 
prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the 
reputation or the rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, 
or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary. 
292 See Directorate General of Human Rights and Legal Affairs, Freedom of expression in times of crisis: 
Guidelines of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, July 2008, available online at: 
http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/cooperation/media/publications/Guidelines%20crisis-20080828160132en.pdf. 
293See I. Nikoltchev, Council of Europe, Directorate of Human Rights. Guidelines on Protecting Freedom of 
Expression and Information in Times of Crisis, IRIS 2007-10:2/1 Committee of Ministers, available online 
at: 
http://merlin.obs.coe.int/iris/2007/10/article1.en.html  
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in many cases by stretching the allowable justifications permitted by the European Court of 
Human Rights (ECtHR), domestic laws appear to be in violation of the requirements of the 
ECHR.   Often, national security and the fight against terrorism are invoked to justify 
repression of protected speech. 
3.13 Media and Human Rights Organisations 
The aims and agendas, of human rights organisations, do not converge necessarily with those 
of the media. In his book about ethical journalism, Aiden White, General Secretary of the 
International Federation of Journalists (IFJ) pointed out that: 
“In fact, while journalists often do good, it is not their purpose. Most journalists may 
well sign up to the notion that democratic pluralism and respect for human rights 
form the core of a unifying political ideology, but few wish to be told to follow a 
particular party, policy or strategy.” 294 
 
Human rights organisations believe that human rights issues do not have enough media 
coverage and, when it is done, there is a lack of depth. In a 2002 report, it was stated that: 
“The basic difference in the cultures of news organisations and human rights 
advocacy organisations is that the latter are concerned with all human rights issues, 
everywhere, while the former are interested merely in issues that are newsworthy. 
The news media are interested in human rights only inasmuch as it bears on news — 
on a war in progress, for example — although it must be said that the interest of the 
media in human rights varies across the media spectrum and from country to 
country.” 295   
 
 For various reasons, the relationship, between such organisations and the media, has not 
improved over the last two decades. Human rights organisations took the opportunity offered 
by the technological revolution and, instead of relying only on media reporting of human 
rights, opted to conducting their own research. This generated information which, then, was 
                                                          
294  See A. White, “Ethical Journalism Initiative”, Published in International Federation of Journalists, 
Belgium, 2008, p.40 
 
295 See International Council on Human Rights Policy, ‘Journalism, Media and the Challenge of Human 
Rights Reporting’, 2002, Versoix, Switzerland, p.17 
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provided to the media in order to convey the message to a wider audience. The same report 
continued: 
“Human rights NGOs have established themselves as vital sources of information, 
before and during crises, and as long-term monitors of human rights. Information 
about human rights violations is systematically released by NGOs, often in great 
detail and with accuracy. Therefore, human rights organisations have, become 
essential sources of information for media”296  
 
 
The same document underlined the media organisations’ concerns as regards, to what extent, 
they considered increased the human rights organisations’ attempts to direct journalism 
priorities. The dilemma, for media organisations, was how to keep an independent stance 
when, due to dire economic constraints, they had to rely increasingly on NGOs reports for a 
large part of their international coverage.   
 
There is no doubt that, in view of the nature of their activities, human rights organisations 
tend to be partisan, and rightly so, since they are standing with one party against alleged 
oppression by the authorities.  They should be aware that the media have, also, a distinctive 
perspective; this should be accepted and respected as legitimate and valid.  The existing gap 
and occasional misunderstanding, between human rights groups and the media, has to be 
reduced, especially when the rights of journalists are under threat or being abused since only 
human rights group may be interested in their cases.  Human rights organisations should not 
have a monolithic vision on the media.  They should recognise the  media’s legitimate role 
as powerful counterbalancing instruments of communication and actors in the policy 
process, rather than  regarding them as the “raison d’être” of the denunciation of human 
rights abuses. A mutual appreciation is essential in facing the growing challenges from the 
legislature; the executive; the police; and the security services.  
                                                          
296 Ibid. p.101 
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3.14 Conclusion 
The relationship between the media and authorities has been always and continues to be 
laden with incompatible interests. On one hand, the media is expected to provide accurate, 
reliable, useful and appropriate information. From a media perspective, in open and modern 
societies, information belongs to the people and the role, of journalists, guided by ethical 
considerations,  is, after confirming its reliability, and  editing as necessary, to deliver or 
return it to its ‘rightful owners’.  On the other hand, decision-makers; judges; the police; and 
security services have another perspective on how to deal with information; this is seen as 
an essential instrument for carrying out political policies. Accordingly, it should be used; 
controlled; and spread in order to fit with the government’s strategic interests. Politicians do 
have a particular opinion of what constitutes the public interest and, quite often, this tends 
to conflict with an independent media perspective. 
As natural reflexes, governments or authorities, trusted by their citizens to ensure their safety 
and protect their lives; wealth; and property, do exert censorship and control of information 
.  Governments promulgate legislation meant to maintain the rule of law without encroaching 
on the civil liberties of the people who elected them. The media function instead according 
to different incentives. The priority, for journalists, is to tell the truth and be independent 
under any circumstances. Such behaviour does not prevent them being aware of the impact 
of their reporting; writing; and images on society. Democratic principles must be respected 
in all situations.  The media are not ill-intentioned, although a competitive spirit might 
induce them to rush their reporting, following their instincts, in order to reveal what they 
believe the public should know. 
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There has been present always a mutual suspicion between the media and executive powers. 
It is not a new phenomenon. There are real and permanent struggles over access to 
information, and both sides are not keen to cooperate willingly or work together. In the UK, 
the challenge, for the media, is the multiplication of laws which occurred since the advent 
of the twentieth century and particularly since the tragic events of New York in September 
2001. Most journalists consider the implementation of the laws as an infringement of their 
jealously protected independence. In relation to the ‘war on terror’, the government and 
legislature demand unquestioning allegiance from the media whether or not this involve a 
reduction of civil liberties and less respect for human rights in the response to the threat of 
terrorism.  
Media people argue that journalists should not intervene directly in the way society is run. 
That is not their purpose. People, who join the media profession, follow ideals where the 
core elements are loyalty; pluralism; and respect for human rights.  Most independent media 
people refuse to submit themselves to the dictates of authorities; executive powers; and 
police or security services.  Anti-terrorist laws represent an enormous challenge for 
journalists; reporters; cameramen; photographers and all media professionals. The 
multiplicity of abrogation and amendments, made to the various statutes enacted since the 
Terrorism Act 2000, proves that the laws are far from being perfect.  Challenging anti-
terrorism-laws and their interpretation by the executive is the natural reaction of the media 
and civil liberties and human rights organisations. In criticising anti-terrorism laws, the 
media are defending not only their right to conduct their profession according to a specific 
ethical code. They are, also, making people aware about the risks of endangering the existing 
balance between the security of citizens and their civil liberties. 
This chapter defined the concept of media and discussed its types and how it developed. The 
following chapter discusses the UK Anti–Terrorism Laws and their impact on the media.  
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     Chapter Four: 
 UK Anti–Terrorism Laws: A Critical Overview 
4.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter addressed more widely the issue of the media and terrorism. It 
considered the existing and particular relationship between the two entities and the 
governments’ attitudes towards the media. The distinctive roles, of the media and human 
rights organisations, were considered, also. In addition, it was suggested that anti-terrorism 
laws, enacted in the context of the new paradigm “war on terror”, were targeting not only 
terrorists, whether individuals; groups; or organisations but also, were used by governments 
as a pretext to muzzle the independent media; make them submissive to the official line; and 
to echo positively the executive’s policies.   
 This chapter analyses how the “war on terror” and the enactment of anti-terrorism laws by 
several countries in the world, and particularly the United Kingdom, affected media 
organisations and professionals in terms of gaining access to information,  along with an 
increase in accusations of incitements to ‘terrorism’ or glorification of “extremism”. The 
chapter sheds light, also, on the anti–terrorism laws which were enacted particularly in the 
UK and the European Union and which  were believed to have impacted upon the  media’s 
and journalists’ freedom.  
Most worldwide governments, which were keen to counter firmly the growing menace of 
terrorism, felt compelled to react by taking drastic measures; these affected citizens’ civil 
liberties and the people’s way of life. The new measures, which the authorities deemed 
necessary, included restrictions on speech; surveillance; and the blocking of internet access 
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or other means of communications. A substantial number of journalists and human rights 
organisations were very critical about the new legislation, which were adopted in a hasty 
manner. They considered that, already, existing laws had affected seriously freedom of 
expression whilst providing little benefit in terms of fighting terrorism.297 It was argued that 
the new anti-terrorist laws paid little attention to human rights which, subsequently, were 
infringed. 
4.2 The Role of Media in Supporting Political Action.  
Before considering the enactment of laws and their effect on the media It is essential to 
examine the role of the media in the life of the state and its citizens,. This media role was 
covered widely during an international conference in Italy,298 and, due to their relevance to 
the topic of this study, it is important to look at some of the proceedings. By reviewing 
articles given by media professionals it is possible to know more about their position in 
modern society.299  Therefore, in order to explore concrete evidence and to assess it fairly it 
is vital to consider these questions, in depth. 
Nowadays, the term, Fourth Power300, is used to refer to editorialists or journalists, who have 
some power to influence the executive powers or the destiny of leaders. However, it  could 
be noticed that, after the September 11 events, the press made a contribution, in an uncritical 
                                                          
297  For instance, the International Federation of Journalists (IFJ) and Liberty, a UK non-party membership 
organisation;  these are at the heart of the movement for fundamental rights and freedoms in the United 
Kingdom. 
298   Three significant interventions were given during the international conference “Media between   
      Citizens and Power Venice in 2006 
299   The media own perspective, about their role, is important  in understanding their mechanisms.  
300   The term ‘fourth power’ derives in fact from the coined term fourth estate attributed to the nineteenth 
century historian, Carlyle, who attributed it instead to Edmund Burke. Carlyle stated what follows: “Burke 
said there were Three Estates in Parliament; but, in the Reporters' Gallery yonder, there sat a Fourth Estate 
more important than they all. It is not a figure of speech, or a witty saying; it is a literal fact, .... Printing, 
which comes necessarily out of Writing, I say often, is equivalent to Democracy: invent Writing, 
Democracy is inevitable. ..... Whoever can speak, speaking now to the whole nation, becomes a power, a 
branch of government, with inalienable weight in law-making, in all acts of authority. It matters not what 
rank he has, what revenues or garnitures: the requisite thing is that he has a tongue which others will listen 
to; this and nothing more is requisite.” Carlyle (1905) pp.349-350 
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way, to the war on Iraq, by being “strong with the weak and weak with the strong301”  and, 
therefore, losing some of their credibility302 with the public. 
Whilst the media showed courage in reporting the events of the war on Iraq, which was 
deemed the bloodiest war ever,303 some thought they were controlled by political agents. The 
complexity, of the situation, meant that it was impossible to know what really happened in 
Iraq, in order to make the people, responsible for that particular war, accountable before the 
international community.304 In the contemporary world, it is a fact that many tragedies occur 
without being reported and numerous parts of the world live in media darkness.305  It has 
become clear, also, that the media are driven no longer by the search for truth306.  
In the age of globalisation, the media is essential and indispensable for the balance of power. 
However, in various instances, the media’s standing with economic and political powers 
engendered a crisis between the media and the public, who, nowadays, tend to distrust what 
is published or broadcast by mainstream outlets.  Often, the media are the main interlocutors 
of politicians. They can either contribute to their ascendance to power or provoke their 
political fall; this explains the power of the media and their importance in the eyes of leaders 
and decision-makers. Media are, also, an instrument used by leaders; rulers; or policymakers 
to influence public opinion or to strengthen popular support.307   
                                                          
301  The writer, who made this statement, meant that the media did not play their original role and  accepted  
instead to convey the rhetoric of the American administration as well as British political  statements (strong) 
without challenging them, or giving some credit to the Iraqi version (weak). 
302   See R. Reale, in International Seminar Media Between Citizens and Power Venice, 23-24 June 2006 
Workshops. P. 12, http://www.theworldpoliticalforum.net/wp-
content/uploads/wpf2006/06_media_between_c-p_venice/documenti/speeches_workshops.pdf  
303 Ibid. In page 13 Reale stated that “Regarding big political choices, the media scene has been at most 
dominated by the men of the spinning machine, the consensus machine, by communicators at the service 
of governments. They succeeded in exploiting with ability the arrogance of some reporters to instigate 
public opinion against liberal information.” 
304 The contrasting figures reported by media outlets regarding the number of civilian victims.  
305 Media darkness in the sense that there is a total absence of the media and who decides what is important to 
report and what is not relevant for the interest of the media corporations. 
306 It is  no longer a priority for the media to unveil the truth to the public. 
307 In particular, the popular support to authoritarian regimes or imperial actions on the world scene.  
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Iouchkiavitchious308 insisted on the importance of having independent media and free press 
since they were experiencing great pressures and difficult working conditions. For instance, 
it is not only the journalists’ professional integrity, which is at a risk, but, also, the 
journalists’ very lives309 are threatened. The risks, encountered by journalists, exist even in 
real democracies where, occasionally, they are arrested and jailed for professional reasons 
such as refusing to disclose their sources.310 For Wallstrom, the free market’s supremacy had 
not produced pluralism but, instead, had allowed the concentration of the media in a few 
hands which tended to be connected to the sources of political and economic power. She 
believed that such a situation undermined the capacity of civil society to have its say in 
“democratic governance”.311  
There was a tension between press freedom and the tendency of governments to limit that 
freedom; this represented the original pattern of the conflict between citizens and the state 
in liberal democracies.312 The lawful regulation, of this tension, is depicted in the UK and 
elsewhere, nevertheless, there is a clear legal realisation that, as a Fourth Power, the media 
has a legitimate and worthy role to play in the political process with the function of 
promoting openness and democratic political processes.313 Nevertheless, most governments 
                                                          
308 See H. Iouchkiavitchious whostated that: 
‘press freedom is under great pressure everywhere. Politicians are for the press freedom when they are 
fighting for a power, but when they come to the power they are not so interested in the press freedom.’ 
In International Seminar Media Between Citizens and Power Venice, 23-24 June 2006 Workshops. P. 
22, 
http://www.theworldpoliticalforum.net/wpcontent/uploads/wpf2006/06_media_between_cp_venice/documen
ti/speeches_workshops.pdf  
309 The number of journalists killed worldwide can be found in the following Committee to Protect Journalists 
link.  “911 Journalists Killed since 1992 “ Available at: http://www.cpj.org/killed/  
310 See “United States Attack on Journalists’ Right to Protect Sources “Violates First Amendment”. Press 
release of the International Federation of Journalists (IFJ) 11 October 2004. Article available online at: 
http://www.ifj.org/en/articles/united-states-attack-on-journalists-right-to-protect-sources-violates-first-
amendment-says-ifj  
311 M. Wallstrom, Vice-president of the European Commission, in charge of Institutional Relations and 
Communication Strategy, Sweden,  2006. 
312  J. Keane, The Media and Democracy, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991. 
313 M. Chesterman, Freedom of Speech in Australia: A Delicate Plant, Ashgate: Dartmouth. 2000 
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have passed anti-terrorism laws since 2001, which limit media freedom and freedom of 
speech. The way, in which individual rights and liberties are affected, has received 
considerable analysis.314 
4.3. International Responses to Terrorism 
The multiplication of terrorist actions in the last two decades, which culminated with the 
attack on the Twin Towers on September 11 2001 in the United States of America, prompted 
reactions worldwide.  However, it was not only states or governments who decided to 
legislate quickly and to give the executive the legal means to combat terrorism. International 
bodies including the UN; EU; OECD; NATO; and the Council of Europe (CoE) adopted 
many international agreements. These appeared to be encroaching upon the citizens’ 
freedom of expression  and to neglect some of the fundamental human rights agreed upon at 
an international level; these were such as the importance of a free media in democratic and 
modern societies. 
In order to understand what occurred on the international scene immediately after September 
11 2001, it is important to note that all international organisations asked for international 
cooperation. For instance, the UN reacted through Resolution 1368 in which they called for 
increased cooperation between states to confront and defeat terrorism.315 Equally, the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) reasserted Article 5 of its Charter,316 which stated that 
aggression, against any NATO member country, would be considered as aggression towards 
                                                          
314 I. Barker, ‘Human rights in an age of counter-terrorism’, Australian Bar Review, 2005, 26: 267–86. 
315    United Nations Security Council (2001, 12 September) Security Council Resolution1368 (2001) 
Adopted by the Security Council at its 4370th meeting, on 12 September 2001.S/RES/1368 (2001). New 
York: United Nations, available online at: 
 http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N01/533/82/PDF/N0153382.pdf?OpenElement 
316   Despite the fact that Article 5 of NATO’s Charter  was never used during the whole Cold War period. 
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all members of the Treaty317. The Council of Europe (CoE) required fast responses in terms 
of state cooperation regarding criminal matters.318  
Researchers, such as McNamara319, considered that the counter-terrorism laws, introduced 
by most governments to guarantee the security of their citizens, definitely limited the 
freedom of the media. The tension, between the media and the British government’s 
intention to restrict that freedom, denoted the typical conflict between state and society, 
particularly in liberal democracies such as the UK.320 Numerous scholars and researchers 
believed that the dramatic events, of September 11 2001, acted as a pretext for the continuing 
struggle between citizens and state, and a way of legitimizing the enactment of restrictive 
laws limiting media freedom.321 
4.4. International Events which led to New Anti-terrorism Laws 
The terrorist acts, conducted on American territory on September 11 2001, were 
unprecedented in United States of America history.322  The response, to such an aggression, 
brought about what the American administration termed “the war on terror”, 323  in all its, 
                                                          
317  On 12 September, NATO decided that, if it was determined that the attack, against the United States of 
America, was directed from abroad, it  ought to be regarded as an action covered by Article 5 of the 
Washington Treaty. This  was the first time, in the Alliance's history, that Article 5  was invoked. See: 
NATO Topics, ‘what is article 5?’, February  2005, http://www.nato.int/terrorism/five.htm 
318 See Council of Europe, Committee of ministers, ‘Recommendation Rec (2001)11 of the Committee of 
Ministers to member states concerning guiding principles on the fight against organised crime’, 19 
September 2001, available online at: 
http://www.coe.int/t/dlapil/codexter/Source/CM_Recommendation_2001_11_EN.pdf  
319  L. McNamara, ‘Counter-terrorism Laws: How They Affect Media Freedom and News Reporting’, 
Westminster Papers in Communication and Culture, 2009,Vol. 6(1): 27-44 
320 J. Keane, The Media and Democracy, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991 
321 L. McNamara, Counter-terrorism Laws: How They Affect Media Freedom and News Reporting’,  
Westminster Papers in Communication and Culture, Vol. 6(1), 2009, p: 27-44. 
322 Until t 11 September 2001, and from an American perspective, the only reminiscence of an attack of such 
a magnitude on U.S.A. soil  went back to Pearl Harbour, Hawaii, in December 1941. Similar to the September 
11 terrorist attacks in New York and Washington, the Japanese raid on Pearl Harbour  was called a defining 
moment in  American history.  
323 The term ‘response’ is nevertheless subjective because there are writers such as Sardar; Chomsky;Ali; and 
Lindauer who argued that, in some ways, the USA’s foreign policies  were a key factor behind the September 
11 attacks. Successive American governments  were not immune from the blame since their policies provoked 
violent reactions. 
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military; financial; or judicial forms.324  Usually, the authorities do not find it difficult to 
govern in times of stability whether in political; economic; or social arenas.325  Conversely, 
real challenges appear when circumstances are less stable and more complex and require 
more appropriate instruments. Numerous questions have arisen at different levels regarding 
the evaluation of responses by states towards the observance of the rule of law and the 
capacity of democratic governments to deal with the issue of terrorism without violating the 
principles of liberal democracies. 326  These values, which form the backbone of society,327 
are based on the freedom of expression; the right to dissent; the freedom of belief; the right 
to access and provide information; and the right to political activism.  The rule of law is 
reckoned to be an excellent control measure in times of instability and disorder. In times of 
crisis, legislation is believed to be a gauge of governments’ success or failure.328 
In exceptional situations, governments’ weak responses by may lead to more and even 
greater challenges, and can stimulate rivalry amongst States. For instance, after the 
dismembering of the Soviet Union, the United States of America faced a difficult 
dilemma.329 They had to choose whether to adhere completely to the concept of the rule of 
law or to follow their own political, economic and military schemes, without considering the 
lawfulness of the means used to achieve their targets.330  This researcher noted that, despite 
                                                          
324 D. Edwards and D. Cromwell, Guardians of Power, The Myth Of The Liberal Media. London. Pluto Press, 
(2006). 
325 E. Barendt & L. Hitchens, Media Law, Cases and Materials, Pearson Education Limited, England, 2000.  
326 These questions were raised by academics; politicians; media professionals; and human rights organisations. 
327 R. Edwards, An investigation into terrorism legislation in the United Kingdom and its effects on civil 
liberties. Glasgow Caledonian University, (Dissertation 2005). 
328 P. A. Thomas, ‘Emergency and Anti-Terrorist Powers, 9/11: USA and UK’, Fordham International Law 
Journal.  2002, pp.1193-1233 
329  Being the only remaining superpower, they found themselves without their traditional challenger .  
330  Two schools of thought, Unilateralism and Multilateralism, dominated the debate regarding the USA’s role 
after the fall of the Soviet Union. Unilateralists argued that the world was unpredictable and dangerous and, 
therefore, the USA had to use power to protect and propagate its interests and values. In fact, the USA used its 
overwhelming military, economic, and political power to build an international order so that its pre-eminence, 
in the world, was maintained and perpetuated. Multilateralists argued that there  were circumstances in which 
the United States of America  ought not to act unilaterally, and most key challenges, facing the USA,  would 
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the unexpected rise of a new wave of international terrorism, world leaders reaffirmed their 
determination to respect the binding effect of international law and to resort to international 
legal instruments to face all sort of challenges.  However, in the USA, successive 
administrations, whether Democrat or Republican, refused to recognise the International 
Criminal Court (ICC) and other fundamental treaties.331 When the USA was exposed to 
violent acts such as the 9/11 attacks, the American administration resorted to unilateralism 
and did not refer strictly to international law. It disregarded the existing approved legal 
instruments which the world communities had put in place at the level of international 
organisations such as the United Nations.332   
By examining the making of international law in the aftermath of the Cold War, Krisch found 
that whilst the US played a leading role in fostering treaty negotiations, it tended to opt out 
                                                          
not be resolved through unilaterally. For them, multilateral approaches  were required to deal with terrorism; 
the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons; illegal drugs; and organized crime.  
 See C. Krauthammer, America and the World’ Foreign Affairs, 1990/91, Vol. 70, No. 1 available from 
Lexis/Nexis Academic Universe. See also S. Joseph, The Paradox of American Power: Why the World’s Only 
Superpower Can’t Go it Alone, New York: OUP, 2002, p. 40. 
 
331 Richard Goldstone wrote: 
“When the United Nations Security Council established the ad hoc criminal tribunals for the former 
Yugoslavia and Rwanda, it conferred jurisdiction on those courts on the basis that the crimes amenable 
to their jurisdiction were international crimes that attracted universal jurisdiction. With regard to these 
developments, the United States played a contradictory role. Generally, the Congress and successive 
Presidents supported the recognition of universal jurisdiction for such shocking crimes. At the same 
time they objected to United States citizens, and especially members of the military, becoming 
amenable to foreign or international courts. This approach is demonstrated by the United States 
opposition to the International Criminal Court, the Kyoto Protocol on global warming and the Protocol 
to the Torture Convention which seeks to make prisons subject to international inspection.”  
See R.Goldstone, ‘The Tension between Combating Terrorism and Protecting Civil Liberties’, , Institute of 
Human Rights, University of Connecticut, 2005, available online at: 
http://humanrights.uconn.edu/documents/papers/TerrorCivilRightsRGoldstone.pdf  
See also M. Freeman, and H. Ross (eds). Law and Philosophy, Oxford University, Oxford, 2008 
332  The United States took a leading role in the writing of treaties such as the Covenant of the League of 
Nations; the Kellogg-Briand Pact; the United Nations Charter; the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT); 
and the Human Rights Covenants. However, histories of the League Covenant; the Universal Declaration on 
Human Rights; and Havana Charter on the International Trade Organization suggested that, the United States 
of America withdrew its adhesion to the far-reaching obligations of those multilateral treaties. This pattern 
persists to this day (Malone, 2003). See D.M. Malone and Y.F. Khong, (eds), ‘Unilateralism and U.S. Foreign 
Policy: International Perspectives’, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003. 
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of the resulting treaties by not ratifying them.333 The researcher underlined the fact that such 
American attitudes were more apparent  after the end of the Cold War. The Krisch’s 
proposed analysis was based on two aspects. The first one showed explicitly the United 
States of America working to “establish strong legal rules for other states” whilst seeking, 
for itself, the right to be “exempt from or even . . . above” these rules.334   The second and 
less apparent one  was the consequence of the first;  this was the fact that, since the 1990s, 
the United States of America   had grown more powerful.  
In considering the case of the war against Afghanistan, one ought to point out that 
there was a controversy around the legality of that particular war. The US administration 
declared that it was its right to respond to aggression against its own territory, referring to 
its own interpretation of international law, and, despite some dissent and a timid reaction 
from other members of the international community, military intervention did take place.335  
In such situations, the rule of law was neglected  since the laws  were interpreted only from 
the executive power’s perspective .336  
Democracies, established on the basis of the rule of law, ought to ensure such basic rights of 
their citizens under the criminal justice system as habeas corpus; the presumption of 
innocence until evidence proved otherwise; and transparency of a trial in appropriate courts 
of justice. Furthermore, the accused had to have the right to legal advice representation. 
                                                          
333 The International Criminal Court (ICC); the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT); the amended 
Convention on the Law of the Sea; the Kyoto Protocol; and the Convention on Biological Diversity  were cases 
in point. See N. Krisch, 'Weak as Constraint, Strong as Tool: The Place of International Law in U.S. Foreign 
Policy', in D.M. Malone & Y.F. Khong, (eds.), Unilateralism and U.S. Foreign Policy: International 
Perspectives , 2003, 41-70 
334 See N. Krisch, loc.cit. 
335 See “No War Against Afghanistan!”, Speech delivered by Professor F.A. Boyle at the Illinois Disciples  
Foundation, Champaign, Illinois on October 18, 2001, 
http://www.ratical.org/ratville/CAH/fab112901.html 
336 The most powerful nation on earth, interpreting international law according to its own perspectives and 
interests, lead to more instability in the world, as witnessed following the invasion of Iraq by the USA and its 
allies. 
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Additionally, sentences ought to be proportional to the crime.337  Other rights ought to 
include the right to oppose the official discourse; the right to denounce executive abuses; the 
right to dissent; and the right to oppose peacefully what was believed to be unfair or  
contradictory to the fundamental values of an open society. 338 
However, after September 11 2001, a tangible change happened in the USA. The 
core problem appeared when the rule of law was considered no longer to be the norm, and 
the executive’s highest ranks considered that they were not bound by norms of good 
governance.339 This shift was evidenced through a USA administration official’s following 
confession to Ron Suskind, an American journalist,: 
“We are an Empire now, and when we act, we create our own reality.  And while you 
are studying that reality – judiciously, as you will – we will act again, creating other 
new realities, which you can study too, and that is how things will sort out. We are 
history’s actors…and you, all of you, will be left to just study what we do.”340 
Such testimony, from a high profile American administrator, reflected the attitude of an 
executive power which did not respect the principles of an open society based on justice; 
transparency; and truth.341 Contempt, for the media, in a democracy based on the rule of law, 
is likely to cause unrest and unpredictable consequences for the civil society in general. 
                                                          
337 Dickinson underlined the fact that “Article 12 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
("ICCPR") requires that defendants be assured the right to choose their own counsel, to have reasonable 
opportunities to prepare their defenses, to be presumed innocent until proven guilty, to know the charges against 
them, and to appeal. The treaty also forbids discrimination on account of "race ... and national origin”. See L. 
A. Dickinson, Using Legal Process to fight Terrorism: Detentions, Military Commissions, International 
Tribunals, and the Rule of Law. In Southern California Law Review , 2002, vol 75, p1407. 
338 R. Foot;J. Gaddis, and A. Hurrell, (eds), Order and Justice in International Relations, Oxford University, 
Oxford, 2007.  
339  T. F. Farr, World of Faith and Freedom. Why International Religious Liberty Is Vital to American 
National Security. Oxford University: Oxford. 2008 
340   R.Suskind. “Faith, Certainty and the Presidency of George W. Bush”, New York Times, October 17, 
2004. It was later revealed that the official was Karl Christian Rove, Senior Advisor and Deputy Chief of 
Staff to President George W. Bush from 2001 to 2007. 
341  A. Francis, The Cost of Terrorism: The Relationship Between International Terrorism and Democratic 
Governance, Terrorism and Political Violence, 2008, vol 20: p 257–270. 
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During the Bush era at the White House, a circumspect perspective, on the role of the media, 
was shared by US officials such as Andrew Card342 for whom the media did not represent 
the people. He had reservations as regards the media’s check-and-balance function.343 When 
a journalist asked Andrew Card whether or not he believed that the press had a legitimate 
check-and-balance function, he answered by stating: "Absolutely not, Congress has a check-
and-balance function; the judiciary does, but not the press."344  
This claim to be making history, with the media playing a minimal role, is concerning 
because if societies allow the executives to have ultimate discretion without regulation, the 
rules of democracy are changed with alarming consequences for society. Altman, a 
researcher and media columnist, argued that the way, in which the American administration 
and its ideological allies dealt with the media, signified that everything  was done to prevent; 
reduce; and weaken the “media’s ability to practice their original function, which is to hold 
power accountable”. It was clear to Altman that the Bush Administration did not recognise 
the constitutional role of the press.345 
Another element to consider was the role, of academia, in seeking answers about terrorist 
actions. For instance, Ignatieff discussed the eventual responses to the threat of terrorism 
and made it clear that the fight against terrorism ought not to be limited only to legislating 
                                                          
342 Andrew Card was a former White House Chief of Staff from 2000 to 2006. 
343 G.L. Munck “Measures of Democracy, Governance and Rule of Law: An Overview of Cross-National 
Data Sets” School of International Relations University of Southern California Paper prepared for World 
Bank workshop on “Understanding Growth and Freedom from the Bottom Up” Washington, DC, July 15-17, 
2003. Available online at: http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTMOVOUTPOV/Resources/2104215-
1148063363276/071503_Munck.pdf  
344 See Interview Ken Auletta, Frontline, 13th June 2006, a leading American journalist, who writes The New 
Yorker's Annals of Communications column s[2003], available online at: 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/newswar/interviews/auletta.html  
345 E. Alterman, George W. Bush’s war on the press, in “Media Between Citizens and Powers”, Proceedings 
of an International Seminar, 23-24 June 2006 – San Servolo, Venice, Italy. 
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and enforcing the new adopted laws. It ought to ensure, also, that political life in democracies 
was free from violence. He added that it was through violence that terror was defeated. 
“It may require coercion, deception, secrecy, and violation of rights. How can 
democracies resort to these means without destroying the values for which they 
stand? How can they resort to the lesser evil, without succumbing to the greater?”346 
This statement suggested abandoning political ethics justified the kinds of abuses which the 
world had witnessed since the “War on terror” was announced by the Bush administration. 
However, a few years later, Ignatieff acknowledged his early misperceptions as regards to 
the war on Iraq and said he was wrong in supporting the invasion of that country.347  
Professor Falk, an eminent scholar of International law, appraised the war on Afghanistan 
immediately after the September 11 2001 events.348  He argued against the existence of 
credible or practical alternatives to war and rejected any UN involvement; the use of missile 
strikes (as used in the past by previous American administrations); or diplomatic efforts 
reinforced by sanctions. All these options appeared unworkable:  
“Each of these alternative options generally seemed unable to punish the perpetrators 
or end the threat, and so the case for war prevailed as national policy without 
mainstream dissent.349 
Professor Falk described the views which prevailed in political circles and which seemed to  
be subject to the pressure of the general sentiment felt in  America in the aftermath of the  
                                                          
346 M. Ignatieff  , The Lesser Evil, Political Ethics in an Age of Terror, Edinburgh University Press: 
Edinburgh, 
2004. 
347 Ibid. 
348 See R. Falk, Appraising the war against Afghanistan , Social Science Research Council, 2002, available 
online at:  http://essays.ssrc.org/sept11/essays/falk.htm  
349 In 2002, Professor Falk wrote an article for the Social Science Research Council Essay Forum, and 
referred to the decision to invade Afghanistan  as the only solution left to the Bush administration 
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September 11 events. Yet, he ought not to have ignored the ‘credible legal alternatives’ 
mentioned by other experts in law; these are discussed below. More than a decade later, there 
is still a war in Afghanistan, with all its consequences on the world scene; consequently, it 
would be interesting to know whether or not Professor Falk expected such an outcome when 
he wrote his paper.   
Professor Francis Boyle, an equally eminent expert on international law, offered an 
alternative opinion regarding the legality of the war on Afghanistan.350 He explained that 
acts of terrorism such as the ones, which occurred on September 11 2001, were dealt with 
generally as “a matter of international and domestic law enforcement”.  In order to reinforce 
his argument he mentioned directly the existence of a treaty on point.351 Referring to the way 
in which the United Nations dealt with terrorism352 he described how it was agreed to itemise 
terrorism into units and deal with them separately. For example, it was decided to criminalise 
certain specific aspects of criminal behaviour, such as the destruction of a civilian aircraft 
whilst in service, and in this case “the Montreal Sabotage Convention353 is directly on point”.  
                                                          
350 See “ No War Against Afghanistan!”. Speech delivered by Professor F. A. Boyle at the Illinois Disciples   
Foundation, Champaign, Illinois on October 18, 2001.  Available online at: 
http://www.ratical.org/ratville/CAH/fab112901.html 
351 See Prof.  Boyle’s article,   Available online at: http://www.ratical.org/ratville/CAH/fab112901.html 
352 Despite the fact that the United Nations has not been able to agree on a formal definition of terrorism, as 
discussed in another chapter of  this study. 
353 According to Professor Boyle “The 1971 Montreal Sabotage Convention is directly on point here, and 
provides a comprehensive framework for dealing with the current dispute between the United States and 
Afghanistan over the tragic events of 11 September 2001. Both States are contracting parties to the Montreal 
Sabotage Convention, together with 173 other States in the World. The United States is under an absolute 
obligation to resolve this dispute with Afghanistan in a peaceful manner as required by UN Charter Article 
2(3) and Article 33 as well as by the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928, as well as in accordance with the 
requirements of the Montreal Sabotage Convention--all of which treaties bind most of the States of the World. 
In addition, the United States should offer to submit this entire dispute to the International Court of Justice in 
The Hague (the so-called World Court) on the basis of the Montreal Sabotage Convention, and should ask the 
Government of Afghanistan to withdraw its Reservation to World Court jurisdiction as permitted by article 
14(3) of the Montreal Sabotage Convention. Furthermore, all other contracting parties must invoke the 
Montreal Sabotage Convention against both the United States and Afghanistan in order to produce a peaceful 
resolution of this dispute”. See “Invoke Montreal Sabotage Convention” by Francis A. Boyle. Available online 
at: http://www.themodernreligion.com/terror/wtc-msc.html  
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Both the USA and Afghanistan were parties to the cited Convention and,  consequently, it 
would have been possible to have recourse to this legal regime to deal with the dispute.354 
Boyle’s strong arguments challenged the opinions of those who supported intervention in 
Afghanistan and weakened the presented legal arguments to support the case for war. 
Another legal opinion was given by Professor Marjorie Cohn gave another legal opinion.355 
Without neglecting the traumatic effect provoked by the September 11 2001 events, she 
considered that, from a legal perspective, that the war against Afghanistan was illegal. For 
her, the bombings were a flagrant violation of both international law and United States law, 
“… set forth in the United Nations Charter, a treaty ratified by the U.S. and therefore 
part of the supreme law of the land under the U.S. Constitution.”  
The U.N. Charter provides that all member states must settle their international disputes by 
peaceful means, and no nation can opt unilaterally for the use of military force except in self-
defence.356 Focusing on the role of the United Nations Security Council, Professor Cohn 
insisted that it was the only body  which could authorise the use of force, or decide the form 
of action to be taken to maintain or restore international peace and security.357 This 
contradicted Professor Falk’s view that there were no credible alternatives to war.  
Cohn listed five possible options: firstly, the possibility for the United States to sue 
Afghanistan in the International Court of Justice (ICJ) for harbouring people supposedly 
involved in the 11th September attacks, and to demand  their arrests; secondly, there  was the 
economic sanctions route and that of diplomacy; thirdly, it  was possible to establish an 
                                                          
354 Professor Boyle deplored that The Bush administration decided to ignore the Montreal Sabotage 
Convention. There was, also, the U.N. Terrorist Bombing Convention  which was,also, directly on point. 
355 M.Cohn is an associate professor at Thomas Jefferson School of Law in San Diego, expert in International 
Human Rights Law. See Marjorie Cohn article “Bombing of Afghanistan is illegal and must be stopped”, 
Jurist, November 6, 2001, , http://www.jurist.org/forum/forumnew36.htm  
356 In fact, the  USA’s argument was that it was acting in self-defence. 
357 See M.Cohn, loc.cit. “Bombing of Afghanistan is illegal and must be stopped”, Jurist, November 6, 2001 , 
http://www.jurist.org/forum/forumnew36.htm 
Chapter Four: UK Anti–Terrorism Laws a critical overview             103 
 
 
international tribunal to try terrorist suspects; fourthly, a U.N. force  could be created “to 
make arrests, prevent attacks or counter aggression”; and, finally as a last resort, the UN  
could authorise “the application of armed force with the Military Staff Committee”.358 
Cohn’s opinion was based on factors which respected international law; encouraged 
cooperation between states for the resolution of conflicts; and the finding of solutions 
without recourse to war.   
Yet another academic, Lietzau, was convinced of the legality of military intervention359 in 
Afghanistan. He represented the American administration’s position and refuted implicitly 
Cohn’s and Boyle’s arguments. He argued that the scale, of the September 11 2001 terrorist 
attacks, confirmed that the previous law enforcement responses were obsolete, and that using 
military force was more than a legitimate option, it was an obligation.  In order to give more 
weight to his argument he considered that the September 11 2001 terrorist attacks made 
world opinion acknowledge that that events were above mere criminal conduct, equating 
them with an act of war. Accordingly, he stated that it was necessary to respond in a violent 
way, 
“Primarily as a preventive measure, but undoubtedly attended by punitive aspects 
that traditionally are associated with law enforcement concepts. The use of military 
force in response to September 11 has been well received both internationally and 
domestically. 
There was a clear disregard of international law by Lietzau, who justified the military option 
as an obligation. The claims that the decision. to go to war  was supported universally, 
                                                          
358 Ibid. 
359 William K. Lietzau, ‘Combating Terrorism: Law Enforcement or War?’ in Terrorism and International 
Law: 
Challenges and Responses, 2002, p75, http://www.iihl.org/iihl/Album/terrorism-law.pdf . The author is 
Lieutenant Colonel, United States Marine Corps, Office of the General Counsel, Department of Defense. 
LLM, U.S. Army Judge Advocate General’s School; JD, Yale Law School; BS, U.S. Naval Academy. 
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seemed rather overstated. For instance, on the other side of the spectrum, another academic 
gave another perspective of the situation by enlarging the picture of “terrorism”360.  
Therefore, to describe the American administration’s actions in response to the September 
11 2001 attacks, Professor Henry Laurens used the term ‘state terrorism’; this was defined 
as: the ‘use (of) violence to keep the monopoly of the violence’.361 
Other supporters of war option such as Martin Kramer362 went beyond supporting the war 
against Afghanistan in stating that, 
“Making 9/11 a turning point in the Middle East will require a lot more than the 
demonstration effect of the Afghan victory”.   
He asked later whether September 11 2001 would be a watershed for the Arab world. 
According to him: 
“If the United States leaves it to the Middle East, the answer will be "no." But it 
might become a "yes" — if America only shows the same resolve in Arabia that it 
has shown in Afghanistan.” 
By suggesting that the United States s ought to extend its interventionism in the Arab world, 
Kramer presented a particular perspective of the world order.  Here, it could be underlined 
that the opinions and influence of writers, such as Kramer. had a real impact on 
policymakers, and contributed to the build-up of the war on Iraq. 
4.5 Terrorism Act 2000 and Regulations of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 
                                                          
360 What the researcher means here is that the term terrorist cannot be limited to non-state actors or its 
proponents confined in a particular geographical area, in certain populations, in certain cultures or religion. 
361 H. Laurens : «  Le terrorisme d’état use de la violence pour garder le monopole de la violence » statement 
made during an interview for Canal Académie (Henry Laurens is Professor of history at the  College de 
France) 
362 See M. Kramer, “From Afghanistan to Araby Sept. 11 and the Mideast”, National Review Online, 
December 10, 2001, http://www.meforum.org/98/from-afghanistan-to-araby  
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The Terrorism Act  (TA) 2000363 consisted not only of a compilation of all previous Acts 
but impacted, also, on several provisions of the HRA 1998. By contrast with earlier 
legislation, which had only a temporary character,364 the TA 2000 was given permanent 
status and  was constructed in a more considered, principled and comprehensive manner.365 
The main introduced amendments were in the provisions relative to all types of terrorism,366 
and were made available, on a permanent basis, throughout the whole United Kingdom. The 
definition of terrorism was expanded, also, to include religiously motivated international 
terrorism,367 which was not linked necessarily with the political struggle of Northern Ireland 
– whilst the power, to make exclusion orders, was abandoned. The power to extend the 
detention of people depended no longer on administrative authorisation but rather on 
demanded judicial authorisation.368 Furthermore, under s.41 (2), an arrested person’s right 
to have access to legal assistance might be postponed for up to 48 hours.369 
 
In view of what was underlined earlier,  it  could  be argued, here, , that the right, to a proper 
defence, was  incompatible with such a provision since  an arrestee needed legal assistance 
in the first hours of his/her arrest. In addition to the postponement of the access to a solicitor, 
the right to silence was limited to the first hours of the arrest since arrestees are told that 
unfavourable inferences might be deduced from their silence.370 The other cause for concern 
                                                          
363 The TA 2000 was based on a report, produced by Lord Lloyd of Berwick  and Mr Justice Kerr, as regards 
to the laws aspects relative to Northern Ireland and on a survey of terrorist threats produced by Professor  
Wilkinson, Inquiry into Legislation against Terrorism, Cm. 3420, London, 1996. Eventually, the government 
supported the report; for further information see ‘Legislation Against Terrorism’ (Cm. 4178, London, 1998). 
364 These legislations were adopted rapidly due the immediate public need. 
365 All provisions,  with the exception of those concerning Northern Ireland, limited to seven years, were to be 
permanent. However, with the events of September 11 2001 and the enactment of more drastic and authoritarian 
laws, most provisions of the TA 2000 became obsolete in the eyes of the British legislators.  
366 See Section of the TA 2000. 
367 See section 112 (S.112) of the TA 2000 
368 See section 41 and section 8 of the TA 2000.   
369 It can be observed that, in case of other indictable offences this right cannot exceed thirty-six hours. See 
PACE 1984, S.42 (2). 
370  The Strasbourg court held that denying access to a lawyer, for the first forty-eight hours of police 
questioning, was incompatible with the accused’s rights under Art. 6 ECHR.  See John Murray v UK, Judgment 
of 8 February 1996 (application no. 18731/91), at 66 
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was the Act’s definition of terrorism.371 The widening, of the meaning, was so significant 
that the provisions might be applied, also, in cases that did not require necessarily using 
special powers and offences.372  Actually, the UK government acknowledged openly the 
definition’s width.373 Moreover, s.118 imposed a legal burden on the defence to prove certain 
issues.374 
 
In addition, s.57 relating to the general offence of possession of articles of terrorism articles 
deserved greater examination. According to the terms of this provision, possession of an 
article was considered to be an offence if the circumstances gave rise to a reasonable 
suspicion that the possession was for a purpose connected with the commission; preparation; 
or instigation of an act of terrorism. 375 Walker observed that there was no requirement for 
                                                          
371 See section 1 (s.1) of the TA 2000 reads as follows: 
(1) In this Act “terrorism” means the use or threat of action where— (a) the action falls within subsection (2), 
(b) the use or threat is designed to influence the government or to intimidate the public or a section of the 
public, and (c) the use or threat is made for the purpose of advancing a political, religious or ideological 
cause.  
(2) Action falls within this subsection if it [?something missing]. 
372 Talbot, (2003), at S.138 et seq. 
373 The acknowledgement was made during legislative debates. See House of Commons Debates, 1999-2000, 
vol.341, col.152. 
374 S.118 provides for two situations: first, the case where it is a defence to prove a particular matter, such as 
in ss.12 (4) or 39 (5) (a) TA 2000 (s.118 (1) and (2)), and second, the case where the court may make 
assumptions or accept a fact as sufficient evidence unless a particular matter is proved, such as in ss.57 (1) and 
(3) (s.118 (3) and (4)). In total, s.118 is applicable to ss.12 (4), 39 (5) (a), 54, 57, 58, 77 and 103 TA 2000 (and, 
until they were repealed, also to ss.13, 32 and 33 of the EPA 1996).  See Walker (2002). 
375 S.57. Possession for terrorist purposes. 
(1) A person commits an offence if he possesses an article in circumstances which give rise to a reasonable 
suspicion that his possession is for a purpose connected with the commission, preparation or instigation of an 
act of terrorism.  
(2) It is a defence for a person, charged with an offence under this section, to prove that his possession of the 
article was not for a purpose connected with the commission; preparation; or instigation of an act of terrorism.  
(3) In proceedings for an offence under this section, if it is proved that an article—  
(a) was on any premises at the same time as the accused, or  
(b) was on premises of which the accused was the occupier or which he habitually used otherwise than as a 
member of the public, the court may assume that the accused possessed the article, unless he proves that he 
did not know of its presence on the premises or that he had no control over it.  
(4)A person guilty of an offence under this section shall be liable 
(a)on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 15 years , to a fine or to both, or  
(b)on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months, to a fine not exceeding the 
statutory maximum or to both. 
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proof of a terrorist purpose in the mind of the possessor, or for proof for eventual links with 
proscribed organisations. Consequently, if animal rights activists considered sabotaging a 
laboratory,  even they could be included.376  It  was not clear whether the burden of proof, 
as regards the possession of particular items, was a simple ‘evidential’ burden, obliging the 
defence to raise merely a doubt regarding the question of possession, with the result that the 
prosecution  had the ‘persuasive’ burden of persuading the jury of the guilt or innocence of 
the accused.377 
 
Mention ought to be made, also, of ss.44 (7) which granted the police powers to stop and 
search individuals even in the absence of terrorist suspicion. Doubts arose about its 
conformity with the ECHR and the HRA 1998, inducing the House of Lords to examine it.378 
Eventually, the Lords eventually dismissed this view and held that the provision did not 
violate Articles 5 or 8 of the ECHR.  
 
A measure, adopted before the September 11 2001 attacks, but which had an impact on 
counter terrorism investigations, was the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act (RIPA) 
                                                          
See Provision 57, Terrorism Act 2000, legistaltion.gov.uk, available online at: 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/11/section/57?view=plain . 
376 See C.Walker (2006). Cyber-Terrorism: Legal Principle and Law in the United Kingdom. Pennsylvania 
State Law Review, Vol 1001(3)  p. 627 . available online at http://www.court21.ac.uk/docs/penn07d.pdf  
In the same paper Walker observedthat:  
“The wide range of articles which may attract suspicion highlights the problematic nature of section 
57. The actions of the suspects at this stage are highly equivocal – persons with overalls and balaclavas 
may be preparing for an attack on a police patrol or on a rabbit warren. In this way, there is an 
extension of the criminal law to put people in the dock for activities which do not require activities 
directly related to terrorism or with the intention of being involved in terrorism.” 
See C.Walker, ‘Cyber-Terrorism: Legal Principle and Law in the United Kingdom’, penn state law 
review, 2006, Vol. 110, p.647, available online at:,http://www.court21.ac.uk/docs/penn07d.pdf . 
For more details about the criticism made by the author see , also, C. Walker, Blackstone’s guide to The Anti-
Terrorism Legislation, Oxford University Press, 2002, p.171-174. 
377 See C. Walker (2002), who quoted the speech of Lord Hope in the Judgement R v Director of Public 
Prosecutions, ex parte Kebilene [1999] UKHL 43, at 992-993. 
378 See the application of Gillan (FC) and another (FC)) v Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis and 
another. [2006] UKHL 12. 
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2000.379 This Act was a reaction to the House of Lords judgment in Regina v Khan,380 where 
it appeared that the police were implanting illegally listening devices in houses.381 The 
Strasbourg Court condemned this practice when examining the Halford case.382  The 
European Court held that there was a breach of Ms Halford’s right to a private life and 
correspondence as enshrined in Article 8 of the ECHR.  Furthermore, the Court considered 
that , due to the absence of any legal provision justifying such interference her private 
telecommunications were intercepted illegally,.383 The absence, of a legal basis justifying 
secret surveillance, gave rise to a number of cases384 in Strasbourg against the UK on the 
basis of violation of Article 8 of the ECHR. The RIPA 2000 sought to update the law relating 
to the interception of communications.385 It was interesting to observe that, unlike other 
intrusive methods to gather evidence, this technique did not require an authorisation from a 
judge, but from the Home Secretary.386  The fact that the government was happy to override 
                                                          
379 For more insight on the RIPA 2000, see Akdeniz, Taylor and Walker Regulation of Investigatory Powers 
Act 
2000, Criminal Law Review, February 2001, pp 73-90. 
380  [1997] AC 558. 
381 Such an action was conducted usually on the basis of advice given in a Home Office circular. The speedy 
legislative response to Khan was Part III of the Police Act 1997, which allowed the interference of the police 
with property, or with wireless telegraphy, when a senior officer considered that such actions might be of 
substantial value in preventing or detecting serious crimes and those objectives  could not be achieved by other 
means (s.93). See also Spencer (2004), at S.188 et seq. 
382 See Judgment of 25 June 1996 (application no. 20605/92). 
383 The then existing Interception of Communication Act 1985 applied only to public and not to private 
telecommunication.  
384 See, for instance the following cases: 
 Malone v UK, Judgment of 2 August 1985 (application no. 8691/79), 
 Khan v UK, Judgment of 12 May 2000 (application no. 35394/97).   
 Taylor-Sabori v UK, Judgment of 22 October 2002 (application no. 47114/99). 
 Allan v UK, Judgment of 5 November 2002 (application no. 48539/99). 
 Chalkley v UK, Judgment of 12 June 2003 (application no. 63831/00). 
 Lewis v UK, Judgment of 25 November 2003 (application no. 1303/02). 
 Perry v UK, Judgment of 17 July 2003 (application no. 63737/00). 
385 The RIPA 2000 replaced entirely the previous Interception of Communication Act 1985. 
386 In fact, before 1985, Home Secretaries used to issue warrants for telephone tapping without any legal 
basis.  This led to a condemnation,  see Malone case mentioned in footnote 93) where the European Human 
Rights Court held that tapping telephones without a legal basis violated Article8 of the ECHR. The UK 
government reacted by issuing the Interception of Communications Act 1985. Under this Act, the Home 
Secretary’s authorisation by the was given a legal framework, and a network of rules was established to 
ensure that his authorisations would not be examined in the ordinary courts. See Spencer (2005). 
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the principles, of the Convention measures, was another matter for concern since it 
threatened civil liberties and rights to freedom of expression and information.  
 
The combination of this state of affairs along with the evidential rules, guiding telephone-
tapping, was very worrying,387 especially when it was seen against background of English 
evidence law, according to which it was primarily the evidence’s relevance which 
determined whether or not it was admissible in court.388 The rule might present some 
advantages since, using privacy-infringing wire-tapping, it reduced the amount of police 
investigations. The rationale being, if the evidence would not be admitted in court, there was 
no need to obtain it through wiretapping.  
  
However, since, under English law, the Home Secretary rather than judges had to authorise 
telephone taps , the only way to assess the legality, of t such applications, would be by 
admitting them as evidence in court. Such a solution was not practical under the current legal 
framework,389 and  suggested that there  was no means for judicially controlling telephone 
interceptions. A dire consequence, of the inadmissibility of evidence obtained via 
wiretapping, was, perhaps, more perturbing, in particular, if that was the only evidence 
which might prove the suspect’s guilt, and it  could not be used in court.  With reference to 
                                                          
387 Under s.17 of the RIPA 2000, telephone-tap evidence, despite being obtained legally,  could not,in any 
case, be permissible or admissible in court. See RIPA 2000, s.17. 
388 It can be observed that under English law, the basic rule is that evidence is admissible if it is relevant (SIAC 
in Court of Appeal, A, B, C, D, E, F,G, H, Mahmoud Abu Rideh, Jamal Ajouaou v Secretary Of State for the 
Home Department, August 2004, [2004] EWCA 1123., at 242). A wide range of discretion is given to English 
judges under the English ordinary criminal law regarding whether or not particular evidence can be admitted 
during the trial. Similarly, s.78 of the PACE 1984 provides that the court can refuse to allow evidence if it 
appears that, 'having regard to all the circumstances, including the circumstances under which the evidence 
was obtained, the admission of evidence would have such an adverse effect on the fairness of the proceedings 
that the court ought not to admit it'. So, unlawfully obtained evidence can be excluded, to avoid the risk of 
jeopardising the fair trial principle. However, in other circumstances, it can be admitted, as in the case of Khan 
vs. UK [1997] AC 558 (HL). Planting and aural surveillance device in defendants’ homes without their 
knowledge is seen as unlawful. The recording obtained in Khan’s case confirmed that Khan was involved in 
drug trafficking, and eventually it was admitted as evidence. The Strasbourg Court held that the admission of 
this evidence did not violate the fair trial principle of Art. 6(1) ECHR, see Khan v UK (application no.35394/97) 
[2000] Crim. LR 684. 
389 Ibid  
Chapter Four: UK Anti–Terrorism Laws a critical overview             110 
 
 
the wide detention powers, approved temporarily under the Anti-terrorism, Crime and 
Security Act 2001,390  Spencer stated that the Home Secretary wanted to solve such a 
problem, 
"Not by abolishing the ban, but by abolishing the need for trials and giving himself 
the legal power to put them under house arrest without one."391 
 
A thorough examination of the various laws showed the existing differences existing 
between them.  
For instance, it  was noticeable that the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 
2001contained measures rejected previously by the TA 2000, whilst a substantial number of 
provisions were added.392 These new provisions related to weapons of mass destruction; the 
requirement for disclosure of financing activities; measures to improve the security of 
pathogens and toxins; powers to inspect premises and deny access to specified persons; 
additional powers of arrest in, and removal from aircraft and airports; wider powers in 
respect of the regulation of aviation security and enhanced powers to detain aircrafts; 
provision for the retention of communications; traffic data; creation of an offence of using 
noxious substances to harm or intimidate (There  was also provision in relation to hoaxes 
involving harmless substances.); asset freezing powers where an individual; entity; or 
country poseda risk to the UK economy; the life; or property of UK nationals or residents.393 
                                                          
390 J.R. Spencer 2005. Is the reason for excluding telephone-tap evidence in court to protect state security or 
to spare the Home Secretary's blushes. New Law Journal 155, 7166: 309 
391 Ibid. 
392 According to Breau et al., (2001)“The Act includes no fewer than 129 sections and eight schedules. The 
matters covered include: seizure of terrorist property; regulation, disclosure and retention of information; 
offences relating to racial and religious hatred; offences relating to weapons of mass destruction; security 
of nuclear and aviation institutions; new police powers; executive law making powers in respect of 
European security cooperation, and the detention of suspected international terrorists.” See S. Breau; S. 
Livingstone and R. O’Connell, “Anti-Terrorism Law and Human Rights in the United Kingdom post 
September 11”, Human Rights Centre, Queens University Belfast, article available online at: 
      http://www.britishcouncil.org/china-society-publications-911.pdf  
393 G. F. Ísaksson  “Human rights against anti-terrorist laws. Are human rights in the UK in jeopardy because 
of the nation’s increasing anti-terrorist laws?”, University of Akureyri, Faculty of Law and Social 
Sciences, Law division, Iceland. 2009. 
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Other purposes of the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 were to allow the 
Military Police, in any circumstances, to intervene outside military bases,394 and to enable 
the arrest and indefinite detention of foreigners. 395  
 
UK anti-terrorism legislation is presented usually as temporary396 or exceptional measures, 
taken in order to counter particular situations.  However, much of it has remained on the 
statute book.  The main characteristics and incentives, of the various Acts, can be 
summarised as follows; the Terrorism Act 2000 expanded the definition of terrorism and 
included both domestic terrorism and all political, religious or ideological forms397 which 
used or threatened violence against people or property.398 It created new offences such as 
incitement to commit terrorist acts399, and strengthened the power, of the police and of other 
                                                          
394 The interventions were not limited only to terrorist cases. 
395 In part 4 of the Act 
396 With the exception of the Terrorism Act 2000 which had originally a permanent status 
397 See section s. 111 of the TA 2000. Much of the legal argument surrounding the passage of the Terrorism 
Act focused on the definition of "terrorism". Section 1, of the Act, elaborates the meaning of "terrorism" over 
five subsections. "Terrorism" can mean the threat of, as well as the use of, an action. Section 1(4) makes it 
clear that this "action" can occur anywhere within or outside the UK. Similarly, the persons; property; or 
government affected by the threat or action itself can be anywhere in the world. The purpose, of the action or 
threat, is important for the definition of terrorism. The purpose must be to influence government "or to 
intimidate the public or a section of the public" for any "political, religious or ideological cause" (S1 (1) b and 
c). The types of action are defined in Section 1 (2) and include "serious violence against a person"; "serious 
damage to property"; endangering a person's life; creating a "serious risk to the health and safety of the public"; 
and "seriously" interfering or disrupting an electronic system. "Terrorism" is defined, also, by the weaponry 
involved, whether or not it is designed to be used to influence government or the public. Firearms and 
explosives deployed in any of the actions in S1(2) means that "terrorism" is involved. UK Terrorism Act 2000, 
new definition of "terrorism" can criminalise dissent and extra-parliamentary action. Available online at: 
http://www.statewatch.org/news/2001/sep/15ukterr.htm  
398 See section 112 (s.112) of the TA 2000 
399 See TA 2000 chapter 11 under the title of  Inciting terrorism overseas where it is stated that 
59. 
(1) A person commits an offence if 
(a) he incites another person to commit an act of terrorism wholly or partly outside the UK, and 
(b) the act would, if committed in England and Wales, constitute one of the offences listed in 
subsection (2). 
(2) Those offences are: 
(a) murder, 
(b) an offence under section 18 of the Offences against the Person 1861 c. 100. Act 1861 (wounding 
with intent), 
(c) an offence under section 23 or 24 of that Act (poison), 
(d) an offence under section 28 or 29 of that Act (explosions), and 
(e) an offence under section 1(2) of the Criminal Damage Act 1971 1971 c. 48. (endangering life by 
damaging property). 
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security services, including stop and search and pre-charge detention for seven days.400 The 
Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 gives the Home Secretary the power to detain 
indefinitely and, without having to try them in court, foreigners who are suspected of 
terrorism.  The 2001 Act extended, also, the executive’s power regarding the freezing of 
suspected terrorists’ bank accounts or assets.401 The Criminal Justice Act 2003 increased  the 
period, for which individuals could be detained without charge, from seven to fourteen days, 
and added a prohibition on the "glorification" of terrorism.402 The Prevention of Terrorism 
                                                          
400 See chapter 11 of TA 2000 Part III entitled Extension of detention under section 41 Warrants of further 
detention 
29. 
(1) A police officer of, at least the rank of superintendent, may apply to a judicial authority for the issue of a 
warrant of further detention under this Part. 
(2) A warrant of further detention— 
(a) shall authorise the further detention under section 41 of a specified person for a specified period, 
and 
(b) shall state the time at which it is issued. 
(3) The specified period in relation to a person shall end not later than the end of the period of seven days 
beginning— 
(a) with the time of his arrest under section 41, or 
(b) if he was being detained under Schedule 7 when he was arrested under section 41, with the time 
when his examination under that Schedule began. 
401 See Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 c. 24 Part 2 Orders Section 5 Contents of order. 
(1)A freezing order is an order which prohibits persons from making funds available to or for the benefit of a 
person or persons specified in the order. . 
(2)The order must provide that these are the persons who are prohibited. 
(a) all persons in the United Kingdom, and . 
(b) all persons elsewhere who are nationals of the United Kingdom or are bodies incorporated under 
the law of any part of the United Kingdom or are Scottish partnerships.  
(3)The order may specify the following (and only the following) as the person or persons to whom or for 
whose benefit funds are not to be made available. 
(a) the person or persons reasonably believed by the Treasury to have taken or to be likely to take 
the action referred to in section 4;  
(b) any person the Treasury reasonably believe has provided or is likely to provide assistance 
(directly or indirectly) to that person or any of those persons. 
402 See Part 13 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003, under the title of Detention of suspected terrorists 
306 on period of detention without charge of suspected terrorists. 
(1) Schedule 8 to the Terrorism Act 2000 (c. 11) (detention) is amended as follows. 
(2) At the beginning of paragraph 29(3) (duration of warrants of further detention) there is inserted 
“Subject to paragraph 36(3A)”. 
(3) In sub-paragraph (3) of paragraph 36 (extension of warrants)— 
(a) at the beginning there is inserted “Subject to sub-paragraph (3A),”, and 
(b) for the words from “beginning” onwards there is substituted “beginning with the relevant time”. 
      (4) After that sub-paragraph there is inserted— 
“(3A) Where the period specified in a warrant of further detention— 
(a) ends at the end of the period of seven days beginning with the relevant time, or 
(b) by virtue of a previous extension (or further extension) under this sub-paragraph, ends after the 
end of that period, the specified period may, on an application under this paragraph, be extended or 
further extended to a period ending not later than the end of the period of fourteen days beginning 
with the relevant time.  
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Act 2005 introduced the concept of ‘control orders’ to restrict the activities, of individuals 
suspected of "involvement in terrorist-related activity", even if there is not enough proof to 
charge them.403  The Terrorism Act 2006 doubled the period of pre-charge detention404 and, 
finally, the Counter-Terrorism Act 2008 allowed the interrogation after people were 
charged;405 also, it allowed constables to take fingerprints and DNA samples from people 
                                                          
(3B) In this paragraph “the relevant time”, in relation to a person, means— 
(a) the time of his arrest under section 41, or 
(b) if he was being detained under Schedule 7 when he was arrested under section 41, the time when 
his examination under that Schedule began.” 
403 See section 2 of Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005. Making of non-derogating control orders 
        (1) The Secretary of State may make a control order against an individual if he 
(a) has reasonable grounds for suspecting that the individual is or has been involved in terrorism-
related activity; and 
(b) considers that it is necessary, for purposes connected with protecting members of the public from 
a risk of terrorism, to make a control order imposing obligations on that individual. 
404 Section 23 of the Terrorism Act 2006 extended the maximum period of detention between arrest and 
charge from 14 to 28 days. Extension of period of detention of terrorist suspects 
(1) Schedule 8 to the Terrorism Act 2000 (c. 11) (detention of terrorist suspects) is amended as follows. 
(7) For sub-paragraphs (3) and (3A) of that paragraph (period for which warrants may be extended) 
substitute 
“(3) Subject to sub-paragraph (3AA), the period by which the specified period is extended or further 
extended shall be the period which— 
(a) begins with the time specified in sub-paragraph (3A); and 
(b) ends with whichever is the earlier of— 
(i) the end of the period of seven days beginning with that time; and 
(ii) the end of the period of 28 days beginning with the relevant time. 
405 See ss. 22 to 27 of the Counter-Terrorism Act 2008. PART 2. Post-charge questioning of terrorist 
suspects.                                                                                                                                      22 Post-charge 
questioning: England and Wales  
(1) The following provisions apply in England and Wales. 
(2) A judge of the Crown Court may authorise the questioning of a person about an offence— 
(a) after the person has been charged with the offence or been officially informed that they may be 
prosecuted for it, or  
(b) after the person has been sent for trial for the offence, if the offence is a terrorism offence or it 
appears to the judge that the offence has a terrorist connection. 
(3) The judge— 
(a) must specify the period during which questioning is authorised, and (b) may impose such 
conditions as appear to be necessary in the interests of justice, which may include conditions as to 
the place where the questioning is to be carried out. 
(4) The period during which questioning is authorised— 
(a) begins when questioning pursuant to the authorisation begins and runs continuously from that 
time (whether or not questioning continues), and 
(b) must not exceed 48 hours. This is without prejudice to any application for a further authorisation 
under this section. 
(5) Where the person is in prison or otherwise lawfully detained, the judge may authorise the person’s 
removal to another place and detention there for the purpose of being questioned. 
(6) A judge must not authorise the questioning of a person under this section unless satisfied— 
(a) that further questioning of the person is necessary in the interests of justice, 
(b) that the investigation for the purposes of which the further questioning is proposed is being 
conducted diligently and expeditiously, and 
(c) that what is authorised will not interfere unduly with the preparation of the person’s defence to 
the charge in question or any other criminal charge. 
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subjected to control orders.406  In addition, it amended the definition of terrorism by inserting 
a racial cause.407 
 
4.5.1 Impact of Human Rights Act 1998 and UK terrorism Legislation on Media 
It was argued that the Human Right Act 1998 was unable largely to have a positive effect   
on the contents and enforcement of UK's terrorism laws.408 Under the Act, Courts had limited 
power since, when they found incompatibility between legislation on terrorism and the Act, 
they  could make only a “declaration of incompatibility” which left it to the government to 
                                                          
(7) Codes of practice, under section 66 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (c. 60), must make 
provision about the questioning of a person by a constable in accordance with this section. 
 
(8) Nothing, in this section, prevents codes of practice under that section making other provision for the 
questioning of a person by a constable about an offence— 
(a) after the person has been charged with the offence or been officially informed that they may be 
prosecuted for it, or  
(b) after the person has been sent for trial for the offence. 
(9) In section 34(1) of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 (c. 33) (effect of accused’s failure to 
mention facts when questioned or charged: circumstances in which the section applies) after paragraph (b) 
insert— “; or (c) at any time after being charged with the offence, on being questioned under section 22 of 
the Counter-Terrorism Act 2008 (post-charge questioning), failed to mention any such fact”. 
(10) Nothing in section 36 or 37 of that Act (effect of accused’s failure or refusal to account for certain 
matters) is to be read as excluding the operation of those sections in relation to a request made in the course 
of questioning under this section. 
406 See section 18 of the Counter-Terrorism Act 2008. Material not subject to existing statutory restrictions 
(1) This section applies to— 
(a) DNA samples or profiles, or 
(b) fingerprints that are not held subject to existing statutory restrictions. 
407 See section 75 of the Counter-Terrorism Act 2008. Amendment of definition of “terrorism.” 
     75 Amendment of definition of “terrorism” etc 
(1) In the provisions listed below (which define “terrorism”, or make similar provision, and require 
that the use or threat of action is made for the purpose of advancing a political, religious or 
ideological cause), after “religious” insert “, racial”. 
408 It is stated in the review of the Human Rights Act 1998 that “The Human Rights Act has had an impact 
upon the Government’s counter-terrorism legislation. The main difficulties in this area arise not from the 
Human Rights Act, but from decisions of the European Court of Human Rights.” See the Review of the 
Implementation of the Human Rights Act, July 2006. Department of Constitutional Affairs. Justice, 
Rights and Democracy. Earlier, in December 2004, the House of Lords stated that the detention powers 
were incompatible with the ECHR. 
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decide whether or not to change the law.409   Consequently, in one case,410 the House of 
Lords declared that a section of the Anti-Terrorism Crime and Security Act 2001 - the 
prescribed indefinite detention of terrorist suspects and the implicit discrimination against 
them based on their nationality or immigration status - was incompatible with human 
rights.411 Lord Nicholls stated:  
“Indefinite imprisonment without charge or trial is anathema in any country which 
observes the rule of law. It deprives the detained person of the protection a criminal 
trial is intended to afford. Wholly exceptional circumstances must exist before this 
extreme step can be justified.412 
Other critics of the Act 2001, such as Gearty,413 observed that an “irrational distinction” was 
made between British citizens and foreigners, implying that only non-British people were 
susceptible to conducting terrorist activities. Therefore, in order not to infringe the European 
Convention of Human Rights, instead of deporting the foreigners to their country of origin, 
indefinite imprisonment without charge or trial would have been the best solution. However, 
                                                          
409 In an UK government document there is a clear statement which said that: 
 “It is however wrong to suggest that the judiciary can, using the Human Rights Act 1998, overturn 
legislation. That Act only permits the High Court, the Court of Appeal or the House of Lords/Supreme 
Court to declare legislation to be incompatible with the Convention rights. A declaration of incompatibility 
does not strike down legislation or remove it from the statute book, as is the case in some jurisdictions.  
     The above quote can be found at the following link: 
     http://www.judiciary.gov.uk/about-the-judiciary/the-judiciary-in-detail/jud-acc-ind/judges-and-parliament  
410 On 16 December 2004, a specially-convened committee of nine law lords sustained that the detention of 
foreigners without trial breached the European convention on human rights incorporated into domestic 
law by the Human Rights Act 1998. The legal decision was based on a finding that the act was 
discriminatory (as it only applied to foreign nationals) and that it breached the right to liberty guaranteed 
under Article 5.  
411 See House of Lords Session 2004–05 [2004] UKHL 56 on appeal from: [2002] EWCA Civ 1502 Opinions 
of the Lords of Appeal For Judgment in the Cause A (FC) and others (FC) (Appellants) v. Secretary of 
State for the Home Department (Respondent) X (FC) and another (FC) (Appellants) v. Secretary of State 
for the Home Department (Respondent) on Thursday 16 December 2004The Appellate Committee 
comprised: Lord Bingham of Cornhill; Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead; Lord Hoffmann; Lord Hope of 
Craighead; Lord Scott of Foscote; Lord Rodger of Earlsferry; Lord Walker of Gestingthorpe; Baroness 
Hale of Richmond; and Lord Carswell. 
412 See p.47 of the document on the ruling. 
413 Gearty, ‘Terrorism and Human Rights’, in Government and Opposition, 2007, Vol. 42, No. 3, pp. 340–
362. 
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this discriminatory measure proved to be inadequate since it appeared that British men 
conducted the  July 2005 terrorist attacks on the London transport system.  
The power given to the Home Secretary to decide on the indefinite imprisonment of suspects 
was also a concern   to Lord Hoffmann, who made the following remarks: 
“[This case] calls into question the very existence of an ancient liberty of which this 
country has until now been very proud: freedom from arbitrary arrest and detention. 
The power which the Home Secretary seeks to uphold is a power to detain people 
indefinitely without charge or trial. Nothing could be more antithetical to the instincts 
and traditions of the people of the United Kingdom.414 
Lord Hoffman addressed, also, the government arguments about the need for provision, by 
stating strongly that it would have had the opposite effect to that intended, and that:   
"The real threat to the life of the nation ... comes not from terrorism but from laws 
such as these. That is the true measure of what terrorism may achieve. It is for 
parliament to decide whether to give the terrorists such a victory."415 
However, despite all the above views, the government maintained its position and, instead 
of repealing the powers of detention, decided to add the new concept of “control orders”. 
Under the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005,   these orders extended the power of detention 
without trial to the whole UK population.416  
                                                          
414  See p. 50 of the document on the ruling. 
415 See p.53 of the document on the ruling 
 
416 In 2005,  accepting the Government’s proposal , the Parliament passed a Bill which  was meant to respond 
to the objections of the Law Lords. It related to the imposition on people  suspected of “terrorism-related 
activity” of two types of control order: one derogating because it might involve deprivation of liberty contrary 
to Article 5 of ECHR and another one, labelled as non-derogating, since it  would fall short of deprivation of  
restrictions on liberty and  would not be incompatible with the European Convention. To meet the requirement 
of non-discrimination, the Bill was extended to the whole UK population instead of being limited only to 
foreign nationals.   
According to s.1 of the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005, a control order is an order imposing obligations 
deemed necessary, either by the Secretary of State or by a court, to prevent the involvement of individuals in 
terrorism-related activity. 16 examples of types of obligation are given in the section and, although they are 
quite illustrative, they are not exhaustive. For instance, the examples include restrictions on possession and use 
of articles and substances; use of services or facilities; work or business activities; place of residence and 
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4.5.2. Criticism of the Terrorism Act 2000  
Terrorism legislation has existed in the United Kingdom since long before the September 11 
2001 attacks. However, this section focuses first on the Terrorism Act 2000 due to the fact 
that it represents an important change from previous laws. For instance, it was the first 
British legislation which gave an extensive definition of terrorism, and provided a long list 
of proscribed terrorist organizations beyond those linked with the Irish question. The Act 
allowed the police to detain suspected terrorists for questioning for up to 7 days.417 
Authors, such as Smith418 and Forster419, considered the  TA 2000  to be the ‘core act of the 
United Kingdom’s anti-terror laws’, whilst Walker stated that the TA 2000 represented a 
useful initiative  “to fulfil the role of a modern code against terrorism”.  However, he 
criticised the legislation for failing to reach expected standards in all respects.  Accordingly, 
he accordingly observed that: 
“There are aspects where rights are probably breached, and its mechanisms to ensure 
democratic accountability and constitutionalism are even more deficient.420 
 
                                                          
persons given access to it; movements “to, from or within” the UK; and requirements to surrender passport;  
giving specified persons access to places of residence or other premises; to allow search of those places and 
the removal of objects found; to co-operate in being photographed or monitored; to provide information when 
demanded; and to report to a specified person at a specified time or place when requested.   These wide-ranging 
obligations  were likely to be costly. However, they were not expected to be imposed indiscriminately and 
automatically, and would rather be tailored to the suspects, and be under judicial supervision. Any breach of a 
control order carries a maximum penalty of 5 years in prison.  
417 G.F.Ísaksson, , Human rights against anti-terrorist laws. Are human rights in the UK in jeopardy because 
of the nation’s increasing anti-terrorist laws?  University of Akureyri, Faculty of Law and Social Sciences, 
Law Division, Iceland. 2009. 
418 See R. K.M. Smith: Textbook on International Human Rights, 2007, Oxford University Press inc. 
419 See Forster, 2009 Chapter 12 Control orders: borders to the freedom of movement or moving the borders 
of freedom  Forster  and Terrorism Act 2000 as the ‘core act of the United Kingdom’s anti-terror laws’ A 
war on terror? : the European stance on a new threat, changing laws and human rights implications  Wade 
M and Maljevic A (eds): Springer, London 
420 C. Walter, Blackstone Guide to The Anti-Terrorism Legislation. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2002. 
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Smith argued that the  TA 2000 contained changes to previous legislation which  were more 
“structural rather than substantive”.421 However, the fact could not be denied that anti-
terrorism laws which were “stated comprehensively and permanently in one code”422 
represented an innovation. However, despite the permanent status given to that new Act by 
British legislators, according to the policy makers, the TA 2000 became obsolete, soon. In 
his study, Smith considered that, whilst assessing the measures needed to confront the 
challenges of terrorism “it is important to keep perspective and proportion”.423  
 
In another study, Smith noted that the TA 2000 was meant really to be the last British 
statement of the law on terrorism.424 In his interpretation of the introduction of that particular 
piece of legislation, he maintained that the motives behind the Act were neither new nor a 
reaction to the September 11 attacks.425 The existing statute books, relating to the Northern 
Ireland question, were full already of offences addressing terrorism.  Therefore, before the 
September 11 2001 attacks, and due to political progress in Northern Ireland, the country 
“decided to place, within a revised framework, the legislation designated hitherto as 
“Temporary”.426  
 
4.5.3 Impact of Terrorism Act 2000 on Human Rights and Media  
Enforcement, of the provisions of the Terrorism Act 2000, might be considered to be a 
breach of certain Articles of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).427 This 
                                                          
421 See R. K.M. Smith: Textbook on International Human Rights, 2007, Oxford University Press inc. 
422 Ibid. 
423 Ibid 
 
424 For the permanent character of the Terrorism Act 2000, see Kevin Gillan, City University (London) Anti-
Terror Legislation and the Judicial Review Process: A Personal Story, Lecture presented to law students 
at Queens University, Belfast, 13th March 2007, available online at: 
http://www.kevingillan.info/wpcontent/uploads/2008/04/gillan_judicial_review_lecture.pdf  
425 See R. K.M. Smith: Textbook on International Human Rights, 2007, Oxford University Press inc. 
426 Ibid. 
427 See the Gillan case  and Rowe (2001) 
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was not due necessarily to an incompatibility of the Act with the Articles of the Convention, 
but “the facts of individual cases may produce violations”.428 Any review of the powers, 
contained in the Terrorism Act 2000, suggested an invasion of liberties.429 It could be argued, 
                                                          
428 Rowe (2001).  In his 2001 review of the operation of the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) 
Act 1989 (amended as explained by Lord Bingham in paragraph 9 of his opinion) and the Northern Ireland 
(Emergency Provisions) Act 1996, Mr John Rowe QC said this of the power to stop and search those entering 
or leaving the United Kingdom with a view to finding out whether they were involved in terrorism: 'The 
“intuitive” stop 
37. It is impossible to overstate the value of these stops ... 
38. I should explain what I mean by an “intuitive stop”. It is a stop which is made “cold” or “at random”—
but I prefer the words “on intuition”—without advance knowledge about the person or vehicle being stopped. 
39. I do not think such a stop by a trained Special Branch officer is “cold” or “random”. The officer has 
experience and training in the features and circumstances of terrorism and terrorist groups, and he or she may 
therefore notice things which the layman would not, or he or she may simply have a police officer's intuition. 
Often the reason for such a stop cannot be explained to the layman.' 
79. Later in his review, Mr Rowe noted the more general stop and search powers originally contained in 
sections 13A and 13B of the 1989 Act that 'these powers were used sparingly, and for good reason'. I 
respectfully agree that the section 44 power (as it is now) should be exercised sparingly, a recommendation 
echoed throughout a series of annual reports on the 2000 Act by Lord Carlile of Berriew QC, the independent 
reviewer of the terrorist legislation appointed in succession to Mr Rowe—see most recently paragraph 106 of 
his 2005 report, suggesting that the use of the power 'could be cut by at least 50 per cent without significant 
risk to the public or detriment to policing.' To my mind, however, that makes it all the more important that it 
is targeted as the police officer's intuition dictates rather than used in the true sense randomly for all the 
world as if there were some particular merit in stopping and searching people whom the officers regard as 
constituting no threat whatever. In short, the value of this legislation, just like that allowing people to be 
stopped and searched at ports, is that it enables police officers to make what Mr Rowe characterised as an 
intuitive stop. 
 
429 For instance, stopping, arresting and detaining  people under certain powers are clearly drafted in Article 5;  
while a burden of proof on the defendant in a criminal case might relate to Article 6; while questioning and 
searching powers might be linked to Article 8; disclosure of information may engage Article 10, and 
proscription may engage Articles 10 and 11.  
  In 2003 a journalist and a peaceful protester were stopped and searched by the police using powers under 
section 44 of the Terrorism Act 2000. Section 44 allowed police to stop and search anyone within a 
designated area without any need for suspicion of any kind. An area can be designated whenever the senior 
police officer making it considers it ‘expedient’ for the prevention of acts of terrorism. Liberty, a human 
right organisation took the case to the ECHR and in January 2010. The Court considered that this broadly 
drafted power was in breach with the right to respect for the applicants’ private lives, and held there was a 
clear interference in person’s private life when a people and their belongings are forcibly searched. So, any 
limitation had to be in conformity with law, pursue a legitimate aim and be necessary and proportionate. In 
the case mentioned above, section 44 was held to fail the first test. The Court held that the powers of 
authorisation and stop and search were not properly constrained and were not subject to adequate legal 
safeguards against abuse. The Court held that, as “there is a clear risk of arbitrariness in the grant of such a 
broad discretion to the police officer”, the power was not in accordance with law and therefore the limitation 
on the right to a private life could not be justified. The judgment was made final in June 2010 and following 
this, the Home Secretary announced that stops and searches of individuals under section 44 would be 
suspended pending a review of the legislation (Quinton and Gillan case). 
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also, that, despite the fact that the European Convention jurisprudence required explicitly 
that domestic law ought to be precise and foreseeable, the legislation  was not clear 
enough.430 
 
4.5.4. Offences under the Terrorism Act 2000  
Certain offences might represent a challenge, if not a threat, to a journalist whilst 
investigating or looking for a source of information. For instance, s.12 of the Terrorism Act 
2000 prohibited individuals to invite support for a proscribed organisation. However, under 
this section, the provisions were limited to non-financial support of a banned organisation, 
in terms of management; or assistance in arranging a meeting to help a ‘terrorist’ 
organisation to promote its activities; or to be addressed by a person who belongs to a 
proscribed organisation; or participating in a meeting knowing that its aim is to encourage 
such an organisation.431 Conviction made the offender liable to a maximum of 10 years 
imprisonment.  Therefore, if a journalist was approached by an individual or by a group, 
labelled as ‘terrorist’; or was given some material to be broadcast (videos; tapes; or printed 
documents) s/he might be prosecuted under s.12. It seemed that the provision was intended 
to target the media in general and journalists in particular. 
 
Section 15 criminalised fund-raising for terrorist purposes.432  It mentioned three kinds of 
offences: the solicitation of funds or property for terrorism; the receipt of money or property 
                                                          
430  Here, the concept of “law” must herebe interpreted, moreover,  in the same way as in the Convention generally, 
that is, as requiring rules that are accessible, and reasonably precise and foreseeable in their application. This 
has implications, e.g., for the rules on the use of lethal force in law enforcement. See D Korff. “The right to 
life, A guide to the implementation of Article 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights”. Human Rights 
Handbooks, No 8, http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/49f184722.html 
 
431 See Section 12(2).  SC Res 1373 (n 61), paragraph 2(a) and (d), section 12(3) and section 12(6) 
432 Fund-raising for terrorist purposes (section 15). For this particular issue, see (Appendix 4 in this thesis) 
See section 15, subsection (1); See section 15, subsection (2) Subsection (3) Corresponding to article 2(1) 
of the Financing Convention (n 61), and paragraphs 1(b) and 1(d) of SC Res 1373 (n 61). 
Chapter Four: UK Anti–Terrorism Laws a critical overview             121 
 
 
for terrorism; and the provision of money or property knowing, or having reasonable cause 
to suspect, that this might be used for the purposes of terrorism.  It was an offence, also, to 
use money or other property intended to serve terrorism; or have money or property with the 
intention of using it; or having reasonable grounds to believe that it  would be used to support 
terrorist activities.433 All kinds of support, whether financial or otherwise, to people, 
suspected to be promoting terrorism, was an offence.434 Also, prohibited, was the 
concealment; removal from jurisdiction; transfer; or other form of action intended to help or 
facilitate the retention or control of terrorist property.435 During their investigations, 
journalists might have to pay persons providing information.  If, in doing so, they 
contravened the law, then, denial of access, to such a common journalistic method, would 
prevent them accessing necessary information.   
 
The fourth part, of the Terrorism Act 2000 is dedicated mainly to terrorist investigations; 
associated cordons; information; and evidence.436 Special powers are established pertaining 
to the establishment and maintenance of cordons.437 A police officer can obtain a warrant to 
access and search premises during a terrorist investigation, and can seize any material found 
on the property or on the suspected person.438 In special circumstances439, a higher ranking 
                                                          
433 Use or possession of money for terrorist purposes (Section 16) subsection (1), and Section 16, subsection 
(2). Not required by, but relevant to, article 2(1) of the Financing Convention (n 61), and paragraphs 1(b) 
and 1(d) of SC Res 1373 (n 61). 
434 Funding terrorism (section 17), corresponding to article 2(1) of the Financing Convention (n 61), and 
paragraphs 1(b) and 1(d) of SC Res 1373 (n 61). 
435 Money laundering for terrorist purposes (section 18(1)). Not required by, but relevant to, article 2(1) of the 
Financing Convention (n 61), and paragraph 1(b) and 1(d) of SC Res 1373 (n 61). Not required by, but 
relevant to, article 2(1) of the Financing Convention (n 61), and paragraph 1(b) and 1(d) of SC Res 1373 
(n 61). 
 
436 See section 32, where a ‘terrorist investigation” is extensively defined as the commission, preparation or 
instigation of acts of terrorism; or as an act which appears to have been done for the purpose of terrorism; 
or as the resources of a proscribed organisation; or as the possibility of making an order for the inclusion 
of an organisation in the list of proscribed organisations in Schedule 2 of the Act; or to the commission, 
preparation or instigation of any offence under the TA 2000. 
437 See sections 33–37 
438 See Schedule 5 to the Act, paragraph 1 
439 such as in case of “great emergency” 
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member of the police is entitled to issue a warrant, instead of a justice of the peace.440 The 
monitoring of a matter, related to terrorism, is one of the Secretary of State’s prerogatives.441 
Judicial authorities do not have any role, and, providing that it will help the terrorist 
investigation, the police can obtain information about a person from his/her financial 
institution.442 On the other hand, disclosing information, believed to prejudice a terrorist 
investigation, is an offence.443 If the  suspected person is a journalist or a photographer, the 
seizure of his material and its analysis might jeopardise his future work; his personal safety; 
and he might risk prosecution. In addition, people, who were his/her sources for sensitive 
issues not related to terrorism, almost certainly would stop providing him with information, 
in order to protect their own identities.  It appears that different branches of the security 
apparatus of the UK government are given too much power, to the detriment of the public in 
general and media professionals in particular.  
 
 
 
4.5.5. Counter-Terrorism Powers 
Part 5 of the Terrorism Act 2000 established a set of powers linked to the stopping; arrest; 
and search of suspected terrorists. Section 40 defined a “terrorist” as an individual who was 
either “concerned in the commission; preparation of instigation of acts of terrorism”; or who 
had committed one of the offences under various sections444 of the Act.  Any individual 
might be arrested without a warrant, provided that the police had plausible reasons to see 
him/her as a suspected terrorist.445 The police’s detention, of a terrorist suspect, falls under 
                                                          
440 See Schedule 5, paragraph 15). 
441  See Schedule 5, paragraph 15(3). 
442 See Schedule 6 
443 It is an offence under section 39 of the Terrorism Act 2000. 
444 See sections 11, 12, 15–18, 54, and 56–63 of the Terrorism Act 2000. 
445 See section 41 of the Terrorism Act 2000. 
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Schedule 8, whilst pre-charge investigative detention is dealt with in s.16(1). Sections 42 
and 43 addressed powers to search “terrorist” premises.  
 
The stop and search provisions, under ss.44-47, provided the police with special powers446. 
Initial authorisation had to come from a very high ranking police officer, with responsibility 
for that specific geographical area, whereupon the granted powers could be used 
immediately. However, within 48 hours, confirmation of this authorisation had to come from 
the Secretary of State, otherwise the authorisation expired.  The period of authorisation could 
not exceed 28 days.  
 
4.6. Anti-Terrorism Crime and Security Act 2001 
The Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 (ATSC Act 2001), which built on the 
Terrorism Act 2000, provided additional powers. Contextually, it represented primarily the 
UK’s answer to the events of 9/11 and added substantially to the provisions of the TA 2000. 
By addressing the penalisation and confiscation of terrorist property and cash, the ATSC Act 
2001 intended to adopt UN Security Council decisions.447  Parts 6 to 9 addressed, also, the 
security of nuclear weapons; pathogens; toxins; and aviation facilities. The Act came into 
force in December 2001. 
 
The introduction, of the ATCS Act 2001, encountered some scepticism amongst academia 
and organisations such as the Joint Committee on Human Rights.  Indeed, it was criticised 
harshly,448 especially with regard to the controversial issue of the option of indefinite 
detention, without trial, of foreign nationals who were suspected to be linked  to international 
                                                          
446 See Sections 44-47 of the Terrorism Act 2000. 
 
447 Decisions drafted in UNSCR 1373 (2001). 
448 Reports by the Joint Committee on Human Rights, Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Bill, Second Report, 
14 November 2001, and Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Bill, Fifth Report, 3 December 2001. 
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terrorism.449 The establishment of this form of detention was motivated by the fact that it 
would not be possible to try such suspects for several reasons: firstly, because of the sensitive 
nature of the evidence; secondly, because the high standard of proof needed for successful 
prosecution is difficult to achieve; and, thirdly, because extradition or deportation was not 
an option, due to its incompatibility with the European Court of Human Rights 
jurisprudence.450  
Yet, it was possible to deport suspected foreign terrorists, provided that their presence was 
considered to be a risk to national security, or where there was no threat of torture in the 
state to which they were deported.451   Furthermore, Walker pointed out that deportation 
might not be the right solution since there was no assurance that, once out of the UK, the 
suspect would not resume his/her activities from abroad.452   
 
It appeared soon, following the enactment of the ATCS Act 2001453, that some of its 
provisions would clash with the rights guaranteed by the European Convention on Human 
Rights.454 However, the ECHR was not supreme over Acts of Parliament and, therefore, it  
could not be argued that there was any violation of the principle of Parliamentary 
sovereignty.   However, that did not mean that UK legislators ought to ignore s.3 of the 
Human Rights Act 1998, according to which, 
                                                          
449 See Part IV of the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001.  
450 It is stated in the jurisprudence of the ECHR that “non-British nationals may not be deported to their state 
of origin if they face a risk of being tortured in the receiving state, as such a deportation would breach 
Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). See the case of Chahal Vs United 
Kingdom, App. No. 22414/93, 23 EHRR 413. 
451 For this particular point, see section 7 Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 and section 97A 
Immigration, Asylum and National Security Act 2006. 
452 Walker, MLR 70 (2007), 433, commenting the Report of the Privy Councillor Review Committee, Anti-
terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 Review: Report (2003–04 NC 100) Pt D, paragraph. 195. 
 
453 In particular, the controversial provisions on the detention without trial 
454 Such as Article 5 of the European Convention on Human Rights. It is important to mention that, since the 
enactment of the Human Rights Act 1998, most of the rights, which were originally in the HR Act 1998, 
have been integrated into the U K’s domestic law. 
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So far as it is possible to do so, primary legislation and subordinate legislation must 
be read and given effect in a way which is compatible with the Convention rights.455 
 
In addition, the House of Lords could present a declaration of incompatibility if such 
incompatibility456 occurred between an Act of Parliament and the ECHR.457 Then, the 
Government might repeal and replace the offending provisions.458 However, the UK 
Government’s acknowledgment, of its violation of the right to liberty459, made it opt for 
derogation from Article 5.460 
 
Another point, highlighted by critics of the ATCSA 2001, was the inadequacy, of Part 4, 
which focused on the security problem originated primarily by foreign nationals.461  The 
House of Lords found that, in addition to the discriminatory character of Part 4, the 
circumstances, for applying for derogation from Article 5 ECHR (by The UK’s government) 
were unsuitable, so that the provision was considered to be in violation of the right to 
liberty.462 Finally, in January 2005, the UK Government recognised the incompatibility and 
decided to replace Part 4 with new legislation.   Consequently, in March 2005, the Prevention 
of Terrorism Act 2005 (PTA 2005) introduced the control order scheme. 
                                                          
455 See section 3 of the HRA 1998. Available at:  http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1998/42/section/3  
456 See Section 4 (1) and (2) HRA 1998. 
457 However, such alternative does not affect the validity of the legislation. See Section 4 (6) HRA 1998. 
458 See Wadham et al., Blackstone’s Guide to the Human Rights Act 1998, pp. 93–97, paragraphs 6.21–6.31. 
Oxford University Press, Oxford 
459 As set out by Article 5 ECHR in  Part 4 of the ATCSA 2001,   
460 See Human Rights Act 1998 (Designated Derogation) Order 2001 (SI No. 2001/3644). In  section 15 ECHR 
are mentioned  the conditions to fulfil in order that a derogation can be made. In 2004, the legality of the 
provisions of Part 4 of the ATCSA 2001 and the government’s decision to apply for a derogation  from 
Article 5 ECHR was challenged by nine claimants who were detained under section 23 ATCSA 2001. The 
House of Lords repealed the derogation order and issued an order of incompatibility concerning section 23 
of the ATCSA 2001. A violation of the prohibition of discrimination detention scheme, set out in Article 
14 ECHR, was found (due to its discriminatory scope). The pertinence of the detention rules to foreign 
suspects was considered to be the only main weakness of the detention system.  
 
461 The terrorist attacks, in London on 7 July 2005, were carried out by British extremists. See Fenwick, Civil 
Liberties and Human Rights, Routledge - Cavendish, 2007, p. 1422–3 
462 A and others v Secretary of State for the Home Department (No. 1) [2004] UKHL 56; [2005] 2 WLR 87 
Most Lords considered the measures to be disproportionate responses to the circumstances; for instance see 
Lord Bingham, paragraph 73, Lord Hoffmann, paragraphs. 96–97, and Lord Hope,paragraphs 119–120.  
Chapter Four: UK Anti–Terrorism Laws a critical overview             126 
 
 
 
4.7. The Prevention Terrorism Act 2005/ Control Order System 
The Prevention Terrorism Act 2005 introduced the system, known as “control orders” 
introduced by to ensure the prevention of terrorist acts.  Control orders are preventive orders 
which are applied, to individuals suspected to be involved in terrorist activities, in order to 
prevent further participation in such activities.463A control order is considered to be an option 
of last resort, expected to be used solely to deal with a potential threat posed by a person 
where prosecution is deemed to be unworkable.464  Section 8(2) imposes a duty on the 
Secretary of State to consult the chief officer of the relevant police force to decide if the 
available evidence might be used for an eventual prosecution,465 and, once an order is made, 
the possibility, of a prosecution for an offence related to terrorism, has to be kept under 
review. However, in practice, it is feared that imposition of a control order is preferred to 
prosecution.466  Conte stated that, 
“… the sole purpose of the enactment of the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 was 
to replace the regime of detention without trial under Part 4 of the ATCSA 2001 by 
repealing sections 21–32 of the latter Act.”467  
 
Control orders arrived a substitute for the 2005 Act and are defined by s.1 (1) as orders 
enforcing obligations on persons for “… purposes connected with protecting members of the 
public from a risk of terrorism.” There are non-derogating control orders and derogating 
control orders.468 The first category is an order, imposed by the Government in the belief 
                                                          
463 The definition of control orders is given as follow in section 1 (1) PTA 2005: “In this Act “control order” 
means an order against an individual that imposes obligations on him for purposes connected with 
protecting members of the public from a risk of terrorism”. 
464 Such impracticality might be due to the fact that evidence cannot be used in court, or, in case of foreign 
nationals whose presence in the UK is seen as a threat to national security, due to the prohibition to deport 
them to states where they will be put under torture. See Chahal v United Kingdom 23 EHRR 413 
465 See  section 8 (2) PTA 2005 
466 Fenwick, Civil Liberties and Human Rights, Routledge - Cavendish, 2007, p. 1440 
467 D. Conte (2009). See section 16(2)(a) of the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 
468  Walker (2006) argued that “In both the cases, the order must be confirmed by a court. The orders issued in 
2005 fell ‘not very short of house arrest’ (Lord Carlile, First Report of the Independent Reviewer pursuant 
Chapter Four: UK Anti–Terrorism Laws a critical overview             127 
 
 
that there is no infringement of the right to liberty, and, consequently, there is no need to 
apply for a derogation of Article 5 of the ECHR.469  On the other hand, if following an 
imposition of an order, potential infringements, of the right to liberty, appear, the UK 
Government has to require a derogation of Article 5.  In this case, firstly, the Home Secretary 
must opt out of Article 5 and, then, ask the High Court for authority to grant such an order.470  
 
In the UK, there are various offences concerned directly with control orders  .471 Among 
them is the failure to comply with an obligation imposed on the person by a control order472 
and travelling abroad and returning without, in terms of s.9(2), the authorities’ knowledge.  
If a control order does not forbid travelling outside the UK, the ‘controlee’ return should be 
notified to a specified person and the fact that the control order expires whilst the individual 
is abroad should not absolve him/her from make the required notification.473  Another 
offence consists of obstructing knowingly the service of a control order in terms of s.9(3). 
Walker considered that control orders clashed with the provisions of the ECHR, and he 
argued that; 
“…though this level of restraint appears to be incompatible with Article 5 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights, no derogation notice has been issued”.474 
 
                                                          
to Section 14(3) of the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 (Home Office, London, 2006), paragraph 43. .) 
See Walker’s “Clamping Down on Terrorism in the United Kingdom”, Journal of International Criminal 
Justice 4 (2006), 1137-1151, Oxford University Press, available online at: 
     http://jicj.oxfordjournals.org/content/4/5/1137.full.pdf  
469 Non derogating control orders have a yearly lifespan, they are made as well as revoked by the Home 
Secretary and might be renewed annually. 
470 The derogating control orders last for 6 months and can be renewed every 6 months after. 
471 See section 9(1). Control Orders were brought in by the Government under the 2005 Prevention of Terrorism 
Act. In practice a control order involves severe restrictions on who a person can meet, where he/she can go 
and all cases so far have involved electronic tagging. What is concerning is the fact that they might 
eventually be permanent, and the person under such a regime does not have to be accused of any crime and 
neither he/she can  be told why they are under suspicion. 
472 See section 9(4). If convicted the individual risks a maximum penalty of 5 years imprisonment.  
473 Regarding the offence under section 9(1), conviction on indictment carries a maximum penalty of 5 years 
imprisonment See section 9(4)  
474 See Walker (2006) “Clamping Down on Terrorism in the United Kingdom”, Journal of International 
Criminal Justice 4 (2006), 1137-1151, Oxford University Press, available online at: 
     http://jicj.oxfordjournals.org/content/4/5/1137.full.pdf  
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Chakrabarti, the director of Liberty, expressed the perspective of human rights organisations 
when she observed that the rushing, of the control orders system through Parliament, affected 
seriously both human rights and freedoms. She observed that: 
“The writing on the wall is that justice must never be compromised in the name of 
security, and we urge Parliament to again reject counterproductive anti-terror 
measures in the next round."475. 
 
In 2010, Liberty produced a report which expressed a list of grievances regarding Control 
orders. It suggested that the control order system was:  
“unsafe and unfair, it abrogates the right to fair trials and presumption of innocence, 
allows endless restrictions on liberty based on secret intelligence and suspicion rather 
than charges, or evidence. It was originally intended as a temporary regime, but it 
does not work, with many of those subject to control orders absconding, and many 
other orders being struck down by the courts. Aside from the human cost of control 
orders, millions of pounds have been spent on administering control orders and 
defending litigation.476 
 
In 2012, Liberty issued another briefing whereby it criticised the new Coalition 
Government’s policies. Whilst original control orders were scrapped and replaced by the 
Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures (TPIMs), Liberty considered that the new 
measures  were simply a ‘control order-lite’, reviving the worst parts of the previous control 
order system.477  
 
4.8. Terrorism Act 2006 
                                                          
475 The statement was made in 2006, a year after the introduction of control orders. See the Press Release of 
Liberty entitled “Independent Reviewer Calls to renew Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005”. available at 
http://www.liberty-human-rights.org.uk/media/press/2006/independent-reviewer-calls-to-renew-
prevention-of-terrorism-act-2005.php  
476 See Liberty, Liberty’s response to the Coalition Government’s Review of Counter-Terrorism and Security 
Powers 2010’, 2010, Report available online at http://www.liberty-human-rights.org.uk/pdfs/policy10/from-
war-to-law-final-pdf-with-bookmarks.pdf p.7. 
477 See Liberty, Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures, available online at: http://www.liberty-
human-rights.org.uk/human-rights/terrorism/control-orders/index.php  
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Walker considered the Terrorism Act 2006 to be the direct consequence of the London 
bombings of 7July 2005. 478 By introducing this new Act, the UK Government intended to 
comply with the Council of Europe 2005 Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism.479 
However, despite the claims of being in accordance with the European Convention, Walker 
noticed what he considered to be “discrepancies between the Act and the Convention, such 
as in the new offences against the “encouragement’ of terrorism”.480 Conte presented another 
perspective; 481 this was that the British authorities regarded the Terrorism Act 2006 as a 
vehicle for implementing the call upon UN Member States to restrain incitement to 
terrorism.482  Sections 1 and 2, of the Act, created the offences of encouragement of terrorism 
and dissemination of terrorist publications. Under s.1, the main offence concerns the 
publication of statements which might be interpreted by readers as  
“…a direct or indirect encouragement or other inducement to the commission, 
preparation or instigation of acts of terrorism or specified offences”  
 
Just as the 2001 Act was a rushed response to the September 11 2001 terrorist attacks, the 
Terrorism Act 2006 was drafted in response to the London bombings. Its most significant 
element was the extension of pre-charge detention, for questioning by police, from 7 to 
                                                          
478 See C. Walker “Clamping Down on Terrorism in the United Kingdom”, Journal of International Criminal 
Justice 4 (2006), 1137-1151, Oxford University Press, available online at: 
     http://jicj.oxfordjournals.org/content/4/5/1137.full.pdf  
479 See Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism, which was opened for signature on the 
16th May 2006, CETS 196, and entered into force 1 June 2007. Document available online at:             
http://www.official-documents.gov.uk/document/cm69/6901/6901.pdf  
480 See C. Walker. “Clamping Down on Terrorism in the United Kingdom”, Int. Criminal Justice, 4(5), p. 
1141, (2006), Oxford University Press, available online at: 
http://jicj.oxfordjournals.org/content/4/5/1137.full.pdf. 
481 A. Conte, Human Rights in the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism Commonwealth Approaches: 
The United Kingdom, Canada, Australia and New Zealand. Springer London 2010 
482 See Implementation of Security Council resolution 1624 (2005): report of the United Kingdom in response 
to the Counter-Terrorism Committee’s questions, UN Doc S/2006/398 (2006). 
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twenty-eight 28 days.483 For Rahman, harsh criticism,484 of the Terrorism Act 2006, was 
justified due to serious breaches of fundamental freedoms and rights. Commenting on the 
controversial s.1, he listed the people and organisations susceptible to be liable under that 
provision,   
“This covers most mediums, including sermons, speeches, chants at demonstrations, 
and written material including the internet.485  
 
 In considering s.1 (3) in the light of Article 10 of the ECHR,486  he observed that s.1  had a 
negative impact on the fundamental right to freedom of expression.  He added that, in 
addition to being incompatible with a protected right, the legislation was imprecise as 
regards to what constitutes precisely an offence: 
“It is unclear how many ‘some members’ of the public would be required to constitute 
the offence, or indeed, to what extent it would be ‘likely’ that they should be encouraged 
to commit acts of terrorism or what constitutes ‘glorification’.  It is anticipated that such 
loose drafting will give rise to many legal challenges”.487 
                                                          
483  See A. Rahman, Guide to the New Terrorism Legislation, Dealing with all three Terrorism Acts and their 
Developments, available at: http://www.rahmanravelli.co.uk/assets/files/terrorism-defence.pdf, The 90 
days, proposed by the Blair government, was rejected by the Parliament who considered that proposal was 
an outrageous negation of liberty. See also Walker, 2006 on that last statement. 
484 Rahman stated that TA 2006 “has been heavily criticised for being an erratic and draconian set of 
provisions.” 
485 A solicitor by profession, Rahman noticed that section 1  made a ‘statement that is likely to be understood 
by some or all of the members of the public to whom it is published as a direct or indirect encouragement 
or other inducement to them to the commission, preparation or instigation of acts of terrorism or Convention 
offences’; an offence carrying a sentence of up to seven years imprisonment. 
486 Section 1(3) reads: ‘For the purposes of this section, the statements that are likely to be understood by 
members of the public as indirectly encouraging the commission or preparation of acts of terrorism or 
Convention offences include every statement which - * (a) glorifies the commission or preparation (whether 
in the past, the future or generally) of such acts or offences; and * (b) is a statement from which those 
members of the public could reasonably be expected to infer that what is being glorified is being glorified 
as conduct that should be emulated by them in existing circumstances.’  
Article 10 provides that: ‘1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom 
to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority 
regardless of frontiers... 2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, 
may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law, and are 
necessary if a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, 
for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the 
reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for 
maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.’  
487 See A. Rahman, Guide to the New Terrorism Legislation, Dealing with all three Terrorism Acts and their 
Developments, available at: http://www.rahmanravelli.co.uk/pr/terrorism-defence.pdf . The 90 days 
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During their daily functions, journalists; reporters; investigators; or any media professionals 
might be considered  to be offenders if they  were found in possession of ‘sensitive’ material 
or  were suspected of distributing ‘terrorist publications’. If journalists did have documents 
which were  considered to be terrorist ‘statements’, whether in writing or in any other form 
of communication, they would be regarded automatically as circulating ‘terrorist 
publications’.488 The question becomes problematic when one has to determine what exactly 
is meant by a ‘terrorist publication’. Is it when the contents are to be interpreted by an 
audience as direct or indirect encouragement to them to commit acts of terrorism? Or is 
material which risks being used in the commission or planning of terrorism acts by the people 
to whom it is made available? An accused  might argue that the document or material, found 
in his/her possession, did not express his/her views or endorsement;  this is often the case  
with journalists, who are looking for a scoop rather than motivated by ideological 
considerations.489 Section 5 makes it an offence to be involved in the ‘preparation of terrorist 
acts’. This is directed against those who cannot be charged with attempting to commit a 
terrorist act.490 This provision is very wide and is based on the accused’s intention to commit 
or assist in terrorism acts. If such an intention is established, any act might be considered to 
be conduct in preparation of terrorist acts.491   
 
Regarding the provisions on ‘glorifying’ of terrorism, Walker gave some interesting 
examples when he stated that it was crucial to the debate as to whether or not,  
                                                          
proposed by the Blair government was rejected by the Parliament who considered that proposal as an 
outrageous negation of liberty. See, also, Walker, 2006 on that last statement. 
488 Terrorist statements can be written; audio; electronic; or visual recordings. 
489 See the report of the International Federation of Journalists (2008). Available online at: 
http://ethicaljournalisminitiative.org/pdfs/EJI_book_en.pdf  
490 Provided that the intention was either to commit an act of terrorism or to assist in committing terrorist acts  
491 For example, enquiring about a course to learn how to fly. The sentence, for this offence, is life 
imprisonment.  
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“an offence might criminalize people like supporters of the armed opposition to the 
South African Apartheid, and more close to the present day the calls for the 
prosecution of Cherie Booth (Tony Blair’s wife), who stated publicly that ‘in view 
of the illegal occupation of Palestinian land I can well understand how decent 
Palestinians become terrorists”.492 
 
The coming into force, of the Terrorism Act 2006, made the ‘glorification’ of terrorism a 
criminal offence,493 and, simultaneously, proscribed ‘extreme’ political groups and 
organisations.494 
 For Liberty, the British human Rights group, denying passionate speech and preventing 
non-violent political parties, from dissenting, was not the best approach to take. Crossman, 
Liberty’s Policy Director, , believed that the new powers, given to the executive, would have 
a negative effect since people would feel less safe.495 Outlawing dissident groups and 
organisations would induce them to work underground, whilst singling out particular 
minority groups might discriminate against genuine opposition to dictatorship. 
 
 Media professionals from the developing world and countries, where freedom of expression 
and information was denied, traditionally were welcomed, in the UK, and allowed to express 
                                                          
492 See Walker (2006) “Clamping Down on Terrorism in the United Kingdom”, Journal of International 
Criminal Justice 4 (2006), 1137-1151, Oxford University Press, available online at: 
     http://jicj.oxfordjournals.org/content/4/5/1137.full.pdf  
493 The provisions, of the Terrorism Act 2006, came into force on 13April 2006.  Sections 1 to 22, together 
with Schedule 1;b) sections 26 to 36, together with Schedule 2;c) sections 37(1) to (4) and 38; d) sections 
37(5) in so far as it relates to the entries in Schedule 3 brought into force by sub-paragraph (e) below; and 
e) all of the entries in Schedule 3 except those relating to paragraph 36(1) of Schedule 8 to the Terrorism 
Act 2000 and section 306(2) and (3) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 (Liberty).  
494 47 international terrorist organisations are proscribed under the Terrorism Act 2000. Of these, two 
organisations are proscribed, under powers introduced in the Terrorism Act 2006, as glorifying terrorism. 
14 organisations, in Northern Ireland, are proscribed under previous legislation. The list of the proscribed 
political groups and organisations can be found at the following government website:   
  http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/publications/counter-terrorism/proscribed-terror-groups/proscribed-
groups?view=Binary  
495 See G. Crossman, ‘New Terrorism Act Powers will make Britain less safe’, Liberty, (April 2006) , available 
online at: http://www.liberty-human-rights.org.uk/media/press/2006/new-terrorism-act-powers-will-make-
britain-less-safe.php   
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freely their political opinions.496  Liberty expressed reservations about draft proposals to 
devising new offences linked with the encouragement of terrorism and dissemination of 
terrorist publications. It argued that there  were sufficient means in the Terrorism Act 2000 
and in the existing common law to tackle any problem.497 
 
4.9. Counter-Terrorism Act 2008 
Conte498 stated that the Counter-Terrorism Act 2008 “deepens and widens” existing legal 
measures on counter-terrorism.499  Amongst other things, the powers to gather and share 
information were improved.500 On sentencing, s.30 made “it an aggravating feature for the 
purpose of sentencing if an offence has or may have a terrorist connection.”501 The Act 
allows police questioning of suspects after they were charged, whilst convicted terrorists 
have to notify the authorities about their locations.  Other important provisions include the 
pre-charge detention of terrorist suspects for up to 42 days, and the banning of all 
photographs of the police in public places.502 In her review of Clive’s book on terrorism and 
the law, Ramage’s opinions underlined that, amongst researchers, there was a strong belief 
                                                          
496 Journalists fled their countries fearing persecution and found asylum in the UK. However,  the draconian 
legislation, enacted during the last decade,  is likely to prevent them to denounce and work towards the 
changes in their countries of origin. See also Liberty’s Press release entitled “New Terrorism Act Powers 
will make Britain less safe” available online at:  http://www.liberty-human-
rights.org.uk/media/press/2006/new-terrorism-act-powers-will-make-britain-less-safe.php  
 
497 Liberty’s statement, on the Terrorism laws, was as follows:  
Proposal to create new offences of encouragement and dissemination of terrorist publications are 
extremely broadly drafted. They do not require any intention to incite others to commit criminal acts. The 
Terrorism act 2000 and existing common law means there is already very broad criminal law. Any 
difficulty in bringing prosecutions can be largely attributed to factors such as the self-imposed ban on the 
admissibility of intercept evidence. 
498 See Conte (2009). In fact, this researcher reviewed all UK’s Counter-terrorism Acts.  
499 See Walker, (2006) “Clamping Down on Terrorism in the United Kingdom”, Journal of International 
Criminal Justice 4 (2006), 1137-1151, Oxford University Press, available online at: 
     http://jicj.oxfordjournals.org/content/4/5/1137.full.pdf  
500 See Part 1 
501 See section 30, quote taken from Conte, 2009. 
502G.F. Ísaksson, , Human rights against anti-terrorist laws. Are human rights in the UK in jeopardy because 
of the nation’s increasing anti-terrorist laws?, University of Akureyri, Faculty of Law and Social 
Sciences, Law division, Iceland. 2009. 
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as regards the incompatibility between certain Acts such as the Counter-Terrorism Act 2008 
and international human rights.503   
 
Certainly, the UK Government is responsible for the protection of all UK citizens from 
terrorism. However, such an objective should not been achieved by or serve as a justification 
for abusing their rights and ethical values or restricting their civil liberties. Any attempt to 
neglect such boundaries is not only imprudent but, also, unproductive.504  Ramage believed 
that the Counter- Terrorism Act 2008 Act created very challenging requirements for people 
convicted of conducting terrorist activities: 
“… Anyone sentenced to five years or more for a terrorism offense or a terrorism-
related offense would be subject to these notification requirements for the rest of 
their lives. Any breach would be punishable by up to five years in prison.” 505 
 
The writer’s concerns were linked particularly to the fact that, regardless of whether or not 
the conviction resulted from a fair trial, respecting international standards, the requirements 
might be applied forcibly on individuals who were convicted abroad rather than by a British 
court. 
 
4.10. Characteristics of Anti-Terrorism Laws and Implications for Human Rights and 
Media 
Certain general characteristics might be highlighted following the examination of anti-
terrorism laws. Firstly, inevitably, a certain number of anti-terrorism laws limit citizens’ 
                                                          
503 According to Ramage (2009):  
“It is well established in international human rights law that any interference with the fundamental right 
to liberty must be shown to be strictly necessary and proportionate. The government has failed to provide 
any evidence that the 28-day limit prevented the police from bringing charges at all or forced them to 
bring lesser charges”. 
504 Ibid. 
505 See Ramage, 2009. Blackstone’s guide to the Anti-Terrorism Legislation 2009 Clive Walker. 
OxfordUniversity Press. Book Review by S. Ramage. Available online at: 
 http://www.sallyramage.net/28-Blackstone's%20guide%20to%20antiterrorism-%202009.pdf  
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human rights such as the right to liberty of movement506; the right of inviolability of their 
home and property507; the right to privacy508; to freedom of association509; to freedom of 
conscience510; and the right not to suffer discrimination511. Equally, there are, also, basic 
procedural human rights which are affected by anti-terrorism laws. These are such as the 
right to a proper defence;512  and the right to remain silent and not incriminate himself/ 
herself.513 It is not this researcher’s intention to dispute the need for anti-terror legislation as 
a whole, or to affirm that there is always a flagrant violation of citizens’ rights. He aimed to 
highlight the elements, in the laws, which restrict certain liberties, and to question the 
justification of the restrictions when they are implemented on a large scale (i.e. extended to 
the whole population and to the media professions in particular.) 
 
Restrictions on citizens’ rights might be indispensable and acceptable in particular 
circumstances. Civil liberties or human rights need not be granted always in absolute terms, 
or on a permanent basis. There are situations where a conflict occurs between rights.514 In 
general, people accepted having some of their rights restricted in order to combat terrorism. 
However, most people believed that that this ought to be achieved through temporary and 
exceptional measures, not permanent restrictions.  Another concern was that the new 
limitations ought to be clear and proportional.  Therefore, in order not to create further 
                                                          
506 Prolongation in custody; indefinite detention of foreign nationals; detention without trial; exclusion orders 
507 House search; bugging operations  
508 Privacy is restrained further, from telephone tapping over data storing and sharing, to grid search etc. 
509 Proscribing organisations through the ban of certain associations deemed to encourage or promote 
terrorism. 
510  See Incitement to terrorism; glorification of terrorism; Racial and Religious Hatred Act. 
511 Equality, before the law, was jeopardised by the special treatment of foreign national suspects, UK’s 
ATCSA 2001 part IV, regulating indefinite detention of foreign terrorist suspects.  
512 Arrested suspects do not have access to defence lawyer during the first 48 hours of detention and, more 
concerning, is the fact that such a normal procedure is not allowed, also, during police interrogations. 
513 In the UK, negative inferences from silence are admitted, whilst European States such as Germany; 
France; and Spain do have provisions for the reduction of sentences for criminals who  agree to collaborate 
with the authorities. For the accused,  incriminating themselves seems to be the only alternative for sentence 
reduction.  
514 Victims of terrorism do have the same right to life as the perpetrators of crime who ignore such right for 
others.  
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problems instead of solving them, the authorities were expected to implement anti-terrorism 
laws in a responsible and sensitive manner. By looking back to the evolution of the law in 
the UK since the enactment of the Terrorism Act 2000, it appears that the public’s 
expectations were far from being satisfied. Confidence invested, in the legislative and 
executive powers, was ill founded. Most analysts; observers; media people; and civil 
liberties organisations, criticised vehemently the various anti-terror laws, which were 
considered to be unclear or ambiguous, and, in particular, the very wide and general 
definition of terrorism adopted by the Terrorism Act 2000.515  
 
The above definition causes concern. Indeed, the created category is very broad, to the extent 
that the provisions may be applied in cases that do not justify the use of specialised powers 
and offences.516 Additionally, it is essential to ensure that there are limits to the extent of 
human rights restrictions. When limitations are left only to the discretion of authorities, there 
are real risks.  There are cases where it is surely inappropriate to limit human rights, since 
the concerned rights are very narrow already.517 It could be argued that the limitations were 
                                                          
515 The definition was extended to include religiously motivated international terrorism. See S.112.  .                                    
S.1 of the TA 2000 reads:  
(1) In this Act “terrorism” means the use or threat of action where (b) the use or threat is designed to 
influence the government or to intimidate the public or a section of the public, and (c) the use or threat 
is made for the purpose of advancing a political, religious or ideological cause. (2) Action falls within 
this subsection if it (a) involves serious violence against a person, (b) involves serious damage to 
property, (c) endangers a person’s life, other than that of the person committing the action, (d) creates 
a serious risk to the health or safety of the public or a section of the public, or (e) is designed seriously 
to interfere with or seriously to disrupt an electronic system.  (3) The use or threat of action falling 
within subsection (2) which involves the use of firearms or explosives is terrorism whether or not 
subsection (1) (b) is satisfied. (4) In this section (a) “action” includes action outside the United 
Kingdom, (b) a reference to any person or to property is a reference to any person, or to property, 
wherever situated, (c) a reference to the public includes a reference to the public of a country other 
than the United Kingdom, and (d) “the government” means the government of the United Kingdom, 
of a Part of the United Kingdom or of a country other than the United Kingdom. (5) In this Act a 
reference to action taken for the purposes of terrorism includes a reference to action taken for the 
benefit of a proscribed organisation. 
 
516 The wideness of the definition was highlighted during legislative debates (see House of Commons 
Debates, 1999-2000, vol. 341, col. 152.) 
 
517 In the UK, the authorities reckoned that it was necessary to make a declaration under Article 15 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights, thereby allowing itself to suspend certain rights such as the right to 
liberty in some circumstances (Art. 5 ECHR). Furthermore, the right to silence is definitely jeopardised if 
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so excessive that no possible threat could justify them, e.g. the provisions imposed by the 
ATCSA 2001 allowing indefinite detention of foreign terrorist suspects; these  were quashed, 
finally, by the House of Lords in 2005, following the 7 July 2005 bombings in London.518  
 
In view of the above cases, it is perfectly reasonable to assess, on the one hand, whether 
there is compatibility between UK anti-terrorism laws and their implementation on the 
ground, and, on the other hand, human rights. The number of cases brought before the Court 
of Strasbourg showed clearly that when it came to terrorism matters and to the adoption of 
related laws, British legislators had negligible respect for human rights.  In addition, it 
appeared that a hasty adoption of new legislation, as a reaction to a terrorist action, was very 
likely to infringe or violate human rights. Moreover, to the increased risk of breaching 
citizens’ rights, was added another type of risk, the neglect of principles contained in the 
general criminal law.519 For instance, as enshrined in the concept of legality, aspects such as 
the principle of legal clarity and certainty520 ; the prohibition of the use of analogy in criminal 
law;521 and, finally, the principles of minimal intervention and proportionality.522 
                                                          
negative inferences can explicitly be drawn from the silence of the accused. The “Criminal Evidence (Northern 
Ireland) Order 1988” restricted the suspect's 'right to silence' by providing that the failure of a suspect to provide 
explanations might lead to inferences and eventually conviction. Defence counsels asked the House of Lords, 
if a suspect arrested under s.14 of the PTA 1989 had (i) a right at common law to be accompanied and advised 
by a solicitor during interviews with the police or (ii) if such right did not exist at common law, could it now 
be said to exist in of The Criminal Evidence (Northern Ireland) Order 1988. The House of Lords stated that it 
was "the clearly expressed will of Parliament that persons arrested under s.14 (1) of the PTA should not have 
the right to have a solicitor present during interview," and it was "impermissible for the House to develop the 
law in a direction which is contrary to the expressed will of Parliament." See also “Opinions of the Lords of 
Appeal for judgment in the cause” Regina v. Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary (Respondent) 
available at: 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld199798/ldjudgmt/jd971016/begley.htm  
518 The belated repeal of this provision was mainly due to the terrorist attacks in London when it was found 
that the perpetrators were British born.   
519 A. Ashworth, Principles of Criminal Law, Oxford University Press: Oxford. 2006. 
520 This principle is undermined not only in the UK but, also, in other countries, the very notion of ‘terrorism’ 
not being defined further. 
521 For the British case s. 57 (3) of the Terrorism Act 2000 is a good example of such prohibition. 
522  The introduction of new criminal offences such as the controversial issue of the 'encouragement of 
terrorism' (S.1 of the TA 2006) included indirect incentive like ‘glorification of terrorism’. The maximum 
sentence provided for such offence is seven years imprisonment.  Other offences regarding the dissemination 
of terrorist publications (s.2); the preparation of terrorist acts (s.5) (life imprisonment); and training for 
terrorism (s.6). The offence  was introduced to implement the requirements of Art. 5 of the ‘Council of Europe 
Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism’, according to which parties are required to criminalise 'public 
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All the above mentioned principles of criminal law are important. However, in the context 
of this study where the laws targeted certain areas, it was essential to  consider, in particular, 
fundamental principles such as the presumption of innocence;523 and the principle of 
minimal intervention and proportionality. The concept of the “presumption of innocence” 
represents the only way to ensure that people, accused of a crime, are not tried hastily and 
convicted unjustly. The general recognition, of this principle, is based on Blackstone’s adage 
in his Commentaries on the Laws of England: “Better that ten guilty persons escape, than 
that one innocent person suffers”.524 The purpose, of the presumption of innocence, is to give 
maximum chances to the accused person. It is believed, also, that the severity of penal 
consequences requires more attention to be paid to the presumption of innocence.525 
 
The principle of minimal intervention and proportionality is the other basic principle to be 
respected in order to ensure that the role of criminal law is followed properly. Excessive 
criminal measures might be frustrating in modern and open societies. They can provoke, 
also, counter-productive reactions; boost criminal behaviour; and weaken the confidence in 
the executive’s power. Retreat from these basic principles undermines the criminal justice 
                                                          
provocation to commit a terrorist offence'. The restriction, on the freedom of speech connected to this offence, 
is obvious. Therefore, it  is opportune to ask if the offences under the TA 2006 are proportionate, by referring 
to the freedom of speech (s.1 (1) (b) HRA 1998 in conjunction with Art. 10 of the ECHR). 
523 In Latin “Ei incumbit probatio qui dicit, non qui negat” the presumption of innocence means that a suspected 
person is innocent until proven otherwise. Application, of this principle, is a legal right of the accused in 
criminal trials.  Accordingly, it is the prosecution which  has to produce the burden of proof;  this consists of 
evidence and testimony admissible by the law, and obtained lawfully, proving that the accused is guilty beyond 
a reasonable doubt. If it is not the case, the accused must be freed. 
524  The ten-to-one rule is an important  one in criminal law. It reinforces the principle of “presumption of 
innocence”. See Elies Van Sliedregt (2009). A contemporary reflection on the presumption of innocence, in 
Revue Internationale de Droit Pénal 2009/1-2 (Vol. 80). See also L Laudan. “The Presumption of Innocence: 
Material or Probatory?, Legal Theory, 2005, issue 4, pp 333-361, 
http://www.derecho.uach.cl/documentos/Laudan_presumption_of_innocence.pdf   
525 See C.M.V. Clarkson ‘Understanding criminal law’, Sweet & Maxwell; 4th edition, 2005. 
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system.  People can regard the state’s illegitimate use of force as an abuse of power which 
can  lead to the destabilisation, of the state,  and an increase of civilian disobedience.526 
 
4.11. The National Union of Journalists (NUJ) and Counter Terrorism Powers 
After considering anti-terrorism laws and identifying what, theoretically, might be 
problematic in the legislation, it is important now to consider the opinion of the main actors, 
the media. In order to do so, the study considers the concerns raised by the NUJ, deemed to 
be the body which is most representative of the media in the UK.527 The NUJ contributed to 
the Rapid Review of Counter Terrorism powers and focused on law enforcers’ use of 
terrorism legislation with regard to photography. For the Union, taking photographs or 
filming  was part of the duties undertaken and expected to be done by media professionals. 
According to them, any attempt to prevent the accomplishment of this task cannot be 
acceptable, and the authorities should not prevent or restrict the journalists’ or 
photographers’ recording of events other than with reference to objective and justifiable 
criteria. The police should not be able to use powers, relating to terrorism, arbitrarily to stop 
and search media people. 
 
Nevertheless, The NUJ protested against only what they considered to be abuse of their 
rights. In 2005, the Union tried, also, to prompt changes through initiatives such as 
collaborating with two important media associations;528 and seeking to agree improvements 
                                                          
526 Civil disobedience is the conscious, individual or collective violation of a law, regulation, or edict. The 
order violated is usually deemed to be immoral or unjust by those undertaking the action. Civil disobedience 
also includes disobeying neutral orders, which serve as symbols of more general opposition.  The intentional 
breaking of immoral laws represented a form of remaining true to one’s beliefs.  In the 1770s, Granville Sharp, 
resigned from the London War Office rather than authorise arms to put down the colonial rebellion in North 
America. See C. E. Miller, A Glossary in Terms and Concepts of peace and conflict studies, University of 
Peace, Costa Rica, 2nd edition, 2005, pp.18-19, http://www.africa.upeace.org/documents/GlossaryV2.pdf 
 and Albrecht (2003).  
527 The National Union of Journalists (NUJ) represents 38,000 members working in the media field; these 
members  include freelancers; writers; reporters; editors; sub-editors; illustrators; and photographers. 
528 The British Press Photographers Association (BPPA) and the National Association of Press Agencies 
(NAPA) 
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in the way the police behaved towards the media generally and towards photographers in 
particular.  The first initiative saw guidelines produced in January 2006.529 NUJ members 
were involved, also, in the campaign group ‘I’m a Photographer, Not a Terrorist’.530 The 
NUJ drew attention to what it considered to be a “disparity between the framework provided 
by legislation, policy and guidance when compared to the operational practice of police 
officers.”531  
 
 The NUJ addressed, also, certain provisions of anti-terrorism laws and made a number of 
comments regarding their interpretation.  They  considered that s.43 of the Terrorism Act 
2000532  ought not to be interpreted to  suggest that being a journalist, in possession or using 
a camera, consisted of sufficient evidence of suspicious activity linked to potential terrorist 
activities. In addition, to avoid any ambiguity, it was suggested that the definition of 
‘reasonable suspicion’ be amended in order to avoid misuse and potential abuse.  
 
The NUJ requested simply that s.44, of the Terrorism Act 2000, ought to be abolished. 533  
They considered that it was inconceivable that police officers ought to be empowered to 
                                                          
529 The Met Guidelines were adopted by ACPO http://www.londonfreelance.org/fl/0704acpo.html and 
explain how the police are expected to allow access to media workers. 
530 The anti-terrorism legislation and its enforcement by the police led to this campaign meant to respond to 
abuses against photographers. The misuse of anti-terrorism laws prompted the union of professional and 
amateur photographers in defence of press freedom and civil liberties. The campaign protested against 
photographers being targeted indiscriminately as potential terrorists, and argued that the making of collective 
visual histories was undermined by the misuse of the new laws. The campaign was concerned, also, that there 
were still laws  which police used  to harass photographers. 
531 The way guidance, given to police officers, was the object of concerns. The police officers  were instructed 
on how to deal with photographers via emails or through the police intranet. In addition, NUJ members claimed 
that a flagrant lack of understanding of new laws; policy; and guidance, by police officers  was blatant. The 
NUJ suggested that “Specific guidance on how to treat media workers should be included in police media 
policies, media training and public order training.” 
 
532 S.43, of the TA 2000, gives law enforcers the power to stop and search a person reasonably suspected to be 
a terrorist in order to check if he/she is in possession of articles which may constitute evidence against him/her.  
533 Section 44, of the Terrorism Act 2000, allows police officers the power to search anyone in an ‘authorised 
area’ without reasonable suspicion to find out if he/she is in possession of articles which may constitute 
evidence that the person is a terrorist. 
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search anyone without reasonable suspicion that an offence had been committed.  However, 
the Union was ready to make concessions in this matter, and was prepared to see the scope 
of s.44 limited significantly, when adding that “safeguards should be added to ward against 
abuse and it must be necessary to have prior judicial authorisation.”534 Commenting on s.58 
of the same Act,535 the Union advised the executive to ensure that appropriate training was 
given to the police forces involved in that area and the proper scope of their powers 
communicated to them. For instance, they ought to be aware that, under s.58, taking 
photographs, of the police, was not a crime.536 NUJ members complained that police 
constantly demand that they showed their materials under this provision. In their daily 
practices, intimidation; forced delays; and harassment prevented photographers from 
carrying out their jobs. 
 
In 2008, a new section was added to the TA 2000 - s.58A.  This provides that a person 
commits an offence if he collects or makes a record of information of a kind likely to be 
useful to a person committing or preparing an act of terrorism; or he possesses a document 
or record containing information of that kind. 537  This section aims to protect members of 
the armed forces; intelligence services; and police officers from being targeted by terrorists. 
The maximum sentence, for this offence, is a jail term of 10 years. However, it is a defence 
for a person, charged with an offence under this section, to prove that they had a reasonable 
                                                          
534 See National Union of Journalists, ‘NUJ response to the Rapid Review of Counter Terrorism powers’, p.3, 
Available online at:   http://media.gn.apc.org/fl/1011poli.pdf  
535 Section 58 of the Terrorism Act 2000  
536 The sections 43, 44 and 58 of the Terrorism Act 2000 are expected to be in accordance with the rules on 
Excluded Material (which includes Journalistic Material) and Special Procedure Material as set out in the 
Police and Criminal Evidence Act (PACE). It is provided that the police must obtain a warrant to search for 
this type of material. Another key point is that police officers should provide a court order before deleting or 
destroying photographs, film or digital images. 
537 Under the new section 58A (added by section 76 of the Counter-Terrorism Act 2008), eliciting; publishing; 
or communicating information on members of the armed forces; intelligence services; and police officers, 
which is "likely to be useful to a person committing or preparing an act of terrorism", will be an offence carrying 
a maximum jail term of 10 years.  
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excuse for their actions.  Consequently, an individual, charged with such an offence, may 
prove that t he or she acted genuinely, without intending to do any harm. The NUJ reacted 
to s.58A by stating that there ought to be, also, a clear public interest defence for 
journalists.538 In addition, they reiterated criticism of s.44 by giving figures which proved 
that, in practice, the section served no useful purpose.539  
 
Despite the flagrant abuse of the stop and search powers, the Union observed that the Home 
Secretary, Theresa May, wanted to scrap the form which recorded stop and search.540 There 
is no doubt that, in a functioning open and modern democracy, accountability and 
transparency are indispensable through proper monitoring – even if it  was reported (by the 
NUJ) that  stop and searches records  were inaccurate,541 and there  was an excessive 
discretion for police forces on the ground with few safeguards against the misuse of anti-
terrorism laws. They believed that legitimate journalistic endeavour ought to constitute 
reasonable justification for their activities, and that anti-terrorism powers were not devised 
for harassing the media by preventing professionals from doing their jobs of taking 
photographs or filming a scene.542  
                                                          
538 See National Union of Journalists, ‘NUJ response to the Rapid Review of Counter Terrorism powers’, p.4, 
Available online at:   http://media.gn.apc.org/fl/1011poli.pdf  
539 Rowlands quoted Home Office Statistical Bulletin 2008/09 where it was stated that “Police invoked powers 
afforded to them under section 44 to stop and search people on 256,026 occasions in England and Wales 
between April 2008 and March 2009. The Metropolitan Police and Transport Police were responsible for 95% 
of this total. Of this figure, only 1,452 stops resulted in arrest, less than 0.6% of the total number, and the vast 
majority of these were for offences unrelated to terrorism. In November 2009, the Home Office published 
information to show a 37% decrease in the use of section 44 for the first quarter of 2009-10, but the figure of 
36,189 still equates to an average of 398 people being stopped every day in April, May and June 2009.”  
See M. Rowlands, ‘Statewatch Analysis, UK: The Misuse of Section 44 stop and search powers continues 
despite European Court ruling’, Available online at http://www.statewatch.org/analyses/no-105-uk-section-
44.pdf  
540 See National Union of Journalists, ‘NUJ response to the Rapid Review of Counter Terrorism powers’, p.4, 
Available online at:   http://media.gn.apc.org/fl/1011poli.pdf 
541 Ibid. p.4 If not all stop and search operations are recorded, it is possible that a significant number has been 
ignored.  
542 Public Order Intelligence Unit and the Criminal Intelligence Database In London, Forward Intelligence 
Teams (FIT) are managed by the Metropolitan police’s ‘Public Order Intelligence Unit’, which is part of the 
public order unit. The NUJ, who claimed that there  were tangible proofs regarding the targeting of some NUJ 
members by the FIT, asked for explanations from the police and the Home Office. There  was a real concern 
about the purpose and means of monitoring journalists. The NUJ do have questions  which remain unanswered: 
Chapter Four: UK Anti–Terrorism Laws a critical overview             143 
 
 
 
 
4.11.1 Protection of Sources 
The NUJ expressed, also, concerns as regards the protection of journalistic sources.543  It 
was alleged that the police and authorities had circumvented that protection by “ phone 
tapping, monitoring of internet traffic and mobile telecommunications; direct seizures of 
journalists’ material including computers and notebooks;  requiring media to provide film as 
evidence; and turning the journalist witness into the defendant.”544 
 
Compelling the disclosure of sources might not compromise only journalists’ 
professionalism but, also, might put them in real danger when the issue was linked with 
terrorism. A journalist’s role does not include being an informant to authorities.545  
 
4.11.2 Cases of misuse of terrorism legislation recorded by the NUJ  
Although these  were certainly not the only examples, even during the period from 2008 to 
2011 to which they are confined, the following examples represent instances of how law 
enforcers misused UK legislation,. 
                                                          
“How is information obtained by the FIT processed and retained? Are individuals listed by name and who has 
access to these records? For what period of time are the records, including video and audio footage, retained 
and what are the guidelines pertaining to the retention and use of information relating to members of the press?” 
543 A journalist right, to protect his/her sources, is a well- recognized right in international law, specifically by 
the United Nations; Council of Europe; and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe. The 
European Court of Human Rights found in several cases that it was  an essential part of freedom of expression. 
544 A case brought by the NUJ on behalf of member, Bill Goodwin, resulted in a major landmark judgement at 
the European Court of Human Rights. The judgement set new case law for Europe and required the UK 
government to amend the law. Successive governments have failed to do so and the cases continue. In recent 
months and years anti-terrorism laws are being used against journalists. In the UK, particularly in Northern 
Ireland, there  were regular cases of the police searching and seizing journalists’ material under anti-terrorism 
laws. 
545 In 2007, the Council of Europe recommended that journalists  ought not  to be required to hand over notes; 
photographs; audio; and video in crisis situations to ensure their safety. Detection and investigative measures, 
meant to identify sources, must be prohibited and legislation on national security or anti-terrorism measures 
should not include media sources. The only exceptions must be the ones specified by the CoE or the ECtHR. 
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Waterloo Station 
An NUJ Member, passing through Waterloo station on 8 May 2009, witnessed Police 
Community Support Officers (PSCOs) detaining a male, who was lying on the floor 
in full view of the public and appeared distressed, crying out that he was hurt and had 
done nothing wrong. The journalist recorded the incident from a distance so as not to 
interfere with any police operation, wanting independent evidence of what had 
happened and hoping his presence would offer re-assurance. Instead the journalist, 
himself; became the subject of unwarranted and unlawful police attention. The 
journalist complained that he was threatened with arrest if he did not delete the six 
photographs he had managed to take. 
 
Docklands 
In December 2008, a NUJ member was detained for more than 45 minutes by police 
while covering a wedding in London’s Docklands. Her camera was removed forcibly 
by an officer who told her: “we can do anything under the Terrorism Act.” She said, 
also, that she was “informed that she could not use any footage of the police car or 
police officers and that if she did there would be ‘severe penalties’. 
 
Kent Police 
An NUJ Member was subjected to a number of stop and searches by police during 
the protest at Kingsnorth Climate Camp in the week beginning 8 August 2009. The 
Member was not part of the Climate Camp Protest and was stopped and searched by 
the Police under s.44. 
“This was a massive policing operation involving officers drawn from forces all over 
the country. The media were filmed and searched entering and leaving the field 
where the protest camp was. On one occasion after photographing a rather brutal 
arrest of protesters who had been filming the police, we were detained for over an 
hour. We were then followed to a restaurant several miles away and were filmed 
through the window by the police Forward Intelligence Team. On that particular day 
I was stopped and searched three times and detained for over two hours.” 
 
Skyline Photographs 
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On 10 May 2010, a NUJ Member went to One Aldermandbury Square in the City of 
London, to take a portrait of one of the architects responsible for the change in 
London Skyline. He was approached by the Police who stopped him under s.44. 
 
Materials & Information 
In 2008, the police instructed a NUJ Member to hand over materials in relation to his 
work reporting on terrorist organisations. Whilst the police can apply for such orders 
under the 2000 Terrorism Act, this case is believed to be unprecedented because the 
main person, of interest to the police, volunteered to speak openly to them. 
 
In 2008, a Milton Keynes NUJ Member was awaiting trial on charges alleging she 
obtained information illegally from the police.546 –  
 
 
4.11. Conclusion 
It was noticed, throughout this section, that terrorist events had a real impact on legislators. 
Nevertheless, rather than the consequences of the acts or the level of threat, it was the media 
                                                          
546 The case was mentioned, without details, in the NUJ response to the Rapid Review of Counter Terrorism 
powers). However, in an article published in Statewatch analysis Media freedoms in the UK curtailed by 
police “culture of suspicion” and double standards”  M.Rowlands  wrote:   
“Sally Murrer, was accused of “aiding and abetting misconduct in a public office”. She was arrested in 
May 2007 on the basis of her association with police officer, Mark Kearney, who she  was alleged to have 
helped leak classified information. Having been under surveillance for months by security services – 
including having her car bugged – police carried out simultaneous raids on her home and place of work, 
the Milton Keynes Citizen newspaper. She has twice been held in police detention; strip-searched; and told 
repeatedly during interrogations that she would be jailed for life. And yet it remained unclear exactly what 
Murrer has done to warrant the charges brought against her and the treatment she  had received. All of the 
stories, for which she used Kearney as a source, such as the arrest of a local footballer and the identity of a 
man killed in a fight,  were relatively ordinary and localised and posed no threat to national security. 
Certainly Murrer’s methods, of obtaining information, were no different from those used by journalists 
throughout the country.  However, in February 2008, Kearney revealed that he had taken part reluctantly 
in a covert operation to bug a conversation between Labour MP Sadiq Khan and a constituent he was 
visiting in prison. Murrer  said “this may be the missing piece of the jigsaw”, and speculated that “they 
tried to discredit the whistleblower and the journalist they thought he was going to blow the whistle to and 
destroy the story that way…they were trying to ruin him, destroying me in the process.” Murrer’s legal 
team is  trying currently to have the case thrown out, arguing that bugging her conversations with Kearney 
breached her rights as a journalist under Article 10 of the Human Rights Act.  Howewver, if she does go to 
trial and is found guilty, a precedent will  be set for the imprisonment of any journalist who receives 
information from a police or government source without official sanction.  
See M. Rowlands, ‘Media freedoms in the UK curtailed by police “culture of suspicion” and double 
standards’, Statewatch Analysis, the full article available online at: 
 http://www.statewatch.org/analyses/no-73-uk-police-press-and-protests.pdf  
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coverage, of such incidents, which affected the legislators more.  Terrorists were aware of 
the indirect ‘help’,  which they  could obtain from media outlets, and  had not spared their 
efforts to attract media attention. The overlapping of interests, between media organisations 
and terrorist groups, induced the state to look with circumspection (and, sometimes, with 
suspicion) on the role of media professionals and to question which side they were on. Such 
behaviour, from the authorities, made them pay less regard to the fundamental issues of 
human rights and freedom of speech; information; and opinion. It could not be denied that 
most of the laws, enacted in the UK in this area, restricted some fundamental human rights.  
In addition, it was noted that some general principles, of criminal law, were neglected, also. 
It was remarkable that the UK  was the only European State  which asked for derogation 
from Article5 of the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR). Whilst some argued 
that the UK’s adoption of the Human Rights Act 1998 reinforced substantially the value of 
the ECHR in domestic case-law, due to the events of September 11 2001, the UK adopted 
the longest ever period of detention without warrant. 
This study noted that, often, the legislative process which followed the events of  September 
11 2001 was hasty. For instance, the ACTSA 2001, a very lengthy and draconian piece of 
legislation, was drafted apparently in just over a couple of months. The other observation, to 
be made regarding the general tendency of anti-terror laws, was that, despite the fact that 
they were meant to address principally the problem of terrorism, they  were used to address 
other forms of crimes and delinquency (illegal immigration; fraud; and so on). This 
illustrated a very wide interpretation of the law by police officers on the ground. The police 
seemed to consider that, if there was the slightest possibility that a certain person might 
represent a threat to the public, that person  had to be stopped under the appropriate 
provisions of anti-terrorist laws. 
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This researcher noted, also, that, more often, terrorism laws were extended rather than 
restricted. Such a phenomenon did not appear to be linked necessarily with real threats. 
Enacting provisional laws and temporary Acts in the UK and, then, giving them in fact a 
permanent status, by continuously extending them, did not seem to obey sound reasoning. 
The general tendency, amongst legislators, to adopt laws hastily in this area, was not counter-
balanced by any inclination to abolish them when all evidence suggested that they served no 
useful purpose.  
 
Frequently, the use of the threat of terrorism was a pretext used to serve different agendas, 
not necessarily related to the challenge of terrorism.  In considering the various measures, 
adopted by the UK  and other European countries, it  was noticeable that the following ‘anti-
terrorism’ measures were applied in most countries: extension of the period of detention; 
detention without a charge; and prolonged police custody. It could not be denied that, in 
addition to exerting a huge psychological and social pressure, this form of custody, might 
prompt the detainee, also, to say what his interrogators wanted him to say. If he was 
convinced that it was the only way to be released earlier. In the UK, pre-charge detention 
was fixed, firstly, to seven days and, then, extended to fourteen days, before reaching twenty-
eight days and  reducing again to 14 days. 
 
Other excessive measures  were solitary confinement; house arrest; telephone tapping; 
bugging operations; video surveillance; use of private informers and undercover agents; the 
extension of police powers, the banning of terrorist associations (a controversial in terms of 
who  was to be on the list, who  ought to decide, under which criteria) and criminalising 
mere membership of such associations; freezing of assets; obliging financial institutions to 
report suspicious transactions (once again, raising the issue of who decided that a transaction  
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was suspicious, and on which basis). Similarities were noted regarding the level of available 
sentences for terrorism.  
 
In conclusion, it could be said that the UK anti-terrorism laws impacted significantly on 
freedom of movement and restricted the right to privacy, and, moreover, people, working in 
the media professions, were the first to be affected. Another element, observed in the 
examined laws, was the change from a repressive phase (i.e. pursuing the people who 
committed crimes) towards a more preventive phase.  Such a move suggested that most 
provisions, of UK anti-terrorism laws, focused on police powers during preliminary 
investigation; criminalising preparatory activities; and instigations of terrorism before any 
terrorist act has been committed.  
 
The new focus on preventing harmful actions was motivated by the change in the nature of 
today’s terrorism.  In order to avoid tragedies and large number of victims such as happened 
on September 11 2001, it was deduced that intervening, after a human catastrophe, was not 
as useful as intervening to prevent it. Under the old law, the police and prosecution could do 
nothing about preparatory actions unless the law were to criminalise the making of 
preparations for a harmful act. Yet, problems arose when it appeared that, as a consequence 
of the new law, one compromised not only the presumption of  the suspect’s innocence  but, 
also, that of a large part of the population. Consequently, the traditional "presumption of 
innocence" became a "presumption of culpability" which obliged accused persons to prove 
their innocence. The following chapter discusses, in depth, the particular cases affected by 
the British Anti-terrorism Laws and a few cases from EU countries which arose in the 
context of the international co-operation in counteracting terrorism. 
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Chapter Five 
 The Anti–Terrorism Laws and Media 
 
5.1. Introduction 
The previous chapter considered the concept of the “war on terror” and the enactment of 
anti-terrorism laws by various institutions and governments. It considered, also, how media 
organisations were affected by the new laws, and how media professionals were restricted 
in terms of access to information.  In addition, the chapter shed light on anti–terrorism laws 
enacted in the UK; in the USA; and in certain European countries. Particular attention was 
given to laws believed to have negative consequences on human rights generally and, in 
particular, upon the freedom of media and journalists.  
 This chapter considers the purpose of introducing laws on terrorism and, then, makes a 
comparison between the laws enacted in the UK; in the USA; and in Europe.  In considering 
the positions of international organisations, governments; international media institutions; 
human rights organisations; and, finally, academics, there is a discussion of the various 
stances, taken by different parties on the issue of Media and Anti-terrorism Laws. Another 
aspect, addressed in this chapter, is the cooperation between states to face the rising threat 
of terrorism.  In order to avoid sticking only to a theoretical approach, a number of concrete 
cases  are presented. These are such as the Taysir Alluni Case; the particular cases of Al-
Jazeera; the BBC; and Indymedia and those of media professionals arrested by a number of 
European countries under the provisions of the new anti-terrorism legislation. Finally, there 
is an assessment of criticisms made against UK anti-terrorism laws and the effect of the 
Terrorism Act 2000 on human rights and media.  
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Amongst the public; governments; and international organisations, there is a unanimous 
acknowledgement about the necessity of having appropriate legislation in order to face new 
challenges such as terrorism. Therefore, following the September 11 2001 events, 
international communities considered the need to give appropriate responses and to prevent 
the recurrence of such devastating acts which were targeted mainly at normal citizens. 
However, legislating, to such effect, without limiting fundamental liberties, was a huge 
challenge. Despite its experience in dealing with internal terrorism, the United Kingdom 
seemed to have had flaws in its various post 9/11 statutes. Different reasons might explain 
the shortcomings of the anti-terrorism laws, amongst them, the inability, of international 
organisations such as the UN or the EU, to reach an agreement about the definition of 
terrorism. The profusion of meanings made national governments adopt their own 
interpretations and legislate according to their own understandings. On the positive side, it 
could be said that those drafting UK laws accepted some of the reservations expressed by 
human rights organisations, and amended anti-terrorist laws accordingly.  However, the 
remaining question was: were those amendments adequate or effective? There were, also, 
dissenting voices who, from the beginning, argued that there was no need, in the UK, to 
reinforce anti-terrorism laws since  the existing legislation was strong enough to address the 
issue. 
The UK is a country well-known for its tradition of allowing all citizens to express their 
opinions and feelings (i.e. freedom of expression; speech; belief and so on) without being 
subjects to any form of prosecution, as long as no social disturbance is caused. However, the 
terrorist acts which occurred in the United States (2001); Madrid (2004);  and London 
(2005); induced Western governments and the UK, in particular, to enact laws which reduced 
civil liberties.  It is interesting to consider the effects of these laws on the media profession 
generally and on journalists; photographers; and reporters in particular.  This covers a fair 
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amount of the ground dealt with in the previous chapter.  However, whilst that chapter sought 
to provide a critical overview of British law, this chapter illustrates, through practical 
examples, how the law impacted on media professionals. 
5.2. Purpose of Introducing Laws on Terrorism 
In the so-called ‘age of terror’ most countries, in the world, introduced new laws.  There 
were several reasons for such attitudes, on the part of executive powers, which were 
determined to defeat, by all means, the rising threat of terrorism.  However, it could be 
argued that terrorism was not a new phenomenon in British history or politics. The UK 
Government justified its enactment of new anti-terrorist laws by pointing out that since 
September 11 2001 the world had entered a new phase in terms of threats, and that it was 
perfectly normal to react swiftly to prevent further terrorist acts. The UK Government did 
not want to be blamed for inaction in case of tragedies, due to acts of terrorism, or to lose 
ground on domestic politics.547  
Any look, at British history, confirms that although the British case  was quite distinct in 
comparison with the legislation of other European countries, the United Kingdom 
experienced a long wave of domestic terrorism with dramatic consequences.  The North 
Ireland problem  might explain why, in the past, UK legislators took very strict measures,548 
even if this might be claimed to be a rather an unnecessary549 reaction.  
                                                          
547 The Madrid bombing affected Spanish politics with the people changing their votes in the 2004 elections 
and sanctioning the government in charge. 191 civilians lost their lives in the Madrid bombing. Spain’s general 
election three days later was upset and contrary to pollsters’ expectations; the incumbent Partido Popular was 
defeated by the Partido Socialista Obrero Español (PSOE).  
 The British government did not want to suffer, as the Spanish government had, the consequences of a vote 
sanction from the people; a vote based on anger against their way of handling terrorism and securing the safety 
of their population)  
 
548 For instance, the UK was the only state who issued derogation orders under Article 15 ECHR, in order  to 
avoid having to justify itself in Strasbourg on basis of Article 5 ECHR, relative to the right to liberty and 
security of the person 
549 A conspicuous juridical arsenal and an elaborated legislative framework against terrorism already existed 
in the UK. 
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5.3. UK Laws compared with the USA and European Anti-terrorism Laws 
Following the 7 July 2005 terrorists attacks in London, Conservative and Labour politicians 
expressed their respective positions through the media, and made public what they had in 
mind for the future in terms of legal proposals. For instance, Michael Howard, the Tory 
leader, made strong accusations against British judges, whom he claimed were guilty of 
‘‘aggressive judicial activism’’ which prevented MPs addressing efficiently the challenge of 
terrorism. A few weeks after the London bombings he wrote:  
“Given that judicial activism seems to have reached unprecedented levels in 
thwarting the wishes of Parliament, it is time, I believe, to go back to first principles. 
The British constitution, largely unwritten, is based on the separation of powers.”550  
Equally, Tony Blair, the Prime Minister, warned judges explicitly that he might have to 
ignore parts of the Human Rights Act 1998, if the courts continued to obstruct the deportation 
of what he called extremists to unsafe countries. Klug and Wildbore stated:  
In 2005, when Tony Blair told us “the rules of the game are changing”, he said, also, 
“Should legal obstacles arise, we will legislate further, including, if necessary 
amending the Human Rights Act”. Statement on anti-terror measures: Press 
Conference, 5 August 2005”.551 
                                                          
. Judges must bow to the will of Parliament”. “Aug 2005 thHoward’s article in the Telegraph, 10. See M 550 
-the-to-bow-must-view/3618954/Judges-://www.telegraph.co.uk/comment/personalhttp Available online at:
 Parliament.html-of-will 
551 See F. Klug and H. Wildbore Protecting rights: how do we stop rights and freedoms being a political 
football? Article available online 
at:http://www2.lse.ac.uk/humanRights/articlesAndTranscripts/unlockDemocracy.pdf    
See, also, the Amnesty International Report: Los Derechos Humanos, una promesa incumplida. Available 
online at:http://www.amnesty.org/es/library/asset/EUR45/004/2006/es/ce28dddd-d45b-11dd-8743-
d305bea2b2c7/eur450042006en.html  
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Although the principle of parliamentary sovereignty gives the UK government much greater 
power than the judiciary, such political intrusions, in legal matters, were unprecedented.  
Undermining the independence of the judiciary, and the jurisdiction of international legal 
treaties, contravenes the achievements of modern democratic societies, based on the 
separation of powers between the executive; the legislature; and the judiciary. One of the 
judiciary’s prerogatives is to ensure that the constitution is respected and to object if it 
notices that new legislation is susceptible of encroaching on citizens’ civil liberties. 
In the USA, the American administration’s passing of the Patriot Act552 a few weeks after 
the September 11 2001 events was largely welcomed. However, the international community 
questioned soon its use for countering terrorism.553  It was argued that, in order to face the 
challenge of terrorism, the executive power ignored the international human rights law and 
country's own bill of rights.554 Under President Bush, the American administration, was 
determined to take all necessary measures to protect American citizens from further terrorist 
attacks.  
The American Constitution prescribes the following Presidential oath:  
"I do solemnly swear that I will faithfully execute the office of President of the 
United States, and will to the best of my ability, preserve, protect and defend the 
Constitution of the United States."555  
                                                          
552 USA Patriot Act stands for Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required 
to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act 
553 In particular, the establishment of the camp at Guantanamo and the extraordinary renditions, both of 
which are in clear contravention with international law. 
554 See Helen Herman, ‘PATRIOT Games: Terrorism Law and Executive Power’, Jurist, 2006, 
http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/forumy/2006/01/patriot-games-terrorism-law-and.php  
555 See The essential Liberty Project, “About the Oath on Constitution” available at:   
http://essentialliberty.us/about/oath/  
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The American Congress showed a worrying passivity; whilst the courts were not involved 
particularly. Constitutional structures are useless if executive powers are not politically 
accountable. Such circumstances require informed and active constituency. The Patriot Act 
debates proved that by conveying public concerns through actions and, eventually, votes, it 
was possible to involve representatives actively.  The Bill of Rights Defense Committee 
resolutions were concerned about several elements such as the “sneak and peek”,556 and 
“libraries” provisions of the Patriot Act.557 For instance, in order to preserve the American 
                                                          
556 Sneak and Peek Warrants are legal instruments, provided by the Patriot Act (section 213), which consist of 
delayed-notification search warrants. In a federal crime, they allow a search and seizure of a property without 
need to notify the suspected person. The government should a priori present a ‘reasonable cause’ to the court 
as regards to the necessity to delay the notification to avoid an “adverse result” such as destruction of evidence, 
intimidation of witnesses, and so on.  
Patriot Act. Sec. 213. Authority for Delaying Notice of the Execution of a Warrant. 
Section 3103a of title 18, United States Code, is amended-- 
(1) by inserting `(a) IN GENERAL- ' before `In addition'; and 
(2) by adding at the end the following: 
(b) DELAY- With respect to the issuance of any warrant or court order under this section, or any other 
rule of law, to search for and seize any property or material that constitutes evidence of a criminal 
offense in violation of the laws of the United States, any notice required, or that may be required, to 
be given may be delayed if-- 
(1) the court finds reasonable cause to believe that providing immediate notification of the execution 
of the warrant may have an adverse result (as defined in section 2705); 
(2) the warrant prohibits the seizure of any tangible property, any wire or electronic communication 
(as defined in section 2510), or, except as expressly provided in chapter 121, any stored wire or 
electronic information, except where the court finds reasonable necessity for the seizure; and 
(3) the warrant provides for the giving of such notice within a reasonable period of its execution, 
which period may thereafter be extended by the court for good cause shown.'. 
See the full text available online at: 
 http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/F?c107:1:./temp/~c1078U19V2:e48053:  
557 Libraries Provision is a legal instrument provided by the Patriot Act (Section 215). It extends FBI’s power 
to seize records of terrorist activities, specifically business records and “any tangible things (including books, 
records, papers, documents, and other items).” Section 215 is called the libraries provision because it could 
potentially be used to subpoena a list of books checked out from a library, or a list of websites visited at a 
library computer, all without notifying the suspect.   
Patriot Act. Sec. 215. Access to Records and other items under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. 
Title V of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1861 et seq.) is amended by striking 
sections 501 through 503 and inserting the following: 
- SEC. 501. Access to certain Business Records for Foreign Intelligence and International Terrorism 
investigations. 
(a)(1) The Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation or a designee of the Director (whose rank 
shall be no lower than Assistant Special Agent in Charge) may make an application for an order 
requiring the production of any tangible things (including books, records, papers, documents, and 
other items) for an investigation to protect against international terrorism or clandestine intelligence 
activities, provided that such investigation of a United States person is not conducted solely upon 
the basis of activities protected by the first amendment to the Constitution. 
(2) An investigation conducted under this section shall-- 
(A) be conducted under guidelines approved by the Attorney General under Executive Order 12333 
(or a successor order); and 
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Constitution, and to ensure that the executive power ought to operate on the same footing as 
the other two powers, it  was necessary to follow through on those resolutions, ensuring a 
more active role of the Congress in checking the executive branch, and strengthening the 
role, of the courts,  in order to achieve an appropriate balance between the three powers.558  
Whilst legislation differs from one European country to the next, since 2001, European 
countries have been making great efforts at the European Union level , to ensure they have 
cohesion and shared objectives, with the UK playing an essential in this process.559 In 
addition, the Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly demanded that countries scrutinise 
the details of incoming terrorism legislation; diminish their reservations; and, whilst 
                                                          
(B) not be conducted of a United States person solely upon the basis of activities protected by the 
first amendment to the Constitution of the United States. 
(b) Each application under this section-- 
(1) shall be made to-- 
(A) a judge of the court established by section 103(a); or 
(B) a United States Magistrate Judge under chapter 43 of title 28, United States Code, who is 
publicly designated by the Chief Justice of the United States to have the power to hear applications 
and grant orders for the production of tangible things under this section on behalf of a judge of that 
court; and 
` (2) shall specify that the records concerned are sought for an authorized investigation conducted in 
accordance with subsection (a)(2) to obtain foreign intelligence information not concerning a United 
States person or to protect against international terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities. 
(c)(1) Upon an application made pursuant to this section, the judge shall enter an ex parte order as 
requested, or as modified, approving the release of records if the judge finds that the application 
meets the requirements of this section. 
(2) An order under this subsection shall not disclose that it is issued for purposes of an investigation 
described in subsection (a). 
(d) No person shall disclose to any other person (other than those persons necessary to produce the 
tangible things under this section) that the Federal Bureau of Investigation has sought or obtained 
tangible things under this section. 
(e) A person who, in good faith, produces tangible things under an order pursuant to this section 
shall not be liable to any other person for such production. Such production shall not be deemed to 
constitute a waiver of any privilege in any other proceeding or context. 
See the full text available online at: 
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/F?c107:1:./temp/~c1078U19V2:e48053 
558 See “Civil Liberties and the War on Terrorism”, available at: http://www.newsbatch.com/civlib.htm  
 
559 See S.Breau, S. Livingstone and R. O’Connell, ‘Anti-Terrorism Law and Human Rights in the United 
Kingdom post September 11’, Human Rights Centre, Queens University Belfast. Article available online at: 
http://www.britishcouncil.org/china-society-publications-911.pdf . See also K. Roach talk on “The 9/11 effect: 
Comparative counter terrorism(2012) available at :http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nTitrbMBbRk    
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extending the authority of the police, ratify conventions against the ‘new’ challenge of 
terrorism.560  
 
 
5.4. Positions taken by Different Parties on the Issue of Media and Anti-terrorism Laws  
5.4.1. Position of Governments post 9/11 
The terrorist acts, against the twin towers in the USA, provoked an understandable and 
emotionally charged effect worldwide. However, politicians rushed to express feelings 
which, a decade later, might be seen as imprudent and in some ways discriminatory. For 
instance, President Bush mentioned the word “crusade”, whilst Prime Minister Blair stated 
that, in some ways, the perpetrators envied and abhorred the western our way of life. Blair 
underlined that it was a struggle about values, adding: 
“Our values are our guide. They represent humanity's progress throughout the ages. At 
each point we have had to fight for them and defend them. As a new age beckons, it is 
time to fight for them again.”561 
Such statements were more than mere slips of the tongue; however, these were personal 
opinions which, in no circumstances, a politician ought to share with the public. In addition, 
both the UK and US governments reacted in a way which caused concern for the defenders 
of civil liberties in the West. For instance, in 2001, David Blunkett, the British Home 
                                                          
 
560 See Parliamentary Assembly, Media and terrorism, Report Committee on Culture, Science and Education, 
Doc. 10557, 20 May 2005, Rapporteur: Mr Josef Jařab, Czech Republic, Liberal, Democratic and 
Reformers’ Group. Available at:  http://assembly.coe.int/Documents/WorkingDocs/Doc05/edoc10557.htm  
 
561 See Tony Blair’s article “A Battle for Global Values”. From Foreign Affairs, January/February 2007. 
Available online at: http://castinet.castilleja.org/users/cstory/IR/articles/blair_article.pdf  
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Secretary, declared that it was possible to live in a libertarian, airy-fairy world, with everyone 
free to do what they wanted believing the best of everybody and “then they destroy us”562   
During the reading of the Antiterrorist, Crime and Security Bill,563 Lord Roker, the Home 
Office Minister, was even more explicit when he claimed, of the Bill. that,  
“…it strikes a balance between respecting our fundamental liberties and ensuring 
that they are not exploited. The problem is that in a tolerant liberal society. If we 
are not guarded we will find that those who do not seek to be part of our society 
will use our tolerance and liberalism to destroy that society. That is reality.564   
It seemed certain that politicians wanted to justify the new legislative measures, which were 
introduced, and were preparing UK citizens so that they would cooperate and accept a 
reduction of their civil liberties. There has been real tension between the press and 
governments who seek to limit media freedom; this represents the original pattern of the 
conflict between citizens and state in liberal democracies.565 The lawful regulation, of this 
tension, is sought in the UK and elsewhere.  However, there is a clear legal realisation that, 
as a Fourth Power and with the function of promoting openness and democratic political 
processes, the media has a legitimate and worthy role to play in the political process .566 
Nevertheless, most governments introduced anti-terrorist laws which reduced freedom of 
                                                          
562 See P. Hillyard, ‘In defense of Civil liberties’, in Scraton (ed.) Beyond September 11: An anthology of 
dissent, pp. 107-12, London, Pluto Press, (2002). 
563 Immediately after the September 11 2001 events, the UK government reviewed the anti-terrorist law passed 
in 2000. The new law, called Antiterrorist, Crime and Security Act (ACTSA),  expanded police powers in order 
to prevent the funding of terrorist organisations; and to tighten the control of the immigration. However, more 
importantly, it was to extend the power and funding of the intelligence gathering community. Such amendments 
can be compared with what happened in the United States with the PATRIOT Act which gave more power to 
the FBI. The new element, of the UK legislation, was the introduction of an extension of the detention without 
trial to 14 days.   
564 Hansard, House of Lords, 27th November 2001, col.143 
565 J. Keane, The Media and Democracy, Cambridge: Polity Press, (1991) 
566 M. Chesterman, Freedom of Speech in Australia: A Delicate Plant, Ashgate: Dartmouth. (2000) 
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information and freedom of speech. Consequently, there was considerable analysis about the 
way in which human rights and civil liberties were affected.567  
 
5.4.2 Position of international organisations (UN, EU, NATO) 
The UN, EU, and the Council of Europe (CoE) and other international and regional 
organisation bodies enacted laws and implemented international agreements which were 
unpopular amongst human rights organisations; media professionals; and  defenders of civil 
liberties.  In particular, concerns were expressed as regards the effects of the new legislation 
on the normal citizens’ freedom of expression and the lack of attention accorded to human 
rights.  
In the aftermath of the September 11 2001 events, most international organisations were 
convinced that the scourge of terrorism would be defeated only through international 
cooperation. As was mentioned in the preceding chapter, it was the United Nations who took 
the lead by calling for increased collaboration between all states’ executives.568 NATO’s 
decision to invoke Article 5 of its charter was unprecedented,569 whilst the Council of Europe 
(CoE) recommended its members to cooperate fully and to face, what was seen as the most 
urgent threat (i.e. terrorism).  
In Council of Europe Resolution 1271 (2002), it was stated explicitly that:  
                                                          
567 I. Barker, ‘Human rights in an age of counter-terrorism’, Australian Bar Review (2005), Vol 26: p 267–86. 
568 United Nations Security Council, Security Council Resolution1368 (2001) Adopted by the Security 
Council at its 4370th meeting, on 12 September 2001.S/RES/1368 (2001). New York: United Nations, (12 
September 2001). Available online: http://daccess-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N01/533/82/PDF/N0153382.pdf?OpenElement 
569   Article 5 is at the basis of a fundamental principle of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. It provides 
that if a NATO Ally is the victim of an armed attack, each and every other member of the Alliance will 
consider this act of violence as an armed attack against all members and will take the actions it deems 
necessary to assist the Ally attacked. 
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“The combat against terrorism must be carried out in compliance with national and 
international law and respecting human rights.”570 
 
The same document addressed the issue of extradition and, in  reiterating its opposition to 
the death penalty regardless of the crime committed, the Assembly refused to make any 
exceptions to the rule that nobody could be extradited if they would face the death penalty. 
Accordingly, CoE members were advised not to extradite suspected terrorists to countries 
where the death penalty remained in operation; it being an indispensable requirement of 
assurance on that matter before carrying out a deportation. However, since assurances were 
based on individual and exceptional cases, even assuming that it was respected by both 
parties, such a clause did not help the improvement of human rights. In addition, torture and 
ill-treatment do not appear in the resolution; this implies that regimes, with poor human 
rights records, are free to carry on their inhuman practices.  
 
Another Council of Europe Recommendation, about terrorism,571 restated that the fight 
against terrorism ought not to be pursued to the detriment of fundamental rights and 
freedoms as defined by the ECHR and the CoE legislation. In 2005, the Parliamentary 
Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) made another recommendation,572 insisting that 
the fact that terrorist actions were witnessed worldwide ought not to be used as an excuse 
for reducing freedom of expression and information, the media being one of the essential 
foundations of democratic society. The public had the right to be informed about what was 
happening in its surroundings and beyond, from petty crimes to terrorist activities and 
                                                          
570   See Parliamentary Assembly, Council of Europe, Combating terrorism and respect for human rights,   
Resolution 1271(2002)[1] , 
http://assembly.coe.int/main.asp?Link=/documents/adoptedtext/ta02/eres1271.htm   
571 See Parliamentary Assembly, Council of Europe, Combating terrorism and respect for human rights,  
Recommendation 1550(2002), available online at: 
,http://assembly.coe.int/Main.asp?link=/Documents/AdoptedText/ta02/EREC1550.htm  
572 See Parliamentary Assembly, Council of Europe , Media and terrorism , Recommendation 1706 (2005), 
,http://www.assembly.coe.int/ASP/Doc/XrefViewHTML.asp?FileID=11108&Language=EN 
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potential terrorist threats. It was, also, through the media that the state policies and responses 
to terrorism  were transmitted to the people. 
 
Recalling the declaration of the Committee of Ministers,573 the Assembly stressed that 
Article 15, of the ECHR, ought not to be referred to in order to restrict the freedom of the 
press beyond the existing limitations of Article 10, paragraph 2 of the Convention.574  
 
The Committee made it clear that terrorist actions were not considered legally as war, and 
certainly would not seriously affect lives in democracies. Amongst the recommendations 
made to the States, the Committee of Ministers stressed that Members and observers ought 
to ensure that the public and media were informed regularly about government policies and 
                                                          
573 See Committee of Ministers, Council of Europe, Declaration on freedom of expression and information in 
the media in the context of the fight against terrorism,(adapted by the Committee of Ministers on 2 March 
2005), https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?id=830679&Site=CM.  
 See, also, the Recommendation Rec(2003)13 of the Committee of Ministers to Member States on the 
provision of information through the media in relation to criminal proceedings, available at:   
https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?Ref=Rec(2003)13&Language=lanEnglish&Site=CM&BackColorInternet=
DBDCF2&BackColorIntranet=FDC864&BackColorLogged=FDC864  
 
574  Article 15 states as regards to the Derogation in time of emergency  
1. In time of war or other public emergency threatening the life of the nation any High Contracting 
Party may take measures derogating from its obligations under this Convention to the extent strictly 
required by the exigencies of the situation, provided that such measures are not inconsistent with its 
other obligations under international law.  
2. No derogation from Article 2, except in respect of deaths resulting from lawful acts of war, or 
from Articles 3, 4 (paragraph 1) and 7 shall be made under this provision.  
3. Any High Contracting Party availing itself of this right of derogation shall keep the Secretary 
General of the Council of Europe fully informed of the measures which it has taken and the reasons 
therefor. It shall also inform the Secretary General of the Council of Europe when such measures 
have ceased to operate and the provisions of the Convention are again being fully executed. 
 Article 10 of the ECHR states as regards to the Freedom of expression : 
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions 
and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and 
regardless of frontiers. This Article shall not prevent States from requiring the licensing of 
broadcasting, television or cinema enterprises.  
2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject 
to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in 
a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the 
prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the 
reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or 
for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary. 
The full text of the  European Convention on Human Rights is available online at: 
http://www.echr.coe.int/NR/rdonlyres/D5CC24A7-DC13-4318-B457-
5C9014916D7A/0/Convention_ENG.pdf  
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decisions regarding terrorist threats. Therefore, it was required to refrain from barring or, 
even, restricting improperly the diffusion of 
 “information and opinions in the media about terrorism as well as about the reaction 
by state authorities to terrorist acts and threats under the pretext of fighting 
terrorism.”  
 
It was considered, also, essential to  ensure that media reporting on terrorism  were aware of 
the security situation to prevent journalists from being “exposed to dangers caused by 
terrorists or the anti-terrorist action of state authorities.”575  
 
In 2011, the PACE, concerned by the challenges encountered by media professionals, made 
a Recommendation whereby it insisted that its Member States should take proper and 
adequate initiatives to ensure the protection of the right of journalists to refuse to disclose 
the origin of their sources. The Assembly was concerned particularly about the fact that,  
“large number of cases, in which public authorities, in Europe, have forced, or attempted 
to force, journalists to disclose their sources, despite the clear standards set by the 
ECtHR and the Committee of Ministers. These violations are more frequent in member 
states without clear legislation.”576 
 This researcher believes that, ten years after the September 11 2001 events, having the 
Council of Europe making such a statement is additional evidence that the enforcement of 
anti-terrorism laws, enacted in Europe, did infringe seriously the fundamental rights of 
journalists. 
 
                                                          
575 See Council of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly, ‘Recommendation 1706 (2005) Media and terrorism’, 
Available online at: 
http://assembly.coe.int/Documents/AdoptedText/ta05/EREC1706.htm  
 
576 See Parliamentary Assembly, Council of Europe, The protection of journalists’ sources, Recommendation 
1950 (2011), http://assembly.coe.int/mainf.asp?Link=/documents/adoptedtext/ta11/erec1950.htm.  
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5.4.3 The Position of Academics; Analysts; and Observers  
Despite wide organisational mobilisation, not everybody shared the concerns of the 
international entities and national governments. It was evident that most people believed that 
the challenge of terrorism needed to be addressed. However, agreement, on the means to 
deal with it, was not universal. Analysts, such as McNamara,577 emphasised that the anti-
terrorist laws, enacted after the September 11 2001 events, had a negative impact on freedom 
of speech generally and on the freedom enjoyed previously in the media profession. Despite 
the country’s traditional liberalism, the relationship, between the various UK governments 
and part of the media, deteriorated considerably.578 There were, also, extreme views, 
amongst some scholars, as regards the laws’  real intentions. Were they a pretext for more 
control of its citizens by the state?579 
Dealing with terrorism does not mean necessarily infringing the principles of democracy. 
Values such as freedom of opinion, expression, and belief; the right of dissent; and of 
accessing or providing information, should not be altered or reduced under any pretext.  
States, based on the rule of law, do not need to suspend such crucial principles in difficult 
times. Legislation is an instrument which tests the performance and the ability of political 
bodies to deal with crises.580 In modern democracies, citizens’ rights should be ensured by 
respecting essential principles as habeas corpus; the presumption of innocence; and the 
provision to the accused of unbiased trials in courts, with proper legal advice and 
representation. Citizens are entitled, also, to oppose the government’s official discourse; to 
                                                          
23 L. McNamara, ‘Counter-terrorism Laws: How They Affect Media Freedom and News Reporting’,  
Westminster Papers in Communication and Culture, Vol. 6(1), 2009, p: 27-44. 
578 J. Keane, The Media and Democracy, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991. 
579 L. McNamara,‘Counter-terrorism Laws: How They Affect Media Freedom and News Reporting’,  
Westminster Papers in Communication and Culture, Vol. 6(1), 2009, p: 27-44. 
 
580 P. A. Thomas, ‘Emergency and Anti-Terrorist Powers, 9/11: USA and UK, Fordham International Law 
Journal, 2002,   pp.1193-1233. 
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protest; to denounce; or to oppose, in a civil manner, what they see as the governing 
authorities’ abuse or manipulation of the public.581 
The negative aspect, which is quite common in executive circles, is a real contempt, for the 
media, because, often, they unveil illegal dealings or criticise too overtly or too much; they 
are seen rather as the ‘enemy’. In modern liberal societies, reducing the role of the media, 
when they are not manipulated intentionally to serve the objectives, of the current political 
and economic power, is particularly disconcerting. There are real and genuine concerns 
about allowing governments, without accountability or regulation, to use their discretion on 
sensitive issues,; certainly, it affects negatively both principles of democracy and aspirations 
of an open society. The media’s real function582 is an essential element  considered in the 
context of  this study.583 The reviewing, of the media professionals’ opinions regarding their 
profession, is essential in order to determine their place in modern and open societies.584  
Often, the Media are considered to be the Fourth Power585 of a democratic system. They 
influence not only the other three legitimate powers but, also, influence policymakers and 
the destiny of leaders. Two years after the tragic events of September 11 2001, the 
mainstream media played a decisive role and contributed heavily to the preparation of the 
Iraq war.  At that time, Reale categorised the media’s position as being “strong with the weak 
                                                          
581 R. Foot, J. Gaddis, and A. Hurrell, (eds), Order and Justice in International Relations, Oxford University 
Press, 2007.  
582 The media is a go between element, the state on one side and citizens on the other. 
583  Several significant interventions were given at an international conference,“Media between Citizens and 
Power”.from 23 to 24 June 2006  in Venice,  
584 The media’s own perspective, about their role, is important  in understanding their mechanisms.  
 
585 The term ‘fourth power’ derives, in fact, from the coined term fourth estate attributed to the nineteenth 
century historian, Carlyle, who attributed it instead to Edmund Burke. Carlyle stated what follows: “Burke 
said there were Three Estates in Parliament; but, in the Reporters' Gallery yonder, there sat a Fourth Estate 
more important than they all. It is not a figure of speech, or a witty saying; it is a literal fact, .... Printing, 
which comes necessarily out of Writing, I say often, is equivalent to Democracy: invent Writing, 
Democracy is inevitable. ..... Whoever can speak, speaking now to the whole nation, becomes a power, a 
branch of government, with inalienable weight in law-making, in all acts of authority. It matters not what 
rank he has, what revenues or garnitures: the requisite thing is that he has a tongue which others will listen 
to; this and nothing more is requisite.” Carlyle (1905) pp.349-350 
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and weak with the strong”.586 For this writer,587 during the Iraq ‘episode’, the media lost their 
credibility588  amongst their respective populations. The media scene was controlled by 
political agents who showed courage in reporting the events of the war on Iraq which  was 
deemed to be the bloodiest war ever589. The complexity, of the situation, made it impossible 
to know what really happened in Iraq, in order to make the people, responsible for that 
particular war, accountable before the international community.590 Nowadays, there is an 
awareness about the subjectivity of reporting.  Often, many tragedies are ignored either 
consciously or inadvertently and, consequently, several categories of people ignore what is 
happening actually in some parts of the world. It can be said that they are living in ‘media 
darkness’.591  It has become clear, also, for reasons such as the “corporatisation” of the media 
and the “embourgeoisement” 
 of journalists, that certain parts of the media information are not interested in the search for 
the truth592. 
The rather pessimistic judgement of writers, such as Reale, does not alter the fact that, in the 
current era, the media’s role remains essential and indispensable for the balance of power. 
The corporate media’s tendency, to support the economically and politically powerful, has 
weakened its relationship with the public. The media profession, by its nature and 
                                                          
586  The writer, who made this statement, meant that the media did not play their original role and accepted 
instead to convey the rhetoric of the American administration  and British political  statements (strong) 
without challenging them, or giving some credit to the Iraqi version (weak). 
587 R. Reale is journalist and Professor of Theories and Techniques of Television Information at the 
University of Padua, Italy. 
588   See R.Reale, International Seminar Media Between Citizens and Power Venice, 23-24 June 2006 
Workshops. P. 12, available online at: http://www.theworldpoliticalforum.net/wp-
content/uploads/wpf2006/06_media_between_c-p_venice/documenti/speeches_workshops.pdf  
589 Ibid. On page 13 Professor Reale stated that 
 “Regarding big political choices, the media scene has been at most dominated by the men of the spinning 
machine, the consensus machine, by communicators at the service of governments. They succeeded in 
exploiting with ability the arrogance of some reporters to instigate public opinion against liberal 
information.” 
590 The contrasting figures, reported by media outlets, regarding the number of civilian victims.  
591 Media darkness means being unaware, due to the lack of reporting, or the biased positioning of the media. 
592 It is not a priority anymore for the media (controlled by corporations and economic factors rather than by 
ethical considerations or pure professionalism) to unveil the truth to the public. 
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development, represents the voices and concerns of citizens and, consequently, its 
professionals find themselves as the main interlocutors of politicians. They can contribute 
either to their political rise or provoke their fall; in some circumstances, this explains their 
importance for politicians or decision-makers. It is believed, also, that the media are 
instruments used by leaders; rulers; or policymakers to convey, to the public, their opinion 
or to strengthen their popular support.593  
A former UNESCO official acknowledged that the independent media were essential, 
stressing the great pressures to which they were subject and their difficult working 
conditions. She criticised politicians who “are for press freedom when they are fighting for 
power, but when they come to power they are not so interested in press freedom.” 594  
Expanding on the issue of disclosure of sources the same author stated: 
“For many years, for us the examples of the free press were not China, of course, but 
the United States, Canada or other democratic countries. But now, after nine years we 
were astonished to find that in some of these democratic countries journalists can go 
to jail for not disclosing their sources of information.”595 
Wallstrom argued that, due to the free market’s supremacy, there was no longer fair 
pluralism since  the market  had led to the media being concentrated in the hands of a few 
agencies and offices of political and economic power. Such a situation prevented most parts, 
of the civil society, having their say on political matters.596  
                                                          
593 It is a classical way used in particular  by authoritarian regimes or imperial actions to  gain popular support 
on the world scene.  
594 See H. Iouchkiavitchious , International Seminar Media Between Citizens and Power Venice, 23-24 June 
2006 Workshops. p. 22, available online at:  http://www.theworldpoliticalforum.net/wp-
content/uploads/wpf2006/06_media_between_c-p_venice/documenti/speeches_workshops.pdf  
595 Ibid. page 22 
596  M. Wallstrom, Vice-President of the European Commission, in charge of Institutional Relations and 
Communication Strategy, Sweden,  2006. 
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5.4.4 The Position of the International Federation of Journalists (IFJ) 
Media organisations were uneasy about the restrictive nature of anti-terrorism laws,597 as  
were human rights and civil liberties institutions.598 In the UK, Cram599 and MacNamara600 
raised concerns whilst, in the USA, the Reporters’ Committee considered the issue.601 
Banisar examined the European scene. 602  Several studies considered the effects of anti-
terrorism laws on the access to information; on media organisations generally; on freedom 
of speech; and on journalists in particular.603  
 
McNamara focused on the effects, of counter terrorism laws, on the freedom of media and 
the press.604 He examined the way anti-terrorism laws affected the media’s ability to inform 
and report on matters of public interest. He found evidence of direct and alarming effects of 
counter terrorism laws on the freedom of both media and the press, especially after the 
September 11 events.  For him, the new laws limited the freedom of media organisations and 
made them pay more attention to the law. 605  Ross observed that the media played a 
                                                          
597 J. Herman, (ed.), ‘State of the News Print Media in Australia 2007: Supplement to the 2006 Report’, 
Sydney: Australian Press Council, 2007. 
598 F. Moorhouse, ‘The writer in a time of terror’, Griffith Review, 2006, 14: 4–54. 
599 I. Cram, ‘Regulating the media: some neglected freedom of expression issues in the United Kingdom’s 
counter-terrorism strategy’, Terrorism and Political Violence, 2006, 18: 335–55. Article available online 
at: 
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/09546550600570184  
600 See L, McNamara Counter-terrorism Laws: How They Affect Media Freedom and News Reporting’, 
Westminster Papers in Communication and Culture, Vol. 6(1), 2009, p: 27-44. 
601 See E. Miller, Here we go again: journalists, police gear up for the 2012 political party conventions 
Reporters Committee, 2012, vol 36, no.3, http://www.rcfp.org/browse-media-law-resources/news-media-
law/news-media-and-law-summer-2012/here-we-go-again-journalist  
602 See D. Banisar, Speaking of terror: a survey of the effects of counter-terrorism legislation on freedom of 
the media in Europe, Council of Europ,  (2008), 
http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/standardsetting/media/doc/banisar_en.pdf 
603 A. Schoenholtz, and J. Hojaiban, International Migration and Anti-Terrorism Laws and Policies: Balancing 
Security and Refugee Protection, Policy Brief, Institute for the Study of International Migration, Walsh 
School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University. 2008 
604 L. McNamara, (2009). The International Federation of Journalists did also express concerns about the 
impact of the laws on the media profession. 
605 See D. Banisar (2008) 
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significant role in events related to terrorism actions. He mentioned the fact that many 
terrorist groups had their own media to propagate their claims, or else, they put pressure on 
official media. 606 He identified the most common challenges, encountered by the media, as 
selective reporting and self-censorship of stories. 
 Often, journalists are intimidated whilst trying to contact people linked or suspected to 
conduct terrorist actions.607 Restrictions are imposed on them by their informers, with the 
risk of losing their contacts or being physically harmed. Not only the profession but, also, 
the lives of journalists are in jeopardy.608 The risks, encountered by journalists, exist under 
all types of political regimes, even in democracies, where journalists can be stopped; 
arrested; and jailed for doing their job or refusing to disclose their sources.609 
There is, also, the editorial discretion factor, whereby the existence of an interesting story 
does not suggest that, automatically, the editor will publish it. Another important element is 
the lack of experts in terrorism, amongst journalists, and national security agencies 
misinforming journalists. There are instances where these agencies used the media to serve 
specific purposes, through what is known as “strategic leaks”.610  In other circumstances, the 
media obstruct counter-terrorist efforts unintentionally. 611  There is, also, amongst the 
various media organisations, the competition factor which certainly affects the methods used 
                                                          
606 J. Ross, Deconstructing the terrorism–news media relationship, R. Paper, University of Baltimore, 2007 
607 See B., Leonard;  B. Weinberg, P. Davis, Introduction to Political Terrorism, McGraw-Hill Higher 
Education, New York, 1989. 
608 The number of journalists, killed worldwide, can be found in the following link Committee to Protect 
Journalists.  “911 Journalists Killed since 1992 “ Available at: http://www.cpj.org/killed/  
609 See International Federation of Journalists (IFJ), ‘United States Attack on Journalists’ Right to Protect 
Sources “Violates First Amendment”, October 2004. http://www.ifj.org/en/articles/united-states-attack-
on-journalists-right-to-protect-sources-violates-first-amendment-says-ifj  
 
610 Ibid. 
611 See Counter-Terrorism White Paper, Published by the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, 
Australia, 2003. 
Chapter Five: The Anti–Terrorism Laws and Media     168 
 
 
to  collect news and deliver it to the public.612 In 2005, journalists, from all over the world, 
attended the International Federation of Journalists conference.613 In the conclusions, which 
were issued, it was stated that the war, on terror, represented an overwhelming challenge to 
the human rights and civil liberties established after WWII.614 The disproportionality of the 
response to terrorism was highlighted. 615 
The IFJ expressed, also, its concern regarding the apparent connection drawn between global 
migration and security. Suspecting non-citizens to be potential terrorists and legislating 
accordingly was thought not to help the fight against terrorism. Instead, it criminalised 
actually a section of the population without providing tangible results in terms of enhanced 
security. The new strategies, put in place to fight terrorism, neglected the real causes of 
migration which were poverty and inequality, not the goal of committing crimes or planning 
terrorist actions. 616 The powers, given to the police, led to the establishment of a surveillance 
society, whereby citizens became accountable increasingly to the authorities. This 
undermined democratic norms since they were introduced through covert secretive 
processes, outside the supervision of Parliament.617 The legislation, enacted worldwide after 
                                                          
612 S. Chermak, (2003). “Marketing Fear: Representing Terrorism After September 11.” Journal of Crime, 
Conflict and the Media, Vol. 1, No. 1. 
613  See B. Hayes and A. White, Background Paper On Challenges for Journalism and Civil Liberties, 
International Federation of Journalists, April 2005,  
http://www.ifj.org/assets/docs/093/092/42b2c5d-91b4a5c.pdf  
614 In the introduction of the report, it is stated that “The criticism, attacks and harassment of Arab media and 
of Al-Jazeera in particular has been widespread and persistent including even a “denial of service attack” from 
the US which prevented public access to Al-Jazeera’s newly launched English language website for several 
weeks.”  
615 For regimes, with poor record on human rights and freedom of expression, the ‘war on terror’ provided 
excuses to go after opposition groups accused of being ‘terrorists”.  
 
616 “The tightening of control on Global migration, the international security policies, and the triggering of 
several wars and occupation diverted attention and resources away from the root causes of global migration 
and insecurity: poverty and inequality. The equation is simple: increased police powers, a compliant private 
security industry, and data collection and surveillance on an unprecedented scale grant extensive new powers 
to the state.”  
617 See B. Hayes and A. White,  Background Paper On Challenges for Journalism and Civil Liberties, 
International Federation of Journalists, April 2005, 
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the September 11 2001 events, gave new emergency and extended powers to 
governments,618 thus enabling the executives to bypass the legislature. 
 
For the IFJ, the review of the reports from selected countries, “confirms that the effects of 
the war on terrorism are even more pronounced in the world of journalism”.619  The reports 
observed that the new laws discouraged legitimate journalistic work about terrorism. It was 
becoming more problematic for journalists to track changes in policy; to follow state 
activities; or to provide key information to citizens. Journalists faced restrictions on freedom 
of movement; constant demands from authorities to reveal sources of information; and 
pressure from politicians to follow the official line on security issues.620 
 
For the IFJ, respect for human rights and democracy are the benchmarks of civilised society. 
Democracy cannot operate without freedom of expression, the independence of the media 
and the people’s right to know.621 It rejects indiscriminate violence  and the claim that people 
should give up some of their fundamental rights for more security.  Democratic states 
enacted laws which undermine “almost half of the minimum standards set out in the 1948 
UN Universal Declaration on Human Rights”.622 The IFJ was concerned by the construction 
of a worldwide registration and surveillance infrastructure whereby citizens and journalists 
were registered, “their travel tracked globally, and their electronic communications and 
transactions monitored”.623 
 
                                                          
618 In fact, it includes civil administration, communications, transport, electricity and other key aspects of 
material life. 
619 A Special Report by the International Federation of Journalists and Statewatch 
620 Ibid.p.57. See the 16th point of the conclusions made. 
621 Ibid. p.59 
622 Ibid . p.58  
623 Ibid. p.58 
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The IFJ recommended that states should not sacrifice civil liberties in the defence of public 
safety. It suggested that states repeal provisions which violated fundamental rights and 
freedoms.624 International cooperation ought not to deviate from its preventive and 
protective aims and become a global instrument for surveillance, and social control of 
societies.625 In 2008, Rosand et al.,626 highlighted the fact that, after the September 11 events, 
17 UN Special Rapporteurs and independent experts, of the UN Commission on Human 
Rights, expressed their concern over the scope of the antiterrorism laws adopted by various 
governments and their eagerness in “targeting groups such as human rights defenders, 
migrants, asylum-seekers and refugees, religious and ethnic minorities, political activists, 
and the media.”627 
 
It was argued, also, that anti-terrorism laws undermined more personal security than any 
terrorist attack.628  In terms of media control, since the ‘War on Terror’, the legislative and 
executive actions, generated by the American Administration, were deemed  to be 
responsible for the decline of the freedom of the press.629  The number of arrests, of 
journalists and the muzzling of media, rose significantly since 2003.630  Since 2001, the 
continuous violation of press freedom  was linked closely to the anti-terror laws adopted by 
several countries. 631 
                                                          
624 Ibid. p.59 
625 Ibid. p.59 
626 See E. Rosand; A. Millar, and J. Ipe, Human Rights and the Implementation of the UN Global Counter-
Terrorism Strategy, Hopes and Challenges, 2008, Available at: 
http://www.globalct.org/images/content/pdf/reports/human_rights_report.pdf   
627 UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), Digest of Jurisprudence of the UN 
and Regional Organizations on the Protection of Human Rights While Countering Terrorism, September 
2003, p. 8, Available at: http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/DigestJurisprudenceen.pdf 
628 See, e.g., Amnesty International, “Annual Report: 2006: Secretary-General’s Message”, 
http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/POL10/001/2006/en/52433fd0-d46f-11dd-8743-
d305bea2b2c7/pol100012006en.html 
      P. Hoffman. "Human Rights and Terrorism." Human Rights Quarterly 26. No. 4 (November 2004): p 933 
629 See, for instance, Reporters Without Borders reports, ‘United States’, Reporters Without Borders, 22 June 
2004: http://www.rsf.org/article.php3?id_article=10612. 
630 Ibid. 
631 See “2003 Round-up Reporters Without Borders”, Charter 97, 6 January 2004, available online at: 
http://www.charter97.org/eng/news/2004/01/06/borders 
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5.5. EU-U.S. Counterterrorism Cooperation: 
The increased cooperation, between the EU and USA was in line with the 9/11 
Commission’s recommendation, according to which the USA  ought to develop a 
“comprehensive coalition strategy”; “exchange terrorist information with trusted allies;” and 
improve border security through better international cooperation.632  
Some measures, found in the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 
(P.L. 108- 458) and in the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 
2007 (P.L. 110- 53) reflected these sentiments and were in line with EU-USA 
counterterrorism efforts, especially those related to the improvement of border controls and 
transport security. During the EU-USA Summit, held in 2009 in Washington, the two 
partners confirmed their intention to cooperate and face the threat represented by 
international terrorism. In June 2010, the EU and the USA adopted a new “Declaration on 
Counterterrorism” to strengthen the anti-terrorism collaboration and to highlight the 
commitment to the rule of law. 
In 2011, the US National Strategy for Counterterrorism reaffirmed the USA’s willingness to 
pursue its partnership with the EU and the European Parliament to sustain their efforts in 
developing counterterrorism measures to ensure mutual security and protect all world 
citizens. Upholding individual rights was highlighted, also, in the statement.  Top members 
of the US administration meet at the ministerial level with EU representatives on a yearly 
basis, whilst a working group, of senior officials, meets twice a year to address police matters 
and judicial cooperation against terrorism.  The USA and EU entities have created, also, 
                                                          
632 See K. Archick, U.S.-EU Cooperation Against Terrorism  May 21, 2012, CRS Report for Congress, 
available online at: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RS22030.pdf  
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mutual liaison relationships, with Europol having two liaison officers in Washington, and 
the USA maintaining an FBI officer in The Hague.  In November 2006, a USA liaison 
position was established at Eurojust headquarters in The Hague as part of a wider USA - 
Eurojust agreement to facilitate cooperation between European and American prosecutors 
on terrorism and other cross-border criminal cases.633  
As this co-operation continues, for each country, there are special characteristics which give 
the laws and measures special shape. For instance, Spain is a country which has been dealing 
with terrorism for a long time.634 The Spanish authorities have been concerned always by 
the subversive activities conducted by independentist movements such as Euskadi Ta 
Askatasuna” or ETA; this can be considered to be domestic terrorism. However, things 
changed substantially with the increase in international terrorism, and Spain was not immune 
from threats. Prominent figures, of the Jihadist Salafist movement, posted numerous 
messages, on the Internet, targeting Spain. Recalling Spain’s Muslim past (711-1492), the 
promoters, of international terrorism, consider Spain to be a continuation of Al Andalus.635  
In light of all these worrying elements, Spanish security forces reviewed their strategies and 
included potential acts from religiously motivated international groups, alongside 
nationalistic groups, such as ETA, which used violence and presented serious security 
threats. 
Despite all precautions taken, a tragedy occurred, with the bombing of a train, in Madrid, on 
the 11 March 2004, confirming the apprehensions of Spanish authorities and the 
determination of terrorists to pursue their lethal operations. For this study, it is worthwhile 
                                                          
633 See K. Archick (2012) . U.S.-EU Cooperation against Terrorism October 3, 2012. CRS Report for 
Congress Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress. Available at: 
http://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=724410   
634 The terrorist threat existed in Spain for more than 30 years. 
635 Al Andalus was the name of Portugal and most of medieval Spain (Iberia peninsula)  
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considering the Spanish experience and institutional measures taken after the Madrid 
bombings. The government established a comprehensive legal framework capable of dealing 
with both ethnic-linguistic-nationalistic terrorism and international religion-based terrorism. 
There  were some cases, involving Arab media professionals, which showed how, post 
September 11 2001, Spain responded to what was alleged to be a terrorist case, and which, 
initially, caught the interest of the international media, including the accusation of Taysir 
Alunni, senior reporter of the well-known Arab Media Channel Al Jazeera. 
Alluni’s case symbolised the effects which anti-terrorism laws had on the media generally 
and on Arab and Muslim journalists in particular. Known for his exclusive interview with 
Bin Ladin after the September 11 2001 events, he was arrested in Spain for alleged links to 
terrorism.  Alluni joined Al Jazeera in 1999, and worked in Kabul. During the American war 
in Afghanistan, he was the only foreign journalist there. His coverage damaged the image of 
the  American action and, after the American bombing of Al Jazeera’s office in Kabul, Alluni 
had to leave the country.  In 2003, Alluni covered, also, the  American  led invasion of Iraq, 
where he escaped the  American bombing of the Al Jazeera Baghdad bureau. 
 Alluni was arrested in Spain 2003 and accused of misuse of his position to carry out an 
interview with Bin Ladin.  Alluni’s colleagues stated that it was his role, as a journalist, 
which disturbed the American administration.636  In March 2005, Alluni was released but 
was put under house arrest pending his trial.  The journalist criticised the Spanish 
government, stating “I no longer believe that the rule of law exists in this country.  The trial 
will be highly politicised and a media affair”.   Subsequently, Alluni was tried; found guilty; 
                                                          
636 ‘When a white man meets a terrorist, he’s a great journalist. And when an Arab journalist meets a 
terrorist, he’s a terrorist’ Marlow, 2003: 17). 
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and condemned to seven years in prison.637  In 2006, nearly a year after Alluni’s 
imprisonment, Leslie Crawford, a journalist from the Financial Times, went to a Spanish 
prison to interview Alluni. 638  What follows is a significant passage of the article: 
“Alony's trial, following normal Spanish procedure, was not heard by a jury. Case 
material for and against the defendant was submitted in writing to a panel of three 
judges. The public part of Spanish trials is relatively brief and concentrates on cross-
examination of defendants and witnesses. Pedro Rubira, the prosecutor, devoted 
about half the cross-examination to Alony's time in Afghanistan and, in particular, 
the bin Laden interview. 639 
 
                                                          
637 See L. Crawford, ‘A dangerous Subject’ , Financial Times, 14th  July 2006. She gives more details about 
the trial in this article. 
In the 600-page indictment, only two arguments are offered as evidence of Alony's guilt. First, Alony was 
accused of "financing a terrorist network" and "transporting funds for terrorists" by taking in March 2000  
$4,000 to Mohamed Bahaia, a Syrian who worked for a charitable organisation in Kabul. Bahaia had lived 
in Granada, Alony's hometown. The prosecution claimed that Bahaia was a "known terrorist", without 
providing evidence of this.  
 
Second, Alony was accused of helping Mustafa Setmarian, another "known terrorist" who lived in 
Granada in the early 1990s. According to the prosecution, Setmarian had been a guest at Alony's home. 
When Alony arrived in Kabul, Setmarian was working for the Taliban information ministry. The 
prosecution claimed Setmarian and Bahaia were members of al-Qaeda, and that Alony called in his 
favours to obtain the bin Laden exclusive. Sheltering alleged terrorists and acting as a money courier were 
sufficient to allow the prosecution to conclude that Alony was  
"one of the most relevant members of the Spanish cell of al-Qaeda, who contributed to its national and 
international structure, and who made use of his activities as a journalist to commit acts of support, 
finance, control and co-ordination as befitted his position as a qualified militant of a criminal 
organisation".  
638 See L.Crawford A dangerous subject, Financial Times, London - Friday, July 14, 2006 
639 This is the exchange between the Spanish prosecutor and Alluni as reported by Crawford: 
 
 "Can you tell us when you began your relations with the Taliban government?" Rubira 
asked.  
 "Me or al-Jazeera?" Alony replied.  
 "No you. I am interested in you, not in al-Jazeera," the prosecutor said.  
Rubira wanted to establish that Alony went to Afghanistan on his own initiative, driven by his 
sympathy and links to al-Qaeda; Alony was at pains to make clear that he was posted there by al-
Jazeera. Rubira told the court 
 "Alony's merits as a journalist were not credited before the bin Laden interview. Therefore 
his journalistic skills could not have been the reason why al-Jazeera hired him."  
That statement was repeated in the verdict  which condemned Alony for collaborating with 
terrorists.  
Al-Jazeera was not asked to submit written evidence or give evidence in court, so the prosecutor's 
attack on Alony's professional qualifications was allowed to go unchallenged.”  
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Alluni spent seven years of his life either behind bars or under house arrest. However, he 
never gave up and submitted an appeal to the European Court for Human Rights, claiming 
that the Spanish judiciary had violated his basic rights. The European Court ruled on 17 
January, 2011, that:  
  “A sentence of seven- year jail term handed down by Spanish Court against Alluni 
over charges of collusion with a terror organisation is not legal” 640 
In addition, the ECtHR required Spain to give Alluni financial compensation and fined Spain 
16 thousand euros. One of the seven counts, presented by the defence, was enough to 
convince the Court to rule out the Spanish Court's verdict. The European Court decision 
underlined the Spanish judiciary’s violation of Article 6.1 of the ECHR.641  
Alluni’s case  was far from being an isolated one; nevertheless, it remains symbolic.642  
                                                          
640  See European court: Al Jazeera’s Alluni trial illegal, ruling reported on the 19th January, 2012, by the 
Doha Centre for Media FreedomThe DCMF is an organisation working for press freedom and quality 
journalism in Qatar, the Middle East and the world.  See Doha Centre for Media Freedom, European court: 
Al Jazeera’s Alluni trial illegal, 9/01/2012. Article available online at: 
http://www.dc4mf.org/en/content/european-court-al-jazeera%E2%80%99s-alluni-trial-illegal  
641 Article 6.1 of the ECHR guarantees the inalienable right of citizens to have a fair and independent trial. 
Article 6.1 of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) reads:  
In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone 
is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal 
established by law. Judgement shall be pronounced publicly by the press and public may be excluded 
from all or part of the trial in the interest of morals, public order or national security in a democratic 
society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or 
the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would 
prejudice the interests of justice.  
See Council Of Europe, ‘The European Convention on Human Rights and its Five Protocols’, 1995, 
available online at: http://www.hri.org/docs/ECHR50.html  
642 Hundreds of journalists are imprisoned only for conducting their media duties. Crawford reported the 
concerns of Julliard of Reporters. Without Borders: "We are very worried about the spread of anti-terrorism 
legislation and the way this is being used to suppress press freedoms". The French journalist observed that a 
well-known practice was authoritarian regimes using anti-terror laws to suppress dissent, was. But, what 
disturbed the media  was the use of these laws to suppress freedom of speech in the Western world. According 
to the Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ), 24 countries imprisoned journalists in 2005, up from 20 nations 
the year before. Of the 125 journalists in prison at the end of 2005, 78 of them had been jailed for "anti-state" 
activities, including subversion. The USA detained another professional from Al-Jazeera, Sami al-Haj (in 
Guantanamo). The CPJ said that leaks of classified information, in the USA showed that the Justice Department  
had warned reporters that they could be prosecuted under espionage laws. According to Ann Cooper, executive 
director at CPJ, "Journalists covering conflict, unrest, corruption and human rights abuses face a growing risk 
of incarceration in many countries, where governments seek to disguise their repressive acts as legitimate legal 
processes,"  
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In the UK, Neil Garrett was arrested, in October 2005, under the Official Secrets Act 1989. 
He was accused of the publication of internal police information regarding the police 
shooting of Jean Charles de Menezes. The report revealed that, in order to prevent criticism, 
the police misled the public about de Menezes’ behaviour to justify his shooting. Garrett was 
freed eventually in 2006 – Garrett, who was working for ITV News, was arrested and 
detained several times under the Official Secrets Act.643 However, eventually, he faced no 
actual charges.644  
In Northern Ireland, in 2003, the Police had to pay extensive damages following their search  
of the office and home of Liam Clarke, the Northern Ireland editor of the Sunday Times, 
after he published a book  which contained transcripts of phone calls which the security 
services intercepted illegally. The Police Ombudsman described the raid as “poorly led and 
… an unprofessional operation”.645  
  
Another incident, occurred in November 2005, when Lord Goldsmith, the Attorney General,   
warned media and, in particular,  UK news organisations that, if they persisted in writing 
about the leaked memo relating to the transcript of exchanges between Tony Blair and 
George Bush about the bombing of Al Jazeera television headquarters, journalists faced  
possible prosecution under s.5 of the Official Secrets Act 1989. Keogh and O’Connor, the 
two political staff at the origin of the leak, were tried and sentenced respectively to six and 
three months in jail. Keogh had to pay, also, £5,000 towards the prosecution's £35,000 costs. 
As regards freedom of information, the British government, in order to reduce media use of 
the Freedom of Information Act 2004, imposed fees for accessing information.646 The Lord 
                                                          
643 See Banisar (2008). Speaking of terror  page 16 
644 See BBC’s article “ No-one will face charges over the alleged leak of papers from the Jean Charles de 
Menezes shooting probe” available at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/4976450.stm  
645 See J.Grimston’s article: “Police in raid on ST journalist face discipline”. Available online at: 
http://www.thesundaytimes.co.uk/sto/news/uk_news/article240607.ece  
646 See  http://www.ico.gov.uk/  and for the details regarding the fees there is a document available at: 
http://www.ico.gov.uk/for_organisations/freedom_of_information/guide/~/media/documents/library/Freedom
_of_Information/Detailed_specialist_guides/fees_cost_of_compliance_appropriate_limit.ashx  
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Chancellor647 said: “Freedom of information was never considered to be, and for our part 
will never be considered to be, a research arm for the media”. 
 
5.6. Cases of Journalists Arrested in European countries  
In the past decade, there was a significant increase in cases, where laws relating to the 
disclosure of state secrets or provisions in the criminal code, were used against 
representatives of the media. However, the Courts dealt with most cases in an adequate 
manner, in that, often, they judged  police actions or the laws  to be illegal or unjustifiable. 
For instance, in November 2006 in Denmark, three journalists, from the Berlingske Tidende, 
were put on trial under the Criminal Code accused of publishing material leaked from the 
Ministry of Defence. However, the Court judged that wh this  leak was in the public interest 
and the journalists were cleared. In 2005 in Holland, a reporter was charged under the 
Criminal Code because he made public (on a TV show) information left by an intelligence 
officer in a car two years earlier. However, the public prosecutor abandoned the case by in 
February 2006. In February 2006 in Romania, in, several journalists were questioned and 
two were arrested because of the information they received from a former soldier who served 
in Iraq and Afghanistan. Due to the fact that the received information had not been published 
but given to the Romanian Government, the Supreme Court ordered the release of one of the 
two detained journalists. In 2003, the Swiss Government opened proceedings against the 
editor of Sonntags Blick for publishing photos of an underground military establishment. In 
2007, reporters, working for the same Swiss newspaper Sonntags Blick , appeared in court 
and were prosecuted under the military penal code. They were accused of publishing an 
                                                          
647 Lord Falconer, during Lecture in memory of lord Gareth Williams, The National Archives, 21 March 
2007,  
 http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.dca.gov.uk/speeches/2007/sp070321.htm 
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Egyptian Government fax which confirmed the existence of secret prisons run by the 
American Government. The fax was supposed to have been intercepted and leaked later by 
the Swiss military. The court acquitted the journalists involved in April 2007.648  
 
5.7. Criticism regarding UK Anti-terrorism Laws  
The UK was the only European country authorising an increase in the period for which 
suspects  could be detained without charge.  The argument, put forward by the policymakers, 
was that the intention was to obtain information from the suspects.  What most concerned 
human rights organisations was the fact that, in some cases, the arrested person did not have 
the opportunity to contact a lawyer for up to forty eight hours.  The new laws restricted, also, 
the accused’s right to silence; the legislators aiming to encourage suspects to reveal what 
they knew, despite being aware that such a measure struck at the right not to incriminate 
oneself. Another issue, of concern, was the wide and ever-increasing powers given to police 
forces to deal with cases of terrorism. In comparison with the police elsewhere in Europe, 
British police had much greater powers. In contrast to what happens usually in countries, 
such as France or Spain,649 in the UK, the police decide whether or not to open an 
investigation, whilst preliminary investigations are conducted without external 
interference.650  
 
                                                          
648 See D. Banisar, D (2008) Speaking of terror. Professor Banisar wrote  on page 15 of his report that: 
“There has been a significant trend in the increased use of state secret laws to penalise whistle-blowers 
and journalists who publish information of public interest. A review in 2007 by the Organization for 
Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) found that nearly half of its 56 participating States imposed 
legal liability for journalists who obtained or published classified information. 60 The study found dozens 
of cases in recent time where journalists were prosecuted for publishing secrets. Many of these cases have 
related to the current debates on anti-terrorism with journalists publishing articles of public interest based 
on leaked classified documents.” 
649 In these countries, it is the public prosecutor who decides whether or not to open an investigation. 
650 The police’s full independence lasts until the formal institution of the investigations when the cases are 
referred directly to the public prosecutor. 
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Essentially, the RIPA 2000 updated the law relating to the interception of 
communications.651 It is essential to note that, unlike other intrusive methods for gathering 
evidence, this method needs only the Home Secretary’s approval. A specific authorisation, 
from a judge, is not required.652 Furthermore, under s.17 of the RIPA 2000, telephone-tap 
evidence, even when obtained legally, cannot be admitted in court653, although, under 
English evidence law, it is the generally the relevance of the evidence which determines its 
admissibility.654 The rule might present some advantages should it reduces the amount of 
police investigations using privacy-infringing wiretapping. The argument is that, if the 
evidence is inadmissible in court, there is no incentive to obtain it through wire-tapping. 
 
According to critics, human rights, and civil liberties organisations, the UK Government's 
assessment, of the level of terrorist threat, is far from being justified,.655 Analysts, such as 
                                                          
651 The RIPA 2000 replaced entirely the previous Interception of Communication Act 1985. 
652 In fact, before 1985, Home Secretaries used to issue warrants for telephone tapping without any legal 
basis;  this led to a condemnation  see Malone case mentioned in footnote 93) where the European Human 
Rights Court held that tapping telephones, without a legal basis, violated Art. 8 of the ECHR. Then, the UK 
government reacted by issuing the Interception of Communications Act 1985. Under this Act, the Home 
Secretary’s authorisationwas given a legal framework, and a network of rules was established to  ensure that 
his authorisations would not be examined in the ordinary courts. See Spencer (2005). 
653 Under s.17 of the RIPA 2000, telephone-tap evidence, despite being obtained legally, cannot be 
permissible in any case or admissible in court. See RIPA 2000, s.17. 
654 Under English law, the basic rule is that evidence is admissible if it is relevant (SIAC in Court of Appeal, 
A, B, C, D, E, F,G, H, Mahmoud Abu Rideh, Jamal Ajouaou v Secretary Of State for the Home Department, 
August 2004, [2004] EWCA 1123., at 242). A wide range of discretion is given to English judges under the 
English ordinary criminal law regarding whether or not particular evidence is admitted during the trial. 
Similarly, s.78 of the PACE 1984 provides that the court can refuse to allow evidence if it appears to the court 
that, 'having regard to all the circumstances, including the circumstances under which the evidence was 
obtained, the admission of evidence would have such an adverse effect on the fairness of the proceedings that 
the court ought not to admit it'. So, unlawfully obtained evidence can be excluded, if there is a risk that the fair 
trial principle is jeopardised. However, in other circumstances, it can be admitted, as in the case of Khan v UK 
[1997] AC 558 (HL). Planting and aural surveillance device in defendants’ homes, without their knowledge, 
is seen as unlawful. The recording, obtained in Khan’s case, confirmed that Khan was involved in drug 
trafficking  Therefure, it was admitted as evidence.  The Strasbourg Court held that the admission, of this 
evidence, did not violate the fair trial principle of Art. 6(1) ECHR, see Khan v UK (application no.35394/97) 
[2000] Crim. LR 684. 
655 For instance, ARTICLE 19, an international human rights organisation defending and promoting freedom 
of expression and information, around the world, states in an article, that “Anti-terror laws trigger executive 
powers that are very restrictive on human rights, often with reduced judicial oversight. As a matter of principle, 
their use should be confined to those circumstances when such severe restrictions can truly be deemed 
“necessary”.  Therefore, anti-terror laws should be drafted narrowly and be proportionate to the legitimate aim 
pursued – protecting national security. See The Impact of UK Anti-Terror Laws on Freedom of Expression 
Submission to ICJ Panel of Eminent Jurists on Terrorism, Counter-Terrorism and Human Rights. Available at: 
http://www.article19.org/data/files/pdfs/analysis/terrorism-submission-to-icj-panel.pdf  
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Fenwick, criticized the UK’s anti-terrorism laws as sometimes disproportionate.656  The 
UK’s security measures are believed to be more in tune with the American White House. 
Consequently, they have eroded progressively civil liberties enshrined in international 
human rights; humanitarian law; and national constitutions protecting human or civil 
rights.657  
UK legislation provoked tensions between the executive and civil liberties and human rights 
organisations. Some British judges, such as Lord Hoffmann, expressed, also, reservations in 
cases under the Human Rights Act whilst Members of Parliament dissented from their 
government policies.658 Critics said that they were  concerned about the new laws since the 
definition of terrorism was wider than what was expected, whilst there  was, also, an increase 
in the period of pre-charge detention. Liberty, the British human rights organisation, stated 
that the extent, of this period, was unique in any modern state.659 Concern was expressed, 
also,  regarding the introduction of the control order system; the ‘exaggerated’ use of closed 
                                                          
656 See H. Fenwick. The Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001: A Proportionate Response to 11th 
September? The Modern Law Review, Blackwell Publishers, MA, USA, 65:5, September 2002)p.724-725. 
According to Fenwick (2002) “…democratic governments are perfectly entitled to take extraordinary measures 
if faced with a threat of atrocities on anything like the scale of those who occurred on the 11 th September. But 
since it is unarguable that counter-terrorist measures such as detention without trial are opposed to democratic 
ideals, they should be subjected to the most rigorous tests for proportionality”.  See also C Gearty, ‘Terrorism 
and Human Rights’, Government and Opposition, 2007, Vol 42, No.3, p340-360.   
657 Liberty (The National Council for Civil Liberties) is one of the UK’s leading civil liberties and human 
rights organisations. Liberty works to promote human rights and protect civil liberties through a combination 
of test case litigation, lobbying, campaigning and research. The organisation underlines that it “… has long 
maintained that the most effective legislation is that which identifies and addresses a specific gap in the law. 
Unfortunately, we believe that much terrorism legislation has been excessive and has proved 
counterproductive”. See Liberty’s Second Reading Briefing on the Counter-Terrorism Bill in the House of 
Lords: Part 2 - Non detention extension provisions July 2008.   
 http://www.liberty-human-rights.org.uk/pdfs/policy08/counter-terrorism-bill-non-detention-provisions-2nd-
reading-lords.pdf  
658 Since their inception, ‘Liberty’ , the British Civil Liberties and Human Rights Organisation  has followed 
the development of UK terrorism laws and regularly, through open letters; reports; and newsletters 
highlighted its observations to the executive. There are, also, International organisations such as Amnesty 
International;  Human Right Watch.; Article 19; and the International Federation of Journalists and so on 
who monitor the UK legislation closely. See, for instance, the 2010 report of Human Rights Watch, “Without 
Suspicion. Stop and Search under the Terrorism Act 2000”, 
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/uk0710webwcover.pdf  
659 See Liberty’s  Report “Terrorism Pre-Charge Detention. Comparative Law Study’’, 2010, available online 
at:  http://www.liberty-human-rights.org.uk/policy/reports/comparative-law-study-2010-pre-charge-
detention.pdf  
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tribunal proceedings; the extensive use of stop and search powers; and the restriction of the 
right to protest or dissent from the government policy.660  
The Gillian case of, reported in the previous chapter, is worth recalling. The concerned 
person, himself, who was stopped and searched under the Terrorism Act 2000, stated that:  
“A broader question here was raised by the practice of the Metropolitan Police 
Commissioner of a rolling series of authorisations every 28 days, which were all 
subsequently confirmed by the Home Secretary without limitation or alteration. From 
19th February 2001 until at least October 2003 these supposedly exceptional powers 
were available to any police officer anywhere in area covered by the London Met.”661 
 
The use of the powers, by a police officer, represents the third stage of the authorised 
process,662 with, nevertheless, a recommendation that they  
“…may be exercised only for the purpose of searching for articles of a kind which 
could be used in connection with terrorism”.663  
In fact, most everyday items articles might be considered in connection with terrorism. For 
example, a journalist might have a map of the London underground; a document from 
anonymous sources; a mobile phone; or a camera All might serve in planning terrorist acts. 
In another s.45(1)(b) it is emphasised that the use of the powers may be exercised:  
“…whether or not the constable has grounds for suspecting the presence of articles 
of that kind”.   
                                                          
660 Lord Hoffmann, member of the panel of Lords has been one of the strongest critics of UK anti-terrorism 
laws. 
661  See K. Gillan Lecture, presented to law students at Queens University, Belfast, 13 March 2007. Anti-
Terror Legislation and the Judicial Review Process: A Personal Story, http://www.kevingillan.info/wp-
content/uploads/2008/04/gillan_judicial_review_lecture.pdf  
662 The process, through which the police use the provisions of Sections 44-47 of the TA 2000, goes through 
three stages. The first one consists of obtaining an authorisation to use the act in a specific area. The second 
stage involves the Secretary of State who has to confirm the authorisation, within 48 hours (if the deadline is 
not respected the authorisation expires). It is worth observing that the authorisation, in question, has a lifespan 
of 28 days. The third stage is the enforcement of the powers by a police officer.  
663 As regards to the limits of the powers see Section 45(1) (a)  
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Part 6, of the Terrorism Act, highlighted several other offences.664  For instance, it is 
considered to be an offence to hold any physical thing susceptible to be,  
“… for a purpose connected with the commission, preparation or instigation of an 
act of terrorism”.665  
It provided, also, that any collection; recording; or possession of information, which might 
profit an individual committing or planning to execute a terrorist act, was a crime.666 Another 
offence relates to eliciting or trying to obtain information about a person who is (or has been) 
a member of the armed forces; the police; or another intelligence service. It is believed that 
such endeavours can profit people intending to commit or arranging the commission of an 
act of terrorism.667 In addition, the Terrorism Act 2000 extended the prohibition to 
encouraging an act of terrorism outside the United Kingdom.668 There are, also, sections 
addressing the incitement of acts susceptible to constitute offences within the UK. 669 
 
At first sight, it seems that these reviewed provision, of the Terrorism Act 2000, were driven 
by rational considerations. There is no reason to doubt the genuine intentions of the policy-
makers and the drafters of the legislation.670 However, problems appear if one considers 
carefully the terms used and their later interpretation by law enforcers.  Consequently, those, 
who interpreted and applied, the law did interfere with the freedom of expression and rights 
                                                          
664 Contraveners risk up to 15 years imprisonment. The maximum sentence for this offence was increased 
from 10 years to 15 years under section 13 (1) of the Terrorism Act 2006 
665 Possessing an article for terrorist purposes, section 57(1) Linked to SC Res 1373 (n 61) paragraph 2(d). 
666 Punishable by up to 10 years’ imprisonment. Collection of information for terrorist purposes, section 58 
(1), relevant to SC Res 1373 (n 61) paragraph 2(d) 
667  Section 58A. Eliciting, publishing or communicating information about members of armed forces as 
inserted by section 76 of the Counter-Terrorism Act 2008 It is prohibited, also, to  publish or 
communicate the obtained information 
668 Incitement to terrorism (sections 59–61) asrelevant to SC Res 1624 (n 61) paragraph 1(a). 
669 Where the offence incited is murder, wounding with intent, poisoning, explosions, or endangering life by 
damaging property: for England and Wales see section 59(2). For Northern Ireland, see section 60(2). For 
Scotland see section 61(2),  
670 The legislation was meant originally to prevent and reduce terrorism activities. 
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of people generally and journalists in particular.671  In addition, the police also used these 
provisions systematically when there was no good reason to do so.672 The Home Office 
directives as regards what constitutes a "reasonable suspicion" or invoking the TA 2000, has 
not prevented police officers acting as they see fit.673   Often, journalists or photographers674  
were stopped and searched under the suspicion of involvement in terrorist activities whilst 
they were  only doing their job.  A confirmation of the abuse came from the police officers 
themselves.  For instance, in 2009, the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) advised 
its members to stop using s.44 against photographers, judging the practice as 
unacceptable.675   
 
The introduction, of the ATCS Act 2001, was met with scepticism by academics and 
organisations such as the Joint Committee on Human Rights. Indeed, it was criticised 
harshly,676 especially as regards the controversial issue of the option of indefinite detention 
without trial of foreign nationals suspected to be linked to international terrorism.677  
                                                          
671  See “Watching the Detectives: the media and anti-terrorism laws”, online video, Front Line Club, 7th 
July 2009, http://www.frontlineclub.com/post/ 
672 Several UK newspapers stated that using section 44 of the TA 2000 was ineffective. For instance, the 
Telegraph confirmed that not a single arrest was made for terrorism-related offences. A total of 101,248 
stops and searches were made under section 44 of the TA 2000 in 2009/10, but only one in every 200 led 
to an arrest and none were terror-related (Home Office figures). The powers allow officers to stop anyone 
in a specified area without the need for reasonable suspicion. In the UK, 506 arrests were made after 
people were stopped and searched under section 44 of the TA, 0.5 % of the 101,248 stops and searches, 
compared with 10 per cent of stops carried out using non-terror powers. But the use of the stop and search 
powers fell by 60 per cent compared with 2008/09. See ‘Terrorism Act: No terror arrests  were made after 
100,000 stop-and-searches’, The Telegraph, 28 Oct 2010  Available online at : 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/terrorism-in-the-uk/8092328/Terrorism-Act-No-terror-arrests-
made-after-100000-stop-and-searches.html 
  See, also, No terror arrests in 100,000 police counter-terror searches, Alan Travis article, published by 
The Guardian, on the 28th October 2010. Available online at:  
http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2010/oct/28/terrorism-police-stop-search-arrests  
673 See the Home Office guidelines issued in 2009 and available at: 
     http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/about-us/publications/home-office-circulars/circulars-2009/012-2009    
674 Taking photographs is allowed by the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, however new limitations 
on photography  were added to the Counter-Terrorism Act 2008). 
675 The police made guidelines as regards the way of dealing with photographers. However,  M. Vallee and 
other members of the National Union of Journalists affirmed that, on the ground, the rules  were not 
respected  http://www.newspapersoc.org.uk/2/sep/10/police-guidance-on-photographers 
676 Reports by the Joint Committee on Human Rights (Session 2001–02), Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security 
Bill, Second Report, 14 November 2001, and Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Bill, Fifth Report, 3 
December 2001. 
677 See Part IV of the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001. 
Chapter Five: The Anti–Terrorism Laws and Media     184 
 
 
 
The establishment, of this form of detention, was motivated by the fact that it might not be 
possible to try suspects for several reasons; firstly, because of the sensitive nature of the 
evidence.678 Secondly, the involved offences were difficult to prove beyond reasonable 
doubt. Thirdly, extradition or deportation was not an option, due to its incompatibility with 
the European Court of Human Rights jurisprudence.679  Yet, it was possible to deport 
suspected foreign terrorists provided their presence was considered to be a risk to national 
security and there  was no possibility that they  would be tortured in the state to which they  
were deported.680   Walker underlined another drawback, of deportation, when he  pointed 
out that there  was no assurance that, once deported, the suspect would  not resume his/her 
activities from abroad.681   
 
Due to the nature of their work and the means they use to  obtain their information, media 
professionals, can be considered easily  to be law-offenders if they possess what is regarded 
as  ‘sensitive’ material or are suspected of distributing ‘terrorist publications’.  If they have 
merely documents which are considered to be terrorist ‘statements’682, they will fall 
automatically into the category of those who circulate ‘terrorist publications’.683  
 
5.8. Review of UK Anti-Terrorism Laws  
                                                          
678 The evidence, presented in court for potential trials, would have jeopardised the investigations in course, 
and alerted the terrorists at large. 
679 It is stated in the ECHR jurisprudence that “non-British nationals may not be deported to their state of origin 
if they face a risk of being tortured in the receiving state, as such a deportation would breach Article 3 of 
the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). See the case of Chahal Vs United Kingdom, App. No. 
22414/93, 23 EHRR 413. 
680 For this particular point, see section 7 Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 and section 97A 
Immigration, Asylum and National Security Act 2006. 
681 Walker, MLR 70 (2007), 433, commenting the Report of the Privy Councillor Review Committee, Anti-
terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 Review: Report (2003–04, NC 100) Pt. D, paragraph. 195. 
682 Terrorist statements can be written, audio, electronic or visual recordings. 
683  Obviously, since the enactment of the anti-terrorist laws, journalists are very cautious, it might be useful to  
recall the bases on which Taysir alluni was condemned, although if it turned out that the accusations were 
baseless for the European Court of Human Rights, any pragmatic journalists will prefer to avoid the fate of 
Alluni. 
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In July 2010, the Home Secretary announced the UK Government’s intention to review its 
terrorism legislation, including counter-terrorism and security powers.684 The review 
focused particularly on issues relating to security and civil liberties. Public concern, 
regarding certain sensitive and controversial counter-terrorism and security powers, induced 
the executive to consider making appropriate amendments in order to protect the public 
without contravening their fundamental liberties. The Home Secretary’s intention was to 
ensure that the powers and measures, covered by the review, were really necessary; effective; 
and proportionate, whilst respecting both UK’s international obligations and human 
rights.685  
 
The 2011 Review of Counter-Terrorism and Security Powers686 addressed eight key counter-
terrorism and security powers;687 amongst them those, directly of concern to media 
professionals, such as stop and search powers; restrictions on photography; and access to 
information by journalists. The reviewers asserted that, in certain areas, the UK’s counter-
terrorism and security powers were ‘neither proportionate nor necessary’688 and 
recommended, inter alia, the following amendments: the return to 14 days as the norm for 
                                                          
684 See HM Government ‘Review of Counter-Terrorism and Security Powers.  Summary of Responses to the 
Consultation, Jan.2011 Cm 8005, available online at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/97969/sum-responses-to-
cons.pdf This document summarises the responses to the review of counter-terrorism and security powers 
which was announced by the Home Secretary on 13 July 2010. It sets out, also, the consultation process 
that was followed on the review.  
685 Ibid. See introduction of the document page 2. 
686 See “Review of Counter-Terrorism and Security Powers. Review Findings and Recommendations”. 
Presented to Parliament by the Secretary of State for the Home Department by Command of Her Majesty, 
January 2011. Available at: 
      http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/publications/counter-terrorism/review-of-ct-security-powers/review-
findings-and-rec?view=Binary  
687 The following are the issues addressed: Pre-charge detention of terrorist suspects, including the possibility 
to reduce it to 28 days; the Terrorism stop and search (section 44); Photography and the use of counter-
terrorism powers; The Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act and local authorities; Access to 
communications data; Groups or organisations that espouse or incite hatred or violence; Deportation of 
foreign nationals engaged in terrorism without infringing legal and human rights obligations; and the 
Control orders. 
688 Ibid. p. 14 where it is stated, as regards to the Control Order regime that:  
A number of contributors raised concerns about the impact the obligations could have on the well-
being of the person and their family. Some contributors also believed that control orders could be 
potentially indefinite and that this was disproportionate. 
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the detention of a terrorist suspect; the end  of the indiscriminate stop and search powers;689 
the end to the use of the most intrusive powers under the Regulation of Investigatory Powers 
Act (RIPA);690 and the need  for magistrate approval before using any RIPA methods.691 In 
addition, it was suggested that the UK’s human rights obligations be respected when 
considering the deportation of foreign nationals involved in terrorist activities.692  It was 
recommended that the control order regime be abolished and replaced by a new regime 
which would be less intrusive and more focused. 693  
 
5.9. The Particular cases of Al-Jazeera; the BBC; and Indymedia  
The “war on terror” created a pervasive atmosphere of fear, where the freedom of the media 
was under strong pressure either from terrorist acts or from counter-terrorism measures 
passed by governments in response to what was seen as a ‘new’ threat for modern societies. 
The struggle saw the press facing several challenges, and conflict between the executive and 
media organisations meant that press freedom and pluralism were the main victims of the 
‘war’.694 Despite the encountered problems, and the physical dangers for media 
professionals, journalists struggled and continue to struggle in order to fulfil their mission 
of informing people about what it is happening in the world. 
                                                          
689 The stop and search powers were provided in  Section 44 of the TA 2000 
690 The Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (c.23) (RIPA) regulates the powers of local authorities 
when carrying out surveillance and investigation, or covering the interception of communications.  
691 Ibid. page 11, where it is stated that: 
A number of contributions received from organisations outside of local government argued that local 
authorities should not use the investigatory techniques covered by RIPA at all and that their use should 
be limited to tackling terrorism and serious organised crime. Amongst this group, there was a view 
that if local authorities were to retain the power to use RIPA, then, its limitation to serious crime and 
the requirement for magistrate’s approval were positive steps. 
692 See the introduction of the report p.4. Available online at:  
http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/publications/counter-terrorism/review-of-ct-security-powers/review-findings-
and-rec?view=Binary  
693 In the same report, in the findings section, p.6, it is stated that: “The end of control orders and their 
replacement with a less intrusive and more focused regime. Additional resources will be provided to the police 
and security agencies to ensure the new measures are effective not only in protecting the public but in 
facilitating prosecution.” 
694 Several casualties, amongst journalists and media staff, have been recorded by the International 
Federation of Journalists (IFJ), since the beginning of the 21st Century. 
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People, eager to understand the context and complexities of the terrorist threat, rely mainly 
on journalists.  However, as information is itself a weapon of choice for governments, they 
try constantly and assiduously to use their powers to influence the media coverage.695 The 
media experience in the United States of America ; the appearance of unexpected voices in 
the Arab world, such as the satellite channel Al-Jazeera; and the clash between the UK 
Government and the BBC are only few examples showing the war on terrorism’s impact on 
journalism. For instance, the Qatari Al-Jazeera, a prominent actor on the media scene,  was 
praised and criticised in equal measure.696  
 
Media, in the United States of America, were subject, also, to intense scrutiny in the 
aftermath of    the September 11 events. A number, of high profile court cases, attempted to 
force journalists to reveal their sources of information.697 Britain was not immune from the 
antagonism between the media and government over the war on terrorism. Conflict appeared 
soon between the Blair government and the BBC over the right to report the origins of the 
war in Iraq. In the UK, journalists were more aware about the impact of the war and the 
arguments regarding Iraq, and were not subject to the same constraints or pressures as  
                                                          
695 Often, the motivations are to achieve their political and strategic interests  
 
696 Al-Jazeera offices in Kabul and Baghdad were bombed and destroyed by the US army, and its journalists 
killed in different circumstances. The mistrust of Al-Jazeera was felt, also,  deeply in political circles. 
Disliked by most Arab governments, it provoked, also a particular resentment in the White House where 
officials,  accused it explicitly of helping terrorists. It is believed that it was under the American 
administration influence that the interim Iraqi authorities decided to ban the station from Baghdad in 2004. 
697 In February 2005, the US Court of Appeals, for the District of Columbia Circuit, upheld a jail sentence for 
journalists Matthew Cooper of Time magazine and Judith Miller of the New York Times, for refusing to 
disclose their sources. They refused to disclose their sources to a grand jury set up to investigate the leaks 
from the White House  which led to the identity of a CIA agent, Valerie Plame, being revealed in the press.  
Two other journalists  were cited for questioning about their sources in this case: Tim Russert of NBC and 
Walter Pincus of the Washington Post. Robert Novak, who was the first to publish Plame’s name, on July 
14, 2003,  had refused always to say if he  had been questioned about his sources. Miller  investigaterd the 
Plame case but ended up not writing any story about it. Cooper wrote in Time (July 17, 2003) that 
government officials had leaked Plame’s identity. He was given a jail sentence in August 2004; this was 
lifted after his source waived their confidentiality agreement and allowed him to answer the grand jury 
questions.  
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American journalists. The evidence, presented by the Blair government to justify the Iraq 
war, provoked fierce exchanges between the Government and the BBC, such a confrontation 
with Downing Street being unprecedented in the history of the BBC.698 
 
With the Indymedia affair699 in 2004, the laws, adopted to fight the ‘war’ on terrorism, 
revealed, for the first time, a disturbing picture of how international legal assistance 
agreements were going to be used in future. The IFJ, worried about the involvement of the 
UK police with other agencies, called for an investigation to explain the seizure of Indymedia 
web sites.700 It considered the international police operation an unacceptable and intrusive 
action against independent journalism.701  The IFJ argued that UK law ought to have 
protected Indymedia and not allowed the FBI to assert its jurisdiction in the UK.702 Later, 
the seized servers were returned without formal explanation, impeding Indymedia’s quest 
for legal redress.703 The IFJ concluded that “procedural guarantees in international law have 
failed to keep pace with global law enforcement cooperation and now pose a serious 
challenge to established human rights protections”.704  
                                                          
698 The battle led to the death of David Kelly, the source for journalists covering the story. The government’s 
intention to spin information, in order to achieve its own strategic interests clashed with the media role 
which felt a real political pressure and intimidation. The row erupted over a radio broadcast and an 
allegation that government had manipulated intelligence information deliberately to support its contentions 
about the existence of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq in order to justify going to war. After the death 
of Dr Kelly, the Government appointed an inquiry, under Lord Hutton, who concluded that the BBC did 
not behave appropriately. Consequently, the Director General of the BBC and the Chairman of the Board 
were forced out of office.  
699 Indymedia’s London-based servers were seized by by the FBI in October 2004, taking down the independent 
media network’s websites in 21 countries. Such action was seen as an outrageous act of disruption. 
Indymedia sites were very challenging and their independent reporting covered several areas, in particular 
political and social justice issues. 
700, As regards the police operation, itself, the IFJ stated  “The way this has been done smacks more of 
intimidation of legitimate journalistic inquiry than crime-busting”. The FBI visited Indymedia in the US 
inquiring about the publication on the French site Indymedia of photos of Swiss police photographing anti-
globalisation protests. The Italian police were also concerned by Indymedia coverage of the prosecutions 
of police officers following the G8 meeting in Genoa in 2001. 
701 The police forces’ conduct during the demonstrations was criticised heavily. 
702 The IFJ argued that, following a request for assistance from the Swiss and Italian authorities, the FBI in the 
US served Rackspace, the parent company of Indymedia’s UK–based service provider, with a subpoena to 
turn over the London-based servers. 
703 For more details about the Indymedia, see the material available online at: http://www.indymedia.org/fbi/  
704 See A.White, ‘Journalism, Civil Liberties and the War on Terrorism’, International Federation of Journalists 
IFJ, 2005, p. 7 , Available online at: http://www.ifj.org/assets/docs/255/050/01e26ff-83e2532.pdf  
Chapter Five: The Anti–Terrorism Laws and Media     189 
 
 
 
5.10. Conclusion 
It was noted, throughout this chapter, that terrorist events had a real impact on legislators. 
Nevertheless, it was media coverage of the incidents which affected the legislators more than 
the consequences of the acts or the level of threat.  The more media attention a terrorist 
incident obtained, the quicker the legislature reacted to it. Also, the more quickly legislation  
was brought forward, the less attention was  given to human rights. Moreover, a number, of 
general characteristics of anti-terror laws, were identified. Most restricted certain human 
rights (in particular, basic procedural human rights).  In addition, sometimes, but not always, 
these restrictions were justified and, sometimes, general principles of criminal law were 
ignored. Furthermore, a number of peculiarities, of different countries, might be identified. 
Consequently, the UK stands alone as the only examined State which, under  Article 15 of 
the ECHR, derogated from its obligations under  Article 5. Moreover, although the adoption, 
of the Human Rights Act 1998, strengthened considerably the value of the ECHR in 
domestic case-law, after the September 11 2001 events, the UK adopted the longest ever 
periods of detention without trial . 
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The September 11 2001 events will remain probably the major event of the twenty-first 
century for several reasons. It provoked a cataclysm at various levels of modern societies.  
Firstly, as a human catastrophe, it was the cause of loss; pain; grief; and incomprehension, 
whilst engendering a profound feeling of insecurity for citizens worldwide. The responses, 
to such a tragedy, from warfare to draconian police measures and drastic legislation were 
multiple and, often, were unconsidered. In modern democratic countries, The citizens’ initial 
reaction was o trust their governments and to support the taken measures, without 
questioning the new policies or challenging the authorities. 
 
Yet, such early unconditional support faded soon when it was noticed that the policies and 
taken measures infringed, in open societies based on the rule of law, several fundamental 
citizens’ rights.  Indeed, the governments’ initial motives were well-intentioned and aimed 
at preventing future occurrence of terrorist actions targeting innocent civilians in their own 
territories. Therefore, no one contested the enactment of anti-terrorism laws. Indeed, there 
was unanimity as regards the necessity to legislate quickly and strongly. However, later, it 
appeared that the taken legislative steps threatened the ideal of liberty on which, 
traditionally, modern liberal democracies were built. It appeared soon to citizens that the 
anticipated anti–terrorism legislation turned out to be a burden, and represented a danger to 
democratic principles. Then, the new challenge was to find equilibrium between the need 
for national security and the preservation of the civil liberties. 
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Amongst the actors, affected by the new legislation, was the independent media.  They were 
concerned not only to ensure the safety of citizens but, also, to widen their ability to exert 
control. Consequently, executive powers decided to tighten and expand their ability to 
control information, and balanced traditional commitments to media freedom against 
national security needs. Therefore, limitations were imposed on the freedom to access 
information and to publish without the risk of prosecution. Furthermore, the new anti-
terrorism laws became key instruments to muzzle media professionals.  
 
 Often, the media  was accused of not fulfilling its role adequately and, therefore, influencing 
the political climate and the democratic process. The media was the cornerstone of 
democracies, due to its function as a provider of indispensable political information to the 
public. For politicians and decision-takers, the new security environment might have an 
impact on society similar to the pre-Cold War ambience, before the bipolar geopolitical 
world configuration  and the imposition of the ‘Cold War’ paradigm. Similarly, the tragic 
events of September 11 2001 accelerated the crowning of a new paradigm which was, in 
gestation, the ‘war on terror’. Influential political analysts and historians contributed heavily 
to the naissance of the new paradigm by emphasising, through their theories and writings, 
the ineluctable clash of civilisations. Other academics and social scientists considered the 
public discourse on terrorism to be unhealthy and irrationally influenced. The responsibility 
of part of the media (which was far from being a monolithic bloc) could not be denied; they 
played a significant role by shifting, firstly, the academic debate to the public arena and, 
then, by amplifying the so-called terrorism threat. Finally, it was decreed that the world was 
entering the ‘age of terror’; justifying all forthcoming initiatives and measures to annihilate 
the new peril, despite the risks of negative effects on human rights and civil liberties.  It was 
that, even before they began to be enforced on the ground, the anti-terrorism laws drafted 
rapidly and enacted endangered freedom of information and speech.  The universal 
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condemnation, of terrorism and the avalanche of hasty legislation to combat it, affected 
particularly the media professionals throughout the world, not only those working in 
authoritarian countries but, also, those living in the more liberal Western states. Investigative 
journalists; reporters; photographers; cameramen; and editors all suffered from the 
restrictions imposed by the new laws.  
 
During this study, the examination of anti-terrorism laws demonstrated some shortcomings 
in most legislation, such as the inability to reach a consensus regarding the definition of 
terrorism. However, it was  not only a problem found in the laws. International institutions; 
governments; academics; media; and the general public had, also, various interpretations of 
the concept. It  was not easy to assess what consequences such divergences might have on 
national or international relations. In the same vein, it would be very difficult to find common 
procedures to confront terrorism either on domestic or international levels. The inability, to 
define the phenomenon, complicated the implementation of any kind of measure or 
programme intended to confront such a threat to international peace and security and 
prevented efficient cooperation.  
 
Furthermore, allowing States to decide what violent actions constituted terrorism, instead of 
facilitating the finding of shared legal instruments, generated ambiguities and discrepancies 
in the legislation of particular states. As a phenomenon, terrorism is an act which exploits 
fear through the use of intentional violence for the achievement of political change. Although 
it impacts, firstly, on the victims of terrorist attacks, it seeks to reach a wider public audience 
in order to produce political changes on international levels, if not, internally. Indeed, there 
is a mutual profitability between terrorism and the media. However, the amplification, of 
this situation,  in political spheres does not reflect the real extent of the overlap. 
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Certainly, media coverage is fundamental for terrorist groups since it gives them a status 
and, even, legitimacy superior to non-violent opposition groups.  Therefore, in their aims; 
planning; strategies; and choices of priorities, media attention is an important factor.  On the 
other hand, the media needs usually to generate profits for shareholders. The fact that a 
relationship exists between the media profession and terrorism is not in doubt; however, 
linking the two might lead to erroneous conclusions.   It is undeniable that the media gains 
by reporting terrorist actions.  This kind of news boosts the audience and, therefore, 
journalists and editors do react fairly instantly when terrorist acts occur. Broadcasting 
terrorism is very profitable for media outlets, strengthening their competitiveness in 
attracting a wider audience.  
 
As regards interference by governments in media affairs, it is indisputable that, due to the 
predominance of authoritarian regimes, developing countries suffer more from state control 
of the media. What was less expected, for observers, was the sudden restrictions and 
limitations, which appeared with the ‘war on terror’, from policymakers of countries 
renowned as modern, liberal and democratic, promoters of civil liberties and all sort of 
freedom for their citizenry. Indeed, when it appears that a representative of the most powerful 
state on earth requires the intervention of an Emir to restrict freedom of information, it is a 
matter of concern. Colin Powell, the American Secretary of State, asking Qatar’s ruler to 
moderate Al Jazeera’s broadcasting, and seen throughout the Arab world, turned reality 
upside down.  Al Jazeera, a new-born form of media, was a hope for the populations of the 
Middle East and North Africa. It was not under direct state control, as  was the rule in the 
rest of the Arab world. Yet, American officials, in the Bush Administration, saw Al Jazeera 
as a hostile channel and categorised it as an adversary in its declared campaign on the ‘war 
on terror’, labelling it  as the “media of the terrorist”.  
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Such incidents would have been innocuous if there were not so much legislation enacted by 
international bodies and most states to prevent future terrorist attacks against civilian 
populations. Although there were genuine and understandable apprehensions in the 
aftermath of the September 11 2001 events, the responses and measures, taken either 
internationally or domestically, provoked, over time, rising concern about the effect of the 
legislation.   
In the UK, the narrow application of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), 
might be due to the British perception of the concept of sovereignty.  The British believe 
that, in liberal democracies, the legislation, enacted by a sovereign parliament, represents 
the will of the people. Therefore, British laws should be dealt with in British courts yielding 
to other legal principles deemed superior. Yet, the British perspective, as regards 
parliamentary sovereignty, is weakened in view of the international developments which call 
into question the conventional interpretation of sovereignty. In the contemporary world, the 
universality of human rights and the establishment of a European Court of Human Rights, 
induced European States, in particular, to renounce some of their powers to the ECtHR. 
The only alternative, for a British citizen, who considers that his rights have been violated 
in British courts, is to make an appeal to the European Court of Human Rights. In Strasbourg, 
the relatively high percentage of cases, from the UK, might be due to the lack of internal 
instruments ensuring the respect for human rights. The UK was one of the first nations to 
enact anti-terrorism legislation after the September 11 2001 events. The newly introduced 
Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 included the adoption of measures such as 
allowing military police, even for non-terrorist cases, to intervene outside military bases 
which had been judged inappropriate to be included in the Terrorism 2000 Act,. It enabled 
the indefinite detention of foreigners as terrorist suspects. The next piece of legislation, the 
Criminal Justice Act 2003, extended to 14 days the period of a suspect’s detention for 
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questioning. This was followed by the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 which introduced 
“control orders”, a form of house arrest.  
The Terrorism Act 2006, passed after the London bombings, created the offence of 
“glorifying” terrorism, and extended the period of detention, of suspects without charge, to 
28 days.  The Act provoked tough criticism from human rights organisations and civil 
liberties groups.  Indeed, it was planned to increase the detention period, for suspects without 
charge, from 14 days to 90 days. This motion was rejected, finally, since Parliamentarians 
were unconvinced by the  UK Government’s arguments. However, as seen above, the period 
was doubled. More recently, the Counter-Terrorism Act 2008 made significant changes by 
allowing the police to interrogate suspects after they  were charged, and obliged convicted 
people to inform the police about their whereabouts.  
The freedom of expression and the right to seek; receive; and convey information is one of 
the most fundamental human rights, enshrined in Article 19 of the United Nations Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights. Nonetheless, this right is not unlimited. Consequently, for 
example, the authorities might be able to limit freedom of expression for the sake of 
‘morality, public order and general welfare’. Accordingly, the implementation of Article 19 
must be contextualised to reach equilibrium between the concerns of media professionals 
and those of the state. 
Human rights organisations argued that, due to the anti-terrorism laws, the right to the 
freedom of expression faced significant challenges. They mentioned the emergence of new 
crimes relating to speech which was seen to encourage, either explicitly or implicitly, 
terrorist activities. Prohibitions were expanded from mere incitement to broader and more 
vaguely defined concepts such as glorifying terrorism or making an apology of it.  Internet-
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based speech has been, also, under scrutiny and various websites, which were judged to be 
controversial, were blocked or removed.  
Nevertheless, at a European level, Davis insisted, in 2008, that no matter the circumstances,  
the ECHR and its related case law were still the norms to which to have regard in relation to 
the right to freedom of expression and information, and in particular in times of crisis. The 
Council of Europe standards and guidelines, on protecting freedom of expression and 
information in times of crisis, advised Member States to be clear and explicit when imposing 
restrictions on freedom of expression and information. Despite the fact that the ECHR 
provided strong protections on freedom of expression under Article 10, in various domestic 
legislation cases, there was proved to be evident violation of the requirements of the ECHR.  
Often, national security and the struggle against terrorist groups are used as justifications for 
repressing freedom of speech.  
Generally, the motives, of human rights organisations, are different from those of the media. 
The former blame the media for not giving sufficient and accurate coverage to human rights 
issues.  Consequently, human rights bodies have profited, also, from the digital age, and 
developed their own media services through the Internet. Instead of relying on the media, 
they have conducted their own research and developed their data collecting and analysis 
capacities in order to communicate information to larger and more diverse audiences.  
Due to their competing interests, the media and authorities are wary of each other. On one 
hand, the media’s role is to report accurate and reliable information to the people, its ‘rightful 
owners’. Yet, politicians and the whole government machine have a different view of how 
to deal with information. For them, information is a key element of politics and, accordingly, 
it should be under government control. It is used; manipulated; organised; and spread 
according to the government’s strategic interests. Therefore, the politicians’ perspective of 
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is quite peculiar as regards what constitutes the public interest.  This explains the clash with 
the views of independent media. As natural reflexes, States exert censorship and control of 
information. Yet the legislation, which they enact, is meant to strengthen and maintain the 
rule of law and to protect their constituents’ civil liberties of.  Journalists’ first mission is to 
inform the people whilst maintaining their independence from any form of pressure.  
Continuous struggle occurs as regards access to information and both media and authorities 
are suspicious of each other.  In the UK, media freedom of movement and information  was 
challenged seriously by the enactment of anti-terrorism laws and their enforcement on the 
ground since the  September 11 2001 events.   Most media professionals are unhappy with 
the implementation of those laws which are seen as a flagrant infringement of their 
fundamental rights and a challenge to their independence.  The governments’ demands that 
the media showed unconditional and blind allegiance to their policies in the ‘war on terror’ 
provoked unease because it suggested a reduction of media freedom and civil liberties.   
The independent media cannot abdicate to the dictate of executive powers.  The anti-
terrorism legislations, enacted since 2000 in the UK, represent an enormous challenge for 
journalists; reporters; cameramen; photographers; and all media professionals.  Despite the 
numerous changes and amendments, made to the provisions of various laws, the UK’s efforts 
the UK remain inadequate and insufficient.  For the media; civil liberties groups; and Human 
Rights organisations at the forefront; the norm should be to challenge the Government; the 
legislators; and the the police and other security services’ interpretation of the laws norm 
with the media,. Criticism of anti-terrorism laws is a sane reaction; and, as prescribed by 
their ethical code, the media must defend their rights to fulfil their mission and to preserve 
the principles of one of the oldest democracies in Europe. 
198 Bibliography 
 
 
 
Bibliography 
 
A Military Guide to Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century’ Chapter 2, Terrorist 
Motivations and Behaviors, 2007, available online 
at:http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/army/guidterr/ch02.pdf . 
White, A. ‘Ethical Journalism Initiative’, International Federation of Journalists (2008), 
available online at:http://ethicaljournalisminitiative.org/pdfs/EJI_book_en.pdf. 
White, A. ‘Journalism, Civil Liberties and the War on Terrorism’, International Federation 
of Journalists IFJ, 2005, p. 7, Available online at: 
http://www.ifj.org/assets/docs/255/050/01e26ff-83e2532.pdf 
Akdeniz, Taylor and Walker. Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, Criminal Law 
Review, February 2001, pp 73-90. 
Akin, J. "Mass Media", Beyond Intractability. Eds. Burgess G and Burgess H. Conflict 
Information Consortium, University of Colorado, Boulder. March 2005, retrieved on day 
month year, http://www.beyondintractability.org/bi-essay/mass-communication. 
Alexander et al., Terrorism: Theory and Practice, Westview Press: Boulder, 1979. p.162. 
Alterman, E. George W. Bush’s war on the press, in “Media Between Citizens and 
Powers”, Proceedings of an International Seminar, 23-24 June 2006 – San Servolo, Venice, 
Italy. 
Amnesty International, “Annual Report: 2006: Secretary-General’s Message”, 
http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/POL10/001/2006/en/52433fd0-d46f-11dd-8743-
d305bea2b2c7/pol100012006en.html. 
Arden, M. Meeting the challenge of terrorism: The experience of English and other courts, 
Australian Law Journal, 2006, 80:818. 
Asal V, Rethemeyer R K, ‘The Nature of the Beast: Organizational Structures and the 
Lethality of Terrorist Attacks’, Journal of Politics, 2008, 70 (2): 437-49. 
Ashworth, A. Principles of Criminal Law, Oxford University Press: Oxford. 2006 
Aubrey, S. M. The New Dimension of International Terrorism, Vdf Hochschulverlag: 
Zurich. 2004. 
Auletta, K. (Interview), Frontline, 13th June 2006, a leading American journalist, who 
writes The New Yorker's Annals of Communications column s[2003], available online at: 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/newswar/interviews/auletta.html 
199 Bibliography 
 
 
Bandura, A. “Mechanisms of Moral Disengagement,” in: W Reich, (Ed.), Origins of 
Terrorism; Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, States of Mind, Woodrow Wilson Centre 
Press: Washington, 1998, pp. 161-191. 
Banisar, D. Speaking of terror: a survey of the effects of counter-terrorism legislation on 
freedom of the media in Europe, Council of Europ,  (2008), 
http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/standardsetting/media/doc/banisar_en.pdf 
Barendt, E. and  Hitchens, L.  Media Law, Cases and Materials, Pearson Education 
Limited, England, 2000.  
Barker, I. ‘Human rights in an age of counter-terrorism’, Australian Bar Review, 2005, 26: 
267–86. 
Baxter, R. ‘A Sceptical Look at the Concept of Terrorism’, Akron Law Review, 1974. 
Bell, J. B. ‘Trends in Terror: The Analysis of Political Violence’, World Politics, 1977, 29 
(3) pp. 447-481. 
Benjamin, D. and Simon, S. The Age of Sacred Terror: Radical Islam’s War Against 
America. Random House, New York, 2003, p. 221 and p. 384. 
Boyle,  Professor F. A. ‘No War Against Afghanistan!’, Speech delivered at the Illinois 
Disciples  Foundation, Champaign, Illinois on October 18, 2001, 
http://www.ratical.org/ratville/CAH/fab112901.html 
Boyle, K. ‘Terrorism, States of Emergency and Human Rights’, Antiterrorist Measures 
and Human Rights, 2004, pp. 95-116. 
Breau, S. Livingstone, S. and O’Connell, R. ‘Anti-Terrorism Law and Human Rights in the 
United Kingdom post September 11’, Human Rights Centre, Queens University Belfast, , 
http://www.britishcouncil.org/china-society-publications-911.pdf 
Brennan, A.M. ‘The Difficulties in Defining Terrorism under International Law’, a blog to 
Human Rights Watch in Ireland, 2011, article available online at: 
http://humanrights.ie/criminal-justice/the-difficulties-in-defining-terrorism-under-
international-law/. 
British Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher, in Apple, R.W. Jr. Meese Suggests Press Code 
on Terrorism,. NewYork Times, July 18, 1985. 
Burnett, J. and Whyte, D. ‘Embedded Expertise and the New Terrorism’ Journal for 
Crime, Conflict and the Media, 2005, vol. 1, no. 4, pp. 1-18. 
Burnett, J. and Whyte, D. ‘Embedded Expertise and the New Terrorism’, Journal for 
Crime, Conflict and the Media, Vol.1 (4) 2005. pp. 1-18.  
Byman, D. L. ‘Never heard of the Cinema Rex fire Abadan? It’s the second-deadliest 
terrorist attack in modern history’, Washington Post, May 6, 2007. 
200 Bibliography 
 
 
Vinson,C.D. “Introduction,” in: Paletz, D.L. and Schmid,A. (1992), Terrorism and the 
Media, London: Sage, 1992, p. 1-5. 
Cameron, I. ‘Human Rights and Terrorism’, Peace and Security: current Challenges in 
International Law, 2004, pp. 193-232. 
Carter, A. B.; Deutch, J. and Zelikow, P.‘Catastrophic Terrorism Tackling the New 
Danger’, Foreign Affairs, 1999, 77(6), pp. 80-94. 
Cheesman, C. ‘BBC photographer terror stop: Former officer blasts Met’, Amateur 
Photographer, 30 November 2009, 
http://www.amateurphotographer.co.uk/news/bbc_photographer_terror_stop_former_offic
er_blasts_met_news_292330.html 
Cheesman, C. Police detain photographer with Leica M6 in London suburb, Amateur 
Photographer, 10 December 2009, 
http://www.amateurphotographer.co.uk/news/Police_detain_photographer_with_Leica_M6
_in_London_suburb_update_Friday_11am_news_292842.html 
Chenoweth, E. The Inadvertent Effects of Democracy on Terrorist Group Emergence, 
(Document published as Discussion Paper at Belfer Centre for Science and International 
Affairs), June 2006, http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/chenoweth_2006_06.pdf 
 
Bassiouni, C. ‘Terrorism, Law Enforcement, and the Mass Media: Perspectives, Problems, 
Proposals’, 2009, 72(1), The Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology. 
Chesterman, M. Freedom of Speech in Australia: A Delicate Plant, Ashgate: Dartmouth. 
2000 
Chomsky, N. Hegemony or survival. NY: Metropolitan Books, 2003.  
Civil Authorities (Special Powers) Act (Northern Ireland), 1922, CAIN Web Service, 
available online at: http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/hmso/spa1922.htm 
Clabaugh, G. K. EdD, ‘The Educational Theory of Lev Vygotsky: an analysis’, p.2, article 
retrieved on day month year, www.aiz.vic.edu.au/.../Article-The-Educational-Theory-of-
Lev-Vygo. 
Clarkson, C.M.V. ‘Understanding criminal law’, Sweet & Maxwell; 4 edition , 2005. 
Cohen, D. S. The War on Terrorism. 2001, online article, 
www.academia.edu/1263787/The_War_on_Terrorism. 
Cohn, M. Article “Bombing of Afghanistan is illegal and must be stopped”, Jurist, 
November 6, 2001, , http://www.jurist.org/forum/forumnew36.htm 
Commission On Human Rights. ‘Specific Human Rights Issues: New Priorities, in 
Particular Terrorism’, Sub-Commission on the Promotion, and Protection of Human 
201 Bibliography 
 
 
Rights, Fifty- fifth session, Agenda item 6 (c), p.26, available online at: 
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/terrorism/docs/WP1.pdf.  
Committee of Ministers,  Council of Europe. Declaration on freedom of expression and 
information in the media in the context of the fight against terrorism,(adapted by the 
Committee of Ministers on 2 March 2005), 
https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?id=830679&Site=CM.  
Coolsaet, R. Al-Qaeda: The Myth, Academia Press: Gent. 2005.   
 
Copeland, T. ‘Is the ‘New Terrorism’ Really New? An Analysis of the New Paradigm for 
Terrorism. The Journal of Conflict Studies, vol. 21 (2), Winter 2001, pp. 7-27, 
COT Institute for safety, security and Crisis Management, Defining Terrorism, WP3, 
Deliverable 4, October 2008, pp. 114-115, Netherland, available online 
at:http://www.transnationalterrorism.eu/tekst/publications/WP3%20Del%204.pdf 
Council of Europe, Committee of Ministers. ‘Recommendation Rec (2001)11 of the 
Committee of Ministers to member states concerning guiding principles on the fight 
against organised crime’, 19 September 2001, available online 
at:http://www.coe.int/t/dlapil/codexter/Source/CM_Recommendation_2001_11_EN.pdf 
Council of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly. ‘Recommendation 1706 (2005) Media and 
terrorism’, Available online at: 
Council of Europe, The European Convention on Human Rights and its Five Protocols’, 
1995, available online at: http://www.hri.org/docs/ECHR50.html 
Cram, I. ‘Regulating the media: some neglected freedom of expression issues in the United 
Kingdom’s counter-terrorism strategy’, Terrorism and Political Violence, 2006, 18: 335–
55. 
Crawford, L. ‘A dangerous Subject’, Financial Times, 14th  July 2006.Crenshaw, M. ‘The 
causes of terrorism’, Comparative Politics, 1981, 13(4), 397–399.   
Crenshaw, M. (Ed.), Terrorism in Context. Pennsylvania State University: Pennsylvania, 
1995. 
Crossman, G. ‘New Terrorism Act Powers will make Britain less safe’, Liberty, (April 
2006) , available online at: http://www.liberty-human-rights.org.uk/media/press/2006/new-
terrorism-act-powers-will-make-britain-less-safe.php   
 
Deflem, M. Terrorism and Counter Terrorism: Criminological Perspectives, Oxford: 
Elsevier, 2004. (p1-6) 
Deflem, M. Terrorism and Counter Terrorism:Ccriminological Perspectives, Oxford: 
Elsevier, 2004. 
202 Bibliography 
 
 
Dickinson, L.A. Using Legal Process to fight Terrorism: Detentions, Military 
Commissions, International Tribunals, and the Rule of Law: In Southern California Law 
Review, 2002, vol 75, p1407. 
Dickson, B. The Detention of Suspected Terrorists in Northern Ireland and Great Britain, 
43: U. Rich. L. Rev. 927 (2008-2009). 
Dipak, K. G.  ‘Exploring Roots of Terrorism’, in Tore Bjørgo (ed.) Root Causes of 
Terrorism. London: Routledge, (2004). 
Directorate General of Human Rights and Legal Affairs, Freedom of expression in times of 
crisis: Guidelines of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, July 2008, 
http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/cooperation/media/publications/Guidelines%20crisis-
20080828160132en.pdf. 
 
Doctorow, C. ‘Manchester man arrested for alleged sewer-grate photography held as a 
terrorist’, Boingboing, 03/03/2009, http://boingboing.net/2009/03/03/manchester-man-
arres.html 
Doha Centre for Media Freedom, European Court: Al Jazeera’s Alluni trial illegal, 
9/01/2012. Article available online at: http://www.dc4mf.org/en/content/european-court-al-
jazeera%E2%80%99s-alluni-trial-illegal 
Donohue, L. K. Civil Liberties, Terrorism, and Liberal Democracy: Lessons from the 
United Kingdom, HARVARD Kennedy School, 2000, p.4, available online at: 
http://www.hks.harvard.edu/var/ezp_site/storage/fckeditor/file/pdfs/centers-
programs/centers/taubman/working_papers/donohue_00_civillib.pdf  
 
Duhaime, L. Legal Dictionary, available online 
at:http://www.duhaime.org/LegalDictionary/D/DualCriminality.aspx    
 
Dumitriu, E. ‘The E.U.’s Definition of Terrorism: The Council Frame-work Decision on 
Combating Terrorism’, 2004, Vol. 5, No. 5, German Law Journal, pp. 585 – 602. 
Duyvesteyn, I.  How New is the New Terrorism? Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, vol. 27 
(5). 2004, pp. 439-454. 
 
Edwards, D. and Cromwell, D. Guardians of Power, The Myth Of The Liberal Media. 
London. Pluto Press, (2006). 
Edwards, R. An investigation into terrorism legislation in the United Kingdom and its 
effects on civil liberties, Glasgow Caledonian University, (Dissertation 2005). 
Ekwueme, A. C. and Obayi P. M. Rev. Fr. ‘Boko Haram Assault on Nigeria: Towards 
Effective Mass Media Response’, New Media and Mass Communication, Vol. 5, 2012, at 
www.iiste.org. 
 
203 Bibliography 
 
 
Elliott, C. and Quinn, F. Criminal Law, Longman, 2006. 
 
Falk, R. Appraising the war against Afghanistan , Social Science Research Council, 2002, 
, http://essays.ssrc.org/sept11/essays/falk.htm 
Farr, T. F.  World of Faith and Freedom. Why International Religious Liberty Is Vital to 
American National Security, Oxford University: Oxford. 2008 
Fenwick, H. The Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001: A Proportionate Response 
to 11th September? The Modern Law Review, Blackwell Publishers, MA, USA, 65:5, 
September 2002) p.724-725.  
Fenwick, H. Civil Liberties and Human Rights, Routledge-Cavendish, 2007, p. 1422–3 
Foot, R.; Gaddis, J. and Hurrell, A. (eds), Order and Justice in International Relations, 
Oxford University, Oxford, 2007. 
Francis, A. The Cost of Terrorism: The Relationship between International Terrorism and 
Democratic Governance, Terrorism and Political Violence, 2008, vol 20: p 257–270. 
Francis, F. ‘The End of History’,  The National Interest ,Summer 1989. 
Freeman, M. and Ross,H. (eds). Law and Philosophy, Oxford University, Oxford, 2008. 
Fromkin, D. ‘The strategy of terrorism’. Foreign Affairs, 1975, 53(4), 683–698.   
Ganor, B. ‘Countering State-Sponsored Terrorism’, ICT Papers, The International Policy 
Institute for Counter-Terrorism, The Interdisciplinary Center, Herzlia, Isreal, 1997. 
Ganor B, ‘Defining Terrorism: Is One Man’s Terrorist Another Man’s Freedom Fighter?’ 
Police Practice and Research, 2002, 3(4): 287–304. 
Ganor, B. Terror as a Strategy of Psychological Warfare, International Institute for 
Counter-Terrorism, July15, 2002, 
http://212.150.54.123/articles/articledet.cfm?articleid=443.  
Gearty, C. ‘Terrorism and Human Rights’, Government and Opposition, 2007, Vol 42, 
No.3, p340-360.   
Gerrits, R.P.J.M. “Terrorists’ Perspectives: Memoirs,” in: D.L Paletz, and A Schmid, 
Terrorism and the Media, Sage: London.1992,p. 29-61 
Gilbert, A. ‘Seven theses on the current period, the war, and the anti-war movement’, 
Solidarity Working Paper, October 2004. Retrieved on 2th March 20111, 
http://www.solidarity-us.org/pdfs/IraqAndBeyond.pdf. 
Gillan, K. Lecture, presented to law students at Queens University, Belfast, 13th March 
2007. Anti-Terror Legislation and the Judicial Review Process: A Personal Story, 
204 Bibliography 
 
 
http://www.kevingillan.info/wp-
content/uploads/2008/04/gillan_judicial_review_lecture.pdf. 
Golder, B. and Williams, G. ‘What is Terrorism? Problems of Legal Definition’, M UNSW 
Law Journal 2004, Vol.27(2), available online at 
http://tamilnation.co/terrorism/terrorism_definition.pdf. 
Goldstone, R. ‘The Tension between Combating Terrorism and Protecting Civil Liberties’, 
, Institute of Human Rights, University of Connecticut, 2005, available online at: 
http://humanrights.uconn.edu/documents/papers/TerrorCivilRightsRGoldstone.pdf 
Hayes, B. and White, A. Background Paper On Challenges for Journalism and Civil 
Liberties,International Federation of Journalists, April 2005, from  
http://www.ifj.org/assets/docs/093/092/42b2c5d-91b4a5c.pdf  
Held, V. How Terrorism Is Wrong: Morality and Political Violence. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2008. 
Herman, J. (ed.), ‘State of the News Print Media in Australia 2007: Supplement to the 
2006 Report’, Sydney: Australian Press Council, 2007. 
Herman, H. ‘PATRIOT Games: Terrorism Law and Executive Power’, Jurist, 2006,  
http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/forumy/2006/01/patriot-games-terrorism-law-and.php . 
Hess, S. and Kalb, M. (eds), “The media and the war on the terrorism”. Brookings 
Institution. Washington. 2003, p.1. 
Higgins, R. ‘The General International Law of Terrorism’, in R Higgins and M Flory, 
International Law and Terrorism, Routledge: London 1997, p. 28 
Hill, John. ‘Photo protest challenges "draconian" terror laws’, Wharf, 14 September 2009,  
http://www.wharf.co.uk/2009/09/photo-protest-challenges-draco.html 
Hillyard, P. ‘In defense of Civil liberties’, in Scraton (ed.) Beyond September 11: An 
anthology of dissent, pp. 107-12, London, Pluto Press, (2002).  
HM Government ‘Review of Counter-Terrorism and Security Powers.  Summary of 
Responses to the Consultation, Jan.2011 Cm 8005, available online at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/97969/sum-
responses-to-cons.pdf 
Hoffman, B. ‘Inside Terrorism.’ Revised and Expanded Edition, New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2006. 
Hoffman, B. Inside Terrorism, 2006, p. 174, cited in Terrorism and the Media, July 23, 
2008, Deliverable 6, Workpackage 4, page 5, 
http://www.transnationalterrorism.eu/tekst/publications/WP4%20Del%206.pdf 
Hoffman, B. Inside Terrorism, Columbia University Press, New York, 2003. 
205 Bibliography 
 
 
Hoffman, B.  Inside Terrorism, Columbia University Press, USA, 2006. 
Hoffman, B. ‘Inside Terrorism’, Columbia University Press: New York, 1998, p.43 
Hoffman, P. "Human Rights and Terrorism." Human Rights Quarterly 26. No. 4 
(November 2004): p 933. 
House of Commons Debate, Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions), (intervention of the 
Secretary of State, Mr Merylin Rees), House of Commons, Deb 09 July 1974 Vol. 876 
cc1273-31, available online at: 
http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1974/jul/09/northern-ireland-emergency-
provisions   
http://assembly.coe.int/Documents/AdoptedText/ta05/EREC1706.htm  
http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:12002M034:EN:H
TML 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2009/feb/11/police-terrorism-photography-
liberty-central  
 
Human Rights Watch Report, World Report 2002: Events of 2001, p XX , 2002, available 
online at: available online at: http://www.hrw.org/legacy/wr2k2/intro.html. 
Human Rights Watch, “Without Suspicion. Stop and Search under the Terrorism Act 
2000”, http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/uk0710webwcover.pdf 
Huntington, S. P. ‘If Not Civilizations, What? Samuel Huntington Responds to His 
Critics’, Foreign Affairs. November/December 1993. available online at: 
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/49414/samuel-p-huntington/if-not-civilizations-
what-samuel-huntington-responds-to-his-crit  
Huntington,S.P. ‘The Clash of Civilisations?’ Foreign Affairs; 1993; 72, 3. 
 
Ignatieff,  M, The Lesser Evil, Political Ethics in an Age of Terror, Edinburgh University 
Press: Edinburgh, 2004 
Ignatieff M.  The Lesser Evil: Political Ethics in an Age of Terror, Toronto:  Penguin 
Canada, 2004. 
International Council on Human Rights Policy, ‘Journalism, Media and the Challenge of 
Human Rights Reporting’, 2002, Versoix, Switzerland, p.17 
International Federation of Journalists (IFJ), ‘United States Attack on Journalists’ Right to 
Protect Sources “Violates First Amendment”, October 2004. Article 
http://www.ifj.org/en/articles/united-states-attack-on-journalists-right-to-protect-sources-
violates-first-amendment-says-ifj. 
206 Bibliography 
 
 
Iouchkiavitchious, H. International Seminar Media between Citizens and Power Venice, 
23-24 June 2006 Workshops. p. 22,  
Iouchkiavitchious, H. who stated: ‘press freedom is under great pressure everywhere. 
Politicians are for the press freedom when they are fighting for a power, but when they 
come to the power they are not so interested in the press freedom.’ In International 
Seminar Media Between Citizens and Power, Venice, 23-24 June 2006 Workshops. P 22, 
http://www.theworldpoliticalforum.net/wpcontent/uploads/wpf2006/06_media_between_c
p_venice/documenti/speeches_workshops.pdf. 
 
Ísaksson, G.F. Human rights against anti-terrorist laws. Are human rights in the UK in 
jeopardy because of the nation’s increasing anti-terrorist laws?, University of Akureyri, 
Faculty of Law and Social Sciences, Law division, Iceland. 2009. 
Jackson, R. ‘The Ghost of State Terror: Knowledge, Politics and Terrorism Studies’, in 
Critical Studies on Terrorism, 2008, 1(3): pp.377–392. 
Janowitz, M. ‘The study of Mass Communication’, in D L Sills (ed), International 
Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences, MacMillan, New York, 1968, pp. 40-51. 
Jenkins, B. M. ‘The Psychological Implications of Media-covered Terrorism’, Rand Paper 
Series, 1981, p.2, http://www.rand.org/pubs/papers/2005/P6627.pdf. 
 
Jenkins, B. ‘International terrorism: A new mode of conflict’ in David Carlton and Carlo 
Schaerf (eds.), International terrorism and world security, Croon Helm: London, 1975. 
Jenkins, B. The Study of Terrorism: Definitional Problems, Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 
1980. 
Jinks, D. ‘State Responsibility for the Acts of Private Armed Groups’, Chicago Journal of  
International law,4(2003),P83-95.   
Johnston, Philip. Why can't we take pictures of policemen?, The Telegraph, 5 Feb 2009, , 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/comment/columnists/philipjohnston/4632459/Whycant-we-
take-pictures-of-policemen.htm 
Joseph, S. The Paradox of American Power: Why the World’s Only Superpower Can’t Go 
it Alone, New York: OUP, 2002, p. 40. 
Kapitan, T. ‘The Terrorism of “Terrorism’, in J P Sterba (Eds.), Terrorism and 
International Justice,  Oxford University Press, NY, 2003, pp.47-68. 
Karber, P.1971, ‘Urban terrorism: Baseline data and a conceptual framework’, Social 
Science Quarterly, 52, p. 529. 
Keane, J. The Media and Democracy, Cambridge: Polity Press, (1991). 
Kellner, D ‘Media Industries and Media/Cultural Studies: An Articulation’ in Jennifer Holt 
and Alisa Perren, Media Industries: History, Theory, and Method, p.2, 2007, Wiley 
207 Bibliography 
 
 
Blackwell, available online at: 
http://pages.gseis.ucla.edu/faculty/kellner/essays/2009_Kellner_blackwell_Chp7.pdf. 
Kellner, D. The Media In and After 9/11, International Journal of Communication, 2007, 
1: 123-142. 
Kilcullen, D. J. ‘New Paradigms for 21st-Century Conflict’, Foreign Policy Agenda, 
eJournal, May 2007, Volume 12, number 5, pp39-50, available online at: 
http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/state/kilcullen_21c_conflict_may07.pdf. 
Kiras, J.D. ‘Terrorism and Globalization’, in J. Baylis and S. Smith (eds.) ‘The 
Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations, Oxford 
University Press, 2004, pp. 479-498. 
Klopfenstein, B. ‘Terrorism and the exploitation of media’, in A P Kavoori and T Fraley 
(eds), Media, Terrorism, and Theory, Rowman and Littlefield, USA, 2006, pp.107-120. 
Kohut A, ‘Self-Censorship: Counting the Ways’, Columbia Journalism Review, May 2000. 
Vol. 39, Issue 1, p42. 
Korff, D. “The right to life,   a guide to the implementation of Article 2 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights”. Council of Europe, Human Rights Handbooks, No 8, 
http://echr.coe.int/NR/rdonlyres/16D05FDF-4831-47EC-AE6D-
A2C760B0B630/0/DG2ENHRHAND082006.pdf. 
Korff, D. ‘The right to life, a guide to the implementation of Article 2 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights’. Human Rights Handbooks, No 8, 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/49f184722.html 
Kramer, M. “From Afghanistan to Araby Sept. 11 and the Mideast”, National Review 
Online, December 10, 2001, http://www.meforum.org/98/from-afghanistan-to-araby 
Krauthammer, C. ‘America and the World’, Foreign Affairs, 1990/91, Vol. 70, No. 1, 
available from Lexis/Nexis Academic Universe. 
Krisch, N. 'Weak as Constraint, Strong as Tool: The Place of International Law in U.S. 
Foreign Policy', in Malone D.M. &. Khong Y.F, (eds.), Unilateralism and U.S. Foreign 
Policy: International Perspectives, 2003, 41-70 
Kuhn, T. S. ‘The Structure of Scientific Revolutions’, International Cyclopaedia of 
Unified Science, 1970, Vol. 2, No. 2, p.47, , 
http://insitu.lri.fr/~mbl/Stanford/CS477/papers/Kuhn-SSR-2ndEd.pdf. 
Kuonqui, C.  Is Human Development a New Paradigm for Development? Capabilities 
Approach, Neoliberalism and Paradigm Shifts, (Paper presented at the August 2006 
international conference “Freedom and Justice” of the Human Development and Capability 
Association HDCA), (p.9), 2006, Groningen, Netherlands, available online at: 
http://www.capabilityapproach.com/pubs//6_3_Kuonqui.pdf . 
208 Bibliography 
 
 
Kydd, A. and Walter, B, ‘The strategies of terrorism’. International Security, 2006, 31(1), 
49–79.   
Laqueur, W. Terrorism, Weidenfeld and Nicolson: London, 1977. 
Laqueur W, The Age of Terrorism, Little, Brown and Company, Boston, Toronto, 1988. 
Laqueur, W. The New Terrorism: Fanaticism and the Arms of Mass Destruction, Oxford 
University Press: New York, 1999, p. 7. 
Laqueur, W. ‘The New Terrorism: Fanaticism and the Arms of Mass Destruction’, Oxford 
University Press: London, 1999. 
Laqueur, W.  “Postmodern Terrorism”, Foreign Affairs, 1996, 75 (5), pp. 24-36. 
Laudan, L.  “The Presumption of Innocence: Material or Probatory? Legal Theory, 2005, 
issue 4, pp. 333-361, 
http://www.derecho.uach.cl/documentos/Laudan_presumption_of_innocence.pdf   
Laurent, O. ‘Award-winning photographer stopped after photographing a bank's building’, 
British Journal of Photography, 08 Dec 2009, http:/ /www.bjp-online.com/british-journal-
ofphotography/news/1648268/award-winning-photographer-stopped-photographingbank-
building-update-30pm 
Laurent, O. Jail for photographing police?, British Journal of Photography, 28/01/2009, , 
http://www.bjp-online.com/britishjournal-of-photography/news/1644048/jail-
photographing-police 
Laurent, O. Young photojournalist detained for army cadet pics, British Journal of 
Photographer, 28 June 2010, http://www.bjp-online.com/british-journal-ofphotography/ 
news/1719526/photojournalist-detained-army-cadet-pics. 
Laws, D. ‘Representation of Stakeholding Interests’: The Consensus Building Handbook. 
Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications. 1999. 
 
Lesser, I. O. et al., Countering the New Terrorism, The Rand Corporation: Santa Monica: 
1999, p. 2. 
Lesser; Hoffman; Arquilla; Ronfeldt; Zanini and Jenkins, ‘Countering the New Terrorism’, 
RAND: Santa Monica, 1999. 
Lewis, P. From snapshot to Special Branch: how my camera made me a terror suspect, The 
Guardian, 11 December 2009, http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2009/dec/11/snapshot-
special-branch-terror-suspect 
Lewis, P. Journalists win payout after police admit failing to respect press freedom, The 
Guardian, 8 June 2010, http://www.guardian.co.uk/media/2010/jun/28/press-freedom-
police-marc-vallee 
209 Bibliography 
 
 
Liberty, Liberty’s response to the Coalition Government’s Review of Counter-Terrorism 
and Security Powers 2010’, 2010, Report available online at http://www.liberty-human-
rights.org.uk/pdfs/policy10/from-war-to-law-final-pdf-with-bookmarks.pdf p.7. 
Liberty, Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures, available online at: 
http://www.liberty-human-rights.org.uk/human-rights/terrorism/control-orders/index.php 
Liberty’s  Report: “Terrorism Pre-Charge Detention. Comparative Law Study’’, 2010, 
available online at: http://www.liberty-human-rights.org.uk/policy/reports/comparative-
law-study-2010-pre-charge-detention.pdf 
Liberty’s Briefing on the Second Reading of Counter-Terrorism Bill in the House of 
Lords: Part 2 - Non detention extension provisions July 2008.   
 
Lietzau, W.K. ‘Combating Terrorism: Law Enforcement or War?’ in Terrorism and 
International Law:Challenges and Responses, 2002, p75, 
http://www.iihl.org/iihl/Album/terrorism-law.pdf 
 
 
Livingstone, S. ‘On the Continuing Problem of Media Effects' in J. Curran and M. 
Gurevitch (eds), Mass Media and Society, London: Arnold, 1996, pp 305-24. 
Lord Carlile of Berwick Q.C., ‘The Definition of Terrorism’, (Presented to Parliament by 
the Secretary of State for the Home Department, by Command of Her Majesty, Home 
Department, 2007,Cm7052. 
Lord Falconer, during Lecture in memory of Lord Gareth Williams, The National 
Archives, 21 March 2007, 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.dca.gov.uk/speeches/2007/sp0703
21.htm 
Lord Lloyd of Berwick, ‘Legislation Against Terrorism ‘, A consultation Paper Presented 
to the Parliament by the Secretary of State for the Home Department and the Secretary of 
State for Northern Ireland by Command of Her Majesty, 1998, Cm 4178, 
http://www.archive.officialdocuments.co.uk/document/cm41/4178/4178.htm. 
Lukaszewski, J.E. (President of the Lukaszewski Group Division at Risdall Public 
Relations.). ‘The Media and the Terrorist: A Dance of death’ (A Presentation by James E. 
Lukaszewski at a Joint Meeting of the Airport Operators Council of America and the 
American Transport Association), March 19, 1987, Clearwater Beach, Florida, retrieved on 
day month year, http://www.e911.com/speeches/mediaandterrorists.html. 
MacCormack,W. ‘Values Implicated in the Struggle with Terrorism: War, Crime, and 
Prevention’ in Values and Violence, Springer, 2009, Volume 4, Part III, pp.257-277. 
MacCormack, W . ‘Legal responses to terrorism’, Newark, NJ: LexisNexis, 2007 
210 Bibliography 
 
 
Mahajan, R. Full Spectrum Dominance, US Power in Iraq and Beyond, Seven Stories 
Press, New York. 2003. 
Mallison, W. and  Mallison, S. ‘The concept of Public Purpose Terror in International 
Law: Doctrines and Sanctions to Reduce the Destruction of Human and Material Values’, 
1973, Howard Law Journal, 12. 
Malone, D. M. and Yuen F.K. (eds), ‘Unilateralism and U.S. Foreign Policy: International 
Perspectives’, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003. 
. 
 
Mapping Counterterrorism: A categorization of policies and the promise of empirically-
based, systematic comparisons’, 17 June 2008, p. 5, Deliverable 11, Work package 6, 
‘Citizens and governance in a knowledge-based society’, 
http://www.transnationalterrorism.eu/tekst/publications/WP6%20Del%2011.pdf. 
Marighella, C. ‘Mini-manual of the Urban Guerrilla’ in Jay Mallin, Terror and Urban 
Guerrillas. A Study of Tactics and Documents, University of Miami Press: Florida, 1982, 
p.104. 
 
 Marlow, L. Post-war, Journalists Ask Themselves Hard Questions: The Vantage Points 
from which this War Was Witnessed Give Future Historians a Wealth of Material’, The 
Irish Times, 8 Nov 2003. 
 
Marshall, M.G. ‘Global Terrorism: an Overview and Analysis’, University of Maryland, 
11 September 2002, p.3, http://www.systemicpeace.org/CSPpaper3.pdf. 
 
 
Martin, J. L.  ‘The Media's Role in International Terrorism’, University of Maryland, 
Mayland, http://pegasus.cc.ucf.edu/~surette/mediasrole.html. 
McNamara, L . ‘Counter-terrorism Laws: How They Affect Media Freedom and News 
Reporting’,  Westminster Papers in Communication and Culture, Vol. 6(1), 2009, p: 27-44. 
McNamara, L. The International Federation of Journalists did also express concerns about 
the impact of the laws on the media profession, 2009. 
Mekhennet, S. and Filkins, D. ‘British Law Against Glorifying Terrorism Has Not 
Silenced Calls to Kill for Islam’, The New York Times, August 21, 2006, 
http://travel2.nytimes.com/2006/08/21/world/europe/21london.html . 
Miller, C. E. ‘A Glossary in Terms and Concepts of peace and conflict studies’, University 
of Peace, Costa Rica, 2nd edition, 2005, pp.18-19, 
http://www.africa.upeace.org/documents/GlossaryV2.pdf 
211 Bibliography 
 
 
Miller, E. Here we go again: journalists, police gear up for the 2012 political party 
conventions Reporters Committee, 2012, vol 36, no.3, http://www.rcfp.org/browse-media-
law-resources/news-media-law/news-media-and-law-summer-2012/here-we-go-again-
journalist 
Moorhouse, F.  ‘The writer in a time of terror’, Griffith Review, 2006, 14: 4–54. 
Morgan, M.J.  ‘The Origins of the New Terrorism’, Parameters, Spring 2004, pp. 29-43. 
Mowbray, A. Cases and Materials on the European Convention on Human Rights, Oxford 
University Press; 2Rev Ed edition (24 May 2007). 
 
Mueller, J. E. Overblown: How Politicians and the Terrorism Industry Inflate National 
Security Threats and why we believe them, Free Press, New York, 2006, p. 40. 
 
Muller, E. R.; Spaaij, R. F. J. and  Ruitenberg, A. G. W. Trends in terrorisme, Alphen aan 
de Rijn: Kluwer, Netherlands, 2003. 
 
Murphy, J. ‘State Support of International Terrorism’, Legal, Political and Economic 
Dimensions, 1989 pp.3-30. 
Nacos. B. L.  “Accomplice or Witness? The Media’s Role in Terrorism.” Current History, 
April 2000, Vol. 99 (636), p. 174-178. 
 
Nacos, B.L. Mass-Mediated Terrorism: The Central Role of the Media in Terrorism and 
Counterterrorism, (2nd edition) (2007), Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 
Inc. p.15. 
 
Nacos, B.L. ‘Mass-Mediated Terrorism: The Central Role of the Media in Terrorism and 
Counterterrorism, Rowman & Littlefield, 2002. 
National Union of Journalists, ‘NUJ response to the Rapid Review of Counter Terrorism 
powers’, p.3, Available online at:   http://media.gn.apc.org/fl/1011poli.pdf  
NATO Topics, ‘What is article 5?’, February  2005, http://www.nato.int/terrorism/five.htm 
Netanyahu, B. (Ed), International Terrorism: Challenge and Response, The Jonathan 
Institute, Jerusalem, 1980. 
Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 1973, Legislation.gov.uk, available online 
at: http://www.legisltion.gov.uk/ukpga/1973/53/pdfs/ukpga_19730053_en.pdf 
Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 1978, Legislation.gov.uk, available online 
at: http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1978/5/pdfs/ukpga_19780005_en.pdf 
Odom, G. W. ‘American Hegemony: How to Use It, How to Lose It’, Proceedings of the 
American Philosophical Society, 2007, 151 (4): 
410,http://www.middlebury.edu/media/view/214721/original/OdomPaper.pdf. 
212 Bibliography 
 
 
Ozimek, J.F. City Police still using Terror Act to bother photographer, The Register, 11 
May 2010, http://www.theregister.co.uk/2010/05/11/police_photographers_terrorism_act/ 
Ozimek, J. Photographer Arrested For Being “Too Tall”, Prison Planet, 17 July, 2009, , 
http://www.prisonplanet.com/photographer-arrested-for-being-too-tall.html 
Parliamentary Assembly, Council of Europe, Media and terrorism, Recommendation 1706 
(2005), , 
http://www.assembly.coe.int/ASP/Doc/XrefViewHTML.asp?FileID=11108&Language=E
N. 
Parliamentary Assembly, Council of Europe, The protection of journalists’ sources, 
Recommendation 1950 (2011), 
http://assembly.coe.int/mainf.asp?Link=/documents/adoptedtext/ta11/erec1950.htm.  
Parliamentary Assembly, Council of Europe, Combating terrorism and respect for human 
rights, Resolution 1271(2002)[1] , 
http://assembly.coe.int/main.asp?Link=/documents/adoptedtext/ta02/eres1271.htm. 
Parliamentary Assembly, Council of Europe, Combating terrorism and respect for human 
rights, Recommendation 1550 (2002),  
 
Parliamentary Assembly, Council of Europe, Combating terrorism and respect for human 
rights, Recommendation 1550(2002), available online at: 
,http://assembly.coe.int/Main.asp?link=/Documents/AdoptedText/ta02/EREC1550.htm 
 
Parliamentary Assembly, Media and Terrorism, Report Committee on Culture, Science and 
Education, Doc. 10557, 20 May 2005, Rapporteur: Mr Josef Jařab, Czech Republic, 
Liberal, Democratic and Reformers’ Group. Available at:  
http://assembly.coe.int/Documents/WorkingDocs/Doc05/edoc10557.htm. 
Pheasant-Kelly, Fantasy Film Post-9/11, London and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2012. 
Price, M. E. Media and Sovereignty: The Global Information Revolution and its Challenge 
to State Power, Massachusetts Institute of Technology: Massachusetts. 2002, p.6  
. 
Provision 57, Terrorism Act 2000, legistaltion.gov.uk, available online at: 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/11/section/57?view=plain . 
Reale, R. in International Seminar Media Between Citizens and Power Venice, 23-24 June 
2006 Workshops. P. 12,  
http://www.theworldpoliticalforum.net/wpcontent/uploads/wpf2006/06_media_between_c-
p_venice/documenti/speeches_workshops.pdf 
 
213 Bibliography 
 
 
Recommendation Rec(2003)13 of the Committee of Ministers to member states on the 
provision of information through the media in relation to criminal proceedings, available 
at:   
https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?Ref=Rec(2003)13&Language=lanEnglish&Site=CM&Ba
ckColorInternet=DBDCF2&BackColorIntranet=FDC864&BackColorLogged=FDC864. 
Rhine, S. L.; Bennett, S. E.; Flickinger, R. S. After 9/11: Televisions viewers, Newspaper 
readers and Public Opinion about Terrorism’s Consequences, (Paper prepared for 
presentation at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association), Boston 
Massachusetts – August 29th - September 1st 2002. 
Richards, B. ‘Anti-terrorism, media and publics’, Seminar organised by the Centre for 
Public Communication Research (CPCR), Bournemouth Media School, Bournemouth 
University, 2005. 
Roach, K.talk on “The 9/11 effect: Comparative counter terrorism(2012 
:http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nTitrbMBbRk. 
Rogers, P. ‘A War Gone Badly Wrong – The War on Terror Ten Years on’, ORG 
International Security Monthly Briefing – August-September 2011. 
Rohner, D. and Frey B. S. ‘Blood and ink! The common-interest-game between terrorists 
and the media’, Public Choice, 2007,133: pp. 129–145, 
http://bsfrey.ch/articles/C_471_07.pdf. 
 
Rosand, E.; Millar,A. and Ipe, J. Human Rights and the Implementation of the UN Global 
Counter-Terrorism Strategy, Hopes and Challenges, 2008, Available at: 
http://www.globalct.org/images/content/pdf/reports/human_rights_report.pdf   
Ross, J. Deconstructing the terrorism–news media relationship, R. Paper, University of 
Baltimore, 2007. 
Rowlands, M. ‘Media freedoms in the UK curtailed by police “culture of suspicion” and 
double standards’, Statewatch Analysis, the full article available online at: 
http://www.statewatch.org/analyses/no-73-uk-police-press-and-protests.pdf 
 
Rowlands, M. ‘Statewatch Analysis, UK: The Misuse of Section 44 stop and search powers 
continues despite European Court ruling’, Available online at: 
http://www.statewatch.org/analyses/no-105-uk-section-44.pdf  
 
Rupére, z. Javier. (). “The United Nations in the fight against terrorism”, (Paper delivered 
during the 132nd International Senior Seminar Visiting Experts’ Papers), 2005, 
http://www.unafei.or.jp/english/pdf/RS_No71/No71_07VE_Ruperez.pdf. 
Sánchez-Cuenca, I. and de la Calle,L. ‘Domestic Terrorism: The Hidden Side of Political 
Violence’, Annual Review of Political Science, 2009, Volume 12. 
214 Bibliography 
 
 
Sanders, E. ‘Results of FCC's Media Studies Are Released’, Los Angeles Times, Oct 2002, 
http://pqasb.pqarchiver.com/latimes/202977141.html?did=202977141&FMT=ABS&FMT
S=FT&desc=California%3b+Results+of+FCC%27s+Media+Studies+Are+Released. 
Saul, B. ‘Defining Terrorism to Protect Human Rights’, FRIDE (Working Papers), 
February 2006. 
Saul, B. ‘Exclusion of Suspected Terrorists from Asylum’, Institute for International 
Integration Studies, Trinity College, Dublin, July 2004, Discussion Paper No 26. 
Saul, B. ‘Reasons for Defining and Criminalizing 'Terrorism' in International Law’. 
Mexican Yearbook of International Law, 2006,Vol. 6, pp. 419-460, Sydney Law School 
Research Paper No. 08/121 http://ssrn.com/abstract=1291567. 
Saul, B. ‘The Legal Response of the League of Nations to Terrorism’. Journal of 
International Criminal Justice, 2006, 78. 
Schaffert, R. W. Media Coverage and Political Terrorists: A Quantitative Analysis, 
Greenwood, 1992. 
Schaffert, R. (The Media's Influence on the Public's Perception of Terrorism and the 
Question of Media Responsibility. Media Coverage and Political Terrorists. Praeger 
Publishers, New York, 1992. 
Schmid, A.P. 'Frameworks for Conceptualising Terrorism', Terrorism and Political 
Violence, 2004, 16: 2, , 197 — 221. 
Schmid, A. P. 'Frameworks for Conceptualising Terrorism', Terrorism and Political 
Violence, 2004, Vol.16 (2), pp.197-221, available online at: 
http://www.olympiaseminars.org/2012/readings/Cycle_C/Schmid_Conceptualizing%20Ter
rorism.pdf 
Schmid, A.  and Jongman, A. ‘Political Terrorism: A New Guide To Actors, Authors, 
Concepts, Data Bases, Theories, And Literature’, Transaction Publishers, 2005. 
Schmidt, A, and Jongman, A. (Eds.), Political Terrorism, SWIDOC, Amsterdam and 
Transaction Books, 1988. 
Schoenholtz, A. and Hojaiban, J. International Migration and Anti-Terrorism Laws and 
Policies: Balancing Security and Refugee Protection, Policy Brief, Institute for the Study 
of International Migration, Walsh School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University. 
2008. 
Shepherd, J. ‘The Rise and Rise of Terrorism Studies’, The Guardian, 3/07/2007, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/education/2007/jul/03/highereducation.research. See as well as 
Attwood, R.‘Study of Terrorism Steps up to New Level’, The Times, 22/6/2007. 
http://www.timeshighereducation.co.uk/news/study-of-terrorism-steps-up-to-new-
level/209437.article. 
215 Bibliography 
 
 
Silke, ‘Research on Terrorism’ in Chen, H; Reid, E; Sinai, J; Silke, A; and Ganor, B. (eds), 
Terrorism Informatics. Knowledge Management and Data Mining for Homeland Security, 
New York: Springer, 2008, pp. 27-50. 
Simon, S. and Benjamin, D. ‘America and the New Terrorism’,  Survival, Vol. 42(1), 
spring 2000, pp. 59-75.  
 
Spencer (2010, p. 1) in Spencer, A.  ‘Tabloid Terrorist’, Palgrave Macmillan: London, 
2010. 
Suskind, R. “Faith, Certainty and the Presidency of George W. Bush”, New York Times, 
October 17, 2004 
Teichner, M. What Does a Terrorist Look Like?, CBSNews, April 11 2010, 
http://www.cbsnews.com/2100-3445_162-6385040.html . 
Terrorism Act: No terror arrests made after 100,000 stop-and-searches’, The Telegraph, 28 
Oct 2010 Available online at : http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/terrorism-in-the-
uk/8092328/Terrorism-Act-No-terror-arrests-made-after-100000-stop-and-searches.html 
Terrorism and the Media”, TTSRL, July 23, 2008, Deliverable 6, Workpackage 4, 
http://www.transnationalterrorism.eu/tekst/publications/WP4%20Del%206.pdf. 
The Council of the European Union, ‘Council Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on 
combating terrorism’, 2002, retrieved on day month year, 
http://eurlex.europa.eu/smartapi/cgi/sga_doc?smartapi!celexapi!prod!CELEXnumdoc&lg=
EN&numdoc=32002F0475&model=guichett 
Thomas, P. A. ‘Emergency and Anti-Terrorist Powers, 9/11: USA and UK, Fordham 
International Law Journal, 2002,   pp.1193-1233. 
Torres Soriano,M.R. ‘Terrorism and the Mass Media after Al Qaeda: A Change of 
Course?’, Athena Intelligence Journal, 2008, Vol. 3, No 1, pp. 1-20, 
http://www.upo.es/export/portal/com/bin/portal/upo/profesores/mrtorsor/profesor/1213692
696893_al_qaeda_and_the_mass_media-_athena.pdf 
Thomas, P. A . ‘Emergency and Anti-Terrorist Powers, 9/11: USA and UK’, Fordham 
International Law Journal.  2002, pp.1193-1233 
Treaty on European Union (Nice consolidated version), Title VI: ‘Provisions on police and 
judicial cooperation in criminal matters’ Article 34, Article K.6 - EU Treaty (Maastricht 
1992). Retrieved on day month year, 
 
Tucker, D. ‘What is New about the New Terrorism and How Dangerous is It?’ ,Terrorism 
and Political Violence vol.14 (3), Fall 2001, pp. 1-14;  
Tuman J S, Communicating terror: The rhetorical dimensions of terrorism, Sage: 
California, 2003. 
216 Bibliography 
 
 
U.S. Army TRADOC G2 Handbook No. 1 (Version 5.0), ‘A Military Guide to Terrorism 
in the Twenty-First Century’, Terrorist Motivations and Behaviors, Chapter 2, 2007, 
available online at: http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/army/guidterr/ch02.pdf 
UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), Digest of 
Jurisprudence of the UN and Regional Organizations on the Protection of Human Rights 
While Countering Terrorism, September 2003, p. 8, Available at: 
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/DigestJurisprudenceen.pdf 
United Nations Security Council (12 September 2001) Security Council Resolution1368 
(2001) Adopted by the Security Council at its 4370th meeting, on 12 September 
2001.S/RES/1368 (2001). New York: United Nations, http://daccess-dds 
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N01/533/82/PDF/N0153382.pdf?Op Interview enElement 
United Nations Security Council, Security Council Resolution1368 (2001) Adopted by the 
Security Council at its 4370th meeting, on 12 September 2001.S/RES/1368 (2001). New 
York: United Nations, (12 September 2001). Available online: http://daccess-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N01/533/82/PDF/N0153382.pdf?OpenElement. 
United Nations, Office on Drugs and Crime, ‘Guide for the Legislative Incorporation and 
Implementation of the universal Anti-Terrorism Instrument’s, 2006, p.16. 
Vallee, M. ‘Documenting dissent is under attack’, The Guardian, 12th February 2009,  
Van Sliedregt, Elies, ‘A contemporary reflection on the presumption of innocence’, in 
Revue Internationale de Droit Pénal 2009/1-2 (Vol. 80). 
Vieira, J. D. ‘Terrorism at the BBC: The IRA on British Television’, in A O Alali & K K 
Eke, Media coverage of terrorism, methods of diffusion. Sage: London, 1991, pp. 73-85. 
Wade, Nicholas, ‘Thomas S. Kuhn: Revolutionary Theorist of Science’, Science, 1977, 
197, 143-145, available online at: 
http://europepmc.org/abstract/MED/17834074/reload=0;jsessionid=0vWYjcN7xJpJYm3E
oosG.2.  
Wadham et al.; Blackstone’s Guide to the Human Rights Act 1998, pp. 93–97, paragraphs 
6.21–6.31. Oxford University Press, Oxford 
Walker, C. “Clamping Down on Terrorism in the United Kingdom”, Int. Criminal Justice, 
4(5), p. 1141, (2006), Oxford University Press, available online at: 
http://jicj.oxfordjournals.org/content/4/5/1137.full.pdf. 
Walker, C. Blackstone’s guide to The Anti-Terrorism Legislation, Oxford University Press, 
2002, p.171-174. 
Walker, C. Blackstone’s guide to The Anti-Terrorism Legislation”.Oxford University 
Press, 2002, p.171-174 
217 Bibliography 
 
 
Walker, C. ‘Cyber-Terrorism: Legal Principle and Law in the United Kingdom’, penn state 
law review, 2006, Vol. 110, p.647, available online at: 
http://www.court21.ac.uk/docs/penn07d.pdf . 
Walker, MLR 70 (2007), 433, commenting the Report of the Privy Councillor Review 
Committee, Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 Review: Report (2003–04 NC 
100) Pt D, paragraph. 195. 
Walker’s “Clamping Down on Terrorism in the United Kingdom”, Journal of International 
Criminal Justice 4 (2006), 1137-1151, Oxford University Press 
Wallstrom, M.Vice-President of the European Commission, in charge of Institutional 
Relations and Communication Strategy, Sweden, 2006. 
Walter, C. ‘Defining Terrorism in National and International Law’, 2003, p.2, available 
online at: 
https://www.unodc.org/tldb/bibliography/Biblio_Int_humanitarian_law_Walter_2003.pdf  
Walter C, The Anti-Terrorism Legislation. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2002 
Watching the Detectives: the media and anti-terrorism laws”, online video, Front Line 
Club, 7th July 2009, http://www.frontlineclub.com/post/. 
Weaver, M. and Dodd, V. Police delete London tourists' photos 'to prevent terrorism', The 
Guardian, 6 April 2009, http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2009/apr/16/police-delete-tourist-
photos 
Weimann, G. and  Winn, C. The theater of terror: Mass media and international terrorism, 
Longman: New York, 1994, p. 14. 
White, A. “Ethical Journalism Initiative”, Published in International Federation of 
Journalists, Belgium, 2008, p.40 
White, J. R. Terrorism and Homeland Security, Wadsworth, Belmont, California, 2011. 
Wilkinson, P. ‘The Strategic Implications of Terrorism.’ in M.L. Sondhi, Terrorism and 
Political Violence, Sondhi: Har-Anand Publications, India, 2000. 
Wilkinson, P . ‘Can a State be 'Terrorist'?’ International Affairs, Royal Institute of 
International Affairs, Summer 1981, Vol. 57, No. 3, pp. 467-472. 
Wilkinson, P. “Response to Terrorism from the Toolbox of Liberal Democracies: Their 
Applicability to Other Types of Regimes’, in Countering Terrorism Through International 
Cooperation. Proceedings of the International Conference on “Countering Terrorism 
Through Enhanced International Cooperation.” Courmayeur Mont Blanc, Italy, 2001, pp: 
206-213. 
Wilkinson, P.Terrorism Versus Democracy: the Liberal State Response. Routledge: 
London, 2006. 
218 Bibliography 
 
 
Williamson, M. ‘Terrorism, war and international law: the legality of the use of force 
against Afghanistan in 2001’. Ashgate, 2009, p. 38. 
Yates, D. Review of the terrorism suppression act 2002: Report of the Foreign Affairs, 
Defense and Trade Committee. Wellington, New Zealand House of Representatives, 2005. 
Yılmaz, M. ‘Resolving Internal Conflicts in the Post-Cold War Era: Is Peacekeeping 
Enough?’ Journal of Economic and Social Research, 8(2), pp. 27-42. 
Zimmerman, D. The Transformation Of Terrorism, Andreas Wenger: Zurich, 2003.  
 
Zurutuza, C. ‘Terrorism as a Communicative Action: a proposal for the study of 
government response’, in Banu Baybars Hawks & Lemi Baruh, Societies under Siege: 
Media, Government, Politics, and Citizens’ Freedoms in an Age of Terrorism, 2010, p18, 
(international conference held at Kadir Has University, Istanbul in 2009), 
http://www.khas.edu.tr/uploads/pdf-doc-vb/SocietiesUnderSiege.pdf. 
 
219 Appendix 
 
 
Appendix 
Annex: 1 
 
Chronology of the Enactment of Laws and Resolutions 
 
 Terrorism Act 2000 (UK voted on the 28th September, entered into force in December 
2001)  
 UN Resolution 1368 (12th September 2001) 
 UN Resolution 1373 (28th September 2001) 
 Article 5 NATO (12th September 2001) 
 USA Patriot Act ( October 2001) 
 The NSA Surveillance program 
 Council of Europe (CoE) 
 European Union (EU) 
 The Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001  (UK)  
 The Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 (UK) 
 The Terrorism Act 2006  (UK)   
 The Counter-terrorism Bill 2008 (UK) 
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Annex: 2 
 
 
 
UNIVERSAL 
DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 
UNITED NATIONS 
HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS 
 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
 
 
Preamble 
 
Whereas recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all 
members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world, 
Whereas disregard and contempt for human rights have resulted in barbarous acts which 
have outraged the conscience of mankind, and the advent of a world in which human beings 
shall enjoy freedom of speech and belief and freedom from fear and want has been 
proclaimed as the highest aspiration of the common people, Whereas it is essential, if man 
is not to be compelled to have recourse, as a last resort, to rebellion against tyranny and 
oppression, that human rights should be protected by the rule of law, Whereas it is essential 
to promote the development of friendly relations between nations, Whereas the peoples of 
the United Nations have in the Charter reaffirmed their faith in fundamental human rights, 
in the dignity and worth of the human person and in the equal rights of men and women and 
have determined to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom, 
Whereas Member States have pledged themselves to achieve, in cooperation with the 
United Nations, the promotion of universal respect for and observance of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms, Whereas a common understanding of these rights and freedoms is 
of the greatest importance for the full realisation of this pledge. 
 
 Now, therefore, The General Assembly, 
 
Proclaims this Universal Declaration of Human Rights as a common standard of 
achievement for all peoples and all nations, to the end that every individual and every organ 
of society, keeping this Declaration constantly in mind, shall strive by teaching and 
education to promote respect for these rights and freedoms and by progressive measures, 
national and international, to secure their universal and effective recognition and 
observance, both among the peoples of Member States themselves and among the peoples 
of territories under their jurisdiction. 
 
 
Article I 
All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with 
reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood. 
 
Article 2 
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Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without 
distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other 
opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status. Furthermore, no distinction 
shall be made on the basis of the political, jurisdictional or international status of the country 
or territory to which a person belongs, whether it be independent, trust, non-self-governing 
or under any other limitation of sovereignty. 
 
Article 3 
Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person. 
 
Article 4 
No one shall be held in slavery or servitude; slavery and the slave trade shall be prohibited 
in all their forms. 
 
Article 5 
No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment. 
 
Article 6 
Everyone has the right to recognition everywhere as a person before the law. 
 
Article 7 
All are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to equal protection 
of the law. All are entitled to equal protection against any 
discrimination in violation of this Declaration and against any incitement to such 
discrimination. 
 
Article 8 
Everyone has the right to an effective remedy by the competent national tribunals for acts 
violating the fundamental rights granted him by the constitution or by law. 
 
Article 9 
No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention or exile. 
 
 
 
Article 10 
Everyone is entitled in full equality to a fair and public hearing by an independent and 
impartial tribunal, in the determination of his rights and obligations and of any criminal 
charge against him. 
 
Article 11 
1. Everyone charged with a penal offence has the right to be presumed innocent until proved 
guilty according to law in a public trial at which he has had all the guarantees necessary for 
his defence. 
 
2. No one shall be held guilty of any penal offence on account of any act or 
omission which did not constitute a penal offence, under national or 
international law, at the time when it was committed. Nor shall a heavier 
penalty be imposed than the one that was applicable at the time the penal offence was 
committed. 
 
Article 12 
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No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home or 
correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honour and reputation. Everyone has the right to 
the protection of the law against such interference or attacks. 
 
Article 13 
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each 
State. 
 
2. Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to 
return to his country. 
Article 14 
1. Everyone has the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution. 
2. This right may not be invoked in the case of prosecutions genuinely arising from non-
political crimes or from acts contrary to the purposes and 
principles of the United Nations. 
 
Article 15 
1. Everyone has the right to a nationality. 
2. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality nor denied the right to change his 
nationality. 
 
Article 16 
1. Men and women of full age, without any limitation due to race, nationality or religion, have 
the right to marry and to found a family. They are entitled to equal rights as to marriage, 
during marriage and at its dissolution. 
2. Marriage shall be entered into only with the free and full consent of the intending spouses. 
 
3. The family is the natural and fundamental group unit of society and is entitled to protection 
by society and the State. 
 
Article 17 
1. Everyone has the right to own property alone as well as in association with others. 
 
2. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property. 
 
Article 18 
Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; This right includes 
freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with 
others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship 
and observance. 
 
Article 19 
Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; This right includes freedom 
to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas 
through any media and regardless of frontiers. 
 
Article 20 
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and association. 
2. No one may be compelled to belong to an association. 
 
Article 21 
1. Everyone has the right to take part in the government of his country, directly or through 
freely chosen representatives. 
2. Everyone has the right to equal access to public service in his country. 
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3. The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government; this will shall be 
expressed in periodic and genuine elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage 
and shall be held by secret vote or by equivalent free voting procedures. 
 
Article 22 
Everyone, as a member of society, has the right to social security and is entitled to 
realisation, through national effort and international cooperation 
and in accordance with the organisation and resources of each State, of the economic, 
social and cultural rights indispensable for his dignity and the free development of his 
personality. 
Article 23 
1. Everyone has the right to work, to free choice of employment, to just and favourable 
conditions of work and to protection against unemployment. 
 
2. Everyone, without any discrimination, has the right to equal pay for equal work. 
 
3. Everyone who works has the right to just and favourable remuneration ensuring for 
himself and his family an existence worthy of human dignity, 
and supplemented, if necessary, by other means of social protection. 
 
4. Everyone has the right to form and to join trade unions for the protection of his interests. 
 
Article 24 
Everyone has the right to rest and leisure, including reasonable limitation of working hours 
and periodic holidays with pay. 
 
Article 25 
1. Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and wellbeing of 
himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing and 
medical care and necessary social services, and the right to security in the event of 
unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood, old age or other lack of livelihood in 
circumstances beyond his control. 
 
2. Motherhood and childhood are entitled to special care and assistance. All children, 
whether born in or out of wedlock, shall enjoy the same social protection. 
Article 26 
 
1. Everyone has the right to education. Education shall be free, at least in the elementary 
and fundamental stages. Elementary education shall be 
compulsory. Technical and professional education shall be made generally 
available and higher education shall be equally accessible to all on the basis of merit. 
 
2. Education shall be directed to the full development of the human personality and to the 
strengthening of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. It shall promote 
understanding, tolerance and friendship among all nations, racial or religious groups, and 
shall further the 
activities of the United Nations for the maintenance of peace. 
 
3. Parents have a prior right to choose the kind of education that shall be 
given to their children. 
 
Article 27 
1. Everyone has the right freely to participate in the cultural life of the 
community, to enjoy the arts and to share in scientific advancement and its benefits. 
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2. Everyone has the right to the protection of the moral and material interests resulting from 
any scientific, literary or artistic production of which he is the author. 
 
Article 28 
Everyone is entitled to a social and international order in which the rights and freedoms set 
forth in this Declaration can be fully realised. 
 
Article 29 
1. Everyone has duties to the community in which alone the free and full 
development of his personality is possible. 
 
2. In the exercise of his rights and freedoms, everyone shall be subject only to such 
limitations as are determined by law solely for the purpose of securing due recognition and 
respect for the rights and freedoms of others and of meeting the just requirements of 
morality, public order and the general welfare in a democratic society. 
 
3. These rights and freedoms may in no case be exercised contrary to the 
purposes and principles of the United Nations. 
 
Article 30 
Nothing in this Declaration may be interpreted as implying for any State, group or person 
any right to engage in any activity or to perform any act aimed at the destruction of any of 
the rights and freedoms set forth herein. 
 
Source: United Nations Department of Public Information 
 
 
 
 
  
225 Appendix 
 
 
Annex: 3 
 
Resolution 1368 of the 12th September 2001 
UNITED 
NATIONS S 
 
 
Security Council Distr.GENERAL 
  
S/RES/1368 (2001) 
12 September 2001 
 
UN Security Council Resolution 1368 (2001) 
Adopted by the Security Council on 12th September 2001 
 
The Security Council, 
Reaffirming the principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations, 
Determined to combat by all means threats to international peace and security caused by 
terrorist acts, 
Recognizing the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence in accordance with the 
Charter, 
1. Unequivocally condemns in the strongest terms the horrifying terrorist attacks which took 
place on 11 September 2001 in New York, Washington (D.C.) and Pennsylvania and regards 
such acts, like any act of international terrorism, as a threat to international peace and security; 
2. Expresses its deepest sympathy and condolences to the victims and their families and to 
the People and Government of the United States of America; 
3. Calls on all States to work together urgently to bring to justice the perpetrators, organizers 
and sponsors of these terrorist attacks and stresses that those responsible for aiding, supporting 
or harbouring the perpetrators, organizers and sponsors of these acts will be held accountable; 
4. Calls also on the international community to redouble their efforts to prevent and suppress 
terrorist acts including by increased cooperation and full implementation of the relevant 
international anti-terrorist conventions and Security Council resolutions, in particular resolution 
1269 of 19 October 1999; 
5. Expresses its readiness to take all necessary steps to respond to the terrorist attacks of 
11 September 2001, and to combat all forms of terrorism, in accordance with its responsibilities 
under the Charter of the United Nations; 
6. Decides to remain seized of the matter.  
226 Appendix 
 
 
Annex: 4 
  
Resolution 1373 of the 28th September 2001 
UNITED 
NATIONS S 
 
 
Security Council Distr.GENERAL 
  
S/RES/1373 (2001) 
28 September 2001 
 
 
Resolution 1373 (2001) 
 
Adopted by the Security Council at its 4385th meeting, 
on 28 September 2001 
 
 
The Security Council,  
Reaffirming its resolutions 1269 (1999) of 19 October 1999 and 1368 (2001) of 12 
September 2001,  
Reaffirming also its unequivocal condemnation of the terrorist attacks which took place in 
New York, Washington, D.C. and Pennsylvania on 11 September 2001, and expressing its 
determination to prevent all such acts,  
Reaffirming further that such acts, like any act of international terrorism, constitute a threat 
to international peace and security,  
Reaffirming the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence as recognized by the 
Charter of the United Nations as reiterated in resolution 1368 (2001),  
Reaffirming the need to combat by all means, in accordance with the Charter of the United 
Nations, threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts,  
Deeply concerned by the increase, in various regions of the world, of acts of terrorism 
motivated by intolerance or extremism,  
Calling on States to work together urgently to prevent and suppress terrorist acts, including 
through increased cooperation and full implementation of the relevant international 
conventions relating to terrorism,  
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Recognizing the need for States to complement international cooperation by taking 
additional measures to prevent and suppress, in their territories through all lawful means, the 
financing and preparation of any acts of terrorism,  
Reaffirming the principle established by the General Assembly in its declaration of October 
1970 (resolution 2625 (XXV)) and reiterated by the Security Council in its resolution 1189 
(1998) of 13 August 1998, namely that every State has the duty to refrain from organizing, 
instigating, assisting or participating in terrorist acts in another State or acquiescing in 
organized activities within its territory directed towards the commission of such acts,  
Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,  
1. Decides that all States shall:  
(a) Prevent and suppress the financing of terrorist acts;  
(b) Criminalize the wilful provision or collection, by any means, directly or indirectly, of 
funds by their nationals or in their territories with the intention that the funds should be used, 
or in the knowledge that they are to be used, in order to carry out terrorist acts;  
(c) Freeze without delay funds and other financial assets or economic resources of persons 
who commit, or attempt to commit, terrorist acts or participate in or facilitate the commission 
of terrorist acts; of entities owned or controlled directly or indirectly by such persons; and 
of persons and entities acting on behalf of, or at the direction of such persons and entities, 
including funds derived or generated from property owned or controlled directly or indirectly 
by such persons and associated persons and entities;  
(d) Prohibit their nationals or any persons and entities within their territories from making 
any funds, financial assets or economic resources or financial or other related services 
available, directly or indirectly, for the benefit of persons who commit or attempt to commit 
or facilitate or participate in the commission of terrorist acts, of entities owned or controlled, 
directly or indirectly, by such persons and of persons and entities acting on behalf of or at 
the direction of such persons;  
2. Decides also that all States shall:  
(a) Refrain from providing any form of support, active or passive, to entities or persons 
involved in terrorist acts, including by suppressing recruitment of members of terrorist 
groups and eliminating the supply of weapons to terrorists ;  
(b) Take the necessary steps to prevent the commission of terrorist acts, including by 
provision of early warning to other States by exchange of information;  
(c) Deny safe haven to those who finance, plan, support, or commit terrorist acts, or provide 
safe havens;  
(d) Prevent those who finance, plan, facilitate or commit terrorist acts from using their 
respective territories for those purposes against other States or their citizens;  
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(e) Ensure that any person who participates in the financing, planning, preparation or 
perpetration of terrorist acts or in supporting terrorist acts is brought to justice and ensure 
that, in addition to any other measures against them, such terrorist acts are established as 
serious criminal offences in domestic laws and regulations and that the punishment duly 
reflects the seriousness of such terrorist acts;  
(f) Afford one another the greatest measure of assistance in connection with criminal 
investigations or criminal proceedings relating to the financing or support of terrorist acts, 
including assistance in obtaining evidence in their possession necessary for the proceedings;  
(g) Prevent the movement of terrorists or terrorist groups by effective border controls and 
controls on issuance of identity papers and travel documents, and through measures for 
preventing counterfeiting, forgery or fraudulent use of identity papers and travel documents;  
3. Calls upon all States to:  
(a) Find ways of intensifying and accelerating the exchange of operational information, 
especially regarding actions or movements of terrorist persons or networks; forged or 
falsified travel documents; traffic in arms, explosives or sensitive materials; use of 
communications technologies by terrorist groups; and the threat posed by the possession of 
weapons of mass destruction by terrorist groups;  
(b) Exchange information in accordance with international and domestic law and cooperate 
on administrative and judicial matters to prevent the commission of terrorist acts;  
(c) Cooperate, particularly through bilateral and multilateral arrangements and agreements, 
to prevent and suppress terrorist attacks and take action against perpetrators of such acts;  
(d) Become parties as soon as possible to the relevant international conventions and 
protocols relating to terrorism, including the International Convention for the Suppression 
of the Financing of Terrorism of 9 December 1999;  
(e) Increase cooperation and fully implement the relevant international conventions and 
protocols relating to terrorism and Security Council resolutions 1269 (1999) and 1368 
(2001);  
(f) Take appropriate measures in conformity with the relevant provisions of national and 
international law, including international standards of human rights, before granting refugee 
status,for the purpose of ensuring that the asylum-seeker has not planned, facilitated or 
participated in the commission of terrorist acts;  
(g) Ensure, in conformity with international law, that refugee status is not abused by the 
perpetrators, organizers or facilitators of terrorist acts, and that claims of political motivation 
are not recognized as grounds for refusing requests for the extradition of alleged terrorists;  
4. Notes with concern the close connection between international terrorism and transnational 
organized crime, illicit drugs, money-laundering, illegal arms-trafficking, and illegal 
movement of nuclear, chemical, biological and other potentially deadly materials, and in this 
regard emphasizes the need to enhance coordination of efforts on national, subregional, 
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regional and international levels in order to strengthen a global response to this serious 
challenge and threat to international security;  
5. Declares that acts, methods, and practices of terrorism are contrary to the purposes and 
principles of the United Nations and that knowingly financing, planning and inciting terrorist 
acts are also contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations;  
6. Decides to establish, in accordance with rule 28 of its provisional rules of procedure, a 
Committee of the Security Council, consisting of all the members of the Council, to monitor 
implementation of this resolution, with the assistance of appropriate expertise, and calls 
upon all States to report to the Committee, no later than 90 days from the date of adoption 
of this resolution and thereafter according to a timetable to be proposed by the Committee, 
on the steps they have taken to implement this resolution;  
7. Directs the Committee to delineate its tasks, submit a work programme within 30 days of 
the adoption of this resolution, and to consider the support it requires, in consultation with 
the Secretary-General;  
8. Expresses its determination to take all necessary steps in order to ensure the full 
implementation of this resolution, in accordance with its responsibilities under the Charter;  
9. Decides to remain seized of this matter.  
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Annex: 5 
 
Council of Europe Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms as amended by Protocols No. 11 and No. 14 
Rome, 4.XI.1950 
Text of the Convention as amended by its Protocol No. 14 (CETS No. 194) as from the date 
of its entry into force on 1 June 2010. 
The text of the Convention had been previously amended according to the provisions of 
Protocol No. 3 (ETS No. 45), which entered into force on 21 September 1970, of Protocol 
No. 5 (ETS No. 55), which entered into force on 20 December 1971 and of Protocol No. 8 
(ETS No. 118), which entered into force on 1 January 1990, and comprised also the text of 
Protocol No. 2 (ETS No. 44) which, in accordance with Article 5, paragraph 3 thereof, had 
been an integral part of the Convention since its entry into force on 21 September 1970. All 
provisions which had been amended or added by these Protocols were replaced by Protocol 
No. 11 (ETS No. 155), as from the date of its entry into force on 1 November 1998. As from 
that date, Protocol No. 9 (ETS No. 140), which entered into force on 1 October 1994, was 
repealed and Protocol No. 10 (ETS no. 146) had lost its purpose. 
Article 10 – Freedom of expression  
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to 
hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by 
public authority and regardless of frontiers. This article shall not prevent States from 
requiring the licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema enterprises.  
2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may 
be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by 
law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, 
territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the 
protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for 
preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the 
authority and impartiality of the judiciary.  
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Annex: 6 
 
Article 5 of the Washington Treaty 
The decision: On 12 September, NATO decided that, if it is determined that the attack 
against the United States was directed from abroad, it shall be regarded as an action covered 
by Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. This is the first time in the Alliance's history that 
Article 5 has been invoked.  
Article 5 of the Washington Treaty:                                                                                    
The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North 
America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if 
such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective 
self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the 
Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other 
Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and 
maintain the security of the North Atlantic area. Any such armed attack and all measures 
taken as a result thereof shall immediately be reported to the Security Council. Such 
measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary 
to restore and maintain international peace and security.  
NATO's Strategic Concept recognises the risks to the Alliance posed by terrorism. 
What does Article 5 mean?  
Article 5 is at the basis of a fundamental principle of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. 
It provides that if a NATO Ally is the victim of an armed attack, each and every other 
member of the Alliance will consider this act of violence as an armed attack against all 
members and will take the actions it deems necessary to assist the Ally attacked. This is the 
principle of collective defence.  
Article 5 and the case of the terrorist attacks against the United States: 
The United States has been the object of brutal terrorist attacks. It immediately consulted 
with the other members of the Alliance. The Alliance determined that the US had been the 
object of an armed attack. The Alliance therefore agreed that if it was determined that this 
attack was directed from abroad, it would be regarded as covered by Article 5. NATO 
Secretary General, Lord Robertson, subsequently informed the Secretary-General of the 
United Nations of the Alliance's decision.  
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Article 5 has thus been invoked, but no determination has yet been made whether the attack 
against the United States was directed from abroad. If such a determination is made, each 
Ally will then consider what assistance it should provide. In practice, there will be 
consultations among the Allies. Any collective action by NATO will be decided by the North 
Atlantic Council. The United States can also carry out independent actions, consistent with 
its rights and obligations under the UN Charter.  
Allies can provide any form of assistance they deem necessary to respond to the situation. 
This assistance is not necessarily military and depends on the material resources of each 
country. Each individual member determines how it will contribute and will consult with the 
other members, bearing in mind that the ultimate aim is to "to restore and maintain the 
security of the North Atlantic area".  
By invoking Article 5, NATO members have shown their solidarity toward the United States 
and condemned, in the strongest possible way, the terrorist attacks against the United States 
on 11 September. If the conditions are met for the application of Article 5, NATO Allies will 
decide how to assist the United States. (Many Allies have clearly offered emergency 
assistance). Each Ally is obliged to assist the United States by taking forward, individually 
and in concert with other Allies, such action as it deems necessary. This is an individual 
obligation on each Ally and each Ally is responsible for determining what it deems necessary 
in these particular circumstances. No collective action will be taken by NATO until further 
consultations are held and further decisions are made by the the North Atlantic Council. 
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Recommendation 1534 (2001)[1] 
Democracies facing terrorism 
 
1. The Parliamentary Assembly refers to its Resolution 1258 (2001) on democracies 
facing terrorism.  
2. It strongly condemns all forms of terrorism as a violation of the most fundamental 
human right: the right to life.  
3. It takes note of the declaration by the Committee of Ministers of 12 September 2001 
and welcomes its decision of 21 September 2001 to include the fight against terrorism 
in the agenda for the 109th Session of the Committee of Ministers (7 and 8 November 
2001).  
4. The Assembly regards the new International Criminal Court as the appropriate 
institution to consider international acts of terrorism.  
5. The Assembly urges the Committee of Ministers to:  
i. ask those member states who have not yet done so to sign and ratify the existing 
relevant anti-terrorist conventions, especially the International Convention for the 
Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism;  
ii. invite member states to lift their reservations to anti-terrorist conventions, which 
hinder international co-operation;  
iii. ensure the full implementation of all existing Council of Europe conventions in the 
penal field;  
iv. request those member and Observer states that have not done so to sign and ratify, 
as rapidly as possible, the Treaty of Rome, which provides for the establishment of 
the International Criminal Court;  
v. make it possible for Observer and non-member states to accede to the European 
Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism at its 109th Ministerial Session, nd invite 
them, as well as those member states who have not yet signed and/or ratified this 
convention, to do so at this session;  
vi. establish immediate, concrete and formal co-operation with the European Union, the 
OSCE and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) on the basis of the 
Council of Europe?s values and legal instruments, in order to guarantee coherence 
and efficiency in Europe?s action against terrorism;  
vii. ask member states to review their education programmes in order to enhance the 
role of democratic values, as children and the younger generation are often used by 
the terrorists to achieve their aims;  
viii. reconsider the basis of international co-operation in criminal matters in Europe, in 
order to find new and more effective means of co-operation which take account of 
present-day realities and needs;  
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ix. extend the terms of reference of the Committee of Experts on the Criminalisation of 
Acts of a Racist or Xenophobic Nature Committed Through Computer Networks (PC-
RX) to terrorist messages and the decoding thereof;  
x. as regards the European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism, remove as a 
matter of urgency Article 13, which grants contracting states the right to make 
reservations which can defeat the purpose of the convention by enabling the states 
to refuse extradition for offences otherwise extraditable;  
xi. give urgent consideration to amending and widening the Rome Statute to allow the 
remit of the International Criminal Court to include acts of international terrorism;  
xii. review the relevant existing conventions in the light of the recent events and declare 
terrorism and all forms of support for it to be crimes against humanity.  
6. The Assembly recommends that the Committee of Ministers examine, in co-operation 
with the European Union bodies, the modalities for extending the European Union 
arrest warrant to all Council of Europe member states in the field of the fight against 
terrorism.  
7. It reiterates its Recommendation 1426 (1999) on European democracies facing up to 
terrorism and calls on the Committee of Ministers to provide a more substantial reply 
to it as a matter of urgency.  
 
[1] Assembly debate on 25 and 26 September 2001 (27th and 28th Sittings) (see Doc. 9228, report 
of the Political Affairs Committee, rapporteur: Mr Davis; and Doc. 9232, opinion of the Committee on 
Legal Affairs and Human Rights, rapporteur: Mr Jansson). 
Text adopted by the Assembly on 26 September 2001 (28th Sitting). 
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Recommendation 1584 (2002) [1]  
Need for intensified international co-operation to neutralise funds for terrorist 
purposes  
 
1. The terrorist attacks against the United States of America on 11 September 2001 
demonstrated in the most dramatic and tragic fashion the vulnerability of civilisation vis-à-
vis those seeking to destroy it, and the resulting need to take every measure to prevent 
terrorist acts and apprehend the perpetrators, organisers and sponsors, along the principles 
set out in Parliamentary Assembly Recommendation 1534 (2001) on democracies facing 
terrorism.  
2. The Assembly, referring in particular to its Recommendation 1550 (2002) on combating 
terrorism and respect for human rights, underlines the importance in this struggle of 
identifying and neutralising funds destined for terrorist purposes – an undertaking which is 
possible only if the world community, and notably Europe, reach a new degree of co-
operation at the normative, operative and implementation levels. While such an effort may 
not ensure the prevention of all terrorist acts, it can contribute significantly to weakening 
terrorist infrastructure. This is so especially if measures can neutralise terrorism’s legal 
sources of financing, which in certain cases operate under the cover of humanitarian, non-
profit or even charitable organisations. It is also necessary to prevent general criminal 
activities that often serve to finance terrorism, such as trafficking in human beings, drugs 
and weapons. The systems and measures developed over the last few years to prevent the 
laundering of proceeds from crime can, if conscientiously applied, play a significant role in 
the detection, freezing and confiscation of terrorist funds.  
3. The Assembly, with the above in mind, recommends strongly that the Committee of 
Ministers of the Council of Europe undertake the following measures:  
At the normative level  
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i. to work in favour of theratification, by all Council of Europe member states and others, of 
the totality of international legal instruments concerned with the fight against terrorism and 
its financing, and in particular the 1999 United Nations International Convention for the 
Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism; ii. to reach immediately an agreement on a 
definition of terrorism, preferably based on that adopted in December 2001 by the European 
Council of the European Union in a common position;  
iii. to render any financial activity in support of terrorism thus defined a criminal offence;  
iv. further to strengthen domestic legislation and any international convention in need 
thereof, by adapting them to new technological and other developments as well as to the 
growing sophistication of terrorists, for the purpose of successfully tracing the origin – 
whether legal or illegal – as well as the routing of funds intended for terrorist ends, with a 
view to their seizure or confiscation. The Assembly in this connection welcomes the 
Committee of Ministers’ decision taken in May 2002 that an additional protocol should be 
drawn up to the 1997European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism (ETS No. 90), 
and asks the Committee of Ministers also to envisage the possibility of adapting the Council 
of Europe Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds 
from Crime (ETS No. 141), for instance through an additional protocol; 
At the operative level  
v. to intensify co-operation between national administration, police forces, courts, financial 
institutions, regulatoryand other authorities in order to uncover suspicious international 
transactions and thereby reach the organisations and individuals behind them. The 
Assembly in this context welcomes the creation in 2001 of EuroJust and supports decisions 
taken to widen the mandates of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) and the Council of 
Europe’s Select Committee of Experts on the Evaluation of Anti-Money Laundering 
Measures (PC-R-EV), to include also the detection of terrorism financing and welcomes in 
addition the establishment within Europol of an international terrorism task force dealing 
also with its financial aspects;  
At the level of monitoring implementation  
vi. to ensure that international conventions and other agreements against terrorism 
financing are effectively implemented in Council of Europe member states and other 
participating states – notably by strengthening the mandates and increasing the resourcesof 
the FATF and other competent bodies such as the PC-R-EV, and by rendering public any 
national shortcoming so as to increase pressure for remedial action;  
vii. finally, the Assembly reiterates its belief, as expressed notably in its Resolution 1271 
(2002) on combating terrorism and respect for human rights, that the fight against terrorism 
must never be allowed to harm the Council of Europe’s fundamental values of democracy, 
the rule of law and human rights – including the provisions of the European Convention on 
Human Rights and the prohibition of the death penalty it upholds. 
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[1]. Text adopted by the Standing Committee, acting on behalf of the Assembly, on 18 November 
2002 (see Doc. 9520, report of the Committee on Economic Affairs and Development, rapporteur: 
Mr Marty).  
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IFJ 'Journalism in the shadows of terror laws' 
 
Journalists need to claim back their role in the discourse about terrorism and refuse to remain 
side-lined by the rhetoric of national security which has been used to stifle scrutiny of 
governments' policies following the 9/11 attacks in the US. The call was made at the opening 
of the Anti-Terror laws Conference organised by the International Federation of Journalists 
(IFJ) and its European group, the Federation of European Journalists (EFJ).Leading 
journalists and human rights advocates told the conference that legislation enacted in the 
aftermath of the attacks as part of the war on terror has had a chilling effect on journalism in 
many countries, allowing governments to evade public scrutiny.    
"The role of media as democracy watchdog has been chipped away even in advanced 
democracies," said IFJ President, Jim Boumelha in his opening remarks. "Restrictions of 
press freedom have been introduced under the cloak of national security."   The conference 
was told that anti-terror laws have empowered governments' law enforcement agencies to 
conduct surveillance on journalists, some of whom have been compelled to reveal their 
sources, produced records and faced charges for publishing information alleged prejudicial 
to national security.   This new media environment has limited journalists' ability to report 
independently on issues related to terrorism. "There has been unwillingness to report on the 
governments' policies out of fear of being on the wrong side," said Arne König, EFJ 
President.     
John Nichols, American journalist and author, said that journalism in the US after the attacks 
was reduced to row information complemented by political commentary from ‘talking heads' 
with vested political interests.  Human rights experts urge governments to address the 
challenge to fight terrorism while remaining true to the core values of respect for rule of law 
and fundamental human rights.  "The language of war on terror has made easier for 
governments to introduce measures which repress media freedom and fundamental rights," 
said Mary Robinson, former President of Ireland and former UN High Commissioner for 
Human Rights. "The anti-terror legislation after 9/11 has undermined journalistic integrity and 
discouraged critical voices." 
   The war on terror has also increased the risks to journalists who face arrests and 
kidnappings while covering conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq. Hervé Ghesquière, the French 
                                                          
 
238 Appendix 
 
 
reporter for France 3 TV and former hostage in Afghanistan said that the work of journalists 
who cover wars waged against terror has become very difficult, including for those who are 
embedded with combat troops as their independence is compromised.  "There can be no 
press freedom without a secure environment," added Dunja Mijatovic, OSCE High 
Representative for Media Freedom." There is a risk of the rule of law being replaced by the 
rule of fear."   
Annex: 10 
 
Declaration Adopted by IFJ/EFJ Conference on ‘Journalism 
In the Shadow of Terror Laws’ 
The international conference organised by the International Federation (IFJ) and the 
European Federation of Journalists (EFJ) on ‘Journalism in the Shadow of Anti-Terror Laws’ 
has concluded today in Brussels by calling for a review of anti–terror legislation which 
undermines journalists’ independence. 
The following is the Declaration which was adopted after two days of debates on the impact 
of anti-terror legislation on journalism following the 9/11 attacks in America: 
We, the participants at the IFJ/EFJ Conference “10 years after 9/11, Journalism in the 
Shadow of Terror Laws”, held in Brussels on 10th-11th September, 
Noting that since the September 11th terrorist attacks on the United States, the response 
by governments to the threat of terrorism had been massively disproportionate, resulting in 
 Fundamental rights being routinely violated and undermined, 
·    A raft of mass surveillance measures targeting journalists and media organisations 
being introduced, 
·    Laws and regulations that undermine almost half of the minimum standards set out 
in the 1948 UN Universal Declaration on Human Rights being enacted by 
governments, often in the absence of scrutiny and debate, and 
·   Media and independent journalism suffering in a “pervasive atmosphere of paranoia” 
which is leading to dangerous levels of self-censorship, 
Recognising that these laws, when adopted in democratic states, are used by authoritarian 
regimes to reinforce their oppressive systems, and in most instances have served to restrict 
dissent inside and outside media and to curtail free speech, 
Believing that all forms of indiscriminate violence and terrorism are unacceptable and 
threaten journalism and press freedom, 
Concerned that the majority of counter-terrorism measures adopted by states over the past 
decade have helped usher in a ‘surveillance society’ with new high-tech forms of 
‘dataveillance’ been used to monitor journalists’ activities, with spies and undercover agents 
been active in newsrooms, and with phones and computers been tapped and movements 
recorded, 
Rejecting the message that fundamental rights can be sacrificed to fight terrorism and 
further concerned that ‘national security’ interest continues to enable governments to 
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withhold information or override the constitutional and legal protections that should be 
afforded to citizens, journalists and whisteblowers alike,  
DECLARE 
1. That governments must not sacrifice civil liberties under the pretext of security; 
2. That all counter-terrorism and national security laws, among them those hastily enacted 
immediately after September 11, should be reviewed to ensure compliance with 
international human rights and freedom of expression norms and prevent the misuse of anti-
terror laws against journalists; 
3. That mandatory data retention regimes must be repealed, and that restrictions and 
controls on the use of surveillance powers and new security technologies, as well as robust 
new mechanisms to protect personal privacy be established; 
4. That journalists and editors must maintain editorial independence and guard against self-
censorship, and that media need more than ever to be active in the scrutiny of the actions 
of government; 
5. That independent journalism’s vital role in investigating and exposing the impact of 
changes in national and global security policy on society at large is crucial to the future of 
democratic society; 
6. That independent organisation of journalists in unions and associations is an essential 
safeguard for press freedom, self-regulation and editorial independence; 
7. That all forms of violence against media and targeting of media workers are completely 
unacceptable; 
8. That all restrictions on journalists’ freedom of movement, pressure on them to reveal 
sources of information, and manipulation of media by political leaders on security issues 
are unacceptable, 
9. That the IFJ/EFJ should 
a) Strengthen their campaign among journalists’ unions everywhere to raise 
awareness of security policies and their impact on the right to report, 
b) Reiterate IFJ policy on the importance of pluralism, diversity, press freedom and 
open government at national and international level, and the need for tolerance in 
journalism, as adopted at the Bilbao international conference in 1997, and reiterated 
in 2005, 
c) Build the wider coalition with other trades unions, human rights campaigners, 
employers, whenever appropriate, other media organisations and relevant civil 
society groups against further attacks on civil liberties and democratic rights, 
d) Advocate for the introduction of freedom of information laws that guarantee 
citizens the right of access to public information and restrict the application of 
national secrecy provisions and for the elimination of all laws that criminalise 
journalism, or restrict the protection of sources, 
e) Promote debates at national and international level on the need for professional 
vigilance, ethical conduct and improvement of journalists’ capacity to work and 
investigate without undue pressure from whatever source, and the need for 
tolerance in journalism. 
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  Adopted in Brussels on 11 September 2011 
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Comparison between the Control Orders (2005) and the TPIM (2011) 
CONTROL ORDER 2005 TPIM 2011 
Annual Renewal Permanent 
Instigated by the Home Secretary with the 
permission of High Court except in urgent 
cases 
Instigated by the Home Secretary with the 
permission of High Court except in urgent 
cases 
Made on the basis of reasonable 
suspicion of involvement in terrorism 
Made on the basis of reasonable belief of 
involvement in terrorism. 
Control orders are indefinite: renewable 
every 12 months on unlimited occasions. 
Initially for 2 years, but can be re-
imposed (on unlimited occasions) on new 
‘evidence’. 
High Court reviews an order after it is 
made; it can quash or revoke the order or 
a condition of the order on the basis the 
Home Secretary’s decision was flawed. 
High Court reviews each TPIM after it is 
made; it can quash or revoke; and may 
direct that restrictions be replaced. 
Closed proceedings and Special 
Advocates to examine secret evidence 
forming the basis of the Order, a hearing 
from which the ‘controlee’ and their 
lawyer are excluded. 
Closed proceedings and Special 
Advocates to examine secret evidence 
forming the basis of the Order, a hearing 
from which the ‘TPIM subject’ and their 
lawyer are excluded 
Made “with a view to prosecution”: 
 Home Secretary asks chief officer of 
police if there is evidence for prosecution 
before making the order. 
 Chief Officer under a duty to secure 
investigation of ‘controlee’ in order to 
prosecute. 
Made “with a view to prosecution”: 
 Home Secretary asks chief officer of 
police if there is evidence for prosecution 
before making the order. 
 Chief Officer under a duty to secure 
investigation of ‘TPIM subject’ in order 
to prosecute and report back. 
Breach of CO without reasonable excuse 
is a crime: max 5 years’ imprisonment. 
Breach of a TPIM without reasonable 
excuse is a crime: max 5 years’ 
imprisonment. 
Curfew (averaging 11.9 hours in 2010); 
electronic tagging 
Overnight residence requirement; 
electronic tagging. 
Restrictions on communication and 
association. 
Restrictions on communication and 
association 
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Prohibited and vetted visitors, banning 
from particular places, no overseas travel; 
restriction on bank accounts and more. 
Exclusion from particular places; overseas 
travel bans; restrictions on bank 
accounts and more. 
Forced relocation. 
No longer available – ruled unlawful by 
the courts. 
Table.i.Liberty Source 
